MICHAEL KAGAN (Philosophy, LeMoyne College)

"Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (ILCT) and Secret Writing"

In this essay, I examine secret writing, its goals and methods, basing my analysis on writings of Leo Strauss and Suzette Haden Elgin. I suggest that ILCT analyses (with their concern for audience, enthymeme, and pragmatics) can lead us toward recognizing secret writing, aiding us in the problematic task of analyzing such deliberately misleading discourse. I consider examples from Plato's Meno, Maimonides' Guide, and HaLevi's Kuzari. Concluding, I address teaching issues, and seek criticisms and suggestions.

 

JUSTIN KALEF (Philosophy, University of Victoria)

"Informal Logic and the Philosophy of Religion"

In this paper I examine the difference between the so-called 'analytic' approach and an informal logical approach in responding to some of the religious arguments of Plantinga, van Inwagen, and Shalkowski. In particular, I examine why simple informal logic seems utterly to refute these arguments, while the analytic approach seems to have a much less compelling response. I discuss the role that contingent historical factors in the development of the analytic approach may have had here.

 

FRED J. KAUFFELD (Communication Arts, Edgewood College) and JOHN FIELDS (Philosophy, Edgewood College)

"I've Something to Tell You: Veracity in Testimony and Gossip"

We offer a Gricean account of expectations regarding truthfulness in the communicative activities of testifying and gossiping. As a corrective to Coady's and Fricker's strictly functionalist accounts of testimony, we focus on what speakers do when producing testimony and gossip. Our paper argues that Stampe's pragmatic interpretation of speaker meaning finds important support in its capacity to anchor a unified account of these two contrasting modes of talk.

 

TAKUZO KONISHI (Tokai University)

"Establishing Informal Logic through Dissociation"

Recently argumentation scholars have started to examine dissociation, one of the two argumentation schemes introduced by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. In this paper, I attempt to examine a text on informal logic to see how dissociation functions in actual argumentation. Since dissociation is important to a discipline like philosophy in which scholars conceptualize ideas, and since no one has critically examined the function of dissociation in a philosophical text, my paper would advance our understanding of dissociation.

 

MARCIN KOSZOWY (Philosophy, Catholic University of Lublin, Poland)

"On the Concepts of Logical Fallacy and Logical Error"

The paper considers the question of whether the concept of logical fallacy captures all cases of "illogical moves". In order to give an answer to this question I develop the distinction between logical fallacy and logical error. I defend the thesis that the concept of logical error is much wider than that of logical fallacy and therefore it is able to fulfill better the task of describing and explaining knowledge-seeking activities and "illogical moves" within them.

 

ERIK C.W. KRABBE (Philosophy, Groningen University)

"The Pragmatics of Deductive Arguments"

Does one always need to take into account both a pragmatic and a logical level when evaluating the illative bond between premises and conclusion? Since arguments purport to be convincing, deductive validity per se is not enough. The opponent must recognize the validity and be committed to it. But if such is the case further critical questioning on the level of argumentation schemes seems out of place. What exactly is it that we need these levels for?

 

TONE KVERNBEKK (Educational Research, University of Oslo)

"Narratives as Informal Arguments"

The paper departs from Matthew Keefer's suggestion that narratives provide a model that better captures the nature of informal (practical, rhetorical) arguments than a theoretical, scientific model. I first discuss what narratives are and what they may have to offer in this context. Second, I discuss the relation between "premises" and conclusion in narratives more specifically. This relation, I believe, bears significantly on the adequacy of narratives as a possible model of informal arguments.

 

JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR (Groningen)

"The charge of ambiguity and nit-picking"

How should parties in a discussion maneuver strategically with a charge of ambiguity? Such a charge must comply with a linguistic and a relevance condition. If a charge fails to satisfy the relevance condition one may raise the counter-charge of nit-picking. Examining the ways in which we may maneuver strategically with such a charge may lead to an account of the fallacies of ambiguity and equivocation that satisfies theoretical requirements imposed by both pragma- dialectics and immanent dialectics. 

 

KIM-HUI LIM (Media and Communication Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia)

"The Concept of Informal Fallacies in the Malay Proverbs"

This paper tries to argue that the concept of informal fallacies is not only confined to the Western tradition but can also be traced from the Malay folk tradition which didn't have any prior knowledge of logic. The author identifies that most conceptions of fallacies can be found in the Malay proverbial literature, and he discusses how prohibitive types of proverbs are used just like what informal logicians use informal fallacies to caution against error in reasoning.

 

JOSEPH A. NOVAK (Philosophy, University of Waterloo)

"Substantial Syllogisms: the use of syllogism in philosophical argument"

The tendency of most logic texts to illustrate the syllogism by trite or contrived examples often leaves the student wondering how this form of reasoning could function as a significant reasoning tool. This paper will examine the incidence of syllogistic reasoning in some key philosophical figures (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, and others) in order to show the substantive use of the syllogism in expressing philosophical ideas. This could provide a base for teaching the syllogism through other stimulating philosophical arguments. 

 

A. J. OHLER (Philosophy, McMaster University)

"Looking for Rationality in Argumentation: Perelman and Johnson"

My paper explores the relationship between rationality and argumentation by discussing Perelman's extension of the concept of reason, and Johnson's call for 'manifest rationality'. I propose one way to overcome the charge of relativism levied against the appeal to the universal audience, and argue that Perelman provides support for Johnson's 'manifest rationality'. Taken together, Perelman and Johnson point to a notion of rationality in argumentation that reflects the dynamic nature of practice and products, but which also claims universality.

 

AHTI-VEIKKO PIETARINEN (Philosophy University of Helsinki)

"Dialogue Foundations and Informal Logic"

Dialogue foundations for logic comprise both informal and formal components. The informal component deals with philosophical assumptions that the use of dialogues for logical purposes takes in. The formal component studies the structure of these dialogues, not the properties of the target language to which dialogues are applied. I will examine the former, informal component, by analysing Wilfrid Hodges' recent derangement of "dialogue foundations", e.g. his mistaken view that dialogues arise as no more than a "psychological convenience".

 

DIEGO A. PINEDA (Philosophy, Xaveriana University, Bogotá)

"On 'good reasons'"

Reasonability is the ability to give, to ask, and to evaluate reasons. For this, we must make a distinction between the merely circumstantial, the explanatory and the justificatory reasons. A reason may be a good reason according to the conversational or argumentative contexts in which it is stated. "Good reasons" may be an essential notion, not only in order to understand the conversational contexts, but in order to ground an ethical reflection leading to an accurate formulation of prudential judgements. 

 

ROBERT C. PINTO (Philosophy, University of Windsor)

"The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts."

The nature of persuasion and its role in the practice of argumentation: (1) Is persuasion the attempt to induce belief?  What about attempts to persuade others to act or to feel a certain way? (2) What is the relationship between persuasion and giving reasons? (3) What must happen if presenting reasons is to issue in persuasion? (4) Are there important uses of argument that do not aim at persuasion? 

 

H. JOSÉ PLUG (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)

"Where political and legal arguments meet: reconstructing the intention of the legislator"

When judges interpret a legal rule, they may justify their interpretation by means of a historical argument. In doing so, they refer to the history of the statute, 'the legislative intention'. However, the arguments of the legislature that justify a specific statute are often difficult to identify, since most of the arguments are expressed during parliamentary debates and in explanatory memoranda. I will demonstrate how pragma-dialectical insights and legal interpretation methods may be of use for the reconstruction and evaluation of historical arguments.

 

PEDRO REYGADAS (México City University)

"Abduction, iconicity and non-discursive arguments"

Abduction is closely related to iconicity, as Peirce shows us. Words, propositions and arguments are mixtures of symbols, icons and indexes; and iconicity is the backing of an essential procedure of argumentation: the passage from the unknown to what is known. Therefore, the exclusion of the Non-Discursive of argumentation theory undermines its own foundations. That is what I will try to demonstrate and at the same time, I will develop the semiotic analysis of a visual argument in advertising.

 

PHYLLIS ROONEY (Philosophy, Oakland University, Michigan)

"Feminism and Argumentation: A Response to Govier"

In her "Feminists, Adversaries, and the Integrity of Argument" (Philosophy of Argument, 1999) Trudy Govier argues that feminist critiques of adversarial argumentation need not be critiques of argumentation per se, since it is possible (and often advisable) to argue in non-confrontational ways. Through an examination of the relationships between metaphors of war and gender metaphors (as embedded in understandings of reason and argument particularly) I argue that adversariality may be more constitutive of philosophical understandings of argument than Govier countenances. 

 

NICHOLAS SHACKEL (Philosophy, University of Nottingham)

"Rhetorical Manoeuvres: the Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology"

Many of the philosophical doctrines purveyed by post-modernists have been roundly refuted, yet people continue to be taken in by the dishonest tropes and devices used in proselytizing for postmodernism. I exhibit, name and analyse five favourite rhetorical manoeuvres: Troll's Truisms, Motte and Bailey Doctrines, Equivocating Fulcra, the Postmodernist Fox Trot and Rankly Relativising Fields of Concepts. Anyone will recognise their pervasive hold on the dialectic of postmodernism, and come to judge that dialectic as it ought to be judged. 

 

JESSICA L. SHUMAKE (Philosophy, York University)

"The Negotiation of Meaning on an Academic Mailing List"

This project is an affirmation of the necessity of voicing women's concerns about being 'flamed' or harassed when they raise or participate in topics that challenge male control of public discourse in computer-mediated communication environments. I examine a private graduate student electronic mailing list and analyze the text of the messages with an interest in how one participant's silence enables her to resist ideological frames that would otherwise render her incapable of accurately reconstructing her personal experience.

 

HARVEY SIEGEL (Philosophy, University of Miami)

"Truth, Thinking, Testimony, Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education"

In his book Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman urges that truth rather than critical thinking be viewed as the fundamental epistemic aim of education, and that reliance on testimony and trust in the classroom is epistemically central and appropriate. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that it is the fostering of critical thinking, rather than true belief, and reliance on critical thinking, rather than on testimony and trust, that is educationally fundamental. 

 

CHRISTINA SLADE (School of Creative Communication, University of Canberra)

"Critical and creative argumentation: Argumentation in classrooms: Quebec, Australia, Mexico."

This paper analyses the argumentation of children doing a philosophy of mathematics curriculum in the style of philosophy for children, as developed by Marie France Daniel of the Université de Montréal. The aim of the curriculum is to improve the thinking skills of children. This paper aims to analyse the transcripts of classroom interaction seeking to identify the hallmarks of critical and creative thinking in argumentation. The classification of critical and creative argumentation has important consequences in an educational context. 

 

A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)

"Indicators of argumentation structures"

In this paper an overview is given of expressions that provide the analyst with information about the dialogical situation anticipated by the protagonist of a point of view and can therefore serve as indicators of different types of argumentation structures. Two types of clues will be discussed: 1) clues in the verbal presentation of the arguments, and 2) clues in the (explicit) critical reactions of the opponent, that call for a further defence of the protagonist. 
 
 

JAN SOBOCAN (Faculty of Education, University of Western Ontario)

 “Teaching Informal Logic and Critical Thinking”

 It has been said that teaching critical thinking includes the teaching of a moral
 dimension, which informal logic absents. I provide reasons for showing that this
 difference is a semantic one.  Both Informal Logic and Critical Thinking are
 normative fields, with the goal of teaching students the knowledge and/or
 methodology needed to skilfully interpret and evaluate arguments. I focus on how
 reasons for belief are evaluated within these fields and argue that, essentially,
 they are the same. 

 

CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE (Philosophy, Trent University)

"The Truth About Orangutans: Defending Acceptability"

Recently, truth has made a comeback as a criterion for assessing premise adequacy. In this paper, I challenge the claim that the truth requirement, and a perspective that adopts it, is to be preferred because it is more rational (Johnson, 2000:337) by arguing (i) that a truth criterion is ill-advised because the concept behind it is both confused and not well justified; and (ii) that a truth criterion is unnecessary because the acceptability requirement is perfectly adequate and no less rational. 

 

DALE TURNER (Philosophy, California State University, Pomona)

"Tempting Mistakes: Toward a Rylean Account of Fallacies"

In this paper I will argue for a "competency treatment" of fallacies by articulating and defending the central role of temptation. Although philosophers have shied away from employing the notion of temptation in theories of fallacious reasoning, failing to come to grips with temptation is failing to come to grips with the concept of a fallacy itself; for it is the concept of temptation that grounds the normativity of the concept of a fallacy in a theoretically satisfying way.

 

MARK VOROBEJ (Philosophy, McMaster University)

"Thick cogency" 

In this paper I develop a person-relative conception of cogency according to which whether a certain argument A is cogent for a particular person P depends upon what it's rational for P to believe about A. This thick (or multi-layered) conception generates a tidy classification of ten argument types (one cogent, nine non-cogent), and it allows for non-cogent sound arguments, as well as cogent arguments with false and irrelevant premises.

 

JEAN H. M. WAGEMANS (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)

"The origin of the discord between dialectic and rhetoric."

My PhD research concentrates on the philosophical backgrounds of the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric. In order to pinpoint the discord between both disciplines, I studied their genesis and early history. In this paper, some characteristics of both disciplines will be outlined by sketching the ""invention"" of dialectic by Zeno, that of rhetoric by the Sophists, and the different ways in which Plato and Aristotle have conceived both disciplines and their relationship.

 

DOUGLAS N. WALTON (Philosophy, University of Winnipeg) and CHRIS REED (Applied Computing, University of Dundee)

"Argumentation schemes in argument-as-process and argument-as-product."

Seeing an argument as a static, fixed, product of reasoning has allowed representational models to be developed which can handle and manipulate complex argument structures. Implementing these models using artificial intelligence techniques has shown how argument-as-product representations can be used as a basis for providing structured information, for eliciting knowledge from experts, and for mediating online discussion. Here, the relationship between the argument-as-process and argument-as-product representations is explored, focussing on the roles that argumentation schemes play in the two approaches.

 

MARK WEINSTEIN (Educational Foundations, Montclair State University)

"Knowledge Structures and the Evaluation of Argument"

Robert Pinto correctly sees argumentation is 'an invitation to inference' and maintains that the evaluation of inference requires a general sense of the knowledge context within which an argument occurs. I see this as requiring theoretical development and rehearse some of my work in applied epistemology in Pinto''s terms. In particular, I indicate the outlines of a theory of inference based on an internal realist theory of truth. This is connected to a broad sense of dialectical obligation. 
 
 

JOHN WOODS (University of British Columbia and King's College,
 London) 
“A Resource-Based Approach to Fallacy Theory”

 Traditionally, a fallacy is an argument that appears to be valid but in fact
 is invalid. A further piece of the received wisdom is that a rational agent is
 one who avoids fallacies.  But truth-preservation is hardly ever what a
 rational being aims for.  I suggest a re-jigged notion that a fallacy is an
 argument that in some contextually desirable respect appears to be good,
 but is not in fact good in that respect. 

 

ROBERT J. YANAL (Philosophy, Wayne State University)

"Linked and Convergent Reasons - Again"

I published a theory in Informal Logic (1991) accounting for the distinction between linked and convergent reasons in terms of when probabilities sum ordinarily and when their sums "jump." While I still adhere to that theory, I have come to see as incorrect the ordinary view of argument diagrams as exhibiting structure prior to and independently of the logical validity of the arguments. Diagramming an argument as having linked premises already says something about the logical validity of the argument.