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"Macro-Toulmin: the argument model as structural guideline in academic writing"< /DL>

Attempts to use Toulmin's argument model in teaching argument have had mixed success. We suggest using it specifically to teach academic writing. Moreover, we think it should be used to teach what major constituents are characteristic of academic wri ting, rather than how to make each individual point. For example, one important feature of academic writing is that the writer should carefully discuss the warrant for the data she uses, whereas debaters in practical argument are rarely required to do so . Extensive experience from the teaching of academic writing along these lines will be drawn upon.

David Hitchcock (Philosophy, McMaster University)

"John L. Pollock's theory of rationality"

Pollock is developing, and testing computationally a theory of rationality. I endorse his claim that the structure of argument is not always linear, his replacement of the deductive-inductive distinction with a deductive-defeasible distinction, and hi s distinction between rebutting defeaters, and undercutting defeaters. I question the absence of pragmatic constraints in his acceptance rule, an absence which fits ill with his criterion of interruptibility, that it is reasonable to act on the conclusions drawn at any point. I also wonder about building a model of a rational agent in which there is no place for interpersonal argumentative discussion.

John Hoaglund (Center for Critical Thinking, Christopher Newport University)

"Inference and argument in informal logic"

We can provisionally distinguish inference as logically drawing some new result out of given information from argument as advancing reasons in support of a challenged claim. Blair and Johnson place inference beyond the scope of informal logic, and Tou lmin considers inference to be the connection of premises with conclusion in a strong argument. Both approaches are inadequate to inference as distinguished here, and partly as a consequence argument analysts tend unwittingly to mark the distinction as t hat between linked and convergent arguments. Here I urge that there are advantages to treating inference as inference.

Hanns Hohmann (Communication Studies, San Jose State University)

"Presumption in legal argumentation: from antiquity to the middle ages"

This paper traces the evolution of the concept of presumption from a subordinate part of the Roman law to a central feature of legal disputations in medieval law. Special attention will be given to the second edition of the Libellus Pylei Disputato rius by Pilius of Medicina, and to the anonymous Tractatus de Praesumptionibus (12th century). My analysis will emphasize elements of these developments useful in the renewed discussion about the role of presumptions in argumentation stimulate d particularly by Richard Gaskins' Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse, highlighting the paradigmatic significance of rhetorical manipulations of burdens of proof in legal reasoning.

Tammy James (Psychology, Brock University), Lewis Soroka (Economics, Brock University) & John Benjafield (Psychology, Brock University)

"Are economists rational or just different?"

Economics students are more likely than others to act self-interestedly and less likely to behave cooperatively, behaviour which is rational from the viewpoint of many economic theories. Students in other disciplines may have another conception of wha t is "rational." The latter may be more likely to behave cooperatively and less likely to behave self-interestedly. We have been comparing the behaviour of students from different disciplines in simple ultimatum bargaining and prisoner's dilemma games. Our paper discusses some of the ways in which different academic disciplines both reinforce and elaborate upon student's conceptions of rationality.

Ralph H. Johnson (Philosophy, University of Windsor)

"More on arguers and their dialectical obligations"

In her 1997 OSSA paper, Trudy Govier discusses in detail my thesis that arguers have dialectical obligations. In a 1998 paper she further examines this thesis to see whether it is viable and concludes that it faces serious problems. In this paper, I assess the state of the thesis in light of Govier's discussion of it. I urge that we have something to gain from the empirical turn--from investigating best practices. At the end, I take a step back to ask what is really at issue here and how it connect s to other issues in the theory of argument.

Michael Kagan (Philosophy, Le Moyne College)

"Persuasive stories"

Since some important and effective forms of persuasion are stories, a task for those interested in argumentation, informal logic and critical thinking, is to consider stories as arguments. In this essay, I discuss three: Plato's "Myth of the Cave," Ay n Rand's Atlas Shrugged, and Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye. I suggest some responses to persuasive stories, including criticizing the plausibility of the story as story, developing counter stories, and considering the stories premises as g rounds for its conclusion. By doing so, I tentatively take steps towards a theory of story argument validity.

Fred J. Kauffeld (Communication Arts, Edgewood College)

"Dialectical tier argumentation as structured by proposing and advising"

This paper discusses the parameters of an arguer's duties on the "dialectical tier of argument appraisal." Argumentative burdens incurred in making proposals will be compared with probative obligations which may be taken on in advising. The burdens t ypically incurred in these two kinds of illocutionary acts are strikingly different; accordingly, the arguer's obligation to response to objections would be circumscribed differently depending on which speech acts initiates the dialogue. This claim has i mplications for how we delimit a "good case" for deliberative propositions. It also casts light on "manifest rationality" and the role of rhetorical art in argumentation.

Erik C. W. Krabbe (Philosophy, University of Groningen)

"The problem of retraction in critical discussion"

The problem is to find a model of dialogue that allows retractions where they seem reasonable or even required, and puts sanctions on them (or even bans them altogether) whenever they would be disruptive of a well-organized process of dialogue. One ty pe of solution will let retraction rules determine which retractions are permissible, and if permissible what the consequences of retraction are. These rules vary according to the type of dialogue and to the type of commitment to which the retraction per tains. To accommodate various incoherent intuitions on retractions, one may resort to modelling complex types of dialogue.

Jonathan Lavery (Humanities, Humber College) & Jeff Mitscherling (Philosophy, Univeristy of Guelph)

"An Aristotelian program for teaching argumentation"

We have modified Aristotelian syllogistic logic in for use in introductory philosophy courses. Although the scope of Aristotle's syllogistic is narrowed by our modifications, its pedagogical value is increased in one crucial way: in 4-6 hours of class time, students with no background in argumentation progress to the point where they can evaluate the structure of condensed and extended arguments. Because the mechanics of the program are readily grasped, it is possible to focus class time on important , abstract notions such as validity, soundness, relevance, etc. If successfully implemented, the program encourages good habits for analysing, assessing and formulating arguments.

Mari Lee Mifsud (Speech Communication, University of Richmond)

"Another reformulation of rhetoric as a wedge"

Henry Johnstone's idea of "The Rhetorical Wedge" began with a remark in his The Problem of the Self where the word "Bridge" is also used. While "The Wedge" has been appropriated as a useful metaphor for understanding rhetorical processes, "The Bridge" has not, despite rhetoric's ability to unify as well as distinguish perspectives. Since "The Bridge" metaphor has been left unexplored, and since "The Wedge" although necessary in rhetorical processes is not sufficient to their completion, this p resentation reformulates "The Rhetorical Wedge" to carry forward the idea of "The Rhetorical Bridge" in rhetorical processes.

Flemming Steen Nielsen (Education, Philosophy and Rhetoric, University of Copenhagen)

"Alfred Sidgwick's 'rogative' approach to argumentation"

Few, if any, logicians deserve the title 'precursor of modern argumentation theory' more than the largely neglected English logician, Alfred Sidgwick (1850-1943). Sidgwick developed a coherent and original theory of argumentation with a distinctly 'mo dern' flavour. This paper outlines his idea of a 'negative' view of logic, an important aspect of which is the thesis that the distinctions and inference schemata of formal logic should not be applied as criteria of the validity or invalidity of natural language arguments, but rather 'rogatively'--as suggesting the kinds of objections or demands for clarification that are relevant at specific stages of a discussion.

Niels Moeller Nielsen (Language and Culture, Roskilde University)

"Mutual reconstruction of arguments in dialogue"

Analyzing argumentative discourse is not a an activity exclusively reserved for scholars in argumentation theory, rhetoric, and philosophy of language. This paper proposes that the faculty of analyzing argument structure is a basic precondition of und erstanding one another in argumentational interactions. Based on an examination of televised debates, it is demonstrated how participants employ quasi-logical schemata to reconstruct implicit elements in other participants's argument structures for purpo ses of clarification and criticism. This very descriptive approach entrusts, as it were, the actual argument analysis to the language users themselves.

Joseph Novak (Philosophy, University of Waterloo)

"Aristotle's Topics and informal reasoning"

The modern tradition of informal logic has relied heavily on accepting, modifying, or criticizing the patterns of reasoning mentioned in Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations. However, already in 1971, Stachowiak focussed his attention on the muc h neglected Topics and enumerated in his work, Rationalismus im Ursprung some of the Aristotelian rules governing the formation of definitions and principles for correct reasoning. The paper will try to examine how these principles might ap ply to informal arguments today.

Neil Paris (Philosophy, Brock University)

"The utility of Perelman's universal audience"

I will endeavour to appraise Perelman's concept of the Universal Audience (UA). If indeed the measure of an argument's worth is solely dependent upon the UA's adherence to it, this fails to specify why the UA adheres to certain arguments and not other s. For Perelman's theory to be an improvement over a Protagorean view requires such a specification. Moreover, if freedom from prejudice and incompetence are the relevant characteristics of the UA, then why not simply declare that the worth of the argum ent itself is measurable by its freedom form prejudice and its competence?

Robert C. Pinto (Philosophy, University of Windsor)

"Logical form and the link between premise and conclusion"

This paper challenges the idea that purely formal or syntactic concepts can, in general, supply criteria for certifying that the premisses of arguments and inferences support their conclusions. It will maintain that neither deductively valid arguments nor inductively strong arguments can, in general, be identified by their logical form.

The paper will attempt to clarify the role that patterns play in appraising arguments. Using argument schemas as an example, it will try to show that the identification of patterns can facilitate appraisal even when those patterns do not supply criter ia (sufficient or even necessary conditions) of support.

Jose Plug (Faculty of Law, Erasmus University)

"The analysis and evaluation of counter-arguments in judicial decisions"

From a (pragma) dialectical point of view, the evaluation of argumentation includes consideration of how well it deals with counter-arguments. This corresponds with one of the requirements developed in Dutch jurisprudence: if the justification of a ju dicial decision does not reflect on essential counter-arguments, the decision may be quashed in appeal. I will first examine what textual clues identify counter-arguments and objections, and then discuss the criteria that are used in legal practice to ev aluate how well the justification responds to counter-arguments and objections. Finally, I compare these with proposals for dialectical criteria.

Gilbert Plumer (Law School Admission Council, Pennsylvania)

"The paradoxical associated conditional of enthymemes"

Expressing a widely-held view, Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is t he argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being enthymematic or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which the view is incorrect, as well as correct (e.g., the case of a modus ponens wherein the major premise is implicit).

Lawrence H. Powers (Philosophy, Wayne State University)

"A problem in the one-fallacy theory"

According to the one-fallacy theory, the only real fallacy is equivocation. In particular, the fallacy of incomplete evidence draws a conclusion inductively from parts of our evidence while ignoring other parts of it which undermine the conclusion. T his is an equivocation on the relative term 'probable': the conclusion is probable relative to a part of our evidence but not relative to the whole of it. Unfortunately, this view is not entirely consistent with my meta-theory of fallacies which allows t hat some failures of rationality are errors simply in inductive reasoning rather than being equivocations.

Allan Randall (Philosophy, York University)

"Layered protocols in coalescent argumentation"

A goal-oriented analysis of argument is presented based on Taylor's layered protocols, a theory of communication based on Powers' hierarchical perceptual control theory. Goals and beliefs are hierarchical, related in a precise way to sensory inputs an d motor outputs. This model is combined with Gilbert's theory of coalescent argumentation. Participants sketch out their own and their partner's goal diagrams as an aid to resolving the argument. For this to work, the argument must be viewed, not in pu rely linguistic or logical terms, but in terms of the entire system of goals in which it is embedded.

Chris Reed (Information Services and Computing, Brunel University)

"Building monologue"

To build an argument--and particularly an argument presented as a monologue--a writer must assemble and marshal a battery of supports for a claim. Some of those supports will be arranged in convergent structures, some as linked; some will be expressed , some will be left implicit; sometimes a support will need further support of its own--and sometimes, not. This paper explores the factors which lead a writer to make particular choices, the interactions between those factors, and the constraints on a w riter's freedom in exercising her power, drawing on recent findings in computational modelling of the generation process.

Marco Ruhl (German Studies, E.N.S. de Fontenay/St.-Cloud)

"Observer and participant perspectives in the analysis of argumentation"

Given a sort of trade-off between normative and descriptive analyses of argumentation, theorists have chosen either the perspective of the evaluating observer or that of the participant-like "co-interpreter" of argumentation. However, the evaluational perspective neglects the dialogical, self-organizing nature of arguing, whereas the participant perspective fails to capture the normative goal-directedness of persuasion and conflict resolution. Since arguers are both participants in argumentation as w ell as well as observers of it, I will propose a method, based on normative pragmatics, of combining both perspectives.

Jean-Pierre Schachter (Philosophy, Huron College, The University of Western Ontario)

"Prejudice, prudence and fairness"

There exists reasoning popularly characterized as "prejudiced" that may nevertheless be both sound and prudential, and this reasoning involves the application of exactly the same inductive correlational strategies applied without moral objection in non -human cases. While such reasoning may be rationally unobjectionable, it may yet be morally objectionable because its methods inherently entail a risk of unfairness to others. This raises the interesting philosophical possibility that arguments may be a ppraised and found wanting on other than rational grounds, that arguments may be subject to moral defects in addition to defects of rationality.

Menashe Schwed (Ashkelon Regional College)

"The Liar Paradox as a reductio ad absurdum argument"

This presentation traces an historical root of the reductio ad absurdum mode of argumentation in Greek philosophy. I propose a new understanding of the liar paradox as an instance of this mode of argumentation. I show that the paradox was crea ted as part of a refutational argument in the controversy over the justification of realism and the realists concepts of truth and certainty. The paradox was part of the dialectical style of Greek scepticism, which was characterized, inter alia, by the u se of the reductio ad absurdum. The paradox turns out to be a metaphysical and epistemological argument.

Marie Secor (English, The Pennsylvania State University)

"Augustus de Morgan on fallacy: pettyfoggers and controversialists"

Augustus DeMorgan wrote an influential nineteenth-century treatise on logic, Formal Logic: The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable, whose treatment of fallacy contributes significantly to the conversation carried on from Bentham to Alf red Sidgwick. Representing fallacy as concerning only inferential processes, DeMorgan focuses on ambiguous matters where it is difficult to determine whether the error resides in the matter or the form. His unpacking of terminological slipperiness and t actical maneuvering pushes his discussion from the logical towards the rhetorical. This study of nineteenth-century fallacy theory identifies logic's rhetorical turn and pulls out a strand connecting the histories of logic and rhetoric.

Harvey Siegel (Philosophy, University of Miami at Coral Gables)

"Argument Quality and Cultural Difference"

Argumentation theorists typically conceive argument goodness in terms of an argument's provision of reasons for its conclusion which are such that fair-minded appraisal suggests that it ought to be accepted by all who so appraise it. This conception o f argument quality makes no reference to either the persons appraising the argument, or the context of the appraisal. Much recent work rejects such an abstract, impersonal notion of argument goodness, with some theorists emphasizing the importance of cul tural difference in argument appraisal. While there is much merit in this perspective, the multiculturalist argument against impersonal, acontextualist conceptions of argument quality fails.

John A. A. Sillince (Management School, University of London)

"Power and topic shifts in strategic management argumentation"

The paper examines a transcript of a meeting at a large acute hospital. Conflict is avoided by means of topic shifting. Initially topics range over items about which agreement exists--the establishment of common ground. More urgent and more certain things get discussed first. Agreement and therefore finishing of a topic are signaled merely by moving on to the next topic. Conflict is avoided by use of dilemmas to identify potential agreements.

Elizabeth Skakoon (Philosophy, McMaster University)

"Hermeneutics, rhetoric and informal logic"

In this paper, I re-examine the connection Hans-Georg Gadamer made between hermeneutics and the rhetorical tradition in light of recent developments in informal logic. Originally, Gadamer made this connection between hermeneutics and rhetoric because both use the theoretical tools of persuasion and acceptance in contrast to scientific objective methodology. Since this association, another possibility has arisen; informal logic. Using the writings of Ralph Johnson, I outline the difference between in formal logic and rhetoric, and suggest that after an analyses of these differences, informal logic appears to be closer to hermeneutics in its overall structure and telos than rhetoric.

Christina Slade (Education, University of Canberra)

"Speaking of South Park"

This paper deals with the new cult cartoon series, "South Park". While reviled as vulgar and likely to lead children astray, it is in fact a fertile field of ethical and logical argumentation. The paper analyses in detail the argumentation of one epi sode, entitled "An elephant makes love to a pig" and shows how it can be used to teach reasoning skills.

Wouter H. Slob (Theology, Groningen University)

"But that simply isn't true; rethinking truth in argumentation"

Since the dialectical turn in logic, truth has been replaced by acceptability. The latter notion, however, does not provide for a strong enough constraint. It is thought that only truth can overrule acceptability, and for that reason we need to reass ess the notion. Still, truth is a confusing philosophical concept, and we should be clear as to which understanding of the notion can do the job. I shall argue that a correspondence theory of truth in particular will not do. Rather we should adopt a de flationary account: all we need is a suitable understanding of the truth-predicate.

Denise Tayler (Philosophy, York University)

"Theoretic bondage: Coalescent argumentation and higher-order goals"

This paper will critically evaluate Pragma-Dialectics and Michael Gilbert's coalescent view of argumentation from a feminist-emancipatory perspective. Pragma-Dialecticians hold to higher-order goals such as the equality of arguers, and assume that the ir ideal model will function well under these conditions. But by not directly addressing arguments in situations of power imbalance, the pragma-dialectical model overlooks the possibility that it reinforces inequality and restricts expression. Gilbert's work on alternative argumentation modes diffuses the oppressive tendencies of the Pragma-Dialectical model, and may further higher-order ideals.

Viktor Tchouechov (Philosophy, Vitebsk State Technological University)

"Bakhtin's dialogism and argumentation perspectives"

Today, dialogism has become a commonplace in argumentation analysis. Bakhtin distinguishes two kinds of humanitarian methodology--monologism and dialogism. Monologism is connected with the nature of subject-object and object-object epistemological an d ontological relationships. Analysing monologism, Bakhtin had come to distinguish between two kinds of dialectics--monological dialectics and dialogical dialectics. Bakhtin thought that it was possible to form not only various kinds of dialectics but a lso dialogisms; for example, the synchronic or interactive dialogism of Dostoyevsky and the diachronic or dialectical dialogism of Bakhtin himself.

Christopher M. Thomson (Philosophy, University of Toronto)

"Are all the pragma-dialectical rules pragmatic?"

From a pragma-dialectical perspective, argumentation rules do not receive their normative import from any "metaphysical necessity." They are, pragmatically speaking, binding only to the extent that reasonable participants regard them as useful for res olving disputes. This may be misleading with regard to the second pragma-dialectical rule relating to the burden of proof. If the obligation to defend a proffered standpoint is a constitutive rule of competent speech, then the obligation denoted by the burden of proof is more binding upon speakers than a pragmatic approach to the subject would have us believe.

Dale Turner (Philosophy, California State Polytechnic University)

"Fallacies and the concept of an argument"

This paper argues that recent theoretical attempts to understand fallacious reasoning fail because these theories presuppose problematic accounts of the nature of argument. The paper outlines an alternative view of fallacious reasoning based on Wright 's recent work on the concept of an argument. This alternative view suggests that fallacious reasoning results from a kind of incompetence. Such failures of competence, however, are not nearly as common as traditional accounts of fallacious reasoning su ggests. Moreover, the very possibility of being tempted by fallacious reasoning depends on our being very competent in normal cases.

Lev G. Vassiliev (Foreign Languages Department, Kaluga State Pedagogical University)

"The functional nature of argument revisited"

Semantically coherent and functionally independent argumentative complexes in a text are called units of argumentation. A unit is a complex of composites performing argumentative functions--elements of argumentation. Functions are only established at the level of their unit. From an enthymematic point of view, the composition of a unit can be minimal, nominal and maximal, these having to do with primary and secondary functions. From an argumentation textual composition angle, a step and a move of a rgumentation are distinguished. A step corresponds to a unit. A move is composed of steps. Steps function as grounds at the textual level.

Paul Viminitz (Philosophy, University of Lethbridge)

"The Deer Hunter Paradox"

In the first Russian Roulette scene in the Deer Hunter, do the circumstances giving rise to Mike's and Nick's "rebellion" merely document Kahneman-Tversky-type glitches in the reasoning of their Vietcong captors, or does the scene also reveal a genuine inadequacy in our current understanding of interactive rationality--the resolution of which would have profound implications for rational choice theory and its myriad applications? I argue the latter.

Johannes N. Vorster & Pieter J. J. Botha (New Testament Studies, University of South Africa)

"Argumentation topoi and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Committee"

The Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) is a constitutional body dealing with South Africa's history of human rights abuses. A commitment to forms of religio-political language is evident in the stories presented to the TRC and in subsequent repo rts. The relationship between this religio-political language and a moral civil society is explored by analysing religious topoi in discourses reflecting the TRC's activities. Religious justification and evaluation of actions are not noticeable whilst m oral implications and assessment are often left implicit. Possibly there is continuation rather than intervention in the value systems generating these topoi.

John Woods (Abductive Systems Group, University of Lethbridge)

"Does informal logic have anything to learn from fuzzy logic?"

Probability theory is the arithmetic of the real line constrained by special aleatory axioms. Fuzzy logic is also a kind of probability theory, but of considerably more mathematical and axiomatic complexity than the standard account. Fuzzy logic purp orts to model the human capacity for reasoning with inexact concepts. It does this by exploring the assumption that when we argue in inexact terms and draw inferences in imprecise vocabularies, we actually make computations about the embedded imprecision s. I argue that this is in fact the last thing that we do, and indeed that we do the opposite.

Igor Z. Zagar (Educational Research Institute, Slovenia)

"What about the context?"

For quite some time now the French linguist Oswald Ducrot has been trying to develop a new theory of argumentation in the language-system (TAL), a theory that explores the argumentative potential of language as a system. In this paper I will try to sh ow how--from the standpoint of TAL--the role of co(n)text in linguistic analysis is often overestimated. The basic features of the co(n)text are already given by the utterance itself: co(n)text does not (re)interpret a given utterance, but the utterance in many respects, creates the co(n)text.

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