Abstracts  A-L

Theodora Achourioti  (Institute for Logic, Language and Computation,  University of Amsterdam)  Context-dependence and the defining of logical fallacies

 This paper illustrates the difficulties that context-dependence poses for defining the so-called logical fallacies affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent. In particular, I question whether these fallacies can be identified with specific argument patterns. I argue that judging such patterns as fallacious is relative to a) the type of underlying reasoning, and b) the world-knowledge deemed relevant to the argumentation at hand. It is concluded that a more context-sensitive definition should be pursued.   

Jonathan E. Adler  (Philosophy, Brooklyn College and the Graduate School, CUNY) Distortion and excluded middles 

Why is there so much distortion in ordinary argument? If there is a core explanation, the leading candidates are the need to economize, widespread fallacious heuristics or assumptions, and self-defensive biases. I argue that these are not sufficient. An additional force is the intellectual pressure generated by rational norms of conversation and argument, which exclude ‘middles’ of neither accept (believe) nor reject (disbelieve).

Bilal Amjarso  (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)  Persuasiveness from a pragma-dialectical perspective

 Persuasiveness is generally equated with the speaker’s ability to change the recipient’s attitude. In this paper, I want to show that by using Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s (2000) theory of strategic manoeuvring a view of persuasiveness can be found that complements the above conception. To illustrate the way in which this pragma-dialectically inspired view can be applied to argumentative discourse, I investigate the possible differences in persuasiveness between the various ways of addressing anticipated countermoves.

Sharon Bailin (Education, Simon Fraser University) & Mark Battersby (Philosophy, Capilano College)  Beyond the boundaries: The epistemological significance of differing cultural perspectives

 This paper explores the issue of the epistemological significance of taking into consideration alternative perspectives, particularly those from other cultures. We have a moral duty to respect the beliefs and practices of other cultures, but do we have an epistemological duty to take these beliefs and practices into consideration in our own deliberations? Are views that are held without exposure to alternatives from other cultures less credible than those that have undergone such exposure?

Hilde van Belle  (Applied Language Studies, Lessius University College, Antwerpen, Belgium & Catholic University Leuven)   No news is good news, or the appeal of controversy

One of the strategies journalists use to attract their audience towards a news item is the suggestion of ‘controversy’. The terminology by which issues are created influences the way discussions evolve. I will examine how such controversies can be part of an argumentative situation, and I will examine whether any evaluation standard can be developed in this matter.

Lilian Bermejo-Luque  (Philosophy, University of Murcia)  Second order intersubjectivity: the dialectical aspect of argumentation

 Following Rescher’s  conception of dialectics, I argue for the view that the dialectical aspect of argumentation enables a “second order intersubjectivity”, to be understood in terms of the recursive nature of the activity of giving and asking for reasons. This feature underlies that most argumentative discourses represent the explicit part of a dynamic activity, “a mechanism of rational validation” (Rescher, 1977: xiii) which presupposes the possibility of attaining objectivity.

 
J. Anthony Blair (Philosophy, University of Windsor) The “logic” of informal logic

 Are there any logical norms for argument evaluation besides soundness and inductive strength?  The paper will look at several concepts or models introduced over the years, including those of Wisdom, Toulmin, Wellman, Rescher, Johnson & Blair, Brandom, Reiter, Pollock, Walton, Hitchcock and Pinto, to consider whether there is common ground among them that supplies an alternative to deductive validity and inductive strength.

 
Christian Campolo (Philosophy, Hendrix College) Rights, reasoning, and dissensus

 When it comes to important ethical or political issues, the decision to abandon attempts to reach consensus is not neutral—someone stands to lose.  When reasoning fails to overcome dissensus, hopeless arguers can be tempted to claim that their position is protected by their “rights.”  This paper explores the recent proliferation of rights-claims as both a symptom of profound dissensus and as an attempt to secure—without direct argument—the legitimacy that ordinarily comes from consensus. 

 
Paola Cantù (Philosophy, University of Milano)  & Italo Testa (Philosophy, University of Parma)   Is common ground a word or just a sound?

 This paper focuses on the role played by the concept of Common Ground by investigating various roles played by consensus and dissensus in different argumentation theories. A dynamic conception of Common Ground as a second order consensus will be invoked instead of a static definition as starting point, precondition or result of an argumentative practice.

Claudia Carlos (English, Carnegie Mellon University) Common ground and argument by indirection in two seventeenth-century sermons

 Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet's sermon to Louis XIV on the "Devoirs des rois" (1662) and John Donne's sermon to Queen Anne at Denmark House (1617) are both texts that offer indirect critiques of their royal audiences--critiques which, if stated more bluntly, might be politically dangerous to the respective speakers.  What makes such oblique criticism "safe" and what ultimately makes it understood?  The answer lies in the rhetor's ability to build common ground with the audience.

Linda Carozza (Philosophy, York University)  Dissent in the midst of emotional territory

 This paper expands Gilbert’s emotional mode of argumentation (1997). First, general concerns with arguments that stray from the traditional approach are addressed. Then a classification system for different types of emotional arguments is developed. Some of the criteria that help determine emotional arguments include dialogue types, arguers involved, as well as the use of emotion.
 

Gladys Cerón (PUC of Chile, Santiago)  A pragma-dialectical analysis of the argumentative discourse of children

This is a research that describes and analyses the argumentative discourse in children from the second level of primary education in Chile. The corpus chosen are recordings from classes at each level (5^th-8^th) at a school in Santiago. The argumentative segments of the corpus were isolated and classified according to the pragma-dialectical schemes and types of argument. It was observed that the classes analyzed were appropriate scenarios to develop a reflexive, open, tolerant and respectful dialogue.  

Martha S. Cheng (English, Rollins College) Undoing common ground: Argumentation in self-help books

 This paper investigates the reasoning in self-help books. A typical aim in self-help rhetoric is the undoing of negative beliefs about oneself drawn from external forces such as family, religion, or culture. Self-help authors rationalize the processes by which such doxa come to be, and thereby undermine their “givenness.” Thus, we might view this popular genre as explicitly exemplifying a sociocritical view of doxa as repressive and alienating.
 

Patrick Clauss (English, Butler University) Prolepsis: dealing with multiple viewpoints in argument

 This paper examines the argumentation strategy of prolepsis: anticipating and subsequently responding to an argument before it has been made. Although prolepsis is common to a variety of arguments, it seems insufficiently studied or understood—or, worse, misunderstood as simply a “feint.” Drawing on scholarship in rhetorical theory and cognitive and social psychology, I offer a new understanding of prolepsis, recognizing the technique’s potential in argumentative discourse—especially in the search for “common ground.”

Daniel H. Cohen (Philosophy, Colby College)  Virtue epistemology and argumentation theory

 Virtue Epistemology (VE) was modeled on virtue ethics theories to transfer those ethical insights to epistemology. VE has had great success: broadening our perspective, providing new answers to traditional questions, and raising exciting new questions.  I offer a new argument for VE based on the concept of cognitive achievements, a broader notion than purely epistemic achievements. The argument is then extended to cognitive transformations, especially the cognitive transformations brought about by argumentation.

Peter A. Cramer (English, Simon Fraser University)  Participants' reasoning in controversy coverage

 This paper investigates the amount and kind of reasoning that appears in the direct reported speech of controversy participants, as presented in a corpus of news coverage.  This particular investigation is part of a larger project to discover how media texts represent controversies, and to develop an approach to controversy that foregrounds textual mediation and circulation. 

Margaret Cuonzo (Philosophy, Long Island University, Brooklyn)  Collective circularity and a problem of infinite regress

On a broad conception of logic as the study of reasoning, circularity applies not only to individual arguments, but to sets of arguments.  Looking at circularity this way is especially useful in analyzing something that I have termed “collective circularity.” This circularity is “collective” because it involves more than one argument, and often more than one reasoner.  This presentation discusses collective circularity and a problem of infinite regress that arises from it.

Claudio Duran (Philosophy, York University) Bi-logic and multi-modal argumentation: understanding emotional arguments 

According to Bi-logic theory, there are two logics operating in the mind. One is traditional logic, and the other one is called “symmetrical”, because it does not respect asymmetrical relations. Bi-logic assumes that mental processes involve combinations of both logics in different proportions. From that perspective, Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal argumentation is discussed focusing upon emotional arguments. It is claimed that these arguments are bi-logical, that is, they contain a combination of traditional and symmetrical logics.
 

F. H. van Eemeren, P. Houtlosser & A.F. Snoeck Henkemans   (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)  Dialectical Profiles and Indicators of Argumentative Moves

In this paper the authors give a brief overview of the theoretical background of their research project ‘Linguistic indicators of argumentative moves’. Starting from the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion, they design dialectical profiles for capturing the moves that may or must be made at a particular stage or sub-stage of such a discussion. They explain how these dialectical profiles can be methodically exploited for systematically identifying the verbal expressions that can be indicative of any of these moves in argumentative practice.

Eveline T. Feteris  (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam)   The pragma-dialectical reconstruction of teleological-evaluative argumentation in complex structures of legal justification.

 I give a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the role of teleological-evaluative argumentation referring to goals and values in the justification of judicial decisions. I establish the role and place of this form of argumentation in complex forms of justification in  which the argumentation interacts with other forms of legal argumentation. I will do this by integrating insights from legal theory and legal philosophy into a pragma-dialectical framework for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation.
 

John E. Fields (Philosophy, Edgewood College)  Acceptable addressee expectationsr regarding testimony

 In this paper, the author presents a theory of testimony intended to provide normative clarity in nonspecialized communication contexts where participants are searching for common ground.  Drawn in part from the work of a number of contemporary philosophers, the theory presented is essentially non-reductionist, but contains qualifications and safeguards sufficient to distinguish it from many so-called default acceptance theories of testimony.

Maurice A. Finocchiaro (Philosophy, University of Nevada, Las Vegas)  Famous Meta-arguments: Part I, Mill and the Tripartite Nature of Argumentation

In the context of a wide-ranging study of meta-arguments in general, and famous meta-arguments in particular, I reconstruct most of chapter 1 of Mill’s Subjection of Women as the meta-argument: that women’s liberation should be argued on its merits (supporting it with reasons and defending it from objections) because the universality of subjection derives from the law of force, which is logically and morally questionable, and hence provides no presumption in favor of its correctness.

 
James B. Freeman (Philosophy, Hunter College, CUNY)   Resolving moral dissensus: some dialectical and epistemic considerations

Moral dissensus may arise first because persons may disagree over the warrants licensing inferring an evaluative conclusion from premises asserting that properties alleged evaluatively relevant hold. This results in seeing different properties as evaluatively relevant. Secondly, such  properties will frequently not be descriptive but interpretive, asserting some nomic connection. Persons may disagree over what evaluatively relevant properties hold in a given case. We explore the possibilities for argumentation to resolve these two types of disagreement.

 
Rich Friemann  (Philosophy, YorkUniversity)  Dialectical obligations of serial arguers 

 I examine the concept of the relationship negotiation dialogue (Weger Jr., 2003) in the context of serial arguing (Trapp & Hoff, 1985). Between argument episodes, marital partners experiencing difficulty may think about entering counseling, or terminating their relationship. Removed from the dialogical context, such judgments involve the notions of argument as inquiry (Blair, 2004; 1992; Johnson 2000) and argument₀ (Hample, 1992). I explore the dialectical obligations of a person who decides to end his relationship.

David Godden (Philosophy, University of Windsor)  Belief, commitment and the effective resolution of differences of opinion

 This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion.  I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning.  Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.

G. C. Goddu (Philosophy, University of Richmond) What are ‘real’ arguments?

 Numerous argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call ‘real’ arguments.  Some theorists go on to reject purported counterexamples to their proposals on the grounds that the counterexamples are not examples of ‘real’ arguments.  But is there a clear distinction to be made between ‘real’ and ‘non-real’ arguments?  Even if there is a genuine distinction, can it support the defensive maneuver of rejecting purported counterexamples?

Tom Goodnight (Communication, University of Southern California) Parhessia:  the aesthetics of arguing truth to power

 Parhessia, says Foucault, is fearless speech. He draws from Quintillian in describing subjects who utter a candid statement against self-interest to figures in authority. Foucault draws from Euripidean drama to explain this form of argument, often associated with Socratic dialogue.  Sophoclean tragedy, however, poses alternate dimensions of truth telling that aesthetically entwine audiences in mutually-imposed failures of communication between interlocutors. The models of Sophocles and Euripides for arguing truth to power are compared and discussed.

Jean Goodwin (English/Speech Communication, Iowa State University) What, in practice, is an argument?

Theorists' conceptions of argument inevitably color their interpretations of argumentative discourse.  In this paper, I will try to reach past our theories and capture a conception of argument held by practitioners.  Using methodologies from corpus linguistics, I will identify what participants in the U.S. congressional debate over entry into the first Gulf War took to be "an argument" and will map the contours of the argument space they perceived themselves occupying.

Jim Gough (Red Deer College and Athabasca University) & Mano Daniel (Douglas Collage)  Solidarist Identity and Fragmentary Logic

Amartya Sen argues that a distorted plural monoculturalism fosters a dangerous one-dimensional, solidarist conception of identity, often the basis for misunderstanding, fundamentalist violence, dissensus. We explicate the role of fragmentary logic (Sen) which undergirds solidarist identity and indicate some ingredients of the antidote that promotes critical, rational choice of multiple individual identities. In our concluding remarks, we delineate some logical contours of a  more textured “second wave” form of multiculturalism; what we have labeled multi-identitism.

Trudy Govier (Philosophy, University of Lethbridge )  Two is a small number: dichotomies revisited

 Our acceptance of falsely dichotomous statements is often intellectually distorting. It restricts imagination, limits opportunities, and lends support to pseudo-logical arguments. In conflict situations, the presumption that there are only two sides is often a harmful distortion. Why do so many false dichotomies seem plausible? Are all dichotomies false?  What are the alternatives, if any, to such fundamental dichotomies as ‘true/false’, ‘yes/no’, ‘proponent/opponent,’ and ‘accept/reject’?

Marcello Guarini (Philosophy, University of Windsor) The triple contract: a case study of blended analogical argument

 One form of analogical argument proceeds by comparing a disputed case (the target) with an agreed upon case (the source) to try to resolve the dispute.  There is a variation on preceding form of argument not yet identified in the theoretical literature.  This variation involves multiple sources, and it requires that the sources be combined or blended for the argument to work. Arguments supporting the Triple Contract are shown to possess this structure.

Kati Hannken-Illjes (Communication Studies/ Sociolegal Studies, Free University of Berlin)  Building a winning team – developing arguments in criminal cases

 When “making a case” in court, the defense lawyer engages different arguments in a situated performance. At the same time, these arguments have developed over time in front of different audiences. In this paper I will follow the construction of arguments in an actual criminal case from preparation to the trial by focusing on the developments, refinements, and possibly silent or not so silent deaths of the arguments that inform and shape the case.

 
Duncan R. Harkness (Communication and Technology, Technical University of Eindhoven)  Applying argumentation theory to cultivate academic common ground

 Nowadays, the Western academic domain is enriched by the inclusion of many scholars originating from other academic traditions. A fundamental problem facing such scholars is to assimilate the norms of the Western academic domain. One effective way of cultivating this common ground is to develop teaching materials that integrate insights from the field of argumentation. Due to its ‘critical-rationalist’ starting points, I argue that the pragma-dialectical theory is particularly suitable for this task.

 
Michael David Hazen  (Communication, Wake Forest University) Dissensus as value and practice in cultural argument

This paper will initially explore the assumptions about dissensus and consensus embedded in the values of cultures such as the dimension of individualism/collectivism.  This will lead into an examination of how the emerging ideas about cultural forms of argument relate to dissensus and consensus in cultural practices.  Finally, the paper will explore the ways that argument as dissensus can bridge the gap between cultural values and practice.

David Hitchcock (Philosophy, McMaster University) Sampling spoken arguments: a test of a theory of following

I hold that a conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if some covering generalization of the argument, possibly modally qualified, is non-trivially acceptable. In this paper, I test the applicability of this theory to a sample of 50 spoken arguments, transcribed from taped radio and television phone-in programs. I also discuss the characteristics and quality of such arguments.

 John Hoaglund  (Philosophy, Christopher Newport University)  Burden of proof in informal logic

Burden of proof should play more of a role in the evaluation of individual arguments. It is particularly important for evaluation at all points on a spectrum (Govier) or continuum (Johnson) ranging from very weak to very strong. The hardest line to draw is in the middle, where I contend that any argument that meets a reasonable burden of proof at a minimum level is some shade of strong.
 

Michael H.G. Hoffmann (School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology)  Searching for common ground on Hamas through Logical Argument Mapping

Robert Fogelin (1985) formulated the thesis "that deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing." The possibility of arguing presupposes "a shared background of beliefs and preferences," and if such a background is not given, there is no way of "rational" dispute resolution. By contrast to this pessimistic view, I will propose a method that has been developed to overcome difficulties as described by Fogelin.

Catherine Hundleby (Philosophy and Women's Studies, University of Windsor)  The need for rhetorical listening to ground scientific objectivity

 Recent work in feminist and postcolonial rhetoric demonstrates various meanings of silence (Glenn 2004).  Listening rhetorically in order to comprehend silences (Ratcliffe 2006) is particularly difficult in scientific contexts, I argue, because the common ground for scientific discourse assumes a culture of disclosure.  Rhetorical listening is also important to science because listening accounts for silence as well as disclosure, and so maximizes  the diversity in recognized perspectives that provides scientific objectivity (Longino 1990; 2004). 

 
David A. Hunter  (Philosophy, Ryerson University) Common ground and modal disagreement

The relations between the factual and linguistic components of common ground are notoriously difficult to trace.  I clarify them by exploring how modal disagreements interact with these elements. I argue that modal agreement is essential to common ground of any kind. I use the debate over free will to show that certain kinds of disagreement cannot be rationally resolved since the common ground needed to formulate the competing sides is absent. 

Thomas J. Hynes Jr. (Communication, University of West Georgia) Common ground or battlefield?  Political argument and valuing of dissensus.

Horowitz (2000) http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.17180/article_detail.asp   argues that politics should be viewed as war; participants in political discourse should be defined as friends or enemies; and arguments should be viewed largely as weapons.  This makes valuing dissensus and a search for common ground naïve at best, and counterproductive and useless at worse.  This essay will explore the nature of Horowitz’ position and the future search for common ground needed for the valuing of dissensus.
 

Henrike Jansen   (Speech Communication, University of Leiden) Common ground, argument form and analogical reductio ad absurdum

Most arguments can be presented in different forms, e.g. with explicit data, with an explicit modus ponens-inference license or with an explicit modus tollens-inference license. It is arguable that one form is more appropriate or effective with regard to a specific piece of argumentation than another. However, with regard to analogical Reductio ad Absurdum argumentation, its alleged persuasive effect is due to a successful appeal to common ground and not to its (modus tollens-)form.
 

 Ralph H. Johnson  (Philosophy, University of Windsor) Anticipating objections as a way of coping with dissensus

 One of the traditional ways in which we manage dissensus is by argumentation, which may be construed as the attempt of the proponent to persuade rationally the other party of the truth (or acceptability) of some thesis. To achieve this, the arguer will often  anticipate a possible objection to which the arguer then responds.  In this paper, I attempt to shed light on the normative aspect of the task of anticipating objections.
 

Charlotte Jørgensen (Rhetoric, University of Copenhagen) Interpreting Perelman’s universal audience: Gross vs. Crosswhite

 While still subject to differing interpretations the universal audience has potential as an evaluative tool in rhetorical criticism, as demonstrated in Gross’ and Crosswhite’s developments of Perelman’s theory of audience. Having compared their explanations of how politicians address the universal audience and the respective implications for evaluating the argumentation, I argue that although Gross provides a more immediately applicable theory, Crosswhite’s interpretation recommends itself by virtue of its wider scope in regard to deliberative rhetoric.

Fred Kauffeld (Communication, Edgewood College) Two views of manifest rationality

 This paper contrasts two views of the necessity to manifest the rational adequacy of argumentation. The view advanced by Ralph Johnson’s program for informal logic will be compared to one based on an account of obligations incurred in speech acts. Both views hold that arguers are commonly obliged to make it apparent that they are offering adequate support for their positions, but they differ in their accounts of the nature and scope of those obligations.

Andrew Kidd  (Communication,  University of Minnesota, Twin Cities)   The limits of dissensus: The case of intelligent design

 Although dissensus is a natural component of argumentation, there are limits as to what can be considered acceptable contrarian arguments.  In science, dissenting arguments are limited by the extent of their fidelity to established facts and theories.  In the case of the so-called “intelligent design” controversy, the supposed “dissensus” is really an attempt at imposing inappropriate forms of argument.  Using this case study as an example, questions on what are the limits of dissensus will be raised and examined.

Moira Gutteridge Kloster (Philosophy and Politics, University College of the Fraser Valley, Abbotsford)  Reasoning in dispute resolution practices – the hidden dimensions 

We know how people could reason well to resolve disputes.  We don’t yet know why they don’t. Which theories we have applied to bridge that gap have had a profound influence on which practices we employ to resolve disputes.  Dispute resolution ideally aims for promote good reasoning and good relationships.  Is it possible to align theory more closely with practice to achieve both goals?

 Takuzo Konishi (Communication, University of Pittsburgh)  Peircean Sign/Semiotics and their Contribution to Argumentation

 Argumentation scholars' interest in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce has been almost exclusively confined to his conception of abduction, and he is not currently regarded as a key figure for development of argumentation. This paper examines his notion of sign and semiotics and their relation to inference and argument, and argues that sign and semiotics, not abduction, should be the focus for argumentation scholars' research on Peirce.

Erik C. W. Krabbe  (Philosophy, University of Groningen)  Predicaments of the concluding stage

Critical discussion is successful only if, at the concluding stage, both parties can agree about the result of their enterprise. If they can not, the whole discussion threatens to start all over again. Dialectical ruling should prevent this from happening. The paper investigates whether dialectical rules may enforce a decision one way or the other; either by recognizing some arguments as conclusive or some criticisms as devastating.

Manfred Kraus (Classics, University of Tübingen)  Early Greek probability arguments and common ground in dissensus

 The paper will argue that the arguments from probability (eikós) so popular in early Greek rhetoric and oratory essentially operate by appealing to common positions shared by both speaker and audience. Particularly in controversial debate provoked by fundamental dissensus they make their claim acceptable to the audience by pointing out a basic coherence or congruence of the speaker’s narrative with the audience’s own pre-established (legal, moral, emotional) standards or standards of knowledge.
 

Tone Kvernbeck  (Education,University of Oslo) Argumentation practice: the very idea

 In this paper I shall examine Ralph Johnson’s concept of argumentation practice. He provides the following three desiderata for a critical practice: (1) It is teleological, (2) it is dialectical, and (3) it is manifestly rational. I shall argue that Johnson’s preferred definition of practice – which is MacIntyre’s concept of practice as human activity with internal goods accessible through participation in that same activity – does not satisfy his desiderata.

Jan Albert van Laar (Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric & Philosophy, Universities of Amsterdam & Groningen.   In other words: Confrontation manoeuvring with the formulation of standpoints

 When exchanging their initial positions, discussants can be assumed to manoeuvre strategically between (1) the rhetorical objective of delineating the difference of opinion in a way instrumental to winning the discussion and (2) the dialectical objective of arriving at an accurate description of the dispute that furthers the subsequent resolution process. One form of manoeuvring amounts to reformulating the other party’s position in an opportune way. Under what conditions is such manoeuvring dialectically sound?

Jonathan Lavery  (Philosophy and Contemporary Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford)  Plato's Protagoras: negotiating impartial, common standards of discourse

Celso López Pontifical Catholic University of  Chile, Santiago) Can everyday arguments be valid?

 Arguments must be convincing. Therefore, we must provide some criteria to decide about this matter. Some people think that this is not possible. In that case, it would be impossible to solve controversies.   I would like to revisit the criteria of relevance, sufficiency and acceptability, proposed by Johnson & Blair and to test their applicability to everyday controversial arguments, especially, their flexibility to adjust to context.