

OSSA 2011 - **PRESENTERS, ABSTRACTS & COMMENTATORS** – OSSA 2011

ANDREW ABERDEIN (Humanities & Communication, Florida Institute of Technology)

The Dialectical Tier of Mathematical Proof.

Ralph Johnson argues that mathematical proofs lack a dialectical tier, and thereby do not qualify as arguments. This paper argues that, despite this disavowal, Johnson's account provides a compelling model of mathematical proof. The illative core of mathematical arguments is held to strict standards of rigour. However, compliance with these standards is itself a matter of argument, and susceptible to challenge. Hence much actual mathematical practice takes place in the dialectical tier.

(*Commentator:* Anton Colijn, Univ. of Calgary)

KHAMEIEL AL TAMIMI (Philosophy, York Univ.)

Gender and the Credibility of Argumentation.

This paper will look at how essential features of power and authority affect both the credibility and reception of arguments. Empirical evidence from communication studies and feminist writings, such as Miranda Fricker and Sue Campbell, shows that there is inherent disparity in the reception of arguments when presented by men and women. Women experience epistemic injustices in the argumentation arena by given minimal credibility by dint of their gender and social status as women.

(*Commentator:* John Fields, Edgewood College)

COLIN ANDERSON (Philosophy, Hiram College), SCOTT F. AIKIN (Philosophy, Vanderbilt Univ.), JOHN CASEY (Philosophy, Northeastern Illinois Univ.)

Tu Quoque Arguments, Subjunctive Inconsistency, and Questions of Relevance.

Tu quoque arguments regard inconsistencies in some speaker's performance. Most *tu quoque* arguments depend on actual inconsistencies. However, there are forms of *tu quoque* arguments that key, instead, on the conflicts a speaker would have, were some crucial contingent fact different. These, we call subjunctive *tu quoque* arguments. Finally, there are cases wherein the counterfactual inconsistencies of a speaker are relevant to the issue.

(*Commentator:* Christoph Lumer, Univ. of Sienna)

SHARON BAILIN (Education, Simon Fraser Univ.) & MARK BATTERSBY (Philosophy, Capilano Univ.)

Reason in the Balance: Teaching Critical Thinking as Dialectical.

Our book, *Reason in the Balance: An Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking*, focuses critical thinking instruction on the process of arriving at a reasoned judgment (a process we refer to as critical inquiry). The traditional analysis and critique of particular arguments is given due emphasis. However, the book goes beyond this dimension focusing on the identification of issues and contexts, understanding the competing cases, and making a comparative judgment among them.

(*Commentator:* Patrick Clauss, Univ. of Notre Dame)

MARK BATTERSBY (Philosophy, Capilano Univ.) & SHARON BAILIN (Education, Simon Fraser Univ.)

Fallacy Identification in a Dialectical Approach to Teaching Critical Thinking.

The dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking is centred on a comparative evaluation of contending arguments, so that generally the strength of an argument for a position can only be assessed in the context of this dialectic. The identification of fallacies, though important, plays only a preliminary role in the evaluation to individual arguments. Our approach to fallacy identification and

analysis sees fallacies as argument patterns whose persuasive power is disproportionate to their probative value.

(*Commentator*: Jan Albert van Laar, Groningen Univ.)

METTE BENGTTSSON (Rhetoric, Univ. of Copenhagen)

Political Commentary – an Ethno-methodological Approach.

Inspired by rhetorical genre theory, I analyze political commentary as it appears in current Danish political debate. I apply an ethno-methodological approach to identify a basic understanding of the phenomenon. Why do people want to read political commentary? What social action is performed? Is there somehow a cultural kairos right now for this genre? The discussion is based on the preliminary findings of my PhD project on political commentary.

(*Commentator*: Mary Kahl, State Univ. of New York at New Paltz)

LILIAN BERMEJO-LUQUE (Spanish National Research Council)

A Unitary Schema for Arguments by Analogy.

Following a Toulminian account of argument analysis and evaluation, I offer a unitary schema for, so-called, deductive and inductive types of analogical arguments that is able to explain why certain analogical arguments can be said to be deductive, and yet, why they are also defeasible. This schema avoids the need for appealing to general principles in order to justify normative claims by means of analogies.

(*Commentator*: George Boger, Canisius College, Buffalo)

J. ANTHONY BLAIR (CRRAR, Univ. of Windsor)

Carl Wellman's Concept of Conduction.

The paper aims to provide an analysis and critique of Carl Wellman's account of conduction presented in *Challenge and Response* and *Morals and Ethics*. It will consider several issues, including: reasoning vs. argument, the definition vs. the three patterns of conduction, pro and con arguments as dialogues, their assessment, the concept of validity, applications beyond moral arguments, argument type vs. criterion of evaluation.

(*Commentator*: Dale Hample, Univ. of Maryland)

CHARLES V. BLATZ (Philosophy, Univ. of Toledo)

Community, Argumentation, and the Legitimacy of Reasons for Action.

Communities gather persons sharing saliences, the meaning of events, and accountability based on shared values. These shared features ensure community-wide legitimacy for one's reasons. But they also might ensure that personal reasons for action are not universally legitimate. This discussion considers Hannah Arendt's and an alternative view of judgment seeking an account of community-limited legitimacy for reasons in both moral and political thought.

(*Commentator*: Mano Daniel, Douglas College, British Columbia)

GEORGE BOGER (Philosophy, Canisius College)

Shifting Focus from the Universal Audience to the Common Good.

Humanist concerns to empower human beings and to promote justice inspired the modern argumentation movement. Turning to audience adherence and acceptability of inferential links raised a

specter of pernicious relativism that undermines concerns for justice. Invoking Perelman's *universal audience* as a remedy only begs the question with 'whose universal audience?' and frustrates fulfilling the justice commitment. Turning discourse toward the *common good* better addresses concerns for justice.

(Commentator: Rongdong Jin, East China Normal Univ.)

PATRICK BONDY (Philosophy, McMaster)

On Begging the Question.

One finds a surprising number of defenses of the legitimacy of some kinds of question-begging (circular) arguments or beliefs in the literature. Without wanting to deny the importance of dialectical analyses of begging the question, what I do here is explore the epistemic side of the issue. In particular, I want to explore the legitimacy of "epistemically circular" arguments and beliefs. My tentative conclusion is that epistemically circular arguments and beliefs are never legitimate.

(Commentator: Kevin deLaplante, Iowa State Univ.)

JAMES BRADLEY (Philosophy, Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland)

A Very Different Kind of Rule: Creedal Rules, Argumentation, Community.

The relation between cognition and community is defined primarily in terms of the generalization of the mathematical function as a model for the nature of rules. Against this approach, I follow Collingwood's hitherto unrecognized view in his *Essay on Metaphysics* that the relation of cognition and community is better understood by way of the ancient and forgotten model of creedal rules of faith or trust.

(Commentator: Peter Loftson, Univ. of Guelph)

MATT BRIGHAM (Communication, James Madison Univ.) and JOHN RIEF (Communication, Univ. of Pittsburgh)

Moral Absolutes and Pragmatic Arguments: Civil and Human Rights.

This paper investigates two exemplars – the Proposition 8 controversy and the national health-care debate – in which political and economic expediency have justified withholding basic rights from citizens despite their recognition by political institutions. These studies illuminate the dangers of rejecting apparently absolutist rights claims in favor of a pragmatism that is beginning to wrest not only effectiveness but also justice from the legal and political institutions of the U.S.

(Commentator: William Balthrop, Univ. of North Carolina)

WILLIAM BROOKE (Philosophy, Univ. of the Fraser Valley)

The Formal Failure and Social Success of Logic.

Is formal logic a failure? It may be, if we accept the context-independent limits imposed by Russell, Frege, and others. In response to such limitations I present a Toulminesque social re-contextualization of formal logic. The results of my project provide a positive view of formal logic as a success while simultaneously reaffirming the social and contextual concerns of argumentation theorists, pragma-dialecticians, and rhetoricians.

(Commentator: Andrew Aberdein, Florida Institute of Technology)

KATARZYNA BUDZYNSKA (Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński Univ. in Warsaw, Poland)
Structure of Persuasive Communication and the Elaboration Likelihood Model.

The aim of the paper is to propose a framework for the structure of persuasive communication based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM, Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The ELM suggests that there are two routes to persuasion: central and peripheral. I will consider where exactly means of the central and peripheral routes operate in the structure of persuasive communication.

(*Commentator*: Harry Weger, Univ. of Central Florida)

LINDA CAROZZA (Humanities, York Univ.)

The Evaluation of Emotional Arguments: A Test Run.

In a recent paper (ISSA 2010), Groarke proposes a view of emotional arguments that seems too narrow. While his notion of pathos and emotional arguments may aid in the development of normative analysis, it is not sufficient in addressing all emotional arguments and is guilty of strictly adhering to the tradition's conception of emotion's place in argumentation. I suggest an alternative evaluation of emotional arguments – relying on Walton's dialogue types and goals as its foundation.

(*Commentator*: Fabrizio Macagno, New Univ. of Lisbon)

BEGOÑA CARRASCAL (Logic and Philosophy of Science, Univ. of the Basque Country)

Authority Arguments in Academic Contexts in Social Studies and Humanities.

In academic contexts, it is quite common that the appeal to authority as an argument is seldom tested, either because we accept the authority without questioning it, or because we look for alternative experts or reasons to support a different view. But, by putting ourselves side by side with an already accepted authority, we often manoeuvre to displace the burden of the proof to avoid the fear of presenting our own opinions and to allow face-saving.

(*Commentator*: Catherine Hundleby, Univ. of Windsor)

IOANA A. CIONEA & DALE HAMPLE (Communication, Univ. of Maryland) & FABIO PAGLIERI (Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome)

A Test of the Argument Engagement Model in Romania.

Hample, Paglieri, and Na's (2010) model of argument engagement proposes that people engage in arguments when they perceive the benefits of arguing to be greater than the costs of doing so. This paper tests the model in Romania, a different culture than the one in which the model was developed, by using a 2 (other arguer: friend or romantic partner) x 2 (topic of argument: private or public issue) design.

(*Commentator*: Lilian Bermejo-Luque, Spanish National Research Council)

PATRICK CLAUSS (Univ. Writing Program, Univ. of Notre Dame)

Is Data the Plural of Anecdote?: Inductive Arguments in Composition.

College writing classes are the ideal site for teaching argument. Writing students develop arguments with a frequency and insistence not present in other disciplines. Typically, however, when their curricula include reasoning instruction, composition courses over-emphasize deductive syllogisms and enthymemes. Inductive logic, the recognition of a pattern within a data set or an ampliative inference, is more useful in composition, and an effective composition curriculum makes ample room for the study and practice of inductive arguments.

(*Commentator*: Laura Pinto, Niagara Univ.)

DANIEL H. COHEN (Philosophy, Colby College) *Academic Arguments*.

Calling an argument 'merely academic' impugns its seriousness, belittles its substance, dismisses its importance, and deflates hope of resolution, while ruling out negotiation and compromise. However, "purely academic" argumentation, as an idealized limit case, is a valuable analytical tool for argumentation theorists because while the *telos* of academic argumentation may be cognitive, it is cognitive in the service of a community, which, in turn, is a community in the service of the cognitive.

(*Commentator*: G. Thomas Goodnight, Univ. of Southern California)

MANO DANIEL (Philosophy, Douglas College)

An Informal Look at the Non-Apology.

While the mechanisms of apology, forgiveness and reconciliation receive considerable scrutiny, little attention has been afforded the non-apology. This counterfeit, confected typically by false substitution or mis-direction, compounds moral insult to moral wrong. The paper explicates the normative structural relationship between apologiser, the apology, and the apologetic attitude and defends the view of the non-apology as the pretended willingness to recalibrate the moral positional relationship between harm, harmer and harmed without actually doing so.

(*Commentator*: Jeff Noonan, Univ. of Windsor)

MARCELO DASCAL & AMNON KNOLL (Philosophy, Tel Aviv Univ.)

'Cognitive Systemic Dichotomization' in Public Argumentation and Controversies.

We analyze an important obstacle in inter- and intra- community's argumentation processes, namely 'Cognitive Systemic Dichotomization' (CSD). This social phenomenon amounts to the collective use of shared cognitive patterns based upon dichotomous schematization of knowledge, cognition and affection. We discuss the formative effect of CSD on communities' collective identities, the main challenges it raises to reasoned argumentation, and how different approaches to argumentation undertake to overcome this obstacle. Examples are drawn from public discourse.

(*Commentator*: Daniel Cohen, Colby College)

SUSAN DIELEMAN (Philosophy, York Univ.)

Should We Agree to Disagree? Pragmatism and Peer Disagreement.

In this paper, I take up the conciliatory-steadfast debate occurring within social epistemology in regards to the phenomenon of peer disagreement. I will argue, because the conciliatory perspective allows us to understand argumentation pragmatically – as a method of problem-solving within a community rather than as a method for obtaining the truth – that in most cases, we should not simply agree to disagree.

(*Commentator*: Steven Patterson, Marygrove College, Detroit)

IAN J. DOVE (Philosophy, Univ. of Nevada, Las Vegas) *Visual Arguments and Analogies*.

Suppose there are visual analogical arguments, i.e., analogical arguments for which some picture, graph or other visual image conveys the argument or its parts. Is the method of evaluation the same as in non-visual cases? I argue that the method is roughly the same even if the mode of presentation is different. Whether I measure similarity visually or not, it is the degree of similarity that determines and informs the strength of the associated inference.

(*Commentator*: Marcello Guarini, Univ. of Windsor)

MICHEL DUFOUR (Philosophy and Communication, Univ. Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris)

Epistemic Communities and Arguments for New Knowledge.

Communities are epistemic when sharing specific beliefs, interests and arguments. Religious and scientific communities are examples. The paper discusses the production of knowledge relevant for such a community and the argumentative resources used to support it inside and outside of the community. It will focus on the views held by the French mathematician Poincaré on the creativity of mathematics, a core topic of his controversy against the new logic and the mathematics he called “Cantorian”.

(Commentator: John Woods, Univ. of British Columbia)

F. H. VAN EEMEREN (ILIAS, Univ. of Amsterdam)

Exploiting the Room for Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse.

The room for strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse depends not only on the dialectical and rhetorical preconditions inherent in strategic maneuvering but also on the extrinsic preconditions imposed on strategic maneuvering by the institutional macro-context of the communicative activity type in which the maneuvering takes place. Van Eemeren discusses the problem of determining the possibilities for exploiting the room for strategic maneuvering.

(Commentator: Robert Craig, Univ. of Colorado)

EMMA ENGDAHL, MARIE GELANG, (Humanities, Education and Social Sciences. Örebro Univ., Sweden) & Alyssa O'Brien (Program in Writing and Rhetoric, Stanford Univ.)

The visual rhetoric of store-window mannequins.

This collaborative paper examines the visual rhetoric of mannequins: the embodied media representation of the future consumer. Citing material evidence from Sweden, the USA, Egypt, Singapore, and China, the paper explores the visual arguments of mannequins as they embody female and male constructions of identity, position, and power, both reflecting and shaping social doxa with regard to gender norms, sexuality, religious behavior, and even nationality.

(Commentator: TBA)

ROBERT H. ENNIS (Univ. of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

Defending Causal Claims.

Even given agreement on the totality of conditions that brought about an effect, there sometimes is disagreement about the cause of the effect, for example, the disagreement about the cause of the Gulf oil spill. Different conditions' being deemed responsible accounts for such disagreements. The *defense* of the act of deeming a condition responsible often depends on *showing* that the condition was the appropriate focus of interference in order to have avoided the effect.

(Commentator: Maurice Finocchiaro, Univ. of Nevada at Las Vegas)

JOHN E. FIELDS (Philosophy, Edgewood College, Madison)

Credibility and Commitment in Making Truly Astonishing First-Person Reports.

Truly astonishing reports are an inveterate feature of the practice of making claims based on personal experience. In this paper, the author will focus on reports of apparent experiences of God. The purpose will be to develop a proper understanding of astonishing reports, which, when combined with

a well-formed theory of the practice of giving testimony, will support a model of the strategies needed in order to use such reports to support truly astonishing claims.

(*Commentator*: Gilbert Plumer, Law School Admission Council)

MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO (Philosophy, Univ. of Nevada, Las Vegas)

Deep Disagreements: A Meta-argumentation Approach.

This paper examines the views of Fogelin, Woods, Johnstone, etc., concerning deep disagreements, force-five standoffs, philosophical controversies, etc. My approach is to reconstruct their views and critiques of them as meta-arguments, and to elaborate the meta-argumentative aspects of radical disagreements. It turns out that deep disagreements are resolvable to a greater degree than usually thought, but only by using special principles and practices, such as meta-argumentation, ad hominem argumentation (in Johnstone's sense), Ramsey's principle, etc.

(*Commentator*: David Godden, Old Dominion Univ.)

THOMAS FISCHER (Philosophy, Univ. of Houston Downtown)

Issues in Conductive Argument Weight.

The concept of conductive argument weight was developed by Carl Wellman and later by Trudy Govier. This concept has received renewed attention recently from another informal logician, Robert C. Pinto. Argument weight has also been addressed in recent years by theorists in AI & Law. I argue from a non-technical perspective that some aspects of AI & Law's approach to argument weight can be usefully applied to the issues addressed by Pinto.

(*Commentator*: Rongdong Jin, East China Normal University))

DAVID M. GODDEN (Philosophy, Old Dominion Univ.)

Presumptions in Argument: Epistemic versus Social Approaches.

This paper responds to Kauffeld's 2009 OSSA paper, considering the adequacy of his "commitment-based" approach to "ordinary presumptive practices" (which explains the communicative force of presumptions socially, through the moral motivation agents have to meet their obligations) to supply an account of presumption fit for general application in normative theories of argument. The central issue here is whether socially-grounded presumptions are defeasible in the right sorts of ways so as to produce "truth-tropic" presumptive inferences.

(*Commentator*: Harvey Siegel, Univ. of Miami)

GEOFF GODDU (Philosophy, Univ. of Richmond)

How Many Premises Can an Argument Have?

Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments, you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated. On certain conceptions there are good reasons to accept the possibility of zero premise arguments, but on other conceptions there are good reasons to reject this possibility.

(*Commentator*: David Hitchcock, McMaster Univ.)

JEAN GOODWIN (Speech Communication, Iowa State Univ.)

Accounting for the Force of the Appeal to Authority.

As appeals to expert authority shift from "fallacies" to "argument schemes," argumentation theorists are called on to provide critical questions for assessing them. I argue that current treatments focus too heavily on assessing expertise, and not enough on judging trustworthiness. I propose instead a normative pragmatic account of the rational force of the appeal to expert authority, one that emphasizes the expert's actions in constructing his/her own legitimate trustworthiness.

(*Commentator*: Ray McKerrow, Ohio Univ.)

DEAN GOORDEN (Philosophy, Univ. of Windsor)

Conductive Arguments and 'The Inference to the Best Explanation'.

My aim throughout this paper is to demonstrate where conductive arguments can be found in the practice of inference to the best explanation, as it is used in science. Conductive arguments operate on two levels: the first is in the construction of hypotheses; the second is through the competition of hypotheses. By constructing arguments based on observations of facts, all conceivable factors are taken into account, and a judgment is made by weighing considerations.

(*Commentator*: Thomas Fischer, Univ. of Houston, Downtown)

TRUDY GOVIER (Philosophy, Univ. of Lethbridge)

Thinking About Counter-Considerations.

In the context of several recent discussions of conductive arguments, I explore further the significance of acknowledging counter-considerations. I consider some of the logical indicator words we use to do that and allude to such phenomena as dogmatism, compromise, and open-mindedness.

(*Commentator*: Derek Allen, Univ. of Toronto)

LEO GROARKE (Philosophy, Univ. of Windsor)

Saying 'Not' with Images.

In *The Expression of Negation*, Laurence Horn suggests that "Negation is a *sine qua non* of every human language." According to many commentators, it is one of the features of language that distinguishes words from images. I examine the arguments for this claim and find them wanting. In the process, I try to illuminate the role that images play in argument from a rhetorical, a dialectical and a logical point of view.

(*Commentator*: Paul van den Hoven, Utrecht Univ.)

BENJAMIN HAMBY (Philosophy Department, McMaster Univ.)

Eating Flowers, Holding Hands: Should Critical Thinking Pedagogy 'Go Wild'?

This paper is a response to Anthony Weston's essay "What if Teaching Went Wild?" (2004), wherein he proposes a radical pedagogical approach to environmental education, and all education, in an effort expose students to their common humanity outside of the traditional classroom community. My response to Weston's proposal is mixed; however, I suggest that "going wild" in stand-alone critical thinking classes could provide a positive, unsettling push, helping students to foster their dispositions to think critically.

(*Commentator*: Ralph Johnson, Univ. of Windsor)

DALE HAMPLE (Communication, Univ. of Maryland)

Convergent Causal Arguments in Conversation.

In theory, flawed arguments are not individually sufficient to justify a conclusion, but several may converge to do so. This is an empirical study of how arguers respond to a series of imperfect causal arguments during a serious conversation. People became less critical of the flawed arguments as more of the arguments appeared. The study gives empirical evidence that ordinary arguers permit sufficiency to cumulate during an extended discussion.

(*Commentator*: Katarzyna Budzynska, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski Univ., Warsaw)

HANS V. HANSEN (CRRAR and Philosophy, Univ. of Windsor)

Are there Methods of Informal Logic?

This presentation seeks to understand informal logic as a set of methods for the logical evaluation of natural language arguments. Some of the methods identified are the fallacies method, deductivism, warrantism and argument schemes. A framework for comparing the adequacy of the methods is outlined consisting of the following categories: learner- and user-efficiency, subjective and objective reliability, and scope. Within this framework, it is also possible to compare informal and formal logic.

(*Commentator*: Daniel Cohen, Colby College)

DONALD L. HATCHER (Philosophy and Religion, Baker Univ.)

Should Critical Thinking Courses Include the Critique of Religious Beliefs?

Over the last few years, there were five *New York Times* best sellers that were critical of religious belief. Given this, it seems there is renewed interest by the U.S.A. public in the rationality of religious belief. Ironically, critical thinking texts seldom examine the topic. This paper will evaluate eight arguments to exempt religious beliefs from rational critique. I conclude that the topic of religious belief should not be exempt from critical thinking courses.

(*Commentator*: Mark Battersby, Capilano Univ., British Columbia)

MICHAEL H.G. HOFFMANN (Philosophy, Georgia Institute of Technology)

Cognitive Effects of Argument Visualization.

Drawing on research in cognitive science that conceptualizes cognition as “extended” beyond the brain, my first goal is to show how argument maps can be interpreted as elements of distributed cognition. This means that we can observe and study cognition in those maps and the processes of their construction. My second goal is to argue that the cognitive efficacy of different argument visualization tools varies depending on the constraints and affordances provided by these tools.

(*Commentator*: Fabio Paglieri, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome)

MICHAEL HOPPMANN (Communication, Northeastern Univ.)

Correlation and Causality.

This paper provides an analysis of the argument from cause and effect and a comparison of its various types with the argument from correlation. It will be claimed that arguments from causality and from correlation should be treated as equivalent for argumentative purposes. The main advantages of this approach (theoretical economy and impact on the taxonomy of critical questions) as well as possible theoretical objections will be discussed.

(*Commentator*: Robert H. Ennis, Univ. of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

PAUL VAN DEN HOVEN (Language and Communication, Utrecht Univ. & Tilburg Univ.)

About the Propositionality of Visually Presented Argumentation.

When we define argumentation as a *communicative* activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward *information* justifying or refuting this standpoint, it is clear that elements of this information can be brought forward in other than verbal modes. An important question is then whether visually presented information needs to be translatable into a set of propositions as traditional definitions require. The answer is: not always.

(*Commentator*: Michael Hoffman, Georgia Institute of Technology)

CATHERINE E. HUNDLEBY (Philosophy & Women's Studies, Univ. of Windsor)

The Fallacy of Centrism.

Creating positions of privilege as standard or ideal is both frequently erroneous and pervasive, as evidenced by the feminist critiques of science. I suggest that standard treatments of fallacies should recognize “the fallacy of centrism,” to denote erroneous attention to the political centre and neglect of the margins. Howard Kahane’s identification of the fallacy of “provincialism” is not only inadequate but itself commits the fallacy of centrism.

(*Commentator*: Claudio Duran, York Univ.)

BETH INNOCENTI (Communication Studies, Univ. of Kansas)

Arguing by Apostrophizing.

I submit that skilled arguers may use apostrophe (direct address to someone present or absent) to pressure reluctant addressees to adhere to norms of argumentation, and illustrate this with Lincoln’s 1860 Cooper Union speech. Lincoln uses apostrophe to make manifest the norm of tentatively considering a reasonable case and to discharge Lincoln’s own obligation to adhere to the norm; and in doing so pressures auditors to adhere to it.

(*Commentator*: Manfred Kraus, Univ. of Tübingen)

ROBERT IRISH (Engineering Communication, Univ. of Toronto)

Deepening Disagreement through Engineering Education.

This paper examines how recent moves in engineering education contribute to deep disagreement. Students who value environmental sustainability meet resistance due to fundamentally different worldviews from employers. Clashing worldviews can, as Robert Fogelin posited, render rational resolution to argument impossible. Disputants must move beyond the rational to consider the emotional and rhetorical as means to move toward productive resolution.

(*Commentator*: Brian MacPherson, Univ. of Windsor)

RONGDONG JIN (Philosophy, East China Normal Univ.)

Rationality, Reasonableness and Argumentation Theory: A Case Study of Perelman.

Perelman’s distinguishing the rational from the reasonable could be seen as an attempt to put forward a new understanding of rationality. Based upon Habermas’s concept of situated reason, this paper argues that Perelman’s explication of the relation between the rational and the reasonable answers to some extent the call for a conception of rationality in argumentation theory, and also underlies the combination of the universalistic approach and the contextualized approach in argumentation study.

(*Commentator*: Christopher Tindale, Univ. of Windsor)

DAVID KARY (Test Development, Law School Admission Council)

When is an Exercise in Logic also a Game?

This paper looks to Bernard Suits' analysis of games and game playing for at least a partial answer to the question in its title. It applies Suits' analysis to Sudoku, a popular logic puzzle, and to Analytical Reasoning, a question type in standardized assessments. The purpose is both to test Suits' analysis in a novel domain and to give educators and test developers useful insight into the relationship between logic exercises and games.

(Commentator: Sheldon Wein, St. Mary's Univ., Halifax)

FRED J. KAUFFELD (Communication Studies, Edgewood College, Madison) *Strategies for Strengthening Presumptions and Ethos by Manifestly Ensuring Accountability.*

In argumentation, as elsewhere, speakers strategically engage favorable presumptions by manifestly making themselves accountable for their communicative efforts. Such strategies provide the addressee with reasons to regard the *speaker* as accountable in specific ways and, via that regard for the speaker, with situation-specific rationales for responding positively to what the speaker says. This paper identifies some resources available to arguers for strengthening, elaborating, and focusing these special presumptions. Such presumptions strengthen an arguer's *ethos*.

(Commentator: Erik Krabbe, Univ. of Groningen)

ANDREW KIDD (Theatre Arts, Univ. of Windsor)

Cognitive Approaches to the Study of Scientific Argumentation.

It is demonstrated that cognitive approaches to argumentative analysis are particularly useful to studies of scientific argumentation and rhetoric. The paper applies relevance theory to Walton's (2008) recent study of the role of arguments from verbal definition and classification in the recategorization of Pluto as a "dwarf planet" to demonstrate how cognitive approaches can facilitate analysis of argumentation in classification and taxonomy, and can further enable interdisciplinary studies of argumentation in the rhetoric of science.

(Commentator: TBA)

JENS ELMELUND KJELDSSEN (Information Science and Media Studies, Univ. of Bergen, Norway)

Visual Argumentation in a Gore Keynote for the Climate.

The use of digital presentation tools such as PowerPoint are ubiquitous; however we still do not know much about the persuasive uses of these programs. Especially examining the use of visual analogy and visual chronology, this paper explores the use of visual argumentation in a Keynote presentation by Al Gore. I will illustrate how the images function as an integrated part of Gore's reasoning.

(Commentator: Michael Potter, University of Windsor)

MANFRED KRAUS (Classics, Univ. of Tübingen) *Cognitive Communities and Argument Communities.*

Since Toulmin's discovery of the field-dependency of arguments, and Perelman's emphasis on audiences, argumentation theorists have developed the notion of "spheres of arguments" or "argument communities." Since argument communities are communities of discourse guided by the participants' cognitive experiences, they are also cognitive communities. "Cognitive breaks" between different argument communities will produce misunderstanding and futile argument. The paper will investigate "cognitive breaks" and describe in which ways they may obstruct reasonable argumentation between communities.

(*Commentator*: Christian Plantin, Lyon Univ.)

TONE KVERNBEKK (Education, Univ. of Oslo)

Evidence-Based Practice (EBP) and Toulmin.

Much of the debate about EBP in education is hampered by misunderstandings about the function of evidence. I investigate whether Toulmin's model of argument can help improve the debate; most notably by allowing a more adequate role for evidence. There is a tendency to understand "based" as meaning "providing rules for practice". Using Toulmin's model, I argue that it is better to view evidence as the backing for warrants.

(*Commentator*: Robert C. Pinto, Univ. of Windsor)

JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR & ERIK C. W. KRABBE (Philosophy, Univ. of Groningen)

The Burden of Criticism.

We examine in what ways critical reactions to arguments can be more or less 'directive' by providing clues about how the interlocutor may defuse or at least contend with them. As to norms, we hypothesize that a critic ought to provide counter-considerations, if available, so that the proponent is helped when developing a successful argumentative strategy. This "burden of criticism" will be discussed, taking into account ideas from Karl Popper, Nicholas Rescher and David Miller.

(*Commentator*: Marcelo Dascal, Tel Aviv Univ.)

NANON LABRIE (Institute of Communication and Health, Univ. of Lugano)

Conflict and Consultation: Strategic Maneuvering in Response to Antibiotic Requests.

In medical consultation, conflict may arise for various reasons. Physicians and patients may, e.g., disagree about symptom etiology or treatment plans. Consequently, the consultation can become argumentative. Discussions about antibiotics are specifically prevalent in doctor-patient interaction. When such discussion emerges, the participants *maneuver strategically* to maintain a balance between reasonableness and effectiveness, as well as patient-participation and evidence-based medication. In this paper, two such cases are explored, taking a pragma-dialectical perspective to the argumentative discussion.

(*Commentator*: Douglas Walton, Univ. of Windsor)

MARCIN LEWIŃSKI (Philosophy, New Univ. of Lisbon)

Monologue, Dialogue, or Polylogue: Which Model for Public Deliberation?

Modelling argumentation as a dialogue brings distinct advantages over monological approaches to analysing actual argumentation. Yet, models of dialogue are typically built of di-logical exchanges between two parties (pro and con). By contrast, many public arguments and deliberations are in fact poly-logues involving many parties. I argue that salient features of polylogues (the possibility for collective (counter-)argument, departures from a simple *ababab* sequential organisation of exchanges, etc.) are theoretically significant for modelling public argumentation.

(*Commentator*: J. Anthony Blair, Univ. of Windsor)

CHRISTOPH LUMER (Philosophy, Univ. of Siena, Italy) *Argument Schemes – an Epistemological Approach.*

The aim of the paper is to develop a classification of basic argument types or argument schemes on the basis of the epistemological approach to argumentation. This approach has provided strict rules for

several types of argument, which may be brought into a system of basic irreducible schemes, that rely on different parts of epistemology. The system covers a huge mass of different argument types and thus resolves the problem of proliferation of argument schemes.

(Commentator: Ian Dove, Univ. of Nevada at Las Vegas)

FABRIZIO MACAGNO (Institute of Philosophy of Language, New Univ. of Lisbon)

Implicatures and Hierarchies of Presumptions.

Implicatures are described as particular forms reasoning from best explanation, in which the paradigm of possible explanations consists of the possible semantic interpretations of a sentence or a word. The need for explanation will be shown to be triggered by conflicts between presumptions, namely hearer's dialogical expectations and the presumptive sentence meaning. What counts as the best explanation can be established on the grounds of hierarchies of presumptions, dependent on dialogue types and interlocutors' culture.

(Commentator: Frank Zenker, Univ. of Lund, Sweden)

GEORDIE MCCOMB (Philosophy, Univ. of Toronto)

Naturalistic Methods, Constitutive Principles and Einstein's Elevator.

First, I motivate the following dilemma. Since Einstein's elevator thought-experiment is a method used in a natural science, it is a *naturalistic* method; yet, since it is a method used to justify a constitutive principle, it is a *non-naturalistic* method. Second, I argue that *prima facie* the best response to this dilemma, given my motivations for it, is to allow that some naturalistic methods can be used to justify constitutive principles.

(Commentator: Pierre Boulos, Univ. of Windsor)

DIMA MOHAMMED (Argumentation Theory, Univ. of Amsterdam)

Strategic Manoeuvring in Simultaneous Discussions.

In public political discussions, an accusation of inconsistency can play a role in a number of discussions that run simultaneously. In this paper, I discuss the implications of considering the different simultaneous discussions to which the accusation contributes when examining it. While the different political considerations derived from these discussions can shed significant light on the strategic function of the accusation, such considerations may also lead to an inconsistent critical evaluation of it.

(Commentator: Robert Rowland, Univ. of Kansas)

RADU NECULAU (Philosophy, Univ. of Windsor)

Practical Reasoning as Creative Social Imagination.

According to Charles Taylor, practical reasoning helps us overcome deeply cultural conflicts of value when we are able to show that the passage from one value to another represents an epistemic gain.

This paper argues that practical reasoning can be effective in pathological cases of cultural convergence but only if it is understood as a species of creative social imagination that makes transparent the nature of the interests that are incorporated in generalizable practical norms.

(Commentator: James Bradley, Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland)

FABIO PAGLIERI (Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome)

Choosing to Argue: Towards a Theory of Argumentative Decision-Making.

This paper outlines the relevance of decision-making for argumentation, and some theoretical implications of looking at arguments from the standpoint of decision theory. I analyze several strategic decisions required for arguing: whether to enter an argument or not, what arguments to use and how to present them, how to react to arguments of the counterpart, how to respond to challenges and objections, how to solve potential ambiguities, when and how to end the argument.

(Commentator: Chris Reed, Univ. of Dundee)

STEVEN PATTERSON (Philosophy, Marygrove College; CRRAR Visiting Research Fellow)

Reflective Equilibrium and Conductive Argument.

In this paper I compare and contrast Rawls's notion of reflective equilibrium with Wellman's notion of conductive argument. In the course of so doing I will address two key questions: (1) Are conductive argument and reflective equilibrium best understood as modes of reasoning or types of argument? and (2) What relationship (logical, pragmatic, etc.), if any, is there between them?

(Commentator: Charles Blatz, Univ. of Toledo)

ROOSMARYN PILGRAM (Argumentation Theory, Univ. of Amsterdam)

Soundness Criteria for a Doctor's Argumentation by Authority.

In medical consultation, the patient by definition regards the doctor as an authority on health problems. A doctor might decide to use his/her authority in argumentation to support claims in the consultation. The question arises to what extent it is reasonable for a doctor to present authority argumentation in medical consultation. In this paper, I will determine the specific reasonableness conditions for a doctor's argumentation by authority in medical consultation based on the pragma-dialectical theory.

(Commentator: Andrew Kidd, Univ. of Windsor)

LAURA ELIZABETH PINTO (Education, Niagara Univ.) & GRAHAM P. MCDONOUGH (Education, Univ. of Victoria)

High School Philosophy: Critical Thinking, or Teaching to the Text?

One of the few contexts in which Ontario high school students are introduced to argumentation in a systematic way is in Ontario's high school philosophy courses. Do high school philosophy teachers promote critical thinking and sound argumentative practices in their attempt to engage students in philosophical inquiry? We present the findings of a mixed-methods empirical study of Ontario high school philosophy teachers' pedagogical approaches which highlights how those teachers use textbooks.

(Commentator: Sharon Bailin, Simon Fraser Univ.)

ROBERT C. PINTO (Philosophy and CRRAR, Univ. of Windsor)

Emotions and Reasons.

Based on an analysis of the concept of emotion, I claim that: (a) emotions can provide reasons for action because the evaluative attitudes at their core can, together with cognitive attitudes, provide reasons for the conative attitudes (desires and intentions) from which actions flow, (b) evaluative attitudes can be rooted in reasons insofar as they arise from a combination of cognitive attitudes together with other evaluative or conative attitudes which (potentially) render them rational.

(Commentator: Trudy Govier, Univ. of Lethbridge)

CHRISTIAN PLANTIN (CNRS - Lyon Univ.)

Persuasion or Alignment?

Persuasion is a fact of social life, upon which positive and negative views can be taken. Argumentative rhetoric is commonly functionally defined as aiming at persuasion. Different concepts of persuasion are used in this discipline, and many other disciplines focus on persuasion. This presentation takes an “inter-discursive” view of argumentation, and, following the “Hamblin’s trade” suggests a possible replacement of the concept of persuasion by the interactional concept of *alignment*.

(Commentator: David Zarefsky, *Northwestern Univ.*)

GILBERT PLUMER (Test Development, Law School Admission Council)

Cognition and Literary Ethical Criticism.

“Ethical criticism” is an approach to literary studies that holds that reading certain carefully selected novels can make us ethically better people, e.g., by stimulating our sympathetic imagination (Nussbaum). I will try to show that this nonargumentative approach cheapens the persuasive force of novels and that its inherent bias and censorship undercuts what is perhaps the principal value and defence of the novel – that reading novels can be critical to one’s learning how to think.

(Commentator: Louis Groarke, St. Francis Xavier Univ., Nova Scotia)

LOTTE VAN POPPEL (Argumentation Theory, Univ. of Amsterdam)

What to do? The Analysis and Evaluation of Pragmatic Argumentation.

In this paper, I will compare different approaches to the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation. Pragmatic argumentation is usually characterized as argumentation that justifies a claim in which some course of action is advocated or discouraged by referring to its positive or negative consequences. While focussing on health promotion material, where pragmatic argumentation plays a prominent role, I will address some particularities of this type of argumentation that complicate its analysis and evaluation.

(Commentator: Linda Carozza, York Univ.)

FEDERICO PUPPO (Research Centre on Legal Methodology, Univ. of Trento)

“Building the Fact” in Trial: A Rhetorical Account.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the method by which it would be possible to deal with the cognition of the fact in the trial. Since there is any “fact” neither before nor in the trial, but only a “representation” of it, the problem is how to evaluate the persuasiveness of the parties' discourses which are rhetorical in nature and oriented towards a “building” of the fact as a narration.

(Commentator: Beth Innocenti, Univ. of Kansas)

CHRYSI RAPANTA (Communication Sciences, Univ. of Lugano, Switzerland)

Argumentation and Design Deliberation: A Mutual Relationship.

Argumentation as an oral communication activity has been underlined by many authors as the base of collaboration in a task-oriented team. At the same time, argumentative (practical) reasoning strongly relates with the cognitive processes of problem-solving and decision-making. Design meetings among professionals in an institutional context is an example where collaboration and practical reasoning meet, thus the role of argumentation is major. This paper focuses on the identification of argumentation *during* and *for* design deliberation.

(Commentator: Carole Blair, Univ. of North Carolina)

CHRIS REED (Argumentation Research Group, Univ. of Dundee)

Implicit Speech Acts are Ubiquitous. Why? They Join the Dots.

Implicit speech acts perform a vital function in argument dialogue, where a key challenge is to account for the 'glue' between utterances. The ways such speech acts are licensed and governed arise from the dialogical context, which in turn defines the argumentative glue which underpins them. Thus, the same explicit speech acts uttered in different dialogical contexts can have different implicit speech acts connecting them, and, thereby, can be used to make different arguments.

(Commentator: Frans van Eemeren, *Univ. of Amsterdam*)

M. LOUISE RIPLEY (Business and Women's Studies, York Univ.)

Argumentation and Emotional Cognition in Advertisements.

From Spinoza to today, it has been noted that human beings respond to what is unusual in our lives. The advertising community knows this and struggles to find ways to be unusual in the face of an estimated 3,500 ads per day. One way is through emotion. This paper examines arguments made in advertisements where emotional cognition is appealed to and how they differ from ads that appeal to rational cognition.

(Commentator: Maureen Gowing, Univ. of Windsor)

PHILIP ROSE (Philosophy, Univ. of Windsor)

Inference as Growth: Peirce's Ecstatic Logic of Illation

For Peirce, logic is essentially illative, a relation of inferential *growth*. It follows that inference and argumentation are essentially *ecstatic*, an asymmetrical, ampliative movement from antecedent to consequent. It also follows that logic is inherently inductive. While deduction remains an essential and irreplaceable aspect of logic, it should be seen as a more abstract or more 'degenerate' expression of the illative essence of inference (and argumentation) as such.

(Commentator: John Woods, Univ. of British Columbia)

JUHANI RUDANKO (Department of English, Univ. of Tampere)

On an Informal Fallacy in Early Political Discourse.

In the paper, a particular type of the fallacy of *ad socordiam*, not hitherto discussed, is identified in its context with authentic data from 1789. The fallacy involves a hidden intention as a salient feature. The paper also addresses the issue of how inferences can be made about hidden intentions. Further, the paper gives a label to the particular type of *ad socordiam*, and discusses its nature and relation to another type of *ad socordiam*.

(Commentator: Stephen Pender, Univ. of Windsor)

RASMUS RØNLEV (Rhetoric, Univ. of Copenhagen)

A Rhetorical Approach to Understanding Online Public Debate.

In my paper I will discuss the potential of taking a rhetorical approach to public debate as a theoretical starting point when analyzing and evaluating online public debate, namely Gerard A. Hauser's public theory. My discussion will be based on the preliminary findings of my PhD project on online rhetorical citizenship and the debate between users of Danish online newspapers.

(Commentator: Jean Goodwin, Iowa State Univ.)

CRISTIÁN SANTIBÁÑEZ YÁÑEZ (CEAR, Diego Portales Univ., Chile)

Evolution, Cognition and Argumentation.

Sperber and Mercier maintain that argumentation is a meta-representational module. In their evolutionary view of argumentation, the function of this module would be to regulate the flow of information among interlocutors through persuasiveness on the side of the communicator and epistemic vigilance on the side of the audience. The aim of this paper is to discuss this definition of argumentation by analyzing what they mean by “communicator’s persuasiveness” and “audience epistemic vigilance.”

(*Commentator*: Michael Gilbert, York Univ.)

PAUL L. SIMARD SMITH (Philosophy, Univ. of Waterloo) & ANDREI MOLDOVAN (Philosophy, Univ. of Salamanca and Logos, Univ. of Barcelona)

Arguments as Abstract Objects.

In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word ‘argument’ exhibits the *process-product* ambiguity, or (as in Goddu 2010) an *act-object* ambiguity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term ‘argument’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments?

(*Commentator*: Geoff Goddu, Univ. of Richmond)

DOUGLAS WALTON (CRRAR, Univ. of Windsor) and THOMAS F. GORDON (Fraunhofer FOKUS, Berlin)

Modeling Critical Questions as Additional Premises.

This paper shows how the critical questions matching an argumentation scheme can be modeled in the Carneades argumentation system as three kinds of premises. Ordinary premises hold only if they are supported by sufficient arguments. Assumptions hold, by default, until they have been questioned. With exceptions the negation holds, by default, until the exception has been supported by sufficient arguments. By “sufficient arguments” we mean arguments sufficient to satisfy the applicable proof standard.

(*Commentator*: Scott Aikin, Vanderbilt Univ.)

SHELDON WEIN (Philosophy, Saint Mary's Univ.)

Productive versus Destructive Cooperation.

Providing for public goods—everything from national defense to environmental protection to infectious disease control to shared moral values—is usually modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. All the standard game theoretic solutions to prisoner’s dilemmas lead, in the real world, to assurance games yet, as Rousseau saw, coordinating in assurance games is surprisingly difficult. Distinguishing between productive and destructive prisoner’s dilemmas helps us find useful assurance amplifiers.

(*Commentator*: TBA)

MICHAEL WALSCHOTS (Philosophy, Univ. of Windsor)

Ernest Sosa and Virtuously Begging the Question.

This paper discusses the notion of epistemic circularity, supposedly different from logical circularity, and evaluates Ernest Sosa’s claim that this specific kind of circular reasoning is virtuous rather than vicious. I attempt to determine whether or not the conditions said to make epistemic circularity a

permissible instance of begging the question could make other instances of circular reasoning equally permissible.

(*Commentator*: Scott Aikin, Vanderbilt Univ.)

JOHN WOODS (Philosophy, Univ. of British Columbia)

Semantic Penumbra.

It is widely accepted by formal and informal logicians alike that a formal logic which, by the lights of English, gets the connectives wrong, nevertheless conspires to get *entailment* right – right that is, modulo English. There is a vexing problem occasioned by this semantic alienation of formal logic. It is next to impossible for formal logic to meet the expectations of realism. What, then, of informal logic?

(*Commentator*: Nicholas Griffin, *McMaster Univ.*)

JINPING YUAN LI YAO, FANG LIU and ZHIYONG HAO (Information Systems, National Univ. of Defence Technology, China)

MASDR: A Multi-agent System for Dialectical Reasoning with Imperfect Information.

Dialectical reasoning refers to critical thinking about controversial issues and evaluating conflicting viewpoints pro and con. This paper presents a multi-agent system for dialectical reasoning, called MASDR consisting of a moderator, and many participants equipped with argument generator for constructing arguments from their knowledge base. Other than two-party dialogue games applied in most argumentation system, MASDR allows more than two participants to have a voice in argumentation. Currently, MASDR has been implemented based on Jade.

(*Commentator*: TBA)

YUN XIE and MINGHUI XIONG (Institute of Logic and Cognition, Sun Yat-sen Univ.)

Whose Toulmin, and Which Logic? A Response to van Benthem.

In a recent paper, “One Logician’s Perspective on Argumentation,” van Benthem expressed his reservations about Toulmin’s diagnosis and abandonment of formal logic, and argued that Toulmin is wrong for leading the study of argumentation away from the formal approach. We will try to demonstrate that the paper is not persuasive because it commits two fallacies (Straw Person and Begging the Question). We further argue a thesis which is just the opposite of that of van Benthem’s paper.

(*Commentator*: Hans V. Hansen, Univ. of Windsor)

IGOR Ž. ŽAGAR (Educational Research Institute & Univ. of Maribor, Slovenia)

Fallacies: Do We “Use” Them or “Commit” Them?

This paper will be concerned with two questions. First, an epistemological one: do we (everyone, politicians, the media...) *commit* fallacies, or do we (intentionally) *use* them? Second, a methodological one: when we (philosophers, sociologists, discourse analysts...) detect a fallacy, on what conceptual grounds do we differentiate between committed and used fallacies? Is there a difference? Examples from Critical Discourse Analysis will be used to illustrate these questions.

(*Commentator*: Dima Mohammed, Univ. of Amsterdam)

FRANK ZENKER (Philosophy, Univ. of Lund)

Foundations for Nothing and Facts for Free?

According to Michael Rescorla's defense of *dialectical egalitarianism* in the *Philosophical Quarterly* (2009) reasoned discourse lacks a foundational structure, but saves the foundational intuition that some propositions are basic. On this view, I may select the reasons forwarded in support of a claim according to their being accepted by *particular* communities. I discuss the epistemic risk of doing so, and clarify if Rescorla's is an epistemic approach in disguise.

(*Commentator*: Fred Kauffeld, Edgewood College)
