Day 18: The Terms of the Mindreading Debate

•           History of Mindreading

•           Philosophy of Cognitive Science and of Neuroscience

•           Hybrid Theory

•           Adjudicating ST, TT, and HT

•           Dimensions of Strength of ST in 3rd person applications

•           Are the Current Terms of the Debate Adequate?

•           Read Simulating Minds, chs. 4 & 8

 

History of Mindreading

•      The traditional philosophical problem of other minds as a normative or justificatory (epistemic) problem

•      The descriptive concerns of much of the current literature on mindreading

•      Why should philosophers be concerned with current debates about mindreading?  What gives these debates a philosophical dimension?

 

Philosophy of Cognitive Science and of Neuroscience

•      Contributions philosophy can make in analysing and evaluting the key concepts and commitments of different research programs in cognitive science and neuroscience

•      Contributions philosophy can make in understanding implications of work on mindreading for other areas of human endeavour

 

Hybrid Theory

•      We have already looked at ST and TT and hybrid theory (HT)

•      What are the different approaches to HT?

•      Which approach does Goldman bet on?

 

Adjudicating ST, TT, and HT

•      How does Goldman frame the debate with respect to the various alternatives?  Why does he frame it in this way?

•      Is Goldman’s framing of the debate adequate?

 

Dimensions of Strength of ST in 3rd person applications

•      What are Goldman’s three dimensions of strength of 3rd person applications of mindreading?

•      Why is the focus on 3rd person applications?

 

Are the Current Terms of the Debate Adequate?

•      Are TT, ST, HT, and Rationality Theory exhaustive of the possibilities?

•      Have we seen anything in this course that might suggest other possibilities?

•      Food for thought: since a complete account of mind design would have to explain mindreading (among many other things), a plausibility criterion of a theory of mind design will be the adequacy of its account of mindreading; moreover, since theories of mindreading make assumptions about mind design, debates about the nature of mind design may have useful applications to the mindreading debates