Day
18: BonJour on Foundationalism (Part 2)
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BonJour on Metabeliefs
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BonJour on Beliefs about Sensory Experience
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Justification and the Conceptual Formulation of Sensory Content
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BonJour on the External World
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Inside-Out Epistemology
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Read IE 133-158
BonJour on Metabeliefs
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Occurrent beliefs (as opposed to other types of beliefs)
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BonJour on the nature of occurrent beliefs
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BonJour on how beliefs about beliefs can be foundational
BonJour on Beliefs about Sensory
Experience
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The status of sensory experience
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Beliefs about sensory experience as descriptions of sensory experience
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The foundational status of beliefs about sensory experience
Justification and the Conceptual
Formulation of Sensory Content
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Do we have the conceptual resources we need to generate the descriptions
of sensory experience required to have justified beliefs?
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Do we have the time to construct the required justifications?
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Can the average person be said to be epistemically justified in believing
anything?
BonJour on the External World
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Why does BonJour think we can be justified in believing in the external
world?
Inside-Out Epistemology
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The Qualitative
Commitment: when we begin the project of epistemic justification, we have reason
to believe that our beliefs about mental states are likely to be true in a way
that we do not have reason to believe that our beliefs about non-mental
states are true.
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The Temporal
Commitment: in the course of epistemically reflecting on our beliefs, we come to
be justified about mental states before we come to be justified about
non-mental states, so we should start the project of epistemic
justification with the justification of mental states, and then use those
states as the basis for justifying our views about non-mental states.