Abstracts A-I

Andrew Aberdein (Humanities and Communication, Florida Institute of Technology) Argumentation schemes and communities of argumentational practice.

Is it possible to distinguish communities of arguers by tracking the argumentation schemes they employ? There are many ways of relating schemes to communities, but not all are productive. Attention must be paid not only to the admissibility of schemes within a community of argumentational practice, but also to their comparative frequency. Two examples are discussed: informal mathematics, a convenient source of well-documented argumentational practice, and anthropological evidence of nonstandard reasoning.

Scott Akin (Philosophy, Western Kentucky University) A self-defeat problem for the rhetorical theory of argument.

The rhetorical theory of argument, if held as the conclusion of an argument, is self-defeating. If one has the view that one’s reasons are arranged with the sole purpose of eliciting assent, one does not view one’s commitments as reflective of truth. The rhetorical theory can be refined, but these refinements either make the theory subject to a second self-defeat problem or tacitly an epistemic theory of argument.

Khameiel Al Tamimi (Philosophy, University of Windsor) Feminist alternatives to traditional argumentation

In this paper, I will look at the critiques that feminists have proposed to existing styles of argumentation. There are two prominent lines of feminist criticism of argumentation: the epistemic critique which argues that women were socialized to argue differently and the equity critique which asserts that argumentation is a patriarchal attempt to dominate one another, as such it is adversarial in nature. I will then discuss the alternatives feminists have proposed to traditional argumentation.

Corrina Andone (Argumentation Theory, University of Amsterdam) The analysis of confrontational strategic manoeuvres in a political interview.

The aim of this paper is to indicate how knowledge of the argumentative activity type of a political interview plays a role in a Pragma-Dialectical analysis of confrontational strategic manoeuvres. The author gives an account of the contextual pre-conditions created by the rules and conventions of a political interview for the performance by a politician of responses to an accusation of inconsistency advanced by an interviewer.

Srđan Atanasovski (Musicology, University of Arts, Belgrade) Music and cultural differences: Strategies of arguing about badness in music.

I will claim that every valuing of a certain cultural product is actually a kind of political statement pointed toward a specific social group. The focus of my paper will be the question how the arguments about badness in music are constructed. I will study the case of “new-composed folk music”, a prominent genre of popular music in Serbia, which is perpetually being dismissed by the intellectual elite.

Sharon Bailin (Education, Simon Fraser University) & Mark Battersby (Philosophy, Capilano College) Inquiry: a dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking.

We argue that the central goal of critical thinking is the making of reasoned judgments. Arriving at reasoned judgments in most cases is a dialectical process involving the comparative weighing of a variety of contending positions and arguments. Recognizing this dialectical dimension means that critical thinking pedagogy should focus on the kind of comparative evaluation which we make in actual contexts of disagreement and debate.

Shawn Batt (Arts and Humanities, Michigan State University) Threats to the integrity of expert argument cultures.

Cultural factors provide troublesome ambiguity for consumers of argument, so it is unsurprising that authority and expertise are immensely attractive fallbacks. Unfortunately, expertise faces threats to its integrity and reliability that go beyond fallacious reasoning or inappropriate maneuvering. A cultural framework for argument analysis provides a critical practice more readily inclusive of messy contextual factors like values, practices, standpoints, and power. To illustrate, this paper discusses cases related to accountability in education and health care.

Todd Battistelli (English, University of Texas, Austin) Rhetoric, dialectic and derailment in church-state arguments.

This paper will examine chronically derailed church-state separation arguments in order to explore the extent to which rhetorical and dialectical approaches can be reconciled. I will consider broader conceptions of rhetoric than those employed to date in studies of strategic maneuvering. While rhetorical appeals, such as claims of persecution, can terminally polarize church-state arguments, they may also serve as means for recovering from dialectical derailment.

Patrick Belanger, Kara Gilbert & Tom Goodnight (Communication, Annenberg School for Communication, UCLA) On argumentation, reconciliation, and forgiveness.

In 2008, the governments of Australia and Canada apologized to indigenous peoples of each respective country for past wrongs, while the United States House of Representatives offered an apology to African peoples and their descendants for slavery. This paper conducts a comparative analysis of the three national moments to explore the capacities for language-based argumentation to invite forgiveness, mitigate historical social injustices, and promote inter-cultural accord that weaves temporal sinews of reconciliation.

Hilde van Belle (Applied Language Studies, Catholic University, Leuven) Verbal and visual antithesis in the media.

I will examine the development of some oppositions in a particular newspaper article about a murder case in which spoken scientific evidence is put against the silence of the accused. I will examine how textual and visual pairs are pushed into more, less, or a different opposition, in an attempt to further our understanding of how visual rhetoric might function as antithesis.

Lilian Bermejo Luque (Philosophy, UNED [Spanish Open University]) Rhetorical meaning and rhetorical import.

I make a distinction between a traditional conception of Rhetoric as a corpus of practical knowledge to improve persuasive abilities, and a more contemporary conception of Rhetoric as a hermeneutic discipline for dealing with communicative activities as a means of influence. I argue that the key difference between both conceptions is whether or not they deal with the rhetorical properties of discourses as a matter of speakers’ intentions.

J. Anthony Blair (CRRAR, University of Windsor) The philosophy of argument.

The paper proposes the ingredients of any philosophy of argument. These elements include: its domain; the ingredients of arguments; definitions of basic terms; the ontology of argument; the norms that apply to arguments; functions, purposes, goals; modes communication, methods of analysis and evaluation; perspectives for evaluation nature of a theory (vs. a philosophy) of argument; contending theories.

Charles Blatz (Philosophy, University of Toledo) Culture, judgment, integration of attention and argumentation.

Some exchanges of reasons are agonistic. Others work mutually, as in planning and adjusting divergent understanding. Mutual argumentation subconsciously yields judgment that integrates and clarifies a common vision coordinating interrelated lives. It harmonizes agents sharing a space of action and understanding. Pierre Bourdieu held that such thought generates and expresses culture, patterning a logic that reflexively constrains itself. This discussion examines Bourdieu’s views as an analysis of mutual argumentation.

George Boger (Philosophy, Canisisus College, Buffalo) Promoting a culture of justice.

Infusing logic with new rhetoric, dialogical pragmatics, and emphasizing argument context revolutionized the practice of logic. Critiquing oppressive practices and promoting justice, argumentationists empower participants to mediate their own argumentative situations. Against relativism to rescue the normative utility of good argument, argumentationists invoke the universal audience. Still, context-concerns eclipse its independence or resurrect Cartesian rationalist absolutism. This vacillation imposes an external mediation that subverts establishing theoretical ground for promoting an empowering culture of justice.

Henrik Bohlin (Culture and Communication, Södertörns High School, Stockholm) The dynamics of belief systems: a Wittgensteinian view.

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues both that certain propositions belong to our “frame of reference” and are “exempt from doubt”, and that this “river–bed of thoughts” can change. Exploring this seeming contradiction, I argue that such changes can take place as the result of rational argumentation, although of a highly indirect nature, and suggest that something like this can hold for argumentation between cultures.

Patrick R. Bondy (Philosophy, McMaster) When reasons don't work.

The aim of this paper is to extend Miranda Fricker's conception of testimonial injustice to what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer's social identity brings listeners to place too little credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to put in place a type of temporary “affirmative action” plan for argument evaluation: attach “bonus points” when evaluating arguments from people with social identities towards which you are disposed to be argumentatively unjust.

Katarzyna Budzynska (Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw) Reasoning, argumentation and persuasion.

In the paper I want to give a new account of notions of reasoning, argumentation, and persuasion – one that resolves problems of the traditional accounts. For example, circular reasoning or question-begging arguments (God exists, because there is God) are considered a fallacy in informal logic, whereas formal logic holds that this reasoning is valid. The new account suggests a possibility of reconciliation of the informal and formal perspective.

Chris Campolo (Philosophy, Hendrix College) Deep disagreement in a multicultural world.

I respond to Phillips’ criticisms of my account of the nature of deep disagreement. I show that Phillips incorrectly characterizes the form of my argument, that she fails to acknowledge a key point regarding what can be articulated as a reason, and that she fails to distinguish between reasoning and other problem solving strategies. I agree with Phillips about the challenges posed by multiculturality; I briefly discuss what we can do when we cannot reason.

Alexandru Cârlan (Communication and Public Relations, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Roumania) Gradualism of relevance in argumentation.

Current research in Argumentation Theory (AT) seems to be based on a binary view on relevance, inherited from H. P. Grice. Yet, relevance has a gradual nature, a point frequently ignored in AT. A theoretical framework able to account for gradualism of relevance is proposed, which might provide new insights about what is traditionally called fallacy of relevance, and a better explanation of why such traditional fallacies might not be fallacious in some cases.

Claudia M. Carlos (English, Carnegie Mellon University) Indirection in Montaigne’s ‘Des cannibales’ and Emerson’s ‘Montaigne, or, the Sceptic’.

The art of “safely” criticizing the powerful through indirect argument was a well-established concept among ancient rhetoricians. What use might such arguments have in a democracy? In exploring an answer to this question, I will consider two essays, both examples of indirection but produced under two distinct sets of cultural conditions: Montaigne’s “Des cannibales” (1588) and Emerson’s “Montaigne, or, the Sceptic” (1850).

Linda Carozza (Philosophy, York University) Testing emotional arguments and their cultural influences with circles.

This paper focuses on emotional arguments, specifically the impact cultural identities can have on the mode. I offer examples of emotional arguments in mediation settings that may be affected by cultural identities and/or specific contexts. Dealing with emotional arguments and the added element of cultural identity is murky territory; here, I begin to test whether a type of mediation called Circles can help to elucidate some of the ambiguity in these argumentation contexts.

Marc Champagne (Philosophy, York University) We, the professional sages: analytic philosophy's arrogation of argument.

One claim reiterated with increasing boldness by the “analytic” tradition in philosophy is that what sets it apart from long-time rivals is a shared adherence to proper norms of argumentation. Gradated deviancy from this (supposedly univocal) canon by English-speaking practitioners has therefore raised important questions about who can repair under the banner “professional philosopher”. We will portray as deeply worrisome the idea that argumentation should secure not just conclusions, but disciplinary membership as well.

Daniel H. Cohen (Philosophy, Colby College) Sincerity, Santa Claus arguments and dissensus in coalitions.

It is a virtue of virtue theory approaches to argumentation that they can integrate the many different factors that make arguments good arguments. The insights of virtue argumentation are brought to bear on a variety of versions of the requirement that good arguments must have good premises, concluding that a sincerity condition serves better than truth or assertability conditions, despite some apparently counterintuitive consequences for arguments involving heterogeneous coalitions.

Claudio Durán (Philosophy, York University) Revisiting emotional arguments in the context of western culture.

In the context of cornerstone ideas of Western Culture, according to which arguments should be studied and evaluated fundamentally from the perspective of logic, this paper focuses on three inter-related issues: (1) Why should emotional arguments be studied and evaluated from the perspective of logic? (2) Could/should logical arguments be examined from the perspective of emotions? (3) Emotional arguments should be investigated from the perspective of emotions.

Frans H. van Eemeren & Bart Garssen (Argumentation Theory, University of Amsterdam) Strategic maneuvering with argument schemes in the European parliament.

Strategic maneuvering with argument schemes is studied in debates in the European Parliament. The choice of argument schemes and the critical questions that must be anticipated are dependent on the specific constraints and opportunities for strategic maneuvering in this activity type. What are the characteristics of a debate in European Parliament that predetermine the possibilities for strategic maneuvering with argument schemes? What kind of constraints and opportunities for strategic maneuvering can be distinguished?

Eveline T. Feteris (Argumentation Theory, University of Amsterdam) Strategic manoeuvring with linguistic arguments in legal discussions.

In legal discussions, parties and judges often use linguistic arguments in a strategic way to defend their position. I analyse and evaluate the strategic manoeuvring with linguistic arguments in legal discussions by integrating insights from Pragma-Dialectical theory and legal theory. I establish norms for acceptable strategic manoeuvring and on the basis of these norms I give an analysis and evaluation of some examples from Dutch civil law.

John E. Fields (Philosophy, Edgewood College) Internet testimony and the alleged culture of youth gullibility.

The author argues that recent data suggesting an emerging culture of gullibility among young Internet users is best explained by the latter’s non-culpable misapplication of common testimonial norms to Internet settings. The author further argues for the likelihood that the norms relative to such settings will gradually change, basing this upon research done on the types of norms of trust that tend to evolve in repeated transactions involving significant informational asymmetry.

Maurice A. Finocchiaro (Philosophy, University of Nevada, Las Vegas) Meta-argumentation in Hume’s critique of the Design Argument.

I examine Hume’s critique of the design argument through a critical examination of Stephen Barker’s reconstruction that Hume’s Dialogues is a (1) powerful (2) non-inductive (3) meta-argument (4) by analogy claiming that the design argument is an (5) inductive ground-level argument by analogy, which is (6) weak because (7) it is similar to many other arguments by analogy that are obviously weak and (8) it is dissimilar from many other arguments by analogy that are obviously strong.

James B. Freeman (Philosophy, Hunter College, CUNY) Justifying higher-level moral principles: a role for argumentation?

Suppose two persons disagree over whether an act is right, justifying their judgments by appealing to divergent higher-level moral principles. These principles function as backing and rebuttals in their argumentation. To justify these principles, we may argue either that they would be accepted in some ideal model or that they are in reflective equilibrium with our considered moral judgments. Disagreement over the model indicates difference in philosophical anthropology but does not preclude resolution through argument.

Andrea Gilardoni (Italy) Using the ‘Protocols’: fallacies and rhetorical strategies.

In our contribution we will analize the way the Protocols of the Elders of Zion are used by anti-Semite or anti-Zionist propaganda. We will try to show how persuasive manipulation systematically violates the so-called “Pragma-Dialectical rules for reasonable discussion” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). In destroying the possibility of a fair discussion, such strategies are particularly effective in persuading not the other party of a dialectical discussion but the target-audience of this “forbidden rhetoric”.

Kara Gilbert and Gordon Whyte (Centre for Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University) Argument and medicine: a model of reasoning for clinical practice.

In a doctor-linguist collaboration, a framework of reasoning in clinical contexts is presented. Arguments used for inquiry, justification and persuasion are sketched in diagnosis, counseling, and management settings integral to everyday clinical practice thereby extending the diagnostic function typically associated with clinical reasoning per se. A system of logic, a method of persuasive orientation, and a synthesis of negotiation in dialogue are then elaborated to illustrate the complexity of argument practice in medical culture.

David M. Godden (Philosophy, Old Dominion University) The epistemic utility of Toulmin’s argument fields.

Toulmin’s DWC model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures through the thesis of field dependency: that the normative features of arguments vary from one field to the next. Yet, little consensus exists concerning the nature and foundations of argument fields. This paper explores the question of whether Toulminian fields have any useful role to play in the epistemic evaluation of arguments.

Geoff Goddu (Philosophy, University of Richmond) Refining Hitchcock’s definition of argument.

David Hitchcock, in his recent “Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument” (2007), defends a recursive definition of ‘argument’. I shall present and discuss several problems that arise for his definition. I shall argue that while some of these problems can be resolved, some leave us with incompatible choices—if we attempt to resolve one problem one way we are forced to a dubious resolution of another problem.

G. Thomas Goodnight (Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California) Critical thinking in a digital age: argumentation and the projects of new media literacy.

How does the digital age pose new challenges for argumentation studies? The paper reviews select goals from the projects of critical thinking as explained by Alec Fisher and Michael Scriven, Carol Ann Facione, Peter A. Facione and C. Giancarlo, and the American Philosophical Association. Then, I inquire into newly emergent tasks for argumentation studies in the interests of addressing the special requirements for addressing media literacy in a digital age.

Philosophers of argumentation and of testimony suggest that we can rely on what someone says because of its epistemic merits. If so, then we should never credit Wikipedia, since we cannot assess what its anonymous contributors know. I propose instead that Wikipedia can have pragmatic merits, in that the contributors' passion for the project, and the emerging communicative design through which that passion is made manifest, provide a reason for trust.

Jim Gough (Philosophy, Red Deer College, Saskatchewan) & Mano Daniel (Philosophy, Douglas College, British Columbia) Composition and division.

A concise diagnosis of the related fallacies of composition and division is elusive because there is no purely formal, mechanical process of critical evaluation. We examine a number of arguments that reject the charge of fallaciously moving from part to whole or vice versa in order to better clarify the nature of such reasoning and suggest some normative options that facilitate the identification of legitimate and illegitimate instances of the inference.

Trudy Govier (Philosophy, University of Lethbridge) More on dichotomization: Flip-flops of two mistakes.

Dichotomous claims can be wrong for a variety of reasons. I will attend here to failures of exhaustiveness, considering two intellectual moves. The Error of Contrariety occurs when we misrepresent contrary predicates as contradictory ones. The Error of Vacuity occurs when we divide a continuum so as to construct two contradictory predicates ‘Q’ and ‘not-Q’, constructing a true but uninformative dichotomy. These pre-formal errors will be illustrated with reference to ‘male/female,’‘inductive/deductive,’ ‘science/non-science’ and ‘theism/atheism.’

Dale Hample (Communication, University of Maryland) Consensus, dissensus, and a third way, learned ignorance.

The simplest statement of the relationship between consensus and dissensus is that arguments are supposed to begin in dissensus and end in consensus. This essay introduces a third state for argumentation, learned ignorance. Nicolas of Cusa’s de Docta Ignorantia (1440) lays out both a case and a logic for argumentation that is not designed to end in a clear conclusion.

Donald L. Hatcher (Philosophy and Religion, Baker University) Should critical thinking courses include the critique of religious beliefs?

Over the last four years, there have been five best sellers all critical of religion and religious belief. It seems that there is great interest in questions about religious belief. Ironically, critical thinking texts seldom examine the topic. This paper will evaluate eight arguments to exempt religious belief from rational critique. I conclude that the topic of religious belief should not be exempt from critical thinking classes.

Mika Hietanen (Language and Communication, Åbo Akademi University, Finland) Finnish working-class argumentation – a minimalist exercise.

Finnish oral discourse is generally considered to be something of a minimalist exercise. Expressions of such discourse are plentiful in Aki Kaurismäki's Proletariat Trilogy (1986, 1988, 1990). The article presents an analysis of argumentative dialogues in these movies. The methodological approach involves Searle’s speech act theory, Gricean maxims, and analysis of argumentative strategy. The result is an analytical understanding of urban working-class argumentation as it is portrayed in three of the most known Finnish movies.

David Hitchcock (Philosophy, McMaster University) The culture of everyday spoken arguments.

More than 40 arguments were selected by random sampling methods from calls to radio and television phone-in programs. I discuss whether my general theory of inference evaluation applies to them and how frequently they exemplify a recognized argument scheme. I also compare their dependence on context, their complexity and their quality to those features of a previously studied sample of 50 scholarly arguments.

Paul van den Hoven (Utrecht Institute of Linguistics, Utrecht University) Argumentative discourse as a sign.

Choices in the presentation of the reasons in argumentative discourse function as a signifier that the author claims a specific conceptualization of the rationality. This explains in which order arguments are presented, which verb tenses are use, whether subjectivity markers are used or avoided. We will focus on the analysis of the preferred presentation of the arguments by judges and show how this presentation coincides with the ideal of a modernist 17th century
rationality.

Michael Hoppman (Communication, Northeastern University) The rule of similarity as intercultural basis of defeasable argumentation

Catharine Hundleby (Philosophy, University of Windsor) Fallacy forward: situating and revising fallacy theory.

I suggest that we can account for both the diversity of logical fallacies and their dependence on vagaries of interpretation by situating them historically, which will also increase their pedagogical value by attending to which fallacies are important at this point in the development of our culture. We must at least sideline the archaic fallacies, and bring into focus the fallacies identified by cognitive psychologists and social theorists, perhaps including experimental philosophers.

Constanza Ihnen (Argumentation Theory, University of Amsterdam) Pragmatic argumentation in parliamentary debates: the British Terrorism Bill (2005).

The paper outlines some institutional characteristics of Second Reading debates on public bills in the British House of Commons that can assist in the analysis and evaluation of MP’s pragmatic argumentation. Special attention is paid to the institutional preconditions for the application of a pragmatic argument scheme. The theoretical starting point is the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Claims are illustrated with examples taken from the Second Reading debate on the British Terrorism Bill (2005).

Beth Innocenti (Communication, University of Kansas) Crying foul to counter questionable tactics.

How do crying foul strategies, such as accusing an opponent of trying to "terrify" into a decision, pressure arguers to argue well? I submit that they work by (1) making a norm determinate, (2) making manifest that the opponent is damaging the deliberations, and (3) inviting retaliation. I will explain why they generate pressure to adhere to norms of argument, particularly when the norms align with those of a broader political culture.