Day 10:  Finishing Goldman & Starting Brandom

      Goldman on Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Justification

      The Founding Insight of Reliabilism

      Reliabilist Recentring of Epistemology

      Chicken Sexing and Super Blind Sight

      Semantics and Epistemology

      Reread Brandom’s “Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism.”  Independent study: look at the first 15 pages of Klein’s “Useful False Beliefs” (in ENE)

 

Goldman on Interpersonal & Intrapersonal Justification

      Why is intrapersonal treated as more basic than interpersonal?

  (1) issue of the existence of other people, minds

  (2) interpersonal reason giving depends on intrapersonal justification

  (3) can be justified (and know) without being able to state reasons  (either due to complexity or for historical/memory reasons)

  (4) someone could be justified even if no one else is bright enough to understand the basis of their justification

 

The Founding Insight of Reliabilism

      When Brandom refers to the “justification condition” of knowledge, what is he referring to?  How does his use differ from Goldman’s?

      What is the point of the Aztec and Toltec potsherds example?

      According to Brandom, what is the founding insight of reliabilism?  Why does he say this?

 

Reliabilist Recentring of Epistemology

      According to Brandom, why should we care about the nonaccidentalness of a true opinion or belief?

      Brandom’s three questions (pp. 374-375)

      How does the externalist reliabilist answer these questions?

      On the reliabilist recentring of epistemology

      How does Brandom answer these three questions?

      Preliminary remark on Brandom’s rejection of the recentring of epistemology

 

Chicken Sexing and Super Blind Sight

      What’s up with these examples?  Why does Brandom bring them up?

      What does Brandom think the lesson is of examples where someone makes reliable reports but cannot give reasons to believe that they are reliable?

 

First Argument Against Recentring Epistemology

      Can you imagine a community where members form beliefs only when they can give reasons for their beliefs?

      Can you imagine a community where members never are in a position to offer reasons for their beliefs?

      How does Brandom answer these questions?  What conclusion does he draw?

 

Semantics and Epistemology

      What is semantics?

      Why does Brandom get into semantics?

      What is inferential/conceptual role semantics?

      What are the implications for epistemology?