Final Exam Study Questions
34-356-01
Mind Design and Android Epistemology
Dr. M. Guarini

 

(1) In his Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Michael Dummett makes the following claim: "What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained."  Evaluate the preceding remarks regarding how we attain an account of thought.  Be sure to discuss the relevant portions of Ramsey's paper in evaluating Dummett's statement.

(2) To what extent, if any, might some of the ideas of Quine and Sellars contribute to naturalizing epistemology?  Ramsey suggests that "connectionist" attempts at cognitive modeling are already leading to a rethinking of the traditional terms of certain debates in the philosophy of mind and in the theory of knowledge.  Is Ramsey's claim a vindication of anything in the work of Quine and Sellars?  Defend your position.

(3) Why is it important to understand the nature of representation?  Do you think representations are essentially linguistic, or can they be non-linguistic?  Do we need both linguistic and non-linguistic representations?  If so, why?  If not, why not?  Discuss with reference to the readings by Patricia Churchland and Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn.  Be sure to lay out their arguments in some detail.

(4) Present the arguments of Fodor and Pylyshyn ((F&P) against connectionism.  Do you think any of the models discussed in Ramsey's paper might be useful for replying to F&P's arguments?  If so, why?  If not, why not?