ALLEN ANDREW A. ALVAREZ (Philosophy, University of the Philippines)
"Critical thinking as arguing against oneself: IL in the
Philippines"
This paper is about informal logic education
(ILE) as practiced by the philosohy department in the leading state university
in the Philippines; how it started as well as recent developments that
highlight its main characteristics. Philippine ILE will be compared
and contrasted with dialectics as understood in informal logic. The
former's concept of "epistemic obligation to produce a counter-argument,"
for example, will be compared with that of Ralph H. Johnson's "dialectic
obligation to respond to objections."
PETER D. ASQUITH (Philosophy, Michigan State University)
"Rules, Exceptions, and the Meta-level of Informal Logic"
When attempting to instruct someone how to accomplish some task, one
way to accomplish this is to provide them with a procedure and a common
way to specify a procedure is to provide a set of rules or guidelines.
To what extent can rules serve as satisfactory meta-instructions for carrying
out the tasks of informal logic? In what ways do the differences between
formal and informal logic affect the applicability of rules to serve as
satisfactory meta-instructions?
MARK BATTERSBY (Philosophy, Capilano College)
"The Rhetoric Of Numbers: Statistical Inference As Argumentation"
In this paper I sketch an approach to understanding statistical inference
as argumentation. The approach utilizes general criteria for assessment
of arguments and evidence rather than treating statistical inference as
purely mathematical. This approach makes explicit that the mathematics
of the inference is only part of the evidence for the (frequently implicit)
claims about the populations being studied. I will also discuss a number
of concepts that can have misleading rhetorical value including "statistical
significance" and "relative risk".
CRAIG BEAM (Philosophy, University of Waterloo)
"The 'Fallacies' of Pity and Fear: Logic, Sentiment, and Ethical
Argument"
The paper attempts to bring ethical theory into dialogue with informal
logic, using the former to assess such alleged fallacies as the appeals
to pity, fear, popularity, and authority. I will argue that many traditional
accounts of these fallacies actually would bar the door to plausible modes
of ethical argument. This is due to assumptions they make about epistemology,
emotion, and authority that are ill-suited to the ethical domain.
J. ANTHONY BLAIR (Philosophy, University of Windsor)
"The Philosophy of Argument and Argumentation"
After setting out the components of the philosophy of any field or practice,
I suggest how these elements would apply in particular to argument and
argumentation-what the philosophy of argument and argumentation consists
of in general terms. I then list what seem to be the main contending candidates
to be found in the literature for each of these elements, thus showing
where conflicts need resolution or new theory is needed.
CHARLES V. BLATZ (Philosophy, The University of Toledo)
"Ethical Impartiality, An Expression Of The Spirit of Critical Thinking?"
Impartiality arguably supplies a large part of normativity: the legitimacy
and authority of ethical guides we articulate tp direct or constrain our
actions. Further, core concerns of critical thinking (those comprising
the spirit of critical thinking) ensure conditions of thought sufficient
for impartiality in ethics generally. After exploring the specifics
and limitations of this claim, I suggest how to extend this approach to
relate impartiality of critical thought and normativity in different domains
of ethics such as law and morality.
GEORGE BOGER (Philosophy, Canisius College)
"The formal logic foundation for fallacy theory"
Taking cogency to be context-relative and considering 'extra-logical'
factors essential for analyzing fallacies blurs the distinction between
ontic and epistemic matters and frustrates the project of logic to establish
objective knowledge. This paper reaffirms the ontic/epistemic distinction
for argument assessment by establishing the objectivity of truth, validity,
and cogency. It emphasizes the importance of the ontic notion of logical
consequence underlying intelligible discourse. By clarifying a notion of
fallacy it shows how formal logic underpins a sound fallacy theory.
CHRIS CAMPOLO (Department of Philosophy, Hendrix College)
"Treacherous ascents: on seeking common ground for conflict
resolution"
Competent reasoners know when exchanging reasons is not the best way
to figure out how to "go on together." In this paper I argue that we endanger
this competence -- along with other reasoning skills -- when we adopt the
policy of ascending to levels of greater generality with the aim of identifying
shared values or interests which can serve as common resources to be exploited
in the reasoned resolution of conflicts.
HOON CHOI (Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University)
"The Ad Hominem Argument in Korean Political Discourse"
In this paper, I evaluate the ad hominem arguments in Korean political
discourse as reasonable or fallacious and argue that those arguments are
not so fallacious as they could be. To fulfill that aim, I use the method
to consider the definite political and historical contexts in which the
arguments are provided and examine the relevancy of personal characters
or circumstances to the main points.
DANIEL H. COHEN (Philosophy, Colby College)
"Just War Theory and Unjust Argument Theory"
Despite its problems, the metaphor of arguments-as-war remains alive
and fertile. Things can still be gleaned from looking at arguments through
the lens provided by the cluster of concepts that constitute our understanding
of war. This paper explores one particular extension of that paradigm by
asking whether there are Just and Unjust Arguments, just as there are Just
and Unjust Wars. The analogy between wars and arguments quickly breaks
down, but not before some morals can be drawn.
ANTON COLIJN (Computer Science, University of Calgary)
"Arguments from Risk"
Important issues raise questions: have the risks implied been addressed
sensibly, or has the audience been subjected to bias and sloganeering?
Many issues - weapons of mass destruction, global climate change - demand
careful scrutiny, and selective attention may be cynically exploited. It
is always tempting to put short-term problems ahead of longer-term goals.
I intend to explore cases where risks may not have been explored fairly,
and where broader risk analysis may make a significant contribution to
understanding critical situations.
PAMELA COURTNAY-HALL (Philosophy, University of Prince Edward Island)
"Cultural Diversity, and the Ethics of Teaching"
Despite improvements in the 1990s, I argue that more needs
to be said in CT
theory and in CT classrooms concerning the limits of human
inquiry, the
epistemological constraints posed by our own social and
cultural
standpoints, and the ethical concerns that need to be
kept in mind in any
effort to teach for critical thinking. I share the
experiences I had in a
graduate epistemology course, where the dynamics of epistemological
negotiation in the classroom took a paradoxical turn.
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN and PETER HOUTLOSSER (Speech Communication, Argumentation
Theory, and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)
"New developments in pragma-dialectics"
In the past five years, van Eemeren and Houtlosser have developed a
theoretical conception of strategic maneuvering aimed at reconciling dialectical
objectives and rhetorical aims. Recently, they have set out to use their
conception of strategic maneuvering to achieve a refinement of the pragma-dialectical
conceptualization of fallacies and to formulate criteria that can be used
to identify fallacies in actual argumentative practice. In this paper they
report on the latest developments in the continuation of this project.
EVELINE T. FETERIS (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric,
University of Amsterdam)
"Arguments from Unacceptable Consequences and a Reasonable
Application of
Law"
Judges often use arguments in which
they appeal to 'reasonableness' to justify their decision. They argue
that application of a legal rule in a concrete case would lead to
an unacceptable result from the perspective of a reasonable application
of law because the result would be incompatible with the goal the rule
is intended to realize. I will reconstruct arguments from unacceptable
consequences and specifiy under what conditions they are an acceptable
way of justifying a legal decision.
MÉLANIE FRAPPIER (Philosophy, University of Western Ontario)
"Dialectic in Heisenberg's Microscope Thought Experiment"
Heisenberg's 1927 microscope thought experiment is usually understood
as a mere illustration of the validity of quantum physics. I argue that,
in fact, it is part of a dialectic argument in favor of the adoption of
the uncertainty relations as a fundamental principle of physics. More generally,
this particular example shows why dialectic is essential in the establishment
of new scientific principles. No scientific background is assumed in this
talk.
JAMES B. FREEMAN (Philosophy, Hunter College of The City University
of New York)
"Progress Without Regress on the Dialectical Tier"
Johnson has maintained that arguments must possess a dialectical tier,
addressing alternatives and objections. Govier finds Johnson's view leads
to an infinite regress and raises the problem of how many alternatives
need be addressed. Considering all is generally impractical. If one considers
only some, which ones? We hold that Rescher's notion of formal disputation
indicates that we may avoid the infinite regress and how we may settle
the discrimination problem through the notions of presumption and burden
of proof.
MICHAEL A. GILBERT (Philosophy, York University)
"Is it an argument? In defense of the linguistically inexplicable"
I have argued that language is inherently resistant to direct unambiguous
and non-controversial interpretation and translation. These arguments are
taken to justify my use of events, emotions, and non-translatable non-discursive
communications as components, i.e., premisses and/or conclusions, in argumentation.
Here I seek to defend my conclusion by showing that it is both impossible
and unreasonable to demand that all enthymematic components in an argument
be linguistically explicable.
DAVID GODDEN (Philosophy, McMaster University)
"Reconstruction and Representation: Deductivism as an Interpretative
Strategy"
Argument evaluation presupposes an interpretation (reconstruction).
It may be asked, then, whether an argument reconstruction is representative
of the argumentative material transacted in the relevant situated argumentative
exchange. Further, any failure of the reconstructive project occasions
a failure of the evaluative project. The paper considers the interpretative
strategy of Reconstructive Deductivism, asking: Does a commitment to a
particular set of normative standards influence the descriptive project
of reconstruction? If so: How? What are the consequences? And, is this
situation avoidable?
G. C. GODDU (Philosophy, University of Richmond)
"The Context of An Argument"
Firstly, I shall articulate some general features that contexts must
have given the functions they must serve, especially with regards to evaluation.
Secondly, I shall evaluate several proposals including (a) some proper
subset of the propositions held by the arguer and the intended audience;
(b) Terrance Parsons' 'the setting of the argument'; and (c) the set of
Relevant Alternatives as adapted from Contextualist theories of justification
for knowledge claims.
JEAN GOODWIN (English, Iowa State University)
"Manifestly adequate premises"
I will argue that manifest adequacy, not audience acceptance, is the
"rhetorical" or normative-pragmatic standard for assessing the premises
of arguments. After reviewing the role that manifestness plays in contemporary
theories of communication, I'll explicate some strategies arguers use to
make their premises manifestly adequate. And I will close by considering
why manifestness is indeed a normative standard, not merely a desideratum
for effectiveness. Why are manifestly adequate premises good?
TRUDY GOVIER
"Relevance, Emotion, and Consolation Arguments"
In Consolation Arguments, B tries to console A, arguing that C has suffered
as badly as A or worse. One might claim here: (1) Irrelevance (C's state
no bearing on A's); (2) Positive relevance (C's situation puts A's in perspective;
and (3) Negative relevance (C's state indicates that things are worse than
A might have thought). The paper considers several accounts of emotion
and belief, and relevance as treated by the pragma-dialectical school,
Douglas Walton, and the author.
CLAUDE GRATTON (Philosophy, University of Nevada, Las Vegas)
"Using Counterexamples to Estimate Degrees of Support"
I distinguish two kinds of counterexamples used against the validity
of arguments, and describe the logical differences between them. I use
elementary probability theory to justify extending the use of one of these
counterexamples to estimate the degree of premise support that is less
than conclusive, and to discuss some of the logical and practical problems
of that expanded use. I then propose some ways of teaching how to construct
and evaluate these counterexamples.
ALAN GROSS (Rhetoric, University of Minnesota -- Twin Cities)
"Scientific Diagrams as Argument: The Example of Darwin"
The single diagram in Darwin's Origin of Species is little commented
upon as a vehicle for argument. This neglect is perhaps due to the relentless
focus of philosophers of science on sentences and their underlying propositions.
To help compensate for this neglect, I place Darwin's diagram in three
contexts: the history of scientific diagrams from a Heideggerian perspective,
the part the diagram plays in Darwin's "one long argument," and its place
in the evolution of Darwin's evolutionary theory.
MARCELLO GUARINI (Philosophy, University of Windsor)
"Connectionist Coherence and Moral Reasoning"
Paul Thagard has developed a computational model of moral reasoning
that he claims overcomes some of the traditional problems of moral theory.
Concerns with the preceding will be examined. First, there are problems
associated with how to weigh the importance of the different types of coherences
that make up the overall metacoherence in moral reasoning. Second, it will
be shown that Thagard's approach is overly sensitive to the manner in which
data are presented.
JOSEFINA GUZMÁN (National Autonomous University of México)
"Argumentation and advertising: Multimodality and cultural
semiotics"
Advertising uses popular music, idioms, colors and religious objects
to "naturalize" arguments. The referred topoï facilitate the acceptation
of the message of buying a product without questioning anything. The discursive
and semiotic strategies go form emotion to visual suggestion permitting
to globalize stereotypes and desires of the consumers. We will try to approach
this analysis of arguments and topoï in advertising from the point
of view of Lotman's cultural semiotics and Gilbert's multimodal approach
to argumentation.
HANS V. HANSEN (Philosophy, University of Windsor)
"Theories of Presumption and Burden of Proof"
I propose to consider the possibility that there are alternative theories
of presumption and burden of proof, and to compare competing 'theories'
according to their views on what presumptions and burdens are, the principles
whereby they are assigned, the conditions whereby one gains a presumption
or discharges a burden, and what is required to shift a burden of proof.
Especially the views of Richard Whately, Alfred Sidgwick and Pragma-Dialectics
are considered.
RANDY HARRIS (English, University of Waterloo)
"Rhetoric and the incommensurability of values."
Feyerabend and Kuhn, borrowed a word from geometry and extended it to
scientific theories, which they claimed might be like incommensurable numbers
and have no common measure. Maybe, but incommensurability has since dilated
even further to the point where cultures, religions, and systems of ethics
are held to be incommensurable. The metaphor snaps. Outside of mathematical
formalisms--in the flexible semantics of ordinary language-- the resources
of rhetoric ensure that the possibilities for common measures are never
foreclosed.
DONALD L. HATCHER (Center for Critical Thinking, Baker University)
"The Role of Personal Values in Argument Evaluation"
This paper argues that, in spite of honest attempts at being objective
when evaluating arguments, there is often a strong subjective element that
determines which position appears to be most "reasonable." That is, in
many cases, the weight given to any specific reason in the overall argument
is a function of an individual's personal values or preferences. The paper
then suggests ways to minimize the force of such subjective influences
in argument evaluation.
DAVID HITCHCOCK, (Philosophy, McMaster University)
"Computer-assisted instruction and multiple-choice testing
in critical thinking: how effective?"
This study investigates the effectiveness of replacing tutorials in
large classes in critical thinking with computer-based self-tutoring exercises
and of using exclusively multiple-choice testing. On a standardized test
of critical thinking skills, administered at the beginning and end of such
a course, students gained on average about half a standard deviation. This
gain is greater than those reported for one-semester courses taught in
a traditional format, but less than those reported for a combination of
computer-assisted instruction with written assignments.
JOHN HOAGLUND (Center for Critical Thinking, Christopher Newport University)
"Truth in Informal Logic"
A formally valid deductive argument transfers the truth of its premises
to its conclusion. Informal logicians abandon truth along with truth functionality
and discuss premises in terms of reliability, sufficiency, adequacy. Ralph
Johnson recently pointed out that adequate premises must be logically consistent:
capable of being true together. So informal logic must consider truth as
a property of statements. Here I investigate both the concept of truth
needed and its further potential for informal logic.
BRIAN HUSS
"Being Careful With Paralogisms: Pedagogical Concerns About
Informal Fallacies"
The way in which informal fallacies are typically presented both by
instructors and by textbooks very often leads to a misunderstanding about
what does and does not count as a fallacy. I catalogue some informal fallacies
which are particularly problematic in this regard and suggest some precautions
which should be taken when presenting informal fallacies to students. The
ad populum, ad hominem, tu quoque, slippery slope, appeal to authority,
and genetic fallacies are considered.
DALE JACQUETTE (Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University)
"Socrates on Rhetoric, Truth, And Courtroom Argumentation in
Plato's Apology"
On trial for his life in Plato's Apology, Socrates appears to sharply
divide philosophy and rhetoric, with a decisive preference expressed for
philosophy over and above the sophistry of rhetorical devices that may
seem to disguise and preclude the truth in the effort to persuade an audience.
Closer examination, however, reveals that Socrates' arguments, including
his rational justification of the philosophical quest for truth, can be
understood as itself a disarming and complex polemical strategy.
RALPH H. JOHNSON (Philosophy, University of Windsor)
“Why Visual Arguments aren’t Arguments”
Several authors (Blair, Groarke, Gilbert, Shelley, Slade, etc.)
have
defended the view that there are visual arguments. I examine
some of the
arguments (principally Groarke’s) that there are visual arguments
and
then I raise a series of objections to and criticisms of that position,
and
suggest why some skepticism is warranted. I go on to look at
the broader
issues, why they matter in informal logic, and where the discussion
might
go next.
RALPH H. JOHNSON & J. ANTHONY BLAIR (Philosophy, University of Windsor)
"Informal Logic 25 Years On: A Retrospective"
An overview of the work done in informal logic in the last 25 years.
An account the original project is followed by a survey of the theoretical
and the pedagogical developments and achievements of the past 25 years’
work, a response to some criticisms of informal logic, some reflections
on the impact of informal logic, and finally our list of pressing research
and practical problems that informal logic faces.
TAEDA JOVICIC (Philosophy, University of Groningen)
"Static and dynamic aspects in argument evaluation"
In recent theories of argumentation, the variety of aspects important
in argumentation analysis is pointed out. Still, it seems that the authors
of these theories neglect that variety when suggesting the principles of
argument evaluation. In this article, I try to distinguish between what
I call the static and dynamic aspects of argumentation. At the same time,
the principles and the criteria of argument evaluation sutiable for taking
into account these static and dynamic aspects are introduced.