ABSTRACTS: A to K

 

PETER D. ASQUITH (Philosophy, Michigan State University) “Theory Dependence, Context Dependence, Tacit Knowledge, and Informal Logic”

 

The activities of "identifying" and "evaluating" arguments are both theoretically and contextually dependent.  It is impossible to lay out fully explicit procedures to govern argument identification and evaluation in every plausibly encountered circumstance.  If these claims about the nature of informal logic are correct, does it help us understand the bewildering array of approaches to informal logic currently available?  In general, what are the implications for both meta-dialogue about informal logic and the pedagogy of informal logic courses?

 

GUILLERMO BARRON (Philosophy, University of Alberta) “Bias, Bayes, and group psychology”

 

The genetic fallacy rightly contends that there is no *necessary* connection between a claim's (biased) origins and its truth. Nonetheless, some philosophers have argued that inductive versions of the genetic argument are acceptable. I argue that not even inductive genetic arguments compel disbelief or agnosticism. Many critics argue that awareness of bias is essential and perhaps sufficient to properly appraise the truth values of scientific claims. I contend that this awareness may in fact reduce our epistemic success.

 

J. ANTHONY BLAIR (Philosophy, University of Windsor) “Argument and logic in philosophy”

 

I identify and classify the ways the concepts of argument and logic, and  the related concepts of reasoning, inference and implication, have been used in the principal textbooks used in teaching logic over the past fifty years. I examine some of the assumptions of the different types, and compare them to some of the ways these concepts are used outside logic (so understood). I then consider the implications of the differences for undergraduate instruction.

 

GEORGE BOGER (Philosophy, Canisius College, Buffalo) “Aristotle on the fallacies involving formal mistakes in reasoning”

 

Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations lists refutation among eristic objectives.  Since this argumentation involves mistakes that appear cogent, Aristotle names it apparent refutation.  The expression 'informal fallacy' misrepresents his accomplishment.  First, Aristotle subsumes these fallacies under ignoratio elenchi.  Second, he considers a refutation to be a deduction as in Prior Analytics.  Thus, an apparent refutation has a formal structure.  Such fallacious argumentation contains mistakes involving contradiction and the structure of syllogistic deduction.

 

PIERRE J. BOULOS (University of Windsor) “The Newtonian Revolution as a revolution in scientific reasoning”

 

In his Principia Newton expresses his methodology in the “Rules of Reasoning in Experimental Philosophy.” This paper will show that Newton's ideal of empirical success, the spirit of which is contained in his Rules of Reasoning, resulted in a new way of reasoning in science. This ideal is the driving force behind not only the wide acceptance of Newtonian science and its results, but also the revolution in science experienced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

 

RICHARD  S. G. BROWN (Philosophy, Brock University) “Varieties of argument in Indian philosophy”

A critical assessment of a variety of arguments drawn from the so-called orthodox systems (Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya-Yoga, Vedanta) which sometime parallel arguments in the Western tradition but more often proving themselves to be unique. Among the arguments to be examined will be transcendental arguments, progressive reduction, leading and provocative questions, grandiose assumption, moral anecdote, paradox, anagram, demonstration, causal inference, and the most extreme refinement of the categories of reasoning itself.

 

CHRIS CAMPOLO (Philosophy and Liberal Studies, University of Arkansas at Little Rock) “Agreement and argumentation”

Argumentation theory can serve as a resource for theories of public reason, especially when we consider certain common difficulties we face when we try to reach agreement. I review two of these sorts of difficulties, then show how recent work by Michael Gilbert (“Agreement,” OSSA 1999) and Larry Wright (Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning, forthcoming) helps us to explain and to address them.

 

DANIELA CARBOGIM (Division of Informatics, University of Edinburgh) “Dialogue games in philosophy”

This work describes the use of an interactive argumentation system in the context of philosophical arguments for democracy, as part of a broader project that aims at exploring ways in which to represent (and present) philosophical arguments to both experts and non-specialists. Arguments generated by this system take the form of dialogue games between a user and the system. This allows users to better understand and explore philosophical arguments, besides giving the possibility for automated testing and simulation.

 

MAURICE CHARLAND (Comuunication, Concordia University)  “The Place of Impiety in Civic Argument”

This paper considers the forms of impiety appropriate to civic argument, i. e. argument that is public and  also addressed to citizens and concerned with the res publica.  The challenge facing civic argument is an excess of “piety,” in the form of the dominance of metanarratives and excessive decorousness.  “Impiety” can serve as a corrective to problem, but risks undermining the very basis of the civic relation unless it is prudent.  Prudent impiety requires the use of dialectical irony.

 

PATRICK CLAUSS (English, Butler University) "The uses of argument: a contextual application"

Writing The Uses of Argument to challenge the analytic philosophers who hold that all arguments should be evaluated vis-à-vis the standards of formal logic, Stephen Toulmin does not intentionally address composition theory or pedagogy. However, because it graphically represents the dynamic nature of natural-language, justificatory arguments, Toulmin's schema is quite useful in the composition classroom: I use the schema to teach invention, paragraph development and focus, and revision; I also use the schema to teach that good arguments are contextual, supported, multi-sided, and goal-directed.

 

DANIEL H. COHEN (Philosophy, Colby College) "How and why to argue with God”

From Abraham and Moses to Ivan Karamazov and Tevye the Dairyman, literature provides examples of arguing with God. Why would anyone try that, knowing there is no way to win? There could be no unconsidered counter-considerations, unanticipated objections, dubious premises, or fallacies in the reasoning of a Being with all Perfections. Yet the examples are coherent and profound. Sense can be made of this only against the backdrop of the full range of motivating purposes and possible resolutions for arguments.

 

PETER CRAMER (English, Carnegie Mellon University) “Arts controversies and the problem of the public sphere”

This paper examines the uses of "the public" as an argumentative ground in contemporary U.S. arts controversies in order to open questions concerning the public sphere as a viable precondition for argumentation. The problem of the public sphere will be discussed in terms of tensions among post-structuralist, formalist, and empirical perspectives. The work of Jurgen Habermas is invoked as an example of a systematic attempt to theorize the public sphere without either assuming its perfectibility or dismissing it as an impossibility.

 

STANLEY B. CUNNINGHAM (Communication Studies, University of Windsor) “Philosophizing propaganda”

Right from the start, in the1920s, propaganda analysis has been dominated by psychology. The result has been to reduce the idea of propaganda to a sequence of persuasion effects, public demonstrations and message artifacts.  Enduring confusion about the meaning of propaganda, even incoherence, indicates a pressing need for theoretical improvements and alternative conceptions.  This paper argues that propaganda, by reason of the amplitude of its epistemic disservices and its inherently unethical dark side, is immediately, primarily and ineluctably a philosophical concept.

 

JACKIE DAVIES (Philosophy, Queen's University) “Analogy and narrative: caring about the forgone and repressed”

While the ethics of care does not preclude certain decisions about abortion, it does preclude certain kinds of reasoning about it.  Comparison of Judith Jarvis Thompson on abortion with Octavia Butler's science fiction, Kindred, indicates that the success of analogical arguments may depend on readings of their narrative elements that repress morally salient emotional responses.  This begs the question and obscures how narrative can do the work in moral reasoning towards which the ethics of care gestures.

 

J. F.  DELANNOY (Computational Linguistics, University of Ottawa) “Arguing about drugs”

I present a manual analysis of various texts about drugs policy, synthesized in a table of the stances, claims and evidence and their relation, the logical validity of the reasoning, the use of irony, and a comparison of the points made by the authors and the persons quoted. This is an exploration of regularities which could be detected automatically, as well as an exploitable form of analysis of complex and discrepant arguments.

 

FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN and PETER HOUTLOSSER  (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric,University of Amsterdam) “Strategic maneuvering with the of burden of proof”

This paper concentrates on the strategic means that can be used to remove the tension between rhetorical and dialectical ambitions when determining the starting point of a critical discussion. It focuses on the ways in which the parties arrive at an allocation of the burden of proof in the opening stage of the discourse, in particular on the ways in which this allocation is open to strategic maneuvering by the participants.

 

ROBERT H. ENNIS (Education, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) “Qualified reasoning”

Much reasoning in everyday life comes close to being deductively valid (especially when an apparently-needed assumption is added), but is not deductively valid because the parts include implicit or explicit qualifying terms like "generally", "rarely", "probably", "ceteris paribus", and "prima facie".

    How should we deal with such arguments? Numerical probabilities? Intuition? Ennis' suggested approach depends on criteria as well as the intelligent, informed, experienced judgment of the argument appraiser.

 

EVELINE T. FETERIS (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, The University of Amsterdam) “Practical arguments, consequences and principles”

In this paper I will show that by integrating ideas taken from different theoretical traditions, ethics, argumentation theory and legal theory, it can be clarified how teleological as well as deontological considerations play a role in practical arguments. By developing a pragma-dialectical model for reconstructing practical arguments, I will show how various elements of practical arguments can be reconstructed and made explicit in an adequate way, and how the various elements of practical arguments can be related to each other.

 

JAMES B. FREEMAN (Philosophy, Hunter College of The City University of New York) “Can interpretations ever be acceptable basic premises?”

Causal and dispositional statements are paradigm examples of interpretations. Could such statements, characteristically supporting subjunctive conditionals, ever be acceptable basic premises? Corresponding to subjunctives are material inference rules. We hold that the acceptability of these rules and the corresponding subjunctives depends on whether there is a presumption of warrant for the belief-forming mechanism generating particular intuitions about what is inferable under certain circumstances. This issue, we believe, is advanced by recent work in naturalistic epistemology.

 

RICHARD FRIEMANN (Philosophy, York University) “Reducing conflict between ordinary people by third-party interventions”

This paper investigates the role of the third party in the reduction of interpersonal conflicts. It is important for the third party to facilitate emotional understanding between parties in conflict. Martin Buber and Carl Rogers believe that emotional understanding should include being open, while at the same time not so open, as to emotionally identify or fuse with the other. I will argue that the danger of fusion is only a danger for therapists and hence not for ordinary people.

 

RICHARD FULKERSON (Literature and Languages, Texas A&M University-Commerce) “Analyzing ‘full-length’ arguments: the unfortunate limits of textbook advice”

Informal logic textbooks present three major techniques for schematizing arguments: standard form layout; Toulmin array; and circle/arrow diagrams.  But none of them work well for arguments over a few hundred words, even if one summarizes beforehand, as sometimes recommended.  Yet students need to work with essay-length arguments.  My paper will raise rather than resolve this frustrating problem.  But I will suggest that one concept from classical rhetoric, stasis theory, can help.

 

MARY M. GARRETT (Communication, Wayne State University) “Looking for logic in China: Blinders and biases”

I explore three issues raised by Christoph Harbsmeier’s Language and Logic in China.  First, I question Harbsmeier’s characterization of  “rational argument” in pre-modern Chinese texts and his consequent neglect of analogical and correlational reasoning.  Second, I maintain that Harbsmeier’s focus on materials from the fifth to second centuries B.C.E. skews his generalizations about Chinese argumentation. Finally, I suggest that his assessment of the influence of Buddhist disputation manuals needs some modification.

 

MICHAEL A. GILBERT (Philosophy, York University) “Ideal argumentation”

I raise several issues concerning the idealized nature of various models offered in Argumentation Theory and Informal Logic, especially in the Pragma-Dialectic enterprise and the categorization of arguments of Walton and others. My focus will be the separation of arguments into categories dependent on allegedly separable and identifiable characteristics. In particular, I will question the distinction between “settlement” and “resolution” in the Pragma-Dialectic programme, and the distinction between “dialectic” and “negotiation” in Informal Logic and Formal Dialectic approaches.

 

DAVID M. GODDEN (Philosophy, McMaster University) “Justification, argumentation and the nature of inference”

Pinto defines arguments as “invitations to inference.” While inference is considered a mental act, valid inference is seen as the proper subject of logic (Kneale 1962).  Few hold the rules of valid inference to comprehensively delineate good argument, but often maintain that, where analysis in terms of inference is appropriate, the traditional relationship obtains.  I consider Russell’s ‘Regressive Method’ (1907), which argues that a claim’s strictly inferential justification may have no epistemic force whatsoever regarding its acceptance or acceptability.

 

JEAN GOODWIN (Communication Studies, Northwestern University) “One question, two answers”

To resolve many “live” problems of argument assessment, we need accounts of the activity of arguing.  Presently, the only widely recognized proposals for such a normative pragmatics are the various dialogue theories.  But there is an alternative that the norms governing argument arise from the arguers' own efforts--are designed, especially through the crafting of the discourse that always surrounds arguments.  This paper will sketch the design theories, contrast them with dialogue theories, and show how they handle argument assessment. (80)           

 

JIM GOUGH (Philosophy, Red Deer College) “Identifying Opinions”

How we are able to successfully identify the distinctive and definitive features of the expression of an opinion has been considered important throughout the history of philosophy. However, the identifying features of an opinion which separate it from an argument remain both controversial and under-determined. In an effort to clearly identify the significant differences between an argument and an opinion, several proposals will be considered and critically evaluated in order to arrive at a viable list of suggestions for further critical discussion.

 

TRUDY GOVIER (Calgary, Alberta) “Composition, division, and collective responsibility”

I offer an account of the fallacy of division and apply it to issues of collective responsibility. If a group is responsible for a deed, are its individual members so responsible? To assume so seems to commit the fallacy of division. Why might this inference be tempting? In order for a group to act, some of its members must act. Also, costs of a collectivity's responsibility typically devolve onto individuals.

 

CLAUDE GRATTON (Philosophy, University of Nevada, Las Vegas) “Common pedagogical weaknesses in critical thinking textbooks and courses”

I will describe some recurring pedagogical weaknesses in critical thinking textbooks and courses. First, we typically overlook that the effective and efficient interpretation of most arguments requires the correct application of evaluative skills, and as a result we usually teach evaluative skills later than we should. Secondly, one of the most common serious pedagogical mistakes consists of teaching skills, standards, and concepts in a way that contributes to students’ fragmented learning. I will suggest ways of addressing these difficulties and others.

 

WAYNE GRENNAN (Philosophy, Saint Mary's University) “An argument evaluation procedure ncorporating arguer credibility”

The paper presents, with the aid of a flowchart, a practical argument evaluation procedure that incorporates arguer credibility as an evidence item in arriving at a judgment of whether to accept an argument's conclusion as true. This factor must be incorporated into any rigorous formalized procedure that reflects our everyday argument evaluation practices, since it frequently counts as a reason for accepting premises and inference claims as true.

 

LEO GROARKE (Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University) “The end of argument and the limits of philosophy”

The ‘end’ of argument could be its telos -- its goal -- or the place at which it ceases. I discuss both in light of Ralph Johnson's stimulating discussion in his recently published Manifest Rationality. In the process I attempt to shed some light on the controversial roles that truth and acceptability can, should and do play in the assessment of natural language reasoning, and the limits of argumentation theory. I argue that philosophers working on argument often overstep the latter.

 

LOUIS F. GROARKE (Philosophy, Trent University) “Anecdotal Reasoning”

Anecdotal reasoning is usually considered a fallacy. In this paper, I distinguish between a social science and a philosophical view of anecdotal reasoning. On the social science model, anecdotal reasoning is always a fallacy. On the philosophical model, anecdotal reasoning is not always a fallacy, but an important and integral part of good reasoning. Aristotle's account of induction is useful in this regard.

 

MARCELLO GUARINI (Philosophy, University of Windsor) “On the limitations of the Woods-Hudak reconstruction of analogical argument”

Woods and Hudak take analogical arguments to be meta-arguments, or arguments about arguments. I argue that their analysis of analogical arguments is inadequate on two counts. First, the emphasis on "deep structure" or "logical form" does not allow for a proper understanding of analogical argumentation which takes place in the absence of a complete grasp of the deep structure of the first order arguments. Second, there exist analogical arguments that are not meta-arguments.

 

JOSEFINA GUZMÁN (National School of Anthropology and History, Mexico) “Death in Mexican proverbs”

Mexico is rich in refranes (proverbs).  Among them I studied three of those that have death as their discourse object and described their argumentative functioning.  The refranes display different argumentative functions: as rhetorical moves they permit the speaker to hide behind the authority of the community beliefs; they show the inter-subjectivity and cultural character of argumentative processes; they sometimes close the discussion and play a central role in culture as unquestioned warrants for a given claim.

 

DAVID HITCHCOCK (Philosophy, McMaster University) “Sampling scholarly arguments: a test of a theory of following”

I hold that a conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if some covering generalization of the argument is non-trivially acceptable. To test the applicability of this theory, I extracted 50 inferences by random sampling from several hundred thousand English-language monographs in a university library. I describe the sampling method, the criteria for identifying inferences, and the results of applying the theory.

 

DAVID HITCHCOCK (Philosophy,  McMaster University),  PETER MCBURNEY (Computer Science, Liverpool University) and SIMON PARSONS (Computer Science, Liverpool University) “A framework for deliberation dialogues"

Deliberation dialogues involve reasoning about the appropriate course or courses of action for a group to undertake.   No models currently exist for the conduct of such dialogues.  Beginning with an analysis of the differences between deliberations and other types of dialogue (such as negotiations or information-seeking dialogues), we propose a generic framework in which to develop such  models.  We then consider various instantiations of our generic deliberation framework so as to illustrate its applicability.

 

JOHN HOAGLUND (Centre for Critical Thinking, Christopher Newport College) “Implicit assumptions, implicit premises”

An assumption is a statement not known to be true. But absent the author, how would we even know that an unstated assumption existed unless it was implied (made true) by given statements? So an implicit assumption is both known to be true and not known to be true. Inquiry into this peculiar status might benefit informal logic in the analysis of argument in natural language, an important part of which is identifying implicit (assumed) premises.

 

HANNS HOHMANN (Communication Studies, San José State University) “Presumptions in Roman legal argumentation”

This paper undertakes a detailed review of the uses of presumptions in Roman legal argumentation, with a view to developing a typology of the argumentative functions of presumptions in this context, exploring rhetorical dimensions of presumptions that go beyond the procedural effect of shifting the burden of proof. It is hoped that such an analysis can also provide insights that may be of use in contemporary discussions of the role of presumptions in argumentation.

 

BETH BROWNING JACOBS (Linguistics, Philosophy, and Rhetoric, University of Illinois at Chicago) “When is a political “lie” really a lie?”

This paper explores how the language and argumentation of politics can slide imperceptibly down the slippery slope between truth and falsehood.  I examine some outrageously false statements from political cults and compare these with examples of political argumentation from mainstream campaigns.  I argue that no clear-cut line can be drawn between the two, and that the standards of what counts as acceptable, sound political argument are socially constructed.  I think history shows this to be a dangerous precedent.

 

RALPH H. JOHNSON (Philosophy, University of Windsor & Visting Professor, Communication Studies, Northwestern University) “More on arguers and their dialectical obligations”

If it is agreed that the arguer has dialectical obligations, we need to be able decide how well the arguer has met those obligations. That is the issue of dialectical adequacy. To make such a decision,  we must first be able to identify what the obligations are.  In this paper, I propose a way of classifying dialectical material and show how it helps to identify the arguer’s obligations.

 

FRED J. KAUFFELD (Communication, Edgewood College) “Grice without the Cooperative Principle”

This paper offers a critique of Grice’s “Cooperative Principle” (CP). I will focus on two claims: (1) within Grice’s thought, justifi­cation for the CP ought be based on the pragmatic core of his analysis of utterance-meaning, but (2) rightly understood, the pragmatics of utterance-meaning render the CP  gratuitous, on interpretations in which “cooperative” carries weight .  Implications for the use of the CP in theories of argumentation will also be discussed.

 

ROBERT A. KOMINAR (Graduate Program in Management and Analysis of Conflict, Royal Roads University) “The declining interest in argumentation in processes of conflict resolution?”

Conflict is becoming naturalized in the contemporary social world. No longer something to be suppressed, we now seek to learn better ways to manage, resolve and even promote it. Strategies of strong collaboration challenge the dominance of traditional adversarial disputing. Many conflict resolution theorists inextricably associate argumentation with an ineffective adversarial paradigm. In this paper I explore the dynamic interrelationship of argumentation and conflict resolution hoping to facilitate collaboration between both fields.

 

TAKUZO KONISHI (Japan) “A generalized stasis theory and arguers' dialectical obligations”

This paper, based on the rhetorical theory of stasis, investigates a theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations to deal with objections and alternative positions.  It will cover: (a) the nature of classical stasis theory, (b) a critical assessment of the implications of classical stasis theory for an arguer's dialectical obligations, (c) an attempt to generalize classical stasis theory, (d) an examination of the implications of generalized stasis theory for an arguer's dialectical obligations pertinent to the construction and appraisal of arguments.

 

ERIK C. W. KRABBE (Philosophy, Groningen University) “Strategies in dialectic and rhetoric”

According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, discussants that comply with norms of critical discussion may simultaneously adhere to a rhetorical strategy. They, rightly, point out types of strategic behaviour that, for a full understanding of argumentation, need to be taken into account. Yet, much of this behaviour is better characterized as following a dialectical, rather than a rhetorical, strategy. It will be argued that more is at stake than a merely terminological issue.

 

GLENN KUPER (Communication, University of Puget Sound) “Argument schemes: comparing Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca with Hastings, Kienpointner, and Walton”

The purpose of my paper will be to evaluate the similarities and differences of the concept of argumentation schemes as developed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) with the model initially developed by Hastings (1963), and expanded by Kienpointner (1992) and Walton (1996). I will consider the similarities and differences of the two approaches, then I will conclude by arguing how the two differing approaches can work together to provide a comprehensive understanding of argumentation scheme theory.