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Keynotes addresses

Ruth Amossy

Robert Pinto

David Zarefsky

 

Agreeing on the “Reasonable”: A Discursive and Cultural Approach to Arguments

RUTH AMOSSY
ADARR (Analyse du Discours, Argumentation, Rhétorique)
Tel-Aviv University
 

Rather than the art of putting forward logically valid arguments leading to Truth, argumentation is here viewed as the use of verbal means ensuring an agreement on what can be considered reasonable by a given group, on a more or less controversial matter (Perelman 1958). What is acceptable and plausible is always co-constructed by subjects engaging in verbal interaction. It is the dynamism of this exchange, realized not only in natural language, but also in a specific cultural framework, that has to be accounted for. From this perspective, it is not enough to reconstruct patterns of reasoning. As logos is by definition both Reason and Language, abstract schemata have to be examined in their verbal realization in a given situation of discourse. Such an approach to arguments allows for a “thick” description taking into account their discursive and communicational aspects, as well as argumentation’s constitutive dialogism and its inscription in a set of common representations, opinions and beliefs (a doxa). These principles will be exemplified by a short analysis of political discourses borrowed from different national cultures.

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 Argumentation and the force of reasons

ROBERT PINTO
Department of Philosophy
 University of Windsor
 

Beginning with a very brief survey of argument cultures in the sense of the various cultures of theorizing about arguments and argumentation, this presentation will attempt answer the question “What must argument or argumentation be if it can be approached and illuminated in the variety of different ways that have appeared in the argumentation literature?”

The presentation will guided by two orienting ideas. First, that argumentation consists in offering and/or exchanging reasons – either reasons for adopting one or another point of view towards a propositional content or else reasons for acting in one or another way.  Second, that the force of reasons is through and through a normative force – both because (i) reasons are always and essentially either good reasons or bad reasons and because (ii) having a good reason for X "justifies" X or makes it right.

The presentation will attempt to outline the core of an account of reasons by offering a coherent set of answers to the following questions: (a) What is it for a person to have a reason? (b)  What is it that persons have reasons for? (c) How do the sorts of norms to which reasons must answer differ from other sorts of norms? And finally (d) How does the sort of "justification" or “rightness” bestowed by reasons differ from other sorts of justification or rightness?

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What Does an Argument Culture Look Like?

 DAVID ZAREFSKY
School of Communication
Northwestern University
 

The very term “argument culture” has been used in the title of a popular book to disparage what the author believes is an epidemic of bickering and quarrelsomeness in contemporary society.  On this view, an argument culture is detrimental to cooperation that improves the quality of life.  Our use of the term, I hope, is more positive and productive.  “Culture” focuses our attention less on disembodied sets of propositions than on argument as process, method, and human activity.  A culture designates a body of norms and practices, and the people who engage in them, that are sustained across time.  The norms may be implicit and even unacknowledged, yet they undergird the practices.

A strong argument culture is characterized by at least five productive tensions: between commitment and contingency, between partisanship and restraint, between personal conviction and sensitivity to the audience, between reasonableness and subjectivity, and between decision and nonclosure.  Differences in how communities manage these tensions explain why there are multiple argument cultures and, hence, why we need to understand arguing both within and among different cultures.  The keynote presentation will elaborate these five productive tensions, offer some examples of argument cultures that negotiate them in various ways, and consider what it means to argue across cultures in a world that is both increasingly diverse and increasingly atomized.

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