Abstracts M-Z

Beth Innocenti Manolescu (Communication, University of Kansas)  Evaluating fear appeals

I inquire into the issue of how to evaluate fear appeals. I propose to suggest modifications to Walton's (2000) position that will help theorists to better assess the place of fear appeals in complex argumentation such as political discourse. Specifically, I make a case for evaluating the argument as actually presented rather than a reconstruction, and for understanding the practical reasoning involved not as an interior monologue but as relational and grounded in particular circumstances.

Danny Marrero (Humanities, University of Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Colombia) How to evaluate arguments in multicultural argumentative dialogues?

The aim of this paper is to present a framework for evaluating arguments in multicultural argumentative dialogues. In these dialogues there is not a common knowledge to evaluate arguments because their participants are members of different ethnical and cultural groups. To solve this problem this paper will propose a multicultural theory of argumentation that will criticize the Blair-Johnson’s claim (1977) that one of the causes of the fallacies is the ethnocentrism.

Vesel Memedi (Communication, South East European University, Macedonia) Resolving deep disagreement: a case in point

The shocking statement made by Robert Fogelin over 20 years ago when he claimed that discourses that are in deep disagreement cannot be resolved rationally, is still causing many problems to argumentation theorists. In this paper, however, I argue that discourses that are in deep disagreement, at least some of them, can be rationally resolved by introducing the concept of “third party” to those particular discourses. This will be done by concentrating on a case in point.  

Dima Mohammed  (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric,  University of Ámsterdam)  Argumentative activity types and the account of arguers’ empirical aims

This paper examines the concept of argumentative activity type as an integration of institutional insights into the pragma-dialectical theory. Since institutional contexts influence the argumentative exchanges that occur in them, such integration is necessary for an empirically adequate account of argumentative discourse. Activity types account for the institutional aims of the arguers and provide tools to trace the influence of these aims on the arguers’ attempt to balance between their dialectical and rhetorical aims.

 
Paula Olmos  (Logic, History and Philosophy of Science, Spanish Open University) Making public: Testimony and socially sanctioned common grounds

Contrary to current individualistic Epistemology, Classical Rhetoric provides us with a pragmatical conception of ‘testimony’ as a source provided to the orator by the particular community in which he acts. In order to count as usable ‘testimony’, any linguistic instance must comply with specific rules of social sanction. A deliberate attention to the social practices in which ‘testimony’ is given and assessed may provide us with a more accurate view of its epistemological role.

Fabio Paglieri (Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome)   No more charity, please! Enthymematic parsimony and the pitfall of benevolence

Why are enthymemes so frequent? Are we dumb arguers, smart rhetoricians, or parsimonious reasoners? This paper investigates systematic use of enthymemes, criticizing the application of the principle of charity to their interpretation. In contrast, I propose to analyze enthymematic argumentation in terms of parsimony, i.e. as a manifestation of the rational tendency to economize over scant resources. Consequences of this view on the current debate on enthymemes and on their rational reconstruction are discussed.
 

Robert C. Pinto (Philosophy, University of Windsor)  On understanding ‘probably’ and other modal qualifiers

 An examination of several approaches to the force of ‘probably’, when it is used to qualify the conclusions of arguments and inferences. Among the views examined are those of Toulmin and of Wilfrid Sellars.  The paper recommends taking the utterance of “Probably p’ to be licensing or authorizing the adoption of a particular doxastic attitude toward p, and offers a functional account of that particular doxastic attitude.

 
H. José Plug  (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)  Analyzing and evaluating argumentation in parliamentary debates

In political science the quality of argumentation in parliamentary debates often plays an important role in the evaluation of the democratic process.  I will discuss to what extent the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory offers a fruitful vantage point for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation in parliamentary debates and which institutional preconditions of this specific type of debate should be taken into account in order to be able to give an adequate analysis of these debates.

Gilbert Plumer & Kenneth Olson (Test Development, Law School Admission Council)  Reasoning from Conflicting Sources

One might ask of two or more texts—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the texts happen to contradict each other in some respect, then the unadorned answer of standard logic is everything. But it seems to be a given that we often successfully reason with inconsistent information from multiple sources. The purpose of this paper will be to attempt to develop an adequate approach to accounting for this given.

Juana Teresa Marinkovich Ravena & Ana María Vicuña Navarro (Faculty of Philosophy and Education, Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, Chile) Euthanasia and the teaching of argumentation in Chile

This paper reports on a research project about Chilean students’ argumentation competency. Our thesis is that ethical issues are an impediment for the teaching of argumentation at high school level. To prove this, we analyze students’ discussions and we compare them with standard philosophical discussions to show the breach between them. We use the pragma-dialectical approach to contrast the different kinds of argumentation.

Chris Reed (Computing, University of Dundee) & Douglas Walton (Philosophy, University of Winnipeg)    Argumentation schemes in dialogue

This paper uses the language of formal dialectics to explore how argumentation schemes and their critical questions can be characterized as an extension to traditional dialectical systems. The aim is to construct a dialectical system in which (i) the set of locutions is extended to include scheme-based moves (ii) the set of structural rules describes the roles that critical questioning can play; and (iii) the set of commitment rules distinguishes between exceptions and presumptions.

M. A. van Rees  (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)  Dialectical and rhetorical effects of dissociation

This paper discusses the dialectical and rhetorical effects of the use of dissociation in the various stages of a critical discussion which is held to resolve a difference of opinion between disputants. First, the way in which the resolution process evolves as a result of the use of dissociation is delineated; subsequently, the paper examines the way in which dissociation can be used for gaining a position that is the most favourable for promoting the standpoint of the speaker.

Pedro Reygadas (Anthropology, College of San Luis) & Josefina Guzman (Political Sciences, National Autonomous University of Mexico)  The Mexican elections: legality vs. legitimacy

We study the discourses throughout July-September 2006 in the Mexican elections, focusing on those points of view expressed in the discussion on whether the election was legal or fraudulent.  We consider the social dynamics of argumentation: the “topology” of positions (Faye, 1976); the political conjuncture; the relation of each point of view with the whole hidden iceberg of the social actors’ positions (Gilbert, 1997); and the eristic dialogues (Kotarbinski 1963, Walton 1998 and Reygadas 2005).

Juho Ritola (Philosophy, University of Turku)  Irresolvable conflicts and begging the question

I will first look at some of the existing literature on irresolvable conflicts, shortly discuss the fallacy of begging the question, and then examine some questions that irresolvable conflicts bring to surface with respect to this fallacy. In particular, I will argue that even though such conflicts invite an analysis of the fallacy based on the doubt of the opponent, an analysis in terms of justified belief of the arguer is preferable.

Phyllis  Rooney  (Philosophy, Oakland University, Michigan)  Reasoning and social context: the  role of social status and power

 Recent work linking feminist epistemology with social epistemology draws attention to the role of status and power in understanding knowledge and reasoning in social context.  I argue that considerations of social justice require better understandings of two particular components of reasoning and social context: (i) abstraction—who gets to abstract, how, and why?  (ii) the individual-social distinction—how do particular understandings of this distinction serve to minimize or elucidate the role of status and power?

Philip Rose (Philosophy, University of Windsor) Dissensus and the rhetorical function of humour

An overlooked element in dealing with dissensus is humour. Humour has two vital rhetorical functions here: 1) it dilutes or diffuses volatility, and 2) it elucidates and constructs shared conditions of reasonableness.  I will suggest that the rhetorical character of humour, as a productive, creative capacity, is an essential feature of its role in helping to generate and substantiate the ‘common sense’ needed for effective communication in general.

Cristián Santibáñez  (Centre for the Study of Argumentation, Diego Portales University) Metaphors and argumentation

To describe how metaphors work from an argumentative point of view is the first step of this paper. After describing the metaphorical argumentative mechanism, the second step is to apply this mechanism by analyzing some paradigmatic international metaphors that are used in public speeches. This analysis will enable us to see some common grounds between different cultures and countries, especially regarding political and economical issues. 

Menashe Schwed (Ashkelon Academic College)  Visual objects as part of rational communication process

In order for visual objects to be fully integrated in argumentation studies, we should be able to show how some visual objects can be part of a rational communication process and be analyzed as part of rational activity, where audiences reason their way to beliefs via their recognition of the arguer's intention to produce such results. This paper will focus on the way to enable the embedment of some visual objects in argumentation theory.

Francisca Snoeck Henkemans  (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)  Manoeuvering strategically with praeteritio:  manifestations and effects of pseudo-omissions

In order to gain more insight into the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring with praeteritio, this paper looks for the ways in which praeteritio can be realized in discourse and the effects the use of praeteritio may have as a result of the presentation techniques that are typically employed. The analysis of manifestations and effects will be used as a starting point for establishing how praeteritio may be instrumental in the realization of arguers’ rhetorical aims.

Christopher W. Tindale (Philosophy, University of Windsor)  Revisiting Aristotle’s topoi.

I investigate a question in the Rhetoric (and Topics) surrounding the metaphorical sense of Aristotle’s  topos: one can look to a location for “available means of persuasion,” evoking an image of seeing (which connects with work on the spectacle in Greek philosophy); or topoi  are viewed as “general lines of argument.”   Are they places we go for arguments, or actual lines of arguments?  The difference matters, given a propensity to view topoi as forerunners of argument schemes.
 

Taeda Tomic (Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden)  Information seeking processes in evaluating argumentation

 This article points out the relevance of the research on information-seeking for argumentation theory. The process of evaluating argumentation presupposes diverse principles of argument classification and forms thus conflicting information needs. Following Taylor (1995), we distinguish between Aristotelian classification and the prototype classification. We show how these classification kinds form the conflicting principles of information seeking providing at the same time a common logical ground for the dissent information seeking processes in evaluating argumentation.

Assimakis Tseronis (Linguistics, University of Leiden)  Evaluating qualified standpoints

I argue that an account of the effect that the use of adverbials such as ‘actually, in fact, clearly, obviously, perhaps, probably’ has, when qualifying an utterance that is reconstructed as a standpoint, contributes to a context-sensitive evaluation of argumentative discourse. The account provided draws from the concept of strategic manoeuvring developed within Pragma-dialectics. The effect of qualified standpoints on argumentative discussions is specified in terms of the protagonist’s management of the burden of proof.

Luis Vega & Paula Olmos  (Logic, History and Philosophy of Science, ,Spanish Open University) Deliberation: a paradigm in the arena of public argument.

Leaving aside the usual approach to deliberation as a private or simulated weighing, based on the traditional model for practical reasoning, normative logic and argumentation schemes, we aim to characterize deliberation as a particular instance of discursive interaction in the public arena in which information, options and preferences are evaluated and handled in order to achieve a decision or a practical resolution in a responsible and reasoned way; a crossroads between epistemological-discursive criteria and ethical-political programs.

Douglas N. Walton (Philosophy, University of Winnipeg) & David M. Godden (Philosophy, University of Windsor)  Redefining knowledge in a way suitable for argumentation theory

Knowledge plays an important role in argumentation. Yet, recent work shows that standard conceptions of knowledge in epistemology may not be entirely suitable for argumentation.   This paper explores the role of knowledge in argumentation, and proposes a notion of knowledge that promises to be more suitable for argumentation by taking account of: its dynamic nature, the defeasibility of our commitments, and the non-monotonicity of many of the inferences we use in everyday reasoning and argumentation.

Mark Weinstein  (Educational Foundations, Montclair State University)  Between the two images: reconciling the scientific and manifest images

The paper bridges between a science-based metamathematical model of emerging truth and truth emerging from inquiry within ordinary contexts of argumentation. This requires that the underlying intuitions driving the notion of truth in the scientific image be made clear and analogues identified in a manner that permits their application within the ordinary contexts found in the manifest image.

Andreas Welzel  (Decision Research Centre, University of Bielefeld, Germany) Dissensus and Common Grounds in Negotiation.   A negotiation analytic perspective

Negotiation analysis is a branch of mathematical decision theory involving a dialectical rationality standard for the resolution of dissensus.   Negotiations are settings of group decision making where people cooperate to arrive at a joint decision representing a mutually acceptable solution of the negotiation problem. Criteria of what is mutually acceptable can be regarded as common grounds. They serve as stopping conditions for the argumentation process during negotiation. Fairness and efficiency are examples.

John Woods (Philosophy, University of British Columbia; Computer Science, King’s College London)  The Incommensurability of Rival Legal Abductions

The totality of evidence heard in a trial is usually collectively inconsistent: each party offering its own theory of the evidence which, jointly  considered, is inconsistent.  But opposing theories are those which purport best to explain different sets of the evidence. How then could they be rival theories since “E best explains S” and “~E best explains S*”?  How can the defense's theory answer the prosecution’s if it does not in some sense contradict it?    

Galia Yanoshevsky (French, Bar Ilan University)  Dissensus at Times of Consensus: Arguing Against in Editorials

The role of the media as the "watchdog of democracy" is hindered at times of war when mainstream newspapers support government's decisions. Disagreement is expressed without breaking away from consensus, by using opposing rhetorical moves such as an appeal to both the deliberative and the epidictic modes and to emotion as well as to the reasonableness of the audience. Such moves sustain the alleged "balance of reason" and thus help to preserve the newspaper's ethos.

 
Tomasz Zarebski (Philosophy, University of Lower Silesia in Wroclaw)  How is dissensus possible in consensual theories?  Remarks on Brandom and Habermas

The presentation focuses on the problem of dissensus in Brandom’s and Habermas’ theories of communication and social action. The main questions it raises concern both the concept of dissensus and the indispensable conditions of it. In particular, it explores the problem of how it is that the same (or apparently the same?) conditions may result in consensus as well as in dissensus.

Frank Zenker  (Philosophy, University of Calgary)  Pragma-dialectic’s necessary conditions for a critical discussion.

I present a “reduced” version of the fifteen Pragma-dialectical rules and inquire into their theoretical status as necessary conditions for a critical discussion. Questions: (i) In what respect is PD’s non-sufficiency a deficiency, (ii) can and (iii) must it be remedied?  Brief answers:  (i) with respect to defining the concept ‘critical discussion,’ (ii) possibly, (iii) yes, if, and only if, one seeks to identify the concept ‘critical discussion’; no, if PD is for fallacy-detection.