ALLEN ANDREW A. ALVAREZ (Philosophy, University of the Philippines)

   "Critical thinking as arguing against oneself: IL in the Philippines"

     This paper is about informal logic education (ILE) as practiced by the philosohy department in the leading state university in the Philippines; how it started as well as recent developments that highlight its main characteristics.  Philippine ILE will be compared and contrasted with dialectics as understood in informal logic.  The former's concept of "epistemic obligation to produce a counter-argument," for example, will be compared with that of Ralph H. Johnson's "dialectic obligation to respond to objections."
 
 

PETER D. ASQUITH (Philosophy, Michigan State University)

"Rules, Exceptions, and the Meta-level of Informal Logic"

When attempting to instruct someone how to accomplish some task, one way to accomplish this is to provide them with a procedure and a common way to specify a procedure is to provide a set of rules or guidelines. To what extent can rules serve as satisfactory meta-instructions for carrying out the tasks of informal logic? In what ways do the differences between formal and informal logic affect the applicability of rules to serve as satisfactory meta-instructions?

 

MARK BATTERSBY (Philosophy, Capilano College)

"The Rhetoric Of Numbers: Statistical Inference As Argumentation"

In this paper I sketch an approach to understanding statistical inference as argumentation. The approach utilizes general criteria for assessment of arguments and evidence rather than treating statistical inference as purely mathematical. This approach makes explicit that the mathematics of the inference is only part of the evidence for the (frequently implicit) claims about the populations being studied. I will also discuss a number of concepts that can have misleading rhetorical value including "statistical significance" and "relative risk".

 

CRAIG BEAM (Philosophy, University of Waterloo)

"The 'Fallacies' of Pity and Fear: Logic, Sentiment, and Ethical Argument"

The paper attempts to bring ethical theory into dialogue with informal logic, using the former to assess such alleged fallacies as the appeals to pity, fear, popularity, and authority. I will argue that many traditional accounts of these fallacies actually would bar the door to plausible modes of ethical argument. This is due to assumptions they make about epistemology, emotion, and authority that are ill-suited to the ethical domain.

 

J. ANTHONY BLAIR (Philosophy, University of Windsor)

"The Philosophy of Argument and Argumentation"

After setting out the components of the philosophy of any field or practice, I suggest how these elements would apply in particular to argument and argumentation-what the philosophy of argument and argumentation consists of in general terms. I then list what seem to be the main contending candidates to be found in the literature for each of these elements, thus showing where conflicts need resolution or new theory is needed.
 
 

CHARLES V. BLATZ (Philosophy, The University of Toledo)

"Ethical Impartiality, An Expression Of The Spirit of Critical Thinking?"
 

Impartiality arguably supplies a large part of normativity: the legitimacy and authority of ethical guides we articulate tp direct or constrain our actions.  Further, core concerns of critical thinking (those comprising the spirit of critical thinking) ensure conditions of thought sufficient for impartiality in ethics generally.  After exploring the specifics and limitations of this claim, I suggest how to extend this approach to relate impartiality of critical thought and normativity in different domains of ethics such as law and morality.

 

GEORGE BOGER (Philosophy, Canisius College)

"The formal logic foundation for fallacy theory"

Taking cogency to be context-relative and considering 'extra-logical' factors essential for analyzing fallacies blurs the distinction between ontic and epistemic matters and frustrates the project of logic to establish objective knowledge. This paper reaffirms the ontic/epistemic distinction for argument assessment by establishing the objectivity of truth, validity, and cogency. It emphasizes the importance of the ontic notion of logical consequence underlying intelligible discourse. By clarifying a notion of fallacy it shows how formal logic underpins a sound fallacy theory.

 

CHRIS CAMPOLO (Department of Philosophy, Hendrix College)

"Treacherous ascents: on seeking common ground for conflict resolution"

Competent reasoners know when exchanging reasons is not the best way to figure out how to "go on together." In this paper I argue that we endanger this competence -- along with other reasoning skills -- when we adopt the policy of ascending to levels of greater generality with the aim of identifying shared values or interests which can serve as common resources to be exploited in the reasoned resolution of conflicts.

 

HOON CHOI (Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University)

"The Ad Hominem Argument in Korean Political Discourse"

In this paper, I evaluate the ad hominem arguments in Korean political discourse as reasonable or fallacious and argue that those arguments are not so fallacious as they could be. To fulfill that aim, I use the method to consider the definite political and historical contexts in which the arguments are provided and examine the relevancy of personal characters or circumstances to the main points.

 

DANIEL H. COHEN (Philosophy, Colby College)

"Just War Theory and Unjust Argument Theory"

Despite its problems, the metaphor of arguments-as-war remains alive and fertile. Things can still be gleaned from looking at arguments through the lens provided by the cluster of concepts that constitute our understanding of war. This paper explores one particular extension of that paradigm by asking whether there are Just and Unjust Arguments, just as there are Just and Unjust Wars. The analogy between wars and arguments quickly breaks down, but not before some morals can be drawn.

 

ANTON COLIJN (Computer Science, University of Calgary)

"Arguments from Risk"

Important issues raise questions: have the risks implied been addressed sensibly, or has the audience been subjected to bias and sloganeering? Many issues - weapons of mass destruction, global climate change - demand careful scrutiny, and selective attention may be cynically exploited. It is always tempting to put short-term problems ahead of longer-term goals. I intend to explore cases where risks may not have been explored fairly, and where broader risk analysis may make a significant contribution to understanding critical situations.
 
 

PAMELA COURTNAY-HALL (Philosophy, University of Prince Edward Island)

   "Cultural Diversity, and the Ethics of Teaching"

   Despite improvements in the 1990s, I argue that more needs to be said in CT
   theory and in CT classrooms concerning the limits of human inquiry, the
   epistemological constraints posed by our own social and cultural
   standpoints, and the ethical concerns that need to be kept in mind in any
   effort to teach for critical thinking.  I share the experiences I had in a
   graduate epistemology course, where the dynamics of epistemological
   negotiation in the classroom took a paradoxical turn.

 

FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN and PETER HOUTLOSSER (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)

"New developments in pragma-dialectics"

In the past five years, van Eemeren and Houtlosser have developed a theoretical conception of strategic maneuvering aimed at reconciling dialectical objectives and rhetorical aims. Recently, they have set out to use their conception of strategic maneuvering to achieve a refinement of the pragma-dialectical conceptualization of fallacies and to formulate criteria that can be used to identify fallacies in actual argumentative practice. In this paper they report on the latest developments in the continuation of this project.

 

EVELINE T. FETERIS (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)

"Arguments from Unacceptable Consequences and a Reasonable Application of 
   Law"
      Judges often use arguments in which they appeal to 'reasonableness' to justify their decision.  They argue that application of a legal rule in a  concrete case would lead to an unacceptable result from the perspective of a reasonable application of law because the result would be incompatible with the goal the rule is intended to realize.  I will reconstruct arguments from unacceptable consequences and specifiy under what conditions they are an acceptable way of justifying a legal decision.

MÉLANIE FRAPPIER (Philosophy, University of Western Ontario)

"Dialectic in Heisenberg's Microscope Thought Experiment"

Heisenberg's 1927 microscope thought experiment is usually understood as a mere illustration of the validity of quantum physics. I argue that, in fact, it is part of a dialectic argument in favor of the adoption of the uncertainty relations as a fundamental principle of physics. More generally, this particular example shows why dialectic is essential in the establishment of new scientific principles. No scientific background is assumed in this talk.

 

JAMES B. FREEMAN (Philosophy, Hunter College of The City University of New York)

"Progress Without Regress on the Dialectical Tier"

Johnson has maintained that arguments must possess a dialectical tier, addressing alternatives and objections. Govier finds Johnson's view leads to an infinite regress and raises the problem of how many alternatives need be addressed. Considering all is generally impractical. If one considers only some, which ones? We hold that Rescher's notion of formal disputation indicates that we may avoid the infinite regress and how we may settle the discrimination problem through the notions of presumption and burden of proof. 

 

MICHAEL A. GILBERT (Philosophy, York University)

"Is it an argument? In defense of the linguistically inexplicable"

I have argued that language is inherently resistant to direct unambiguous and non-controversial interpretation and translation. These arguments are taken to justify my use of events, emotions, and non-translatable non-discursive communications as components, i.e., premisses and/or conclusions, in argumentation. Here I seek to defend my conclusion by showing that it is both impossible and unreasonable to demand that all enthymematic components in an argument be linguistically explicable.

 

DAVID GODDEN (Philosophy, McMaster University)

"Reconstruction and Representation: Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy"

Argument evaluation presupposes an interpretation (reconstruction). It may be asked, then, whether an argument reconstruction is representative of the argumentative material transacted in the relevant situated argumentative exchange. Further, any failure of the reconstructive project occasions a failure of the evaluative project. The paper considers the interpretative strategy of Reconstructive Deductivism, asking: Does a commitment to a particular set of normative standards influence the descriptive project of reconstruction? If so: How? What are the consequences? And, is this situation avoidable?

 

G. C. GODDU (Philosophy, University of Richmond)

"The Context of An Argument"

Firstly, I shall articulate some general features that contexts must have given the functions they must serve, especially with regards to evaluation. Secondly, I shall evaluate several proposals including (a) some proper subset of the propositions held by the arguer and the intended audience; (b) Terrance Parsons' 'the setting of the argument'; and (c) the set of Relevant Alternatives as adapted from Contextualist theories of justification for knowledge claims.

 

JEAN GOODWIN (English, Iowa State University)

"Manifestly adequate premises"

I will argue that manifest adequacy, not audience acceptance, is the "rhetorical" or normative-pragmatic standard for assessing the premises of arguments. After reviewing the role that manifestness plays in contemporary theories of communication, I'll explicate some strategies arguers use to make their premises manifestly adequate. And I will close by considering why manifestness is indeed a normative standard, not merely a desideratum for effectiveness. Why are manifestly adequate premises good?

 

TRUDY GOVIER

"Relevance, Emotion, and Consolation Arguments"

In Consolation Arguments, B tries to console A, arguing that C has suffered as badly as A or worse. One might claim here: (1) Irrelevance (C's state no bearing on A's); (2) Positive relevance (C's situation puts A's in perspective; and (3) Negative relevance (C's state indicates that things are worse than A might have thought). The paper considers several accounts of emotion and belief, and relevance as treated by the pragma-dialectical school, Douglas Walton, and the author.

 

CLAUDE GRATTON (Philosophy, University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

"Using Counterexamples to Estimate Degrees of Support"

I distinguish two kinds of counterexamples used against the validity of arguments, and describe the logical differences between them. I use elementary probability theory to justify extending the use of one of these counterexamples to estimate the degree of premise support that is less than conclusive, and to discuss some of the logical and practical problems of that expanded use. I then propose some ways of teaching how to construct and evaluate these counterexamples.

 

ALAN GROSS (Rhetoric, University of Minnesota -- Twin Cities)

"Scientific Diagrams as Argument: The Example of Darwin"

The single diagram in Darwin's Origin of Species is little commented upon as a vehicle for argument. This neglect is perhaps due to the relentless focus of philosophers of science on sentences and their underlying propositions. To help compensate for this neglect, I place Darwin's diagram in three contexts: the history of scientific diagrams from a Heideggerian perspective, the part the diagram plays in Darwin's "one long argument," and its place in the evolution of Darwin's evolutionary theory. 

 

MARCELLO GUARINI (Philosophy, University of Windsor)

"Connectionist Coherence and Moral Reasoning"

Paul Thagard has developed a computational model of moral reasoning that he claims overcomes some of the traditional problems of moral theory. Concerns with the preceding will be examined. First, there are problems associated with how to weigh the importance of the different types of coherences that make up the overall metacoherence in moral reasoning. Second, it will be shown that Thagard's approach is overly sensitive to the manner in which data are presented.

 

JOSEFINA GUZMÁN (National Autonomous University of México)

"Argumentation and advertising: Multimodality and cultural semiotics"

Advertising uses popular music, idioms, colors and religious objects to "naturalize" arguments. The referred topoï facilitate the acceptation of the message of buying a product without questioning anything. The discursive and semiotic strategies go form emotion to visual suggestion permitting to globalize stereotypes and desires of the consumers. We will try to approach this analysis of arguments and topoï in advertising from the point of view of Lotman's cultural semiotics and Gilbert's multimodal approach to argumentation.

 

HANS V. HANSEN (Philosophy, University of Windsor)

"Theories of Presumption and Burden of Proof"

I propose to consider the possibility that there are alternative theories of presumption and burden of proof, and to compare competing 'theories' according to their views on what presumptions and burdens are, the principles whereby they are assigned, the conditions whereby one gains a presumption or discharges a burden, and what is required to shift a burden of proof. Especially the views of Richard Whately, Alfred Sidgwick and Pragma-Dialectics are considered.

 

RANDY HARRIS (English, University of Waterloo)

"Rhetoric and the incommensurability of values."

Feyerabend and Kuhn, borrowed a word from geometry and extended it to scientific theories, which they claimed might be like incommensurable numbers and have no common measure. Maybe, but incommensurability has since dilated even further to the point where cultures, religions, and systems of ethics are held to be incommensurable. The metaphor snaps. Outside of mathematical formalisms--in the flexible semantics of ordinary language-- the resources of rhetoric ensure that the possibilities for common measures are never foreclosed. 

 

DONALD L. HATCHER (Center for Critical Thinking, Baker University)

"The Role of Personal Values in Argument Evaluation"

This paper argues that, in spite of honest attempts at being objective when evaluating arguments, there is often a strong subjective element that determines which position appears to be most "reasonable." That is, in many cases, the weight given to any specific reason in the overall argument is a function of an individual's personal values or preferences. The paper then suggests ways to minimize the force of such subjective influences in argument evaluation. 

 

DAVID HITCHCOCK, (Philosophy, McMaster University)

"Computer-assisted instruction and multiple-choice testing in critical thinking: how effective?"

This study investigates the effectiveness of replacing tutorials in large classes in critical thinking with computer-based self-tutoring exercises and of using exclusively multiple-choice testing. On a standardized test of critical thinking skills, administered at the beginning and end of such a course, students gained on average about half a standard deviation. This gain is greater than those reported for one-semester courses taught in a traditional format, but less than those reported for a combination of computer-assisted instruction with written assignments.

 

JOHN HOAGLUND (Center for Critical Thinking, Christopher Newport University)

"Truth in Informal Logic"

A formally valid deductive argument transfers the truth of its premises to its conclusion. Informal logicians abandon truth along with truth functionality and discuss premises in terms of reliability, sufficiency, adequacy. Ralph Johnson recently pointed out that adequate premises must be logically consistent: capable of being true together. So informal logic must consider truth as a property of statements. Here I investigate both the concept of truth needed and its further potential for informal logic.

 

BRIAN HUSS

"Being Careful With Paralogisms: Pedagogical Concerns About Informal Fallacies"

The way in which informal fallacies are typically presented both by instructors and by textbooks very often leads to a misunderstanding about what does and does not count as a fallacy. I catalogue some informal fallacies which are particularly problematic in this regard and suggest some precautions which should be taken when presenting informal fallacies to students. The ad populum, ad hominem, tu quoque, slippery slope, appeal to authority, and genetic fallacies are considered.

 

DALE JACQUETTE (Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University)

"Socrates on Rhetoric, Truth, And Courtroom Argumentation in Plato's Apology"

On trial for his life in Plato's Apology, Socrates appears to sharply divide philosophy and rhetoric, with a decisive preference expressed for philosophy over and above the sophistry of rhetorical devices that may seem to disguise and preclude the truth in the effort to persuade an audience. Closer examination, however, reveals that Socrates' arguments, including his rational justification of the philosophical quest for truth, can be understood as itself a disarming and complex polemical strategy. 
 
 
 

RALPH H. JOHNSON   (Philosophy, University of Windsor)

“Why Visual Arguments aren’t Arguments”

Several authors  (Blair, Groarke, Gilbert, Shelley, Slade, etc.) have
defended the view that there are visual arguments.  I examine some of the
arguments  (principally Groarke’s) that there are visual arguments and
then I raise a series of objections to and criticisms of that position, and
suggest why some skepticism is warranted.  I go on to look at the broader
issues, why they matter in informal logic, and where the discussion might
go next. 
 
 

RALPH H. JOHNSON & J. ANTHONY BLAIR (Philosophy, University of Windsor)

"Informal Logic 25 Years On: A Retrospective" 
 

An overview of the work done in informal logic in the last 25 years. An account the original project is followed by a survey of the theoretical and the pedagogical developments and achievements of the past 25 years’ work, a response to some criticisms of informal logic, some reflections on the impact of informal logic, and finally our list of pressing research and practical problems that informal logic faces.
 
 

TAEDA JOVICIC (Philosophy, University of Groningen)

"Static and dynamic aspects in argument evaluation"

In recent theories of argumentation, the variety of aspects important in argumentation analysis is pointed out. Still, it seems that the authors of these theories neglect that variety when suggesting the principles of argument evaluation. In this article, I try to distinguish between what I call the static and dynamic aspects of argumentation. At the same time, the principles and the criteria of argument evaluation sutiable for taking into account these static and dynamic aspects are introduced.