Choosing "Loves" -- Entrenched Learnings (Vol. 3)

(Love as Filter, as Tool, as Sign, as Concept, as Framing, as Hypothesis, and as Theory -- Research Foci for a Bridging Strategy from Affect to Cognition)

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Abstract

Various problematized loves are considered with respect to frameworks, hypotheses, and theories, on the one hand, and filters, tools, language, contexts, and signs, on the other hand. The various love issues reflect entrenched learnings. At a superficial level, take the person who claims "money is the root of all evil." Upon closer inspection one sees that the problem is not so much "money;" rather, the problem is love—that is, love of money. Love of money can be quite entrenched. But the claim that love is the problem doesn't fit neatly with the contemporary mind resting in the high view of "love" with the poetry, the literature, the music, and the films of modern-day love in play. Yet, when the notion is unpacked a little the intent is clear. It is not money that is the problem; it really is some variant of love, and in this case, the "love of money." Love offers a plethora of constructs. Love is a polysemous word with a myriad of meanings. This multiplicity is instrumental for the current investigations. The psychological, or biological, study of love tends to narrow the focus to manageable taxonomies with a focus on romantic love, parent/child love, lust, friendship, attachment, and other high-profile concepts. Those following this path, work to develop taxonomies, and then build a theory of love from the taxonomic data. Moreover, their focus tends to be on traditional interpersonal relations, usually male-female dyads. A love like the love of money doesn't fit this approach. Nor do many of the darker aspects of love fit this approach. In the present essay the focus is not the development of a taxonomy, though taxonomies are used; the focus is not the development of a theory of love, though theories are used; rather, the focus is: love as an analytical program, a research method, (where love claims are considered in their broad context permitting an analysis of such contexts, and the love constructs advanced). As such, love claims are used as a filter to sift the context, or as a tool to probe the context. An ideal outcome is a bridge. Love, the various love claims, correlates, taxonomies, and theories serve as a bridge from an affective position (involving behaviour, emotions, attitudes, and feelings) to a cognitive position (involving understanding, clarifications, development, education, growth, maturity, and wisdom).

Preface

Where am I coming from... personally

Where am I coming from? There are several dimensions to this question. Firstly, where am I coming from *career-wise*? Part of my career in education was oriented towards learning disorders (learning disabilities, learning problems, learning delays, learning deficits, learning differences, learning styles, and other descriptive labels differentiating desirable learning from deficient learning). The focus was primarily on the roots of learning in the individual, and the context was predominantly the school. Now, from the vantage point of a later stage in life, there is an interesting flip in focus from learning disorders to disorders of learning—disorders that seem to end in *entrenched learnings*. This reframing broadens the focus to include the particular and the general individual, the social milieu, the internal and external influences (e.g., biology, psychology, family, culture, media, politics, luck and chance, etc.), the historical context, the philosophical/epistemological context, and the existential issues one faces. Furthermore, "the school" is no longer the building, or the local system; rather the school is life.

Secondly, where am I coming from *educationally*? My interests involve reading broadly in psychology, philosophy, theology, science, literature, history, and beyond. My first major reading venture as an adolescent was Freud. From the local library I took out the collected works of Freud (by A. A. Brill) and devoured them all. I was smitten. So smitten was I that I could not bring myself to return the book to the library. Freud had linked me to sex, to self, to mystery, to healing, to perspective, to insight, and to others—a great, and not-so-great, cloud of witnesses in shrouds of endless cross-examination. The branching quickly spread to other "others" in diverse fields: psychology, history, theology, philosophy, literature, sciences, and even the parapsychological.

Formal education was necessary to properly attend to the cosmic, the existential, and the divine, which were surely the more important pursuits. A degree in theology, a subsequent undergraduate major in history provided a broad external context, while an undergraduate major in psychology provided a growing internal context. Then another undergraduate degree in education was pragmatic, putting employment opportunities on the table. At the graduate level, MA and PhD, I was focused on learning disorders. At the PhD level we had to select a Major and two Minors. My selected Major was Neuropsychology; my minors were Cognitive Psychology and Psychological Assessment. A scholarship—Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC)—was a great assist with the PhD studies.

Thirdly, where am I coming from in terms of my own professional *research path*? My research interests ranged widely, but always there was a focus on personal interests, play, curiosity, and then learning—learning disorders, disabilities, differences, determinants, and dangers. After some 50 publications in science and social science journals, and retirement, my research focus shifted. That's where I'm coming from.

My focus in retirement has flipped; I'm still interested in personal items, play, and curiosity, but my interest in learning disorders is now configured as an interest in problematic "entrenched learnings" as opposed to learning disorders. The former, entrenched learnings, are rooted more broadly: in the individual, the environment, the culture, the institutions, the media, the academy, the politics, luck, chance, personal agency, free will, and choices made, all situated diachronically.

Where am I coming from... chronologically

There are a number of problematic *entrenched learnings* addressed now over the course of three essays. The first, addressed earlier in Volume I was logically the first essay. It dealt

with belief, disbelief, and theological disbelief, in particular. That was a major existential issue given the theological implications. The second group of problematic *entrenched learnings* was addressed in a second essay—albeit chronologically first. These *entrenched learnings* were free-will-based, or choice-based, problematic manifestations of orientations—particularly in the area of sexualities, eating problems, suicidality, and smoking. The third group of problematic *entrenched learnings,* addressed here in this third essay, reflects variants of love, popularizations of love—arguments about love and arguments purportedly arising from love! Problematized loves!

In addressing problematic *entrenched learnings,* as I see it, learning is brought back to the front, the frontlines. Education—training, self-taught prodigies, discipleship, schools, apprenticeships, reading, testing, examinations, criticism, failures, parents, and laws—gains a premier place in each developmental trajectory.

Introduction

"A picture is worth a thousand words," an analogy ten thousand, an investigation scores more,

an argument, if true, outweighs ….

Love! Ah, love! It's disarming! Love is wonderful! Love fills the bookstores. Love thrills the audience. Love stills the heart. Love kills the qualms. Love is awe full! Traditional approaches to love focus on romantic love, friendship, erotic love, familial love, pair-bonding, long term attachment, companionship, and self-sacrificial love.

Yet, a darker side of love lurks like dusk or dawn. Love can be problematic, messy, and troublesome. It is the problematic sides of love that are also explored in this essay. A few questions were asked initially. These questions arose from an earlier consideration analogizing the development of a smoking orientation to a heterosexual orientation, a homosexual orientation, an eating orientation, a suicidality orientation, and a number of other orientations. The questions now asked here are: (1) Is smoking a love-problem? (2) Is homosexuality a love-problem? (3) Is eating a love-problem? (4) Is suicidality a love-problem? (5) Is music-immersion a love-problem? Is athletic hyper-involvement a love-problem? Are these potential love-problems analogous in any way?

Then there are the darker love problems. For example, love of self, narcissism,, gambling, drugs, stalking, Stockholm syndrome, pornography, schadenfreude, and so on. Human loves, behaviours, identities, and orientations have a broad array of determinants influencing their formation. They are complex. The range of determinants would encompass the general categories (i.e., broad basics like biology, environment, time and luck) (Kagan, 2010) and the more specific and personal factors (i.e., influences like memories, knowledge, beliefs,

history, experiences, curiosity, wisdom, intentionality, and choices). Moreover, these determinants would occur in varying proportions, interactions, and potencies functionally related to time. In effect, the determination of a love, a feeling, a behaviour, a belief, or an orientation is complex, fluidic, and dynamic. However, the final product can be fixed, entrenched, and solid.

Simplistic responses regarding *what caused what* are often single factor views. For example, one hears statements like, "the cause is biology," or "the cause is choice," or "the cause is the mother," or "the cause is the absent father," or "the cause is the crowd he runs with," or "the cause is the media images of beauty in magazine ads," and so on. One particular remarkable cause that one hears presented as an important consideration in openness to sexual orientations, arguably, is "love" at some level. It can reach single-cause status. A particular person is "loved," and it just so happens that that person is of the same-sex. Such a singular causal focus seems to overshadow and even preclude consideration of the more complex nature of causal influences impacting human responses. When there is an impulsive response with respect to any behavior that is ascribed the label "problem behaviour," the level of thinking is often quite narrow, indeed, perhaps consistently too narrow (see Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1987). The singular focus on love is too narrow, or can be too narrow.

Reflective responses are more nuanced. Causal determinants of human development, beliefs, identities, orientations, behaviours, and emotions are complex with a constellation of variables contributing to the product. Yes, some variables may be far more important than others. Admittedly, a variable labeled "love" should be quite important. But love needs a context. If the causation of all identities, orientations, proclivities, curiosities, loves, and behaviours are viewed as complex with respect to determination, and include "love" as one of the possible determinants, then thoughtful, thorough, and diverse approaches could be quite

enlightening. Approaches conducive to reflective depth and breadth are desirable approaches to get onto an academic agenda with respect to love.

A major problem with respect to the introduction of love as a behavioural determinant is that it is often used as the trump card. When love is advanced as a motive, or rationale, any challenger is expected to back off. After all, how can one find fault with love? Yet love can be a problem. How, when, and where love can be a problem are some of the questions explored in this essay.

In Chapter One several frameworks are developed to provide conceptual contexts for the consideration of problematized loves: for example, the love of smoking, the love of food, the love of alcohol, the love of gambling, the love of pornography, the love of a person of the same sex, the love of playing a guitar, the love of creative writing, the love of athletic prowess, the love of a person, the love of a rock star, the love of a charismatic leader, the love of a prophet, the love of self, the love of a murderer, the love of a captor, the love of an evil, and so on. These potentially problematized loves push the limits of normal when obsessive and when costly (e.g., loss of health, loss of other skills, social deprivation, and so on).

The first framing is a religious framing drawing upon the thinking of two prominent Christian thinkers: Augustine (and properly ordered love) and C. S. Lewis (and his four types of love). The second framework is a psychological framing and draws upon the thinking of two interesting theoretical perspectives: Sternberg (and a triangular theory of love, along with his attention to psychological balance) and Baumeister (and four psychological roots of evil with their links to love). The third framework is an analogical framing and draws upon two theoretical approaches to analogical thinking: Holyoak & Thagard, and Gentner & Markam. A fourth framing addresses the biological underpinnings of love (looking to Dunbar, Fisher and others). A fifth framing considers a place for stories of love, both simple dichotomous stories

(grand stories and dark stories) and as a subtheory of love (Sternberg, 2006) with a taxonomy of somewhat metaphorical considerations of love. With these framings the issues of various problematized loves as functionally related to self and others are explored.

Chapter 2 addresses a number of problematized loves, like love of self, schadenfreude, love of an object, and so on. As well, also addressed are a number of objections raised with respect to a particular analogy—comparing a smoking orientation and a homosexual orientation. The objections are cast as aspects of love, and addressed as aspects of love.

Chapter 3 addresses several epistemic issues.

Chapter 4 addresses some empirical data on the various targets of the analogy with smoking. Such aspects as suicidality, eating-problems, and ethnicity are considered.

Finally, in Chapter 5 a summary is attempted. Here are considered orientations like heterosexuality, suicidality, eating-problems, music-immersion, athleticism, and so on.

A note on the methodology used in this essay is appropriate here. Love is a polysemous word with a myriad of meanings. An effort is made to keep the broad spectrum of meanings in focus, even those love claims that would typically be dismissed with a comment like: "That's not love." The psychological, and biological, approaches to the study of love tend to narrow the constructs of love to manageable taxonomies and focus on romantic love, falling in love, lust, and attachment (e.g., Fisher 2006), or slightly broader fields (e.g., parent/child love, friendship, agape, and other high-profile concepts). Those following this path work to develop taxonomies, and then build a theory of love from the taxonomic data. Moreover, their focus tends to be on traditional interpersonal relations, usually male-female dyads (e.g., Sternberg, 1986, 2006). A love like the love of money doesn't fit this approach. Nor do many of the darker aspects of love (love of a rock star, transference, stalking, love of the charismatic prophet, Stockholm syndrome, de Clérambault syndrome, narcissism, gambling, racing, and others) fit this approach. Hence, in the present essay the focus is not the development of a taxonomy, though taxonomies are used; the focus is not the development of a theory of love, though theories are used;

rather, the focus is: love as an analytical program (where love claims are considered in their broad

context permitting an analysis of such contexts, and the various love constructs advanced). As such, love

claims are used as a filter to sift the context, or as a tool to probe the context. As an ideal outcome, love,

the various love claims, correlates, taxonomies, and theories serve as a bridge from an affective position

(i.e., the emotive side of love involving behaviour, emotions, attitudes, and feelings) to a cognitive

position (i.e., the rational understanding involving clarifications, development, education, growth,

systematizing, maturity, and wisdom).

Chapter 1: Frameworks

Where is this notion of framings going? Framings provide matrices for the consideration of problematized loves. The overall matrix looks like the following table. Explanations of the cells in the Table 1 will be elaborated in the subsequent discussions of representatives identified.

Table 1: Major Framings For Viewing Problematized Loves								
Framing	Religious		Psychological		Analogical		Biological	
Representatives	C. S. Lewis	Augustine	Sternberg	Baumeister	Holyoak & Thagard	Gentner & Markam	Dunbar	Fisher
Organizing Construct	Categorizing	Ordering & Virtues	Relation & Imbalance	Motivation	Constraints & Thinking	Knowledge & Thinking	Bio-Philosophic	Propagation
Love Types	Eros	Godly Order	Intimacy	Rewards			Romantic	Romantic Love
	Storge	Disordered	Passion	Self Enhancement			Friendship	Lust
	Phileo		Commitment	One's Ideology			Maternal	Attachment
	Agape			Schadenfreude			"Numinous"	
Elements For Problem Consideration	Melding	Teleology (God-centered)	Balance *Deficits*	Gain	Similarities (elements & relations)	From commonalities	Bio-chemical	
	Displacement	Controlled Affections	Balance *Dispositions*	Ego Enhancement	Structures (mapping elements & relations)	From differences	Mystical	
	Reordering	Temperance	Balance *Desires*	Idealism Defended	Goals (Authorial Intent)	Systematicity (higher order relations...)	Charismatic	
		Fortitude	*INTERESTS*	Power And Justice			Iconic	
		Justice	*TIMEFRAMES*		Inductive Thinking	Inductive Thinking		
		Prudence	*ACTIONS*		Bridging Strategy	Bridging Strategy		
					Reasoning	Reasoning		
					Problem Solving	Problem Solving		
					Abduction	Abduction		

<u>Seeing Love as a Problem—Religious Framings</u>

From a religious perspective much has been written on love—from the Apostle Paul (with his famous hymn to love in I Corinthians 13) through Augustine (in several works) and C. S. Lewis (in his analysis of Four Loves) to Martin Luther King Jr. (in his sermons on love). As a technique one can consider the positive approach to love considered in a religious context and then flip the issue to see how a negative side might be in play.

The Array of Loves (C. S. Lewis)

On the positive side Lewis (1960) presents four loves: (1) *phileo* (e.g., brotherly love, friendship), (2) *storge* (e.g., familial love), (3) *eros* (e.g., romantic and sexual love), and (4) *agape* (e.g., the love characterized by willful self-sacrifice). These are clearly considered as positives. What about the flip side? How could such loves go awry in a religious framework? With respect to twisting love, three routes to consider are melding, displacement, and reordering.

Melding. *Melding* would be one possibility to easily imagine. If brotherly love, *phileo*, is encroached upon by *eros*, friendship could turn sexual (i.e., homosexual). If familial love, *storge*, is encroached upon by *eros*, familial love could turn sexual (i.e., incest). If *agape* is encroached upon by *eros* that which begins as admirable service (i.e., evangelism, pastoring, counseling, psychotherapy, teaching, mentorship, etc.) can be overcome by lust, power, and abuse (e.g., pedophilia, hebephilia, adultery, fornication, and seduction). Boundaries blur! With *melding* eros is a diachronic, encroaching danger.

Displacement. Another possibility for love-askew is *displacement*. Most likely this dangerous form of *displacement* would occur when *eros* displaces one of the other loves: brotherly love, familial love, or spiritual, self-sacrificial love. With *displacement* there is less

blurring, if any blurring, of the boundaries. Here arguments are regularly considered in favour of recategorization. Hence, homosexuality (actual and hypothetical) and incest (actual or even hypothetical, see Haidt, 2012, Voshell, 2012) are normalized. Even more dramatic, eros can be seen *displacing* normal affections, attitudes, and behaviours, with respect to animals, children, corpses, and more.

   Reordering. *Reordering* would be a variant of the *displacement* problem. Some loves are more important than others, and consequently should be pre-eminent in a decision hierarchy. Arguably, agape ought to be the highest love and eros the lowest love. A case could be made that agape is the highest form of love and the overseer of the lesser loves. If agape falls into disuse or even a lower order on the decision hierarchy the lesser loves can go awry. A proper order would be *agape* first, *storge* second, *phileo*, third, and *eros*, fourth. Conceivably, arguments could be made to flip the order for *storge* and *phileo*, but *eros* needs restraint when encroachment and/or displacement are likely. It is the proper ordering that best offers restraint.

   A limitation with the framework offered by Lewis is as follows: there are loves that extend beyond persons. There are loves that relate to material things, self, goals, ideas, ideologies, knowledge, methodologies, and other good things. Yet relations-to-things can signal disorder. A workable framework needs to be broad enough to consider the love of things other than persons.

The Ordering of Loves (Augustine)

   Augustine's exploration of disordered love is important for an expanded framework of how and where love can go awry. Basically, love of God is primary in Augustine's framing. Indeed it is the first and greatest commandment. Our human loves are to be ordered under God. As a graduate student Dermer (no date) insightfully writes:

"Augustine says that the inhabitants of the city of God sing 'Order love within me.' This is a cry for virtue. The citizens of the eternal city ask God to order their love, for they recognize that only God can order their love in and through God's own love. Therefore, virtue is fundamentally a gift from God; it is dependent upon divine agency. Disordered love is the result of human pride in the fall. It is only in and through God's initiative in the humble and incarnate Christ that human beings are healed of pride and made capable of virtue. In sum, Augustine describes the just and holy person as someone who has 'ordered his love, so that he does not love what it is wrong to love, or fail to love what should be loved, or love too much what should be loved less.' For Augustine, the perfect lover is someone whose various loves are ordered to their proper end—enjoyment of God. Vice then is disordered love: an enjoyment and use of things with no reference to the enjoyment of God (p. 4)."

Disordered love is the result of sin. As Dermer (no date) points out: even things we moderns highly value (e.g., curiosity, study, and knowledge) can be an absence of virtue, if not ordered correctly according to Augustine.

Indeed, it seems that all human loves are to be considered disordered, as a result of sin, if they do not have their end, or their purpose, in proper relation to God. In fact, "...all objects, except god, are for use; for, though some of them may be loved, yet our love is not to rest in them, but to have reference to god (Augustine, 2010, "On Christian Teaching," p. 7)." Love then can extend to people, acts, states, and objects; but love not properly ordered with respect to God is disordered. In "On Christian Teaching" (Book One, Chapter 27) Augustine addressed the ordering of love as follows: "Now he is a man of just and holy life who forms an unprejudiced estimate of things, and keeps his affections also under strict control, so that he neither loves what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he ought to love, nor loves that more which ought to be loved less, nor loves that equally which ought to be loved either less or more, nor loves that less or more which ought to be loved equally (Augustine, 2010, p. 17)."

For Augustine there are four forms of love. In "Of the Morals of the Catholic Church" he relates virtue to the love of God but framed as four virtues. The four virtues are defined as four forms of love. "For the fourfold division of virtue I regard as taken from four forms of love

(Augustine, 354-430, Loc 345)." The four virtues are temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence. "So we may express the definition thus: that temperance is love keeping itself entire and incorrupt for God; fortitude is love bearing everything readily for the sake of God; justice is love serving God only, and therefore ruling well all else, as subject to man; prudence is love making a right distinction between what helps it towards God and what might hinder it (Augustine, 354-430, Loc 352)."

For Augustine love, rightly ordered love, is essential for morality, character, stability, epistemology, wisdom, purpose, and service. One cannot understand the scriptures correctly without the graces of faith hope and love. One cannot understand nature correctly without love. One does not function properly without rightly-ordered love.

Seeing Love as a Problem—Psychological Framings

Psychological Imbalance (Sternberg)

Sternberg (1986, 1988, 2002) finds a focus on balance to be psychologically informative for a broad array of constructs, for example, stupidity, love, wisdom, intelligence, and so on. When things go awry there is an imbalance. The imbalance can be seen in his earlier approach to love, as well as his approach to foolishness (which involves love/desires out of balance).

Triangular model of love. Sternberg's approach to problematic love is related to his triangular approach to love relationships. For Sternberg (1988) the three points of the triangle are intimacy, passion, and commitment. When all three points of the triangle align for two people, both people can experience consummate love. This is the ideal.

However, there can be an imbalance between triangles. For example, when one person is high on intimacy and passion but low on commitment whereas their partner is high on commitment, but perhaps lower on passion, their triangles do not align. In effect, such triangles

are misshapen and consequently fail to map one onto the other in a harmonious fashion. Balance

is the ideal key. To illustrate congruent and discordant relationships see the following figure

(Figure 1). The "A" couple would be an example of a congruent relationship; they align with

respect to intimacy, passion, and commitment. The "B" couple is close with respect to intimacy

but quite discordant on passion and commitment. The "C" couple is close with respect to

passion but discordant for commitment and intimacy. The "B" couple seems to be functioning

along the line of friends. The "C" couple seems to be caught up in the emotions of sex, the

triggers of pheromones, and the rush of eros. It is the "A" couple that seems to align with

Sternberg's view of consummate love. Such balance is a recurring theme with Sternberg. He

draws upon balance as well when dealing with the question of foolish behaviour, or an absence

of wisdom (Sternberg, 2002).

Figure 1. Illustrating Sternberg's (1988) triangular view of love marked by *intimacy*, *passion* and *commitment* when persons are congruent and align ("A"), or are discordant ("B" and "C"), for example.

Although only three configurations are shown in the figure, in this Sternberg model there

are eight possible configurations of alignments. When all points of the triangles align there is

"Complete love." When none of the points align there is "Lovelessness." When one or two points align one sees different varieties of love. If only *passion* aligns we have "Infatuated love." If only *commitment* aligns we have a "Practical love." If only *intimacy* aligns we have "Liking." When both *intimacy* and *commitment* only align we have "Compassionate love." When both *intimacy* and *passion* only align we have "Romantic love." When both *passion* and *commitment* only align we have "Fatuous love." The model offered by Sternberg is an interesting and useful psychological framing.

One problem with drawing upon this formulation of Sternberg's model for the current essay is its narrow focus; it is too limited. Sternberg's model assumes a traditional male-female relationship. But his triangular view with respect to balance could apply, without much difficulty, equally well to some potentially problematized loves: brother-sister love, intergenerational love, polygamous love, and homosexual love. In these latter cases intimacy, passion and commitment could readily align; or perhaps be better aligned than some comparable conventional relations. Yet, in contemporary society, good alignment is not likely to justify such incestuous love as brother-sister love. Nor would good alignment justify intergenerational love as in pedophilia at this point in contemporary history, although polygamy and homosexuality might fare better for various cultures. Furthermore, in Sternberg's framing there is no room for more problematic loves such as love of objects, fetishes, narcissism, money, power and so on. A broader perspective would be more functional. Linking misalignment to imbalance does broaden the perspective a little.

Triangular model of foolishness. Sternberg (2002) advances an imbalance theory of foolishness which he contrasts with wisdom, as opposed to the stupid/intelligent contrast others often make. It seems—admittedly taking a little interpretive liberty—the imbalance applies to *deficits*, *dispositions*, and *desires*, and could be applied to love. Sternberg sees the beginning of

foolishness in a problem with tacit knowledge which is considered to be in a *deficit* state. Tacit knowledge is: (1) procedural (i.e., knowing how), (2) instrumental (i.e., tools for achieving goals and valuables, or what one desires in the context of competing desires), and (3) indirectly acquired (e.g., via pragmatics, socio-linguistics, or dispositions). When one lacks tacit knowledge the imbalance that follows involves foolishness, faulty beliefs, disordered goals, disordered relationships, problematic behaviours, and problematized *loves*. In this configuration the "beginning of problematized love" is independent of personal agency.

The three *dispositions* that interfere with tacit knowledge use are: a sense of omnipotence, a sense of omniscience, and a sense of invulnerability. Such dispositions—bad beliefs—would indicate a psychological state that was out of balance. *Desires* out of balance might be seen in a selective focus, or narrowing of attention, to an interest, a timeframe, or an action.

Wisdom, whether shown in beliefs, loves, desires, attitudes, or behaviours, involves balance: (1) between INTERESTS, intrapersonal interests, interpersonal interests, and extrapersonal interests (e.g., city, country, God), (2) between TIMEFRAMES, the short term and the long term, and (3) between ACTIONS, adaptation to an environment, shaping an environment, and selecting a new environment. Disorder is seen in an imbalance in one or more of these areas.

While Sternberg's balance theory does provide a descriptive framework, a very real question is: what pushes the *deficit* in tacit knowledge? Is it a failure to learn? Is it incorrect learning? Is it an inability to learn? Is it developmental immaturity? Does it reduce to belief, that is, the absence of sound beliefs? What pushes problematic *dispositions* to the surface? Are these just problematic beliefs? Are desires entangled with beliefs? Does Sternberg's focus on balance

in a sense reduce to a focus on beliefs? It seems so. As an aside, where does personal agency, and therefore responsibility, fit in Sternberg's approach[1]?

Applying Sternberg's model to smoking (i.e., a growing "love" of smoking) consider the *dispositions*. Young smokers just beginning their smoking trajectory do seem to have a disposition characterized by a sense of omnipotence, a sense of omniscience, and a sense of invulnerability. They deny vulnerability and risk; they seem to think their omnipotence is real; and they know it all. Secondly, they clearly have *desires* out of balance: (1) between INTERESTS, intrapersonal interests (e.g., health, athletic ability), interpersonal interests (parents, teachers, peers, health practitioners, etc.), and extrapersonal interests (e.g., city, country, God), (2) between TIMEFRAMES, (i.e., the initial curious dabbler in the short term, and the addict in the long term), and (3) between ACTIONS, adaptation to an environment, shaping an environment, and selecting a new environment. They adapt to their environment. Thirdly, with respect to *deficits* in tacit knowledge, they have them. They lack the procedural and instrumental knowledge necessary to deal appropriately with situations, dispositions, interests, timeframes, and aspirations. Though Sternberg's model contains a great deal of detail and direction for thought it too does reduce to faulty beliefs, competing beliefs, or bad beliefs, and, consequently, the choices such beliefs sustain. In this model problematized loves emerge from imbalance and faulty beliefs.

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[1] Sternberg applies his balance theory to Clinton, Nixon, Chamberlain, Judge Wachtler, War, and so on. In terms of *dispositions* these individuals could be viewed as having a sense of omniscience, omnipotence and invulnerability, at least arguably to some degree. In terms of *desires*, these individuals likely did show an imbalance in interests (personal through to extrapersonal), an imbalance in timeframes (immediate, distant), and an imbalance in objectives (reactive, stasis, and proactive). But doesn't everyone? In terms of *deficits*, these individuals may have opted for strategies that revealed they really did not have good knowledge regarding "know-how," at least in some areas. Even though the problem is in a select area, we still are likely to assign responsibility.

Psychological Roots of Evil (Baumeister)

From another psychological perspective, one can take the roots of evil as framed by Baumeister and his associates (Baumeister, 1997; 2005; Baumeister & Vohs, 2004a, 2004b) and recast the framing within the context of love. Essentially, with this reframing it is possible to approach love with this question: Does one end up doing what is wrong (even evil), with the intention of "doing good" (that is, doing the "loving thing")? Yes! Doing what one believes to be "the good" or the loving thing, can end up with one doing what is stupid, wrong, and even evil. In fact, it might be the case that all stupidity is driven by doing what one believes to be good and loving.

While termed a "doing-the-loving-thing" focus for the present discussion, it is an approach that links psychologically to the roots of evil—the four roots of evil as identified by Baumeister (1997; Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). The four roots can be labeled as: (1) gain, (2) egotism, (3) idealism, and (4) schadenfreude. These roots of evil can be configured as "doing good" as follows:

- (1) when good is defined as getting what one wants (Instrumentality for gain),

- (2) when good is defined as dealing with threats to the ego, the self (e.g., responding to an attack on honour, image, self esteem, etc.) and therefore image enhancement (self-protection, and the development of self-esteem),

- (3) when doing good is defined as doing what one believes to be right (idealism), and,

- (4) the Law of Effect (i.e., behaviour that is followed by a good effect tends to be repeated), when doing good is defined as obtaining reinforcement (even from such suspect sources as sadism, schadenfreude, or a vengeful, vigilante-justice).

It can be rewarding to see the criminal suffer at the hands of justice. It can be

rewarding to see another suffer given the uplift one gets from "downward

comparisons."

Applying Baumeister's four roots of evil (Baumeister, 1997; Baumeister & Vohs, 2004)

on either a macro level or a micro level is informative. On a macro level consider the terrorist

attacks on 9/11. Was this "doing-good" with respect to the following four sources: (1) gain, (2)

egotism, (3) idealism, and (4) schadenfreude? Yes. These roots of evil can be configured as

doing good: (1) *gain*, when good is defined as getting what one wants (revenge, attention, the

will of Allah, jihad, submission, etc.), (2) *egotism*, when good is defined as dealing with threats

to the self (an attrition of honour, image, self esteem, culture, religion, etc.) and therefore image

enhancement (self-protection, and the development of self-esteem, as with the image

enhancement evident in much of the Islamic reaction), (3) *idealism*, when doing good is defined

as doing what one believes to be right (idealism, particularly religious idealism), and, (4) *the

Law of Effect* (behaviour that is followed by a good effect tends to be repeated), when doing

good is defined as obtaining reinforcement even when the reinforcement emerges from such

suspect sources as sadism, schadenfreude, or revengeful justice, as in the rewards (perceived

justice) which followed previous terrorist acts.

On a micro level consider the robbery of the local 7/11. Was this "doing-good" with

respect to: (1) gain, (2) egotism, (3) idealism, and (4) sadistic pleasure. Yes. These roots of evil

can be configured as doing good: (1) *gain*, when good is defined as getting what one wants

(money and cigarettes), (2) *egotism*, when good is defined as dealing with threats to the self (an

attrition of honour, image, self esteem, etc.) and therefore image enhancement (self-protection,

and the development of self-esteem, as with the image enhancement that money and crime can

buy), (3) *idealism*, when doing good is defined as doing what one believes to be right (a sense of

entitlement, or a retributive sense of dealing with Marxist injustice), and (4) *the Law of Effect/Schadenfreude/Power* (behaviour that is followed by a good effect tends to be repeated), when doing good is defined as obtaining reinforcement (even when the reinforcement emerges from such suspect sources as sadism or schadenfreude, as in the rewards which followed previous criminal acts). At the macro level and the micro level "doing good" appears malevolently intertwined with doing evil.[1]

How does one frame this with respect to love?

- (1) *gain*: one feels good getting things one wants, what one loves (e.g., material things, ...),

- (2) *ego*: one feels good when something is enhancing self love (e.g., honour, image, self esteem, status, recognition, fame, etc.),

- (3) *idealism*: one feels good when one is obtaining the furtherance of one's beloved ideals, beliefs, religion, ideology, agenda, and,

- (4) *power*: one feels good in the presence of empowerment, love of activated power, real or imagined, (even when the payoff emerges from such suspect sources as control, praise, sadism, bullying, schadenfreude, gloating, or witnessing vengeful, vigilante-justice).

Seeing Love as a Problem—Analogical Framings

Analogical thinking can be viewed as: (1) a form of inductive thinking (Moore & Parker, 2001), (2) a "bridging" strategy to facilitate understanding of a complex concept by means of a

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[1] Is smoking viewable as both doing good and doing "evil?" Is homosexuality viewable as both doing good and doing "evil?" Is over-eating viewable as both doing good and doing "evil?" Is suicide viewable as both doing good and doing "evil?" Yes, in all cases?

simpler concept, or (3) a form of reasoning and problem solving requiring theoretical and empirical analysis (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997) and/or neuropsychological considerations (Ashcraft, 2002). Each of these three views is amenable to thinking via the instrumental use of an analogical base like smoking applied to various target analogies like drug use, shop-a-holic, infatuation, stalking, homosexuality, compulsive musicianship, obsessive writing, gambling, video-game infatuation, and so on. Inductively, as the analogical thinking unfolds, more and more facts, perceptions, elements and relations can be laid out which serve to facilitate induction and abduction. With respect to "bridging," smoking does serve as a bridge to complex and socially-complicated concepts—identities, orientations, loves, beliefs, and behaviours. Then, thirdly, theoretical and empirical considerations add credit to the reasoning and problem solving.

In terms of theoretical underpinnings, the multiple-constraints theory (Holyoak & Thagard, 1997) and the structure-mapping theory (Gentner & Markam, 1997) offer two frameworks to draw upon when considering what can be learned from the use of analogical thinking, and what has been learned from particular analogies. Together, the two theories enrich the infrastructure for thinking, and give direction for a range of considerations.

Multiple-Constraints Theory (Holyoak & Thagard)

In the multiple-constraints theory approach, Holyoak and Thagard (1997) present three types of constraints: similarity, structure, and goals. With respect to similarity, the analogy is driven by, and dependent on, similarities in key *elements* and key *relations*. With respect to structure, *elements* and *relations* are mapped from the source to the target to identify consistent structural parallels. With respect to goals, the question of what the thinker's intent might be is developed to guide the thinking.

On another axis, the authors address a "mapping step," an "inference step," and a "learning step." Essentially, in the "mapping step" the logician (or the "analogician") identifies similarities with respect to *elements*, *relations*, and coherent structural parallels. In the "inference step" new information is formulated, hypothesized, and considered. Likely, there is a tentative acceptance or rejection process active at this point as well. In the final step, the "learning step," one acquires a broader perspective and perhaps a more-informed opinion or better understanding of the target analogy. In essence, then, knowledge grows in a manner that corresponds with reason and reality.

Structure-Mapping Theory (Gentner & Markam)

In structure-mapping theory (Gentner & Markam, 1997) the emphasis is on the knowledge which emerges from comparison processes (of similarities, metaphors, analogies, and anomalies) targeting commonalities (systematic, parallel, connected) and differences (alignable differences and non-alignable differences) in the source and target. The alignment of the structures is the defining characteristic but there are three psychological constraints on this alignment that the authors argue for: (1) structural consistency, (2) a relational focus, and (3) systematicity. Generally, the parallels with multiple-constraints theory are clear given the constraints related to structure and relations. The notion of systematicity, however, is less clear. In view of the notion that analogies "tend to match connected systems of relations" Gentner and Markam (1997) describe systematicity as follows: "A matching set of relations interconnected by higher order constraining relations makes a better analogical match than an equal number of matching relations that are unconnected to each other. The systematicity principle captures a tacit preference for coherence and causal predictive power in analogical processing (p. 47)."

Drawing on the two theoretical approaches to analogical thinking there would be a series of questions one could generate as a guide for evaluating the components in the analogies considered, and, subsequently, the merits of the investigation. Such questions could be addressed initially and subsequent to a consideration of the various analogies.

1. What are the goals in formulating the analogy?

2. What are the elemental similarities?

3. What are the relational similarities?

4. What are the differences (non-alignable)?

5. What are the differences (alignable)?

6. Is the mapping coherent (showing systematicity and parallel connectedness)?

7. What is the "inference step?"

8. What is the "learning step?"

To illustrate reflection on these questions the following table represents an initial consideration using smoking as the analogical base and homosexuality as the target. The suggestions are preliminary at this initial point.

When considering analogies, as Gentner and Markam (1997) point out, inferences are drawn from the base case to the particular target scenario. Given this directionality it makes sense that the base is constructed from the more information-rich, coherent, and systematic formulation. This facilitates mapping a maximal amount of information to the target scenario.

Table 2. Focus questions to address when using analogical thinking, and suggested answers for comparing a smoking orientation and a sexual orientation analogically.

	Focus Questions	Suggestions	
1	What are the goals in formulating the analogy?	-Generally: knowledge, understanding, truth seeking, theory-building, thinking, gaining tools for assisting thinking, conceptual analysis, education, and prevention, … -Specifically: To consider biological parallels, to consider environmental parallels, and to consider the psychology of choice and personal agency.	
2	What are the elemental similarities?	-Determinants (biology, environment, interactions, chance, choice, ...) -Course of development (habit, addiction—physical and psychological) -Learning processes -Psychology (identity, orientation, change,) -Psychology (self-regulation literature) -Developmental trajectory -Choice -Social status-Frowned upon by segments of society -Moral status – judged by segments of society	
3	What are the relational similarities?	-Determinants: Biology interacting with environment is similar -Society interfacing with each analogical component is similar -Remains to be seen if the elemental similarities can be moved to this relational category	
4	What are the differences (non-alignable)?	-Pre-adolescent evidences for homosexuality (unless these are explainable—see discussion of environmental influences) -Suicidality in homosexuality (unless of course there is a relationship between suicidality and smoking—for example, see Leistikow, 2003) -Feelings –reports that it "feels right" in homosexuality (unless the rebuttal argument in Volume III stands) -cross-cultural differences (unless such differences can be shown for homosexuality as well) -Development of knowledge reveals better understanding of sexuality -Pragmatism[1]	
5	What are the differences (alignable)?	-Remains to be seen if the non-alignable can be moved to this alignable category (e.g., there may not be compelling evidence for preadolescent homosexuality; there may be an issue of suicidality linked to smoking, etc.)	
6	Is the mapping coherent (showing systematicity and parallel connectedness)?	Yes	
7	What is the "inference step?"	-Both are addictions (with physiological and psychological elements) -Both are learning-based -Both show choice-points and different calibers of choice along the formative continuum -Both choice patterns founded on faulty beliefs and thinking	
8	What is the "learning step?"	-Beliefs are a key focus -Beliefs are foundational for choice -Thinking must be addressed -Change is credible -Education must be brought back to the front	

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[1] A number of the non-alignable differences have been suggested in conversations. They are considered more closely in a later essay on problematized love.

The situation of a smoking base can be advanced to provide a base that is information-rich, coherent, and parallel to various learned identities, orientations, and behaviours. Therefore, the smoking analogy is advanced as a vehicle for understanding multiple learned-behaviours. Learned-behaviours, or behaviours with a feasible learning component, such as drug use, eating problems, suicidality, homosexuality, paraphilias, musical prowess, reading styles, and athletic proficiency are potentially better understood, or more broadly understood, using analogical reasoning, given an analogy that has similarities in elements, structure, relations, goals, and learning patterns.

Analogically, particular problematic loves are posited here for comparison. One major comparison influencing problematized love and its contexts is the love of a particular enterprise (i.e., smoking) and the love of a particular person of the same sex (e.g., homosexuality). These are particular loves and quite distinct from broader loves like the love of the good, the love of the beautiful, or the love of God. At another level, these problematized loves are distinct from the love of a child, the love of a parent, or the love of a friend. The non-problematized loves are high-order loves. What about the two former loves, smoking and homosexuality? Smoking and homosexuality, as loves, are different from the love of the good, the love of one's child, the love of a friend, and the love of God. The latter two loves are problematic loves, at least, for some segments of society.

One interest in this essay is firstly how the latter two loves (smoking and homosexuality) differ, or are the same, with respect to each other. Analogical thinking offers a method that invites both breadth and depth in such a consideration. Analogical thinking facilitates the exploration and elaboration of the causation, nature, and course of development of these two loves—the love of smoking and the love of a same-sex type. In fact, the parallels in the

acquirement process of various behaviours, orientations, identities, or loves, beyond just smoking, the base analogy, are arresting, and several are considered.

In the previous essay (Volume II), analogical parallels with smoking informed the acquisition of a sexual orientation (both heterosexual and homosexual) as well as other learned identities (e.g., problem eating, suicidal ideation, creative writer, athlete, musician, etc.). Similarities in internal elements and relations (for both the base analogy and the target analogies) showed that the value of the analogical thinking went beyond simple development. Such an approach did cast both smoking and sexual orientation as interesting as problematized loves.

The question of analogous thinking in comparing, for example, sexual orientation to other "orientations" is not unusual. Sexual orientation has been compared analogically to such bases as race and left handedness on the value-neutral end of the continuum, and to coprophilia and necrophilia on a value-loaded end of the continuum (see Goldberg, 1991). Likewise, problematized love of food (eating disorders) have been compared to simple diversity on the value-neutral end of the continuum, to mental disorders on a value-concern point of the continuum, and to vices or sin (e.g., sloth and gluttony) on the value-loaded end of the continuum. Even love of reading (the obsessive reader) has been compared to "scholar" on the value-neutral end of the continuum, and to "nerd" on the value-loaded end of the continuum. Analogical thinking arguably can carry a moral load as well as a cognitive load.

Is it appropriate to compare eating problems with sexual orientation, that is, love of food and love of the same-sex-type, for example? Well, some eating disorders do seem to have an addictive quality. Similarly, a sexual orientation, or behaviour, has been compared to addictive-type behaviours by others (e.g., Satinover, 1996), and the addictive comparison extends as far back as Imperial Rome (see Brooten, 1996). Clearly, smoking has an addictive component, so

the possibility of using a smoking model analogously (to sexual behaviour and/or eating problems) is not unreasonable, at least on one level.

The principal analogical base to facilitate thinking about orientations advanced earlier (Volume II) was smoking and that primarily as an analogy for sexual orientation, both heterosexual and homosexual. Yet, there is a broader general focus, in that, the smoking analogy is presented as a possible organizing focus for such constructs as various problematized loves: sexual orientations (e.g., heterosexuality, bisexuality, asexuality, zoosexuality, pedophilia, necrophilia, etc.), abnormal relationships (e.g., relationship addiction, stalking, jealousy, battered-spouse syndrome, Stockholm syndrome, etc.), eating problems (obesity, bulimia, anorexia, dieting, etc.), suicidality (ideation, idealization, parasuicide, suicide), and, in fact, learning generally—musicianship, athletic prowess, obsessive creative writing, reading, and so on. Each time this basic smoking analogy was considered in the earlier essay, it was seen to hold value in addressing other tangential issues associated with the various targets in the analogical comparisons.

While some analogies might be better than others in terms of more similarities, or fewer non-alignments, it is arguable that even diverse analogies can be specifically informative. Morally, the identity "I'm a reader" is clearly more analogous to the formation of the identity "I'm a musician," than the identity "I'm a thief." The similarity is greater at one level between reader and musician. However, if the acquisition process in the reader/criminal analogy is both similar, and primary, it is possible that the reader/criminal analogy could actually be quite informative.

The analogical argument was advanced as follows:

The Claim: The smoking orientation—that is, the *desire* to smoke (perhaps coexisting with the desire to not-smoke), the *attachment* to smoking (physical and psychological addiction or attachment), the *inception* of smoking, the *choices* to smoke at various choice-points on the acquisition trajectory, the personal *history* of smoking, the subsequent *sense of powerlessness* related to smoking, the *self-identification as smoker*—all offered parallels to other behavioural phenomena like sexual orientation, eating problems, relationship addictions, musicianship, athletic prowess, obsessive reading, compulsive writing, fanatical preaching, and more. Of interest for the present essay, all of these—the base and the targets—have elements of love: problematized love. For purposes of the present essay then, it was argued that smoking is an informative base for illustration of various analogies which have been advanced. This holds whether the target is a sexual orientation, an eating orientation, an obsession with athletic, music, creative writing, pornography, gambling, a shopping addiction, and so on.

One learns to smoke, to eat, to copulate, to relate, to denigrate, and perhaps even self-destruct. One learns to play music, to play basketball, to read, to write, and co-construct. In this learning (whether positive or negative) choice is prominent—choices are made, choices are triggers, choices have a psycho-social underpinning, choices have influential biological roots, choices have a history, and choices have an edifying philosophical function of pointing to the transcendent aspect of the human being. Choice is also seen to exist in different degrees, or different calibers, which adds layers of complexity to the psychology of choice, in the learning process. The caliber of the choice one has when taking the first cigarette, is different from the caliber of choice when one takes the tenth cigarette, which in turn is different from the caliber of the choice when one takes the ten-thousandth cigarette or the hundred-thousandth cigarette. Choice changes, and this is a key point to be extracted from the analogical thinking advanced.

As a parallel, the smoking orientation serves as an analogy for the sexual orientation and vice versa. A smoking orientation serves as an analogy for an eating orientation and vice versa. A smoking orientation serves as an analogy for the musicianship orientation and vice versa. Analogies when used to facilitate thinking (i.e., analogical thinking) serve to direct thinking, to elaborate thinking, to raise questions, to suggest answers, to suggest possibilities, to give insights, to defuse emotions, and to challenge dogma, propaganda, and rigidity. For example, as choosing changes over time this is a valuable point to be learned from the analogy between a smoker and a homosexual—there are choice-points with different calibers of choice at different times.

The Argument:

- Major Premise: Analogies facilitate thinking when meaningful parallels are drawn between two phenomena.

- Minor Premise: A smoking orientation has meaningful parallels with target orientation X.

- Conclusion: A smoking orientation facilitates thinking about target orientation X.

The argument is simple as may be seen in the syllogism. Here, in this present essay, the argument is contextualized in the framework of "love." This move, ironically, casts love in a negative light, and casts critical questions raised (including questions related to human relationships involving love, personal memories of loving, feelings of love, current knowledge impacting love, pragmatism and love, religious diversity and love, and so on), in a new light.

The nature and potential of this smoking analogy invites challenges to the argument; such arguments particularly challenge the minor premise. A few acquaintances expressed claims that the parallels between smoking and homosexuality will not stand and thus a smoking orientation might work as an analogy for the alcoholic orientation but it fails as an analogy for

something like a sexual orientation. But does it? That's a question worth considering. It is clear that most of the thinking linking love to an orientation has arisen with respect to homosexuality. Consequently, a focus on homosexuality is currently the richest resource for considering problematized loves.

Though the analogical reasoning was seminal, many of the criticisms emerged independently and tangentially. The criticisms and concerns which surfaced are addressed in this present essay as critical reflections: analyses, caveats, considerations, challenges, and responses, with the particular focus on problematized love. That problematized love extends beyond a sexual orientation like homosexuality is evident in applications to heterosexuality, eating disorders, suicidality, smoking, and even shopping.

At a surface level, it is a given that some analogies have more merit (better coherence, more parallels, substantial empirical foundations, reasonableness, similar implications, moral equivalence, and so on) than other analogies. Various aspects of thinking are considered when developing a general case for analogical thinking, and the specific case for the argument in favour of the smoking orientation as an analogy for a particular target. The psychology of thinking, thinking dispositions, thinking skills, thinking styles, thinking problems, and so on, can be brought into the mix for consideration at various points in the conceptual analysis. For example, one might address the notions of induction, deduction and abduction. One might address the notions of critical thinking skills and critical thinking dispositions. One might address the problems associated with thinking: logical fallacies, inevitable illusions, stupidity, self-deception, denial, rationalization, and so on. Such problems and practices that can nullify rational thinking hopefully are up for consideration. Further, one might address problems related to culture, religion, and worldviews. However, the specific objections voiced by acquaintances, and encountered in reading, are the ones addressed initially here. So there are limitations.

At this point a foundational principle is posited, that is, a dispositional attitude of openness. One ought to have a disposition, such that, one does not prematurely reject a claim for a particular point, position, or analogy. One ought to consider the case fairly, aware of human propensity to limitations, to a narrowed focus, to biases, and to self-deception. If deception is so prominent, whether by self or others, we ought to examine our knowledge claims, our beliefs, our thinking, to guard against deception, particularly self-deception. How? Obviously, clear thinking is a primary answer. Critical thinking! We still admit the possibility of deception, and we still need to guard against being led astray, but sound thinking, informed by sound beliefs, is the ground of wisdom. Analogical thinking can be a very potent technique for considering knowledge claims, and formulating knowledge claims. It can facilitate sound thinking and lead to sound beliefs. But further, broadening perspective can facilitate thinking. Hence the broadened perspective adopted here by attending to multiple framings.

Seeing Love as a Problem—Biological Framings

Biology and Infrastructure (Dunbar, Fisher, ...)

A biological framing of love addresses infrastructure. As such, one focus is the biochemical underpinnings, and neurological structures, driving various constructs defined as love, and behaviours defined as loving. A second focus is the purported evolutionary explanations of the nature of love; this would extend to various species in nature, various primates, various points in human history, and various cultural factors. The question here is how love is developed by natural selection mechanisms to ensure adaptability. The adaptability would apply to the individual's genes being propagated and protected into the next generation.

The third focus is affective. Since love is viewed as a feeling, an emotion, an attitude, a motivation, a drive, or even a faulty belief, it is a component of the infrastructure.

In a biological framing the focus is on infrastructure for love. Humans can learn a great deal about aspects of love from the study of different species. As well, the study of human differences with respect to emotions, attachments, sex, pair-bonding, neurological differences, developmental trajectories, brain damage, cognitive dysfunctions, and so on, can inform the infrastructure upon which we set love (psychologically, theologically, and philosophically).

While the principal focus in the essay is superstructure (i.e., psychological, theological, and philosophical constructs) there are factors in the infrastructure that have a bearing on understanding the superstructure. Yet, for the most part, the infrastructure is not in view.

Dunbar

Dunbar (2012) is focusing on pair-bonding as a proxy for love. Biochemical factors that he addresses are: oxytocin, vasopressin, dopamine, and the endorphins. Oxytocin (perhaps released with a variety of triggers, during female orgasm, birthing, lactation, hugs, touch, etc.) facilitates bonding—whether mother and child, lover and beloved, or toucher and touchee. Dunbar contends: "It's a cheap chemical trick to bypass your natural defences. Rational thought flies out the window, and instead you get poleaxed whether you want to or not, your better judgement not withstanding (Dunbar, 2012, p. 32)."

The oxytocin effect is interesting, and the research on additional biochemical influences is intriguing but the data are not yet strong enough to build an understanding of a convincing infrastructure. As one reads through Dunbar's speculations the best one can do is pause and say: Interesting!

It's the same with neurological structures. Evidence of different brain activation patterns as a function of different love type (i.e., romantic love versus friendship versus maternal love) is

interesting. There are some common brain regions active and some unique brain regions active for the different kinds of love. Of interest are the role of emotion areas and the suppression of critical thinking areas with respect to romantic partners (Dunbar, 2012, p. 79). More dramatic is the contrast with maternal love. In view of brain activation patterns Dunbar (2012) writes: "It's as though we abandon any pretence at trying to read too much into the behaviour of those we (desperately?) want to be attached, so we switch the socially smart areas off. It's a case of blind commitment, the heart literally overruling the brain (p. 80)."

One structural factor relates to the right/left hemispheres. Dunbar attends to language—the language of poetry, and the language of love, and the language of emotions. We have difficulty expressing our personal emotions in cognitive terms, that is, language. Language fails us in this area. "There are two important lessons here that are germane to our enquiry. One is that the emotions that well up and create our inner feelings are not well connected to the conscious, language-accessible brain. They belong to the emotional right side of the brain, the side that seems to handle our more supposedly irrational, animalistic reactions (Dunbar, 2012, p. 28)." This situating of the emotional side of love in the right hemisphere mitigates understanding. "We feel our emotions, but we do not always understand them. The problem for our present enquiry is that this makes it very difficult for us to dig beneath the surface and find out what is actually going on (Dunbar, 2012, p. 29)." These biochemical and neurological factors place understanding of the infrastructure of love at a rudimentary level.

One area where one could take some liberty in drawing upon Dunbar is his attention to the love of God, and by extension his representatives. We could call it the numinous love. There seems to be a difference in this possible problematic love emerging from the female as opposed to the male. Females seems more disposed to this "mystical" love or numinous love. Dunbar (2012) addresses this question and it is relatively clear that males and females can fall prey to

such mystical love, but the female of the human species seems more prone to this phenomenon. Whether this particular aspect of love is best viewed at a biological level or a psychological level is not clear. However, the sex difference does point to a biological underpinning. As Dunbar notes: "...there are good reasons for believing that socialization merely exaggerates existing biological differences (2012, p. 204)." The particular draw upon females could be linked to: (1) their heightened emotional, social, and empathic sensitivity, (2) their depth of processing for emotional events, (3) their broader neurological engagement in drawing upon left and right hemisphere processing, (4) their need for security and associative-status, or (5) their enhanced cognitive abilities like mentalising. With respect to cognitive processing differences Dunbar notes: "Women also score significantly better than men on mentalising (theory of mind) tests. One consequence of this may be that women are both more sensitive than men to reflective anxieties about the vagaries of everyday life and the uncertainties of the future, and better able to reflect on other people's mind states. As a result, women may be more prone to seek structures and processes like religion that bolster their ability to cope with these anxieties. Given the role that religion plays in this respect, these effects would tend to make women more susceptible to religious persuasion (2012, p. 204)."

An additional, but likely related, phenomenon that Dunbar addresses is the female propensity to be drawn to charisma. "Charismatic individuals, whether political or religious leaders, sports stars, musicians or even occasionally writers, seem to be especially attractive, and notoriously so in the case of male pop icons who continue to attract more than their fair share of free sex. The reasons for their attractiveness might be either something to do with their status (and hence potential wealth) or their good genes (as implied by their intellectual or physical skills). So powerful is this effect that it seems to generalize even to virtual individuals such as God (Dunbar, 2012, p. 205)." The draw to the mystical, the numinous, the charismatic,

is particularly problematic when the charismatic individual is a rebel, a rock star, a murderer, a mesmerizer, or a cherub.

It is a love of the icon. Dunbar speculates that we "...are falling in love with an image we have constructed that is only partly informed by what is actually in front of us (2012, p. 205)." This mystical love is love of an image, love of a construct, or love of an ideal; hence, it is ultimately love of something internal to the individual rather than something external. This would be true, unless of course, the internal construct correctly maps onto the external reality. These numinous forms of love (i.e., the mystical, the charismatic, the iconic) that Dunbar taps into are potentially quite important for the consideration of problematized loves.

Fisher

Helen Fisher is a social anthropologist who has devoted a large segment of time and attention, over the past fifteen years, to the issue of love. In her typology there are three types of love: *lust*, *romantic love* and *attachment*. The biological underpinnings of *romantic level*, she contends, are three neurotransmitters: dopamine and norepinephrine showing increases, counterbalanced with serotonin decreases, in specific brain regions, particularly the caudate nucleus. The biological underpinning of *lust* is the increased levels of testosterone, in part due to the dopaminergic, norepinephenergic and serotonergic systems. The biological underpinnings of *attachment* are seen in the increases in vasopressin for males, and oxytocin primarily for females but also for males.

These three love types can follow different ordered sequences. One might first fall in love with all the correlates associated with *romantic love*. This can be followed by *lust*. After a period of time *attachment* is dominant. Or, one might be drawn by *lust* into a relationship first; this then can turn into *romantic love*; finally *attachment* again emerges. Even so, it is possible

that *attachment* might grow out of friendship or platonic relationship first. After a period of time the person could find *romantic love* surfacing, or *lust* surfacing. The point is: various sequences are possible.

The purpose of these loves from an evolutionary perspective would be mating for the sake of propagating one's genes (*lust* and *romantic love*); and, bonding for the sake of caring for the offspring (*romantic love* and *attachment*). So why do people fall in love? Because it is adaptive! This emotional propensity, or drive, to fall in love, to form pair-bonds, is viewed as the product of an evolutionary history where the biological mechanics of love have been developed to facilitate the production, propagation, and protection of one's progeny now and into the future. Arguably, each of the four loves considered by C. S. Lewis could contribute to such effects.

But, there is a dark side to love possibly operative as well. That is, love of money, love of power, and love of self-aggrandizement, could place one in a position of prestige, or high profile; these loves in turn can serve as an appeal to the female. These are proxies for protection. Similarly, there is that peculiar phenomenon of females being attracted to the rebels, the bad boy. So risk-taking might be a desirable male trait for females in that it indicates strength, courage, ability, and even a life-force. These could be desirable traits for females with respect to their offspring.

Darker still, from another perspective this evolutionary mechanism (gene production, propagation and protection) would not explain certain love variants—necrophilia, pedophilia, zoosexuality, and homosexuality. Would such loves actually be loves gone awry?

Biology and Sex Differences (Baron-Cohen)

Sex differences are in play as well. Obvious differences are seen in the biochemical underpinnings. Oxytocin seems more relevant for females than males. Vasopressin seems more relevant for males. More obvious are the differential needs of the female. The need for support, protection, and a longer term commitment will differentiate male and female love dynamics. Perhaps most striking are cognitive processing differences likely rooted in brain-based differences.

The Brain On Love

While Baron-Cohen's (2002) paper is focusing on autism and Aspergers' Syndrome, his framework and groundwork, are applicable to addressing the male brain. He distinguishes between a female type brain characterized by "empathizing" and a male type brain characterized by "systematizing." While both cognitive abilities are available to both males and females, the proportions differentially characterize males and females, generally. Baron-Cohen distinguishes between five types, but two types are relevant here for queries here about male and female love-patterns—Type 1 -- S > E (i.e., systematizing is greater than empathizing and this reflects the typical male brain), and Type 2 -- S < E (i.e., systematizing is less than empathizing and this reflects the typical female brain).

Love for the female type brain is strong on empathy; there is likely a better balance between the cognitive and the affective aspects of love, pair-bonding, and relationships themselves. Love for the male type brain may be more product-oriented; love for the female brain may be more person-oriented.

Of functional interest here for the male-brained are: those aspects of typical male-brained processing that might support vociferous males with respect to weighing evidence, arguing, defending, contending, and teaching.

On male-brainedness

Males systematize. "By a 'system', I mean anything that takes inputs and deliver outputs. When you systemise, you use 'if–then' (correlation) rules. The brain focuses in on a detail or parameter of the system, and observes how this varies. That is, it treats a feature as a variable. Or a person actively manipulates this variable (hence the English word, systematically). They note the effect(s) of this one input elsewhere in the system (i.e. the output). 'If I do *x*, then *y* happens'. Systemising therefore needs an exact eye for detail (Baron-Cohen, 2002, p. 248)."

Baron-Cohen (2002) suggests six kinds of system that the human brain can analyse or construct:

(1) Technical systems (he suggests examples like a computer or a musical instrument, etc.)

(2) Natural systems (he suggests examples like tides, weather, plants, etc.)

(3) Abstract systems (he suggests mathematics, computer programs, language syntax, etc.)

(4) Social systems (he suggests an election process, legal systems, a businesses, etc.)

(5) Organisable systems (he suggests taxonomies, collections, libraries, etc.)

(6) Motoric systems (he suggests techniques in sports, playing a musical instrument, etc.)

Systems 3-5 would be potentially relevant with respect to analysis, synthesis, application and creation of dogma, and then practice. Data gathering, experimentation, estimating, pattern-seeking, prediction, deduction, induction, abduction, rule-generation, and theory building would be at home in such systematizing, as would a focus on details, precision, and truth-value.

"Systemising is an inductive process. You watch what happens each time, gathering data about an event from repeated sampling, often quantifying differences in some variables within the event and their correlation with variation in outcome. After confirming a reliable pattern of association –generating predictable results – you form a rule about how this aspect of the system works. When an exception occurs, the rule is refined or revised; otherwise, the rule is retained. Systemising works for phenomena that are indeed ultimately lawful, finite and deterministic. The explanation is exact and its truth-value is defeasible. (e.g. '*The light went on because switch A was in the down position*'). Systemising is of almost no use, however, when it comes to predicting moment-by moment changes in a person's behaviour. To predict human behaviour, empathising is required. Systemising and empathising are entirely different kinds of processes (Baron-Cohen, 2002, p. 248)."

Baron-Cohen lists 13 male flags of strong areas. Underpinning his search would be the focal area: "The relevant domains in which to look for evidence include any that are in principle rule-governed. Thus, chess and football are good examples of systems; faces and conversations are not. Systemising involves monitoring three things in order: input–operation–output. The operation is what you did to the input, or what happened to the input, to produce the output (p. 250)."

The six potentially relevant areas are as follows:

(2) *Occupations.* "Some occupations are almost entirely male. These include metalworking, weapon making, manufacturing of musical instruments, or the construction industries, such as boat building. The focus of these occupations is on constructing systems."

(3) Hard Sciences (e.g.,*Maths, physics, and engineering).* "These all require high systemising, and are largely male dominated disciplines. The Scholastic Aptitude Math Test (SAT-M) is the maths part of the test administered nationally to college applicants in the USA. Males on

average score 50 points higher than females on this test. Taking only those people scoring above

700, the sex ratio is 13:1 (men to women)."

(6) Field Independence. If a person's judgement of vertical *in The Rod and Frame test* is

influenced by the tilt of the frame, they are considered to be 'field dependent.' "Their judgement

is easily swayed. Most studies show that females are more field dependent – that is, women are

relatively more distracted by contextual cues, rather than considering each variable within the

system separately. They are more likely than men to say (erroneously) that the rod is upright if it

is aligned with its frame."

(7) *Attention to detail. "*This is a general feature of systemizing. It is not the only factor, but it is

a necessary part of it. Attention to relevant detail is superior in males. A measure of this is the

Embedded Figures Task: on average, males are quicker and more accurate in locating the target

embedded within the larger, complex pattern. Males, on average, are also better at detecting a

particular feature (static or moving)."

(11) *Organisability. "*People in the Aguaruna tribe (northern Peru) were asked to classify a

hundred or more examples of local specimens together into related species. Men's classification

systems had more sub-categories (i.e. they introduced greater differentiation) and more

consistency between each other than those of the women. The criteria that the Aguaruna men

used to decide which animals belonged together more closely resembled the taxonomic criteria

used by western (mostly male) biologists. Classification and organisation involves systemising

because categories are predictive. The more fine-grained the categories, the better the system of

prediction will be."

(12) *The Systemising Quotient. "*This questionnaire has been tested among adults in the general

population. It has 40 items asking about the subject's level of interest in a range of different

systems that exist in the environment (including technical, abstract, and natural systems). Males

score higher than females on this measure (S. Baron-Cohen and J. Reichler, unpublished data).

This framing casts males, or the male-brained, in a particular cognitive light. So why

would one want males (or the male-brained) in charge of weighing the evidence and arguments,

implementing critique, facilitating doctrinal development, building organizations, and teaching

in this particular venue? It seems arguably obvious from the previous paragraphs!

On Female-Brainedness

So, what about the women? Is it not chauvinism to cast women in a lesser light, to

silence women? Is it politically incorrect to see sex differences? Not necessarily. Actually,

Baron-Cohen (2002) casts women (or the female-brained) in a very strong light given their

strengths related to empathizing. He lists 16 strength areas, of which seven seem relevant for

female voicing, but perhaps in a different venue—a venue like counselling, service, support,

dealing with social problems, and so on. Such strengths as: (1) *sharing and turn-taking*, (2)

responding empathically to another's distress, (3) *use of a 'theory of mind,'* (4) *sensitivity to*

expressions (e.g., facial and gestural), (5) *values in relationships* (for example, women value

developing relations that are altruistic, reciprocal, intimate, and empathic. Men, on the other

hand value competition, social status, and dominance, as seen in power and politics, (6)

language style (for example, *"*Girls' speech is more cooperative, reciprocal and collaborative.

When girls disagree, they are more likely to express their different opinion sensitively, in the

form of a question, rather than an assertion. Boys' talk is more 'single-voiced discourse' (the

speaker presents their own perspective alone). The female speech style is more 'double voiced

discourse' (girls spend more time negotiating with the other person, trying to take the other

person's wishes into account) (Baron-Cohen, 2002, p. 250)," and (7) *talk about emotions.*

Women talk about feelings. Men's talk has a different focus; it is focused on objects or activities.

As infrastructure, these possible sex differences could impact the superstructure factors related to love. They could offer caveats when making judgments about love. They could offer tangential considerations when reflecting on love.

Seeing Love as a Problem—Storied Framings

Grand Stories

The issue here is the stories we hear about love and the stories we experience about love. Stories we hear are related to grand stories or everyday stories. We hear grand stories like Abelard and Heloise, Romeo and Juliette, Jonathan and David, Ruth and Naomi, Jesus and John, Jesus and Peter, Kierkegaard and Regine Olsen, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Dante and Beatrice, and more. These stories seem to point to bonds that transcend eros, friendship, and agape; they are bonds that unite, unify, and even fuse parts into a new unit. There is something that exists independent of time and distance. Some of these grand loves are real and objective (e.g., Abelard and Heloise); some are idealized and subjective (e.g., Dante and Beatrice).

Dark Stories

Then we hear the darker stories, *the stalker* and the stalked, *the outlaws* like Bonnie and Clyde, and *the psychopaths* like Barnardo and Homolka. We are puzzled by *the saviours*—the women who start relationships with prison inmates, marry them, and defend them. We are puzzled by *the groupies* attracted to rock stars, serial killers, mass murderers, and so on. We are puzzled by the irrational aspects of love. We don't understand the mother who leaves her child for a lover. We are puzzled by the delusional belief seen in the *de Clérambault syndrome*—

where the deluded person believes that some particular person is very much in love with them. There are the destructive loves characterized by emotional abuse or physical abuse. There are lopsided love affairs (e.g., Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt). There are loves attributed to *transference* mechanisms. There are loves linked to the *Stockholm syndrome*. And still there are more dark loves.

Taxonomy of Stories

Sternberg (2006) uses a storied approach in identifying people's conceptualizations of the love relationship. He has developed a taxonomy of sorts that is a "working list" that seems to offer metaphors for the various love relationships. Of the 26 types he lists so far some are more obvious than others; but they all seem to be potentially useful for broadening perspective. The table below is based on Sternberg's taxonomy.

Love Type/Metaphor	Roots of Love	Rating
Table 3: Adapted From Sternberg's Taxonomy for Stories of Love (Sternberg, 2006, p. 192). Colour Coding is Rating -- Green for Potentially Positive Loves and Red for Potentially Negative Loves.		
Love as Addiction	Attachment is strong, dysfunctional, compulsive, learned,	
Love as Art	Love object is a thing of beauty	
Love as Business	Partnership, power	
Love as Collection	Partner is viewed as an object. "Partner viewed as 'fitting in'..."	
Love as Cookbook	Follow the recipe seems to be the rule here.	
Love as Fantasy	The princess, the knight, the happily ever after scenarios	
Love as Game	Rules, play, maneuver, ...	
Love as Gardening	Nurture, attention, weeding...	
Love as Government	Totalitarian, hegemonic, democratic, libertarian, ...	
Love as History	Records, stories, artifacts, dates, ...	
Love as Horror	"Relationships become interesting when you terrorize or are terrorized by your partner."	RED
Love as House & Home	Developing and maintaining the home	
Love as Humor	"Love is strange and funny."	
Love as Mystery	Keeping things and self hidden, or masked somewhat...	
Love as Police	Surveillance, "close tabs," protection, weaponized...	
Love as Pornography	Degrading and being degraded	RED
Love as Recovery	"Survivor mentality" ...bad experiences make the person stronger.	
Love as Religion	"Views love either as a religion or as a set of feelings and activities dictated by religion."	
Love as Sacrifice	Giving oneself to the other, at a cost to the self.	
Love as Science	Love is a natural phenomenon. Analyze it. Understand it.	
Love as Science Fiction	"Feeling that the partner is like an alien—incomprehensible and very strange."	
Love as Sewing	"Love is whatever you make it."	
Love as Theatre	"Love is scripted, with predictable acts, scenes, and lines."	
Love as Travel	We are on a journey.	
Love as War	Devastation. Continuous battles.	RED
Love as Student-Teacher	"Love is a relationship between a student and a teacher."	

How might these stories function as framings for considering love? They are not so much framings as flags. For one thing they flag the importance of *emotions*, even the priority of emotions, in positioning love as a determinant. They flag *anomalies*. They are clearly in line with *analogical thinking*. And, they provide *alternate hypotheses* for consideration. Moreover, with reference to Sternberg's taxonomy there are diverse metaphors that serve to *broaden perspective* about the nature and roots (i.e., psychological, conceptual, cultural, and personalized) of various loves.

The Frameworks As Lenses, Filters, and Tools

The approach adopted here is to consider problematized loves through explanatory lenses that utilize love as an interpretive guide. While the storied lens offers interesting explanatory considerations, it is the religious, the psychological, the biological, and the analogical that are central. All five lenses are factors but the primary focus points are: (1) a *religious lens* which situates love in a context involving God (i.e., informed by C. S. Lewis and Augustine), (2) a *psychological lens* which situates love in the context of psychological balance (i.e., Sternberg) and motivation (doing what is good/bad) (Baumeister), (3) a *biological lens* which situates love in the context of brain-based typologies tied to biochemical and neurological influences (i.e., informed by Dunbar, Fisher, and others), and (4) an *analogical lens*, which considers various love phenomena from the broad perspectives of Thinking, Constraints, and Knowledge (informed by Holyoak & Thagard; Gentner & Markam). The *storied lens* offers metaphors for enriched thinking, suggested tangents, and possible concepts that could be informative if developed further.

Table 4: Major Framings For Viewing Problematized Loves							
Framing	Religious		Psychological		Analogical		Biological	
Representatives	C. S. Lewis	Augustine	Sternberg	Baumeister	Holyoak & Thagard	Gentner & Markam	Dunbar	Fisher
Organizing Construct	Categorizing	Ordering & Virtues	Relation & Imbalance	Motivation	Constraints & Thinking	Knowledge & Thinking	Bio-Philosophic	Propagation
Love Types	Eros	Godly Order	Intimacy	Rewards			Romantic	Romantic Love
	Storge	Disordered	Passion	Self Enhancement			Friendship	Lust
	Phileo		Commitment	One's Ideology			Maternal	Attachment
	Agape			Schadenfreude			"Numinous"	
Elements For Problem Consideration	Melding	Teleology (God-centered)	Balance *Deficits*	Gain	Similarities (elements & relations)	From commonalities	Bio-chemical	
	Displacement	Controlled Affections	Balance *Dispositions*	Ego Enhancement	Structures (mapping elements & relations)	From differences	Mystical	
	Reordering	Temperance	Balance *Desires*	Idealism Defended	Goals (Authorial Intent)	Systematicity (higher order relations...)	Charismatic	
		Fortitude	*INTERESTS*	Power And Justice			Iconic	
		Justice	*TIMEFRAMES*		Inductive Thinking	Inductive Thinking		
		Prudence	*ACTIONS*		Bridging Strategy	Bridging Strategy		
					Reasoning	Reasoning		
					Problem Solving	Problem Solving		
					Abduction	Abduction		

Chapter 2: Addressing Problematized Loves

1. <u>Problematized Love: Schadenfreude/Sadism</u>

"Love" The Suffering of Others?

People can "love" to see others suffer, a phenomenon consistent with gloating, bullying, vigilante justice, real justice, gossip, practical jokes, or just the dark side of curiosity. As an emotion getting the label "love," if it is a love, it is certainly not an admirable love. In fact, it may be seen as a root of evil. To illustrate, Baumeister (1997) proposed four roots of evil that can be tapped in various garb. The fourth root—a propensity towards sadism and schadenfreude in human beings—would be in focus here as a peculiar love[1]. On the positive side one can delight in the suffering of others when correlating the feeling with a sense of justice, retribution, or even vigilantism. One could use the experience to make downward comparisons with others which would serve to bolster one's own self image; the love is seen to have value in enhancing one's self esteem. Or one might be simply entertained.

But then there's the negative side. How does schadenfreude and sadism fit here as a problematized love? Is there really a "love" that delights in the suffering of others and seems rooted in malevolence? Indeed. Both children and adults have such a propensity! Many children find no problem in using a magnifying glass to focus sunlight on an ant until it burns up. Dozens might be so dispatched before the child loses interest. A child may catch and remove the wings from a fly partly to see what happens. A dark curiosity! Dozens of flies might be subjected to the child's dexterity and so turned loose before the child loses interest. Such behaviour has the earmarks for some of a problematized love.

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[1] The other three roots when cast as "loves" would be: (1) love of material gain, (2) love of ego satisfaction and heightened self esteem, and (3) love of seeing, or having, one's ideology implemented or vindicated.

What about adults? Are comparable behaviours evident with adults? Can it be morally neutral for adults to "torture" animals? Many adults in the past found bear-baiting to be fun. Dog-fighting and cock-fighting are, for some, enjoyable spectator sports. Worse events, such as those in the ancient Roman coliseum, were catering to the crowds. In the not too distant past, public executions drew large crowds of spectators. Such a love oriented towards the suffering of others is a problematized love even in mild forms like gossip, gloating, eavesdropping, reading tantalizing newspaper stories or watching certain clips from the evening news.

"Understand" The Suffering of Others?

A naturalist, in support of a morally neutral position, points to numerous descriptive facts. For example there are natural facts of animal torture. At times a cat will seem to torment a mouse, a form of torture evident in nature. At the human level, for a child who intentionally kills ants most child psychologists are not likely to be too concerned. They could see it as normal, natural, and conceivably just immature. Is the child's behaviour sadism, curiosity, or simply shallow sight? Does the child need time for a sense of empathy to develop, along with a sense of morality and personal responsibility? Is the problematized love flagged here really a problematic love, or is it merely immaturity or a lack of appropriate social restraint on human nature?

At another level of understanding, researchers shock animals in learning studies. Researchers inflict pain on animals to study the neurological and neurochemical responses to pain. Researchers inflict pain in toxicity studies. It is argued that such research is a "necessary evil." Not torture! Not schadenfreude. Those who are more cognitively mature are likely to

show increased concern regarding the "torture" of animals. It is likely a small percentage of formal-operational thinkers who torture animals?[1]

At a contemporary intuitive level one believes it is wrong to torture animals, and quite likely most people at a basic level of cognitive maturity would subscribe to this belief. But appeals to the majority, or to emotions, are not valid arguments. In addition, there is empirical evidence supporting the notion it is wrong to torture animals (Lindzey, 2009) since such practices are possible precursors to human violence. Moreover, there are conceptual cases being advanced regarding the treatment of animals from a theological perspective (Lindzey, 1994), a legal rights perspective (Regan, 1983/2004), a moral theory perspective (Rollin, 2006), or a logical perspective (see Singer, 2006). Even among those with dissenting views (Cohen & Regan, 2001; Smith, 2010) there are none who argue for the claim that it is morally neutral if one tortures animals.

The beliefs regarding unacceptable behaviours can be seen as worldview-rooted. Indiscriminate killing and torture (of animals and humans) are wrong, as basic principles in the Judeo-Christian worldview. With respect to animals one is expected to show care, stewardship, compassion, and kindness (Lindzey, 1994; Scully, 2002). With respect to humans there is the fundamental acknowledging of human dignity, human empathy, love, and moral commandments. One suspects there is a case to be made that cruel behaviours are wrong in other religions like Hinduism or Buddhism as well, although, the rationales might be different (e.g., reincarnation, detachment, or karma). In the religious, creedal worldviews sadism seems

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[1] We have empirical data (on a sample of 137 male university students) showing a portion has killed an animal (less than two percent have killed a pet, and five percent have admitted killing a stray or wild animal) (Daly & Morton, in preparation). Do we judge this behaviour from a purely descriptive worldview (naturalism) or from a more moralistic worldview (religious)? The naturalist points to this as evidence of different practices and "different beliefs" in a population. It is descriptive.

wrong; schadenfreude seems suspect, as a desire, or more descriptively, as a "love." If a "love," it is a defective love a darker love.

Schadenfreude, sadism, gloating, gossip, and so on, can be seen as rooted in immaturity. But they are also rooted in a human nature—a cognitive nature, an empathic nature, and a sinful nature. Failures in restraint can manifest as failures in empathy (de Waal, 2009; Rifkin, 2009), failures related to maturity, failures related to cognitive and heuristic problems, failures related to faulty beliefs, and failures related to a defective human nature.

This problematized love can be addressed via the frameworks (religious, psychological, analogical) in a couple of ways. For the religious framing, Augustine would contend that the desires are not properly ordered, that is, not God-centered. For Lewis there is a failure at the "*phileo*" level—a kinship with animals in the sense of St Francis, and fellow human beings —is not recognized when someone delights in the suffering of others. Displacement of this *phileo* love is occurring by self-love, self-service, or self-interests.

In a psychological framing, Sternberg would highlight an internal psychological imbalance related to *deficits*, *dispositions*, and *desires*. The *deficit* with tacit knowledge would be likely linked to cognitive processes and heuristics, strategy, and moral developmental immaturity. The three *dispositions* that interfere with tacit knowledge use are: a sense of omnipotence, a sense of omniscience, and a sense of invulnerability. Interestingly, these are often characteristic of children and immature adults. *Desires* out of balance might be seen in a selective focus, or narrowing of attention, to a particular INTEREST (say, intrapersonal), a particular TIMEFRAME (say, the immediate), and a particular ACTION (say, shaping an environment). Disorder is seen in an imbalance in these areas. Order involves new choices, new beliefs, in fact, a mind-change.

2. Problematized Love: Self Love

The Upside of Self Love

Is self-love a good thing or a bad thing? On the good side of the balance is the very real value attached to the human being, the self. Such value may be a function of our creaturely status; a creation has value because of its creator. Or, such value may reside in the Judeo-Christian notion of human beings bearing the image of God (imago dei). Human beings have a special standing. They stand higher than the animal kingdom and a little lower than the angels. Perhaps the greatest signal for the Christian assigning value to the person, the self, is the fact that God set in motion a plan of redemption—a gut-wrenching plan of suffering, sacrifice, love and grace that birthed redeemed human beings. Valuing the self in this context would seem to be a good thing. There are grounds then for thinking highly of the self.

The humanist attribution of value is likely seen in human beings being at some type of apex of development. Humans are the most advanced of all life forms, at least in the eyes of those following conventional wisdom. While the elevation of some species (certain primates for example) is a trend in motion, and arguments for animal rights are flourishing, there is not yet a compelling case for moral equivalence for those following conventional wisdom. Humans are still seen as paramount, and human flourishing as the desirable objective for the human enterprise. Logically, the human, as human, is loved.

The Downside of Self Love

On the down side, certain forms of self-love are problematic. Self love and the contiguous manifestation of high self-esteem raise questions. High self-esteem has been

associated with criminality (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). In fact, as Baumeister et al note, high self-esteem is relatively common in prison populations. Furthermore, there is a case to be made that self-esteem is inflated artificially by concerned educators and parents. There is a reluctance to allow children to fail, to make mistakes, to be on a losing team, and so on (see Prager, 2010; Stout, 2000).

After Prager changed his view on the self esteem movement, becoming more critical, he came to see he could not discount the idea that there might be merit in having low self esteem. He writes: "...I have analyzed the finest adults I know well. It turns out that none had high self-esteem as a child. In fact, virtually most of them 'suffered' -- as it would now be deemed -- from low self-esteem." Low self-esteem could motivate one to achieve. It could contribute to setting higher standards and admirable goals. The self-esteem issue invites a broader perspective.

The more fine-grained continuum utilized here, to broaden perspective, involves a seven-point scale. As seen in the figure (Figure 2) three types of self-esteem would be considered normal. In this framing High Self-Esteem (L4) would be considered in a normal range (L2, L3, L4)—neither Problematic (L1 or L5) nor Disordered (L0 or L6). This High Self-Esteem would be warranted; it would be characteristic of the child who works hard at home and work diligently at school tasks, the child who achieves, who has admiring friends and relatives, who is creative, and who has justified true emotions.

The person with Inflated Self-Esteem (L5) is the person who has unwarranted high self-esteem. This person is praised regardless of success and effort. This person is never on a losing team. This person never strikes out. This person is taught to see life through rose-coloured glasses.

L0	L1	L2	L3	L4	L5	L6
Self-Hate			Balanced		Self-Love	
Self Destruction	Self Abasement	Low Self-Esteem	Ordinary Self-Esteem	High Self-Esteem	Inflated Self-Esteem	Narcissism
Disordered	Problematic	Normal			Problematic	Disordered
Improper Function		Fuzzy Function	Proper Function	Fuzzy Function	Improper Function	

Figure 2. Illustrating a seven-point continuum of self-love profiles.

When such inflated self-esteem transitions to narcissism the "disordered" label is clear. The narcissistic person is characterized by obsessive egocentricity, vanity, prestige, show, status and power. Liberace comes to mind, as does Bernie Madoff, Jodi Arias, Leopold and Loeb, Ted Bundy, Jeffrey Dahmer, and others.

Stout (2000) has explored a focus on self-esteem in society as an addiction. She sees it as "...producing some alarming symptoms that undermine the entire educative process. The first and most obvious of these is narcissism (p. 33)." In narcissism the focus is on self first, and self only, with no empathy or respect for others. That is an alarming effect. The other three symptoms are "separatism" (in the form of labels like multiculturalism, cultural differences, nonwhites, feminism, gays, lesbians, and other separatist groupings), "emotivism" (in the form of focus on "feelings" rather than critical thinking skills, a focus on preferences rather than objective facts, or a focus on opinion rather than truth), and "cynicism" (in the form of loss of faith, loss of hope, loss of ideals, loss of trust, and so on). As Stout expressed it in a capsulated statement: "We have traded substance for image (2000, p. 43)."

With respect to the four effects (i.e., narcissism, separatism, emotivism, and cynicism) operating, arguably there can be a push to Inflated Self-Esteem (L5) and Narcissism (L6) via the narcissistic route. But also, there can be a push in the other direction, a push to Self-Abasement (L1) and Self-Destruction (L0) via the latter three effects: separatism, emotivism, and cynicism.

On the self-hate end of the continuum, low self-esteem can be motivational, perhaps encouraging one to get out of the mess and pursue success. This is like the category that Prager (2010) addressed as valuable. Low self-esteem can push one to repentance, redemption, and rehabilitation. However, when dysfunctional self-esteem makes the transition to self-abasement, serious problems can follow: poor hygiene, cutting behaviours, eating disorders, social withdrawal, drugs, crime, suicidal ideation, and so on. Any semblance of High Self-Esteem or Inflated Self- Esteem at this level would be an example of self-deception. Indeed the High Self-Esteem noted by Baumeister et al (1996) for criminals may be an example of self-deception, if not prior social-deception. A further transition to Self-Hatred could be characterized by depression and suicide; it would be destructive—loss of faith, loss of hope, loss of ideals, loss of trust, and so on.

What is the problematized love here? Self love in the form of inflated self-esteem has the counterproductive effect of generating complacency rather than effort, apathy rather than rehabilitation, indifference rather than repentance, and the four effects noted by Stout (2000): narcissism, separatism, emotivism, and cynicism. This problematized love of the self can be addressed via the religious framework in two ways. For Augustine the problem would be that the love is not properly ordered, that is, it is not God-centered; it is self-centered love. For Lewis the problem would likely be seen as a displacement of such loves as *phileo*, *storge*, and *agape*. The "other" is not seen—simply not seen, not seen as important, not seen as equally important, and not seen as more important.

In the psychological framing the problem is viewed via Sternberg as imbalance. There is an internal psychological imbalance related to *deficits*, *dispositions*, and *desires*. The *deficit* with tacit knowledge would be likely linked to cognitive beliefs—the belief that everything is fine.

That is a deficit. It might also be a self-deception given deficits in awareness of appropriate strategies to deal with deficits. The three *dispositions* that can interfere with tacit knowledge use are: a sense of omnipotence, a sense of omniscience, and a sense of invulnerability. All three of these dispositions seem consistent with, and characteristic of, inflated self-esteem—an unwarranted self-esteem. When the adolescent expresses a sense of omnipotence, voices "know-it-all" opinions, and sees no personal vulnerabilities associated with their risk-taking behaviours, the objective spectator sees foolishness. *Desires* out of balance might be seen in a selective focus, or narrowing of attention, to a particular INTEREST (say, intrapersonal self aggrandizement, or seeking interpersonal praise, or obeisance, from the "other"), a particular TIMEFRAME (say, the immediate rewards rather than the long term benefits and losses), and a particular ACTION (say, adapting to an environment, rather than proactive shaping of an environment). Disorder is seen in the imbalance in these areas. Though differently viewed from Augustine, the love of self in this scale is a problematic love.

Is there something to be learned from an analogical framework here? Consider an analogical comparison between a smoking orientation and a self-love orientation (i.e., Inflated Self-Esteem). There is a clear addictive component to smoking. Is there an addictive component to Inflated Self-Esteem? Stout (2000) thinks so. Are there choice points in a choice continuum for Inflated Self-Esteem? While it seems less likely at a surface level (as it seems high self esteem is a function of propaganda rather than choices) there is a case to be made for choice. When does one choose high self-esteem? When parents and educators propagandize?

The answer to the question of when one might choose high self-esteem, or inflated self-esteem, is best seen from the flip side. That is, when does one deny low self-esteem? Or, when does one deny self-abasement? When one manipulates events that should contribute to lowered

self-esteem (via suppression, self-deception, denial, cheating, lying, and so on), one is denying

lowered self-esteem, and thereby inflating self-esteem. Reality fades. Here's the interesting

question: Are these choice-points? Yes. These are choice points for artificially inflating self-

esteem. As with smoking and the first few cigarettes, the first few lies, or cheating ventures, are

innocuous. As with smoking the mechanics of smoking, the learning, becomes customary, then

habit, then addiction and then entrenched. As with smoking, were there is a difference between

the first cigarette, and the $10,000^{th}$ cigarette, so with lying, there is a difference between the first

lie, and the $10,000^{th}$ lie. Choice atrophies! The personal culpability dwindles over time.

As with smoking the causal attribution falls, on the one hand, to the environment—

advertisers and peers for smoking, parents and teachers for inflated self-esteem. On the other

hand, the causal attribution falls to biology—heritability estimates for smoking have ranged

from 46 to 84% (Batra, Patkar, Berrettini, Weinstein, & Leone, 2003), and for self-esteem about

30% (Kendler, Gardner & Prescott, 1998). There are biological influences. The comparable

interaction of biology, environment, chance and choice then makes sense analogically when

comparing attachment to smoking and attachment to inflated self-esteem.

	Table 5. Focus questions to address when using analogical thinking, and suggested answers for comparing a smoking orientation and a self-love orientation analogically.		
	Focus Questions	Suggestions	
1	What are the goals in formulating the analogy?	-Generally: knowledge, understanding, theory-building, with respect to self-love … -Specifically: To consider biological parallels, environmental parallels, and the psychology of choice and personal agency in self love.	
2	What are the elemental similarities?	-Determinants (biology, environment, interactions, chance, ...and choices) -Course of development (choices, habit, addiction—physical and psychological) -Learning processes are operative (plus self-regulation processes) -Psychology (identity, orientation, and change possibilities, ...) -Developmental trajectory (from simple to complex) -Choice is arguably evident with High Self-Esteem (1) virtue epistemology: override narcissism, emotivism, separatism, and cynicism (2) human nature: suppression, self-deception, denial, cheating, lying,)	
3	What are the relational similarities?	-Determinants: Biology interacting with environment is similar -Society interfacing with each analogical component is similar (mirrored?)	
4	What are the differences (non-alignable)?	-choice is direct for smoking; it is indirect for High Self-Esteem -social status (smoking frowned upon vs self-esteem valued)	

		-Moral status – (condemned vs rewarded)	
5	What are the differences (alignable)?	-choices driven by propaganda vs advertising	
6	Is the mapping coherent (showing systematicity and parallel connectedness)?	Yes	
7	What is the "inference step?"	-Both are addictions (with physiological and psychological elements) -Both are learning-based -Both show choice-points and different calibers of choice along the formative continuum -Both choice patterns founded on faulty beliefs and thinking	
8	What is the "learning step?"	-Beliefs are a key focus -Beliefs are foundational for choice -Thinking must be addressed -Change is credible -Education must be brought back to the front	

The problematized love is clearly entrenched. The religious framing, the psychological framing and the analogical framing offer some suggestions for change. Change is possible as argued in Volume II (for a full discussion see Volume II, Chapter 5). Choice is a key element. One set of solutions offered in Volume II drew upon *willful-sanctification*, *systems-sanctification*, *chemical-sanctification*, and *transcendental-sanctification*. The text that follows here on sanctification (i.e., change) is drawn largely from a segment of Chapter 5 in Volume II.

Attaining "improved people"—changing people to do the good or to do better—has multiple mechanisms. Four are considered here. This four-category approach uses the religious term *sanctification,* for effect, although it can be either a religious or secular concept. It is elaborated as follows: (1) *willful-sanctification,* or simply improving by choosing, choosing to do the right thing; (2) *systems-sanctification,* or being channeled into doing the right thing by constraints, rewards, or models (e.g., parents, peers, praise, media, manners, money, laws, society, biology, etc.), and subsequent habits formed; (3) *chemical-sanctification,* or being channeled to do the right thing by medications (e.g., Ritalin for ADHD, Lithium Carbonate for improving specific mood behaviours, Depo-Provera for eliminating behaviours like pedophilia, and Antabuse, Naltrexone, Vivitrol and Campral supporting the alcoholic's "better behaviour," etc.); and finally, (4) *transcendental-sanctification.* This transcendental-sanctification could be

seen as religious or secular. In a religious sense one has the Christian notion of the beginning of

better behaviour in this life (motivated by internal nudges like love, gratitude, the sensus

divinitatis, the Holy Spirit, wisdom, conscience, codes, laws, manners, support groups, and

models), and the fullness of right behaviour as an eternal teleological outcome eventually, with

God as the cause or source. In a secular sense, perhaps, ethereal principles like "the golden

rule," or empathy (de Waal, 2009; Rifkin, 2009), or "human flourishing" (Harris, 2010), or

"ultimate concern"—"a meaning which gives meaning to all meanings" (Tillich, 1952)—or self

actualization (Maslow, 1970), fit the bill for the "transcendent." A broader secular sense is

captured by Haidt's (2012) Social Conservative Moral Matrix that weights equally—at least for

conservatives—the following moral roots: *Care* vs harm, *Liberty* vs oppression, *Fairness* vs

cheating, *Loyalty* vs betrayal, *Authority* vs subversion, and *Sanctity* vs degradation (p. 306). This

six-fold focus, as opposed to a singular focus, is itself transcendent.

All four determinants of "doing good" could have an honourable place at the table and

could be considered as independent, interdependent, subsets, or peripherals of each other (as in

the various configurations seen in Figure 5). The first figure (5a) shows *willful-sanctification*

(and therefore choice) as a subset of all other determinants. Choice is foundational! The second

figure (5b) shows a scenario where all four elements are separate—a dichotomous view would

be typical here. Such a view would be characteristic of those who are likely to default to an

either/or perspective when attributing blame, or praise, to an individual for a particular success,

or failure. The third figure (5c) shows *willful-sanctification* interfacing, in part, with all other

determinants which may or may not be overlapping with each other. In the fourth figure (5d) we

see *willful-sanctification* as a subset of the social-systems but peripherally, and possibly, linked

to *chemical-sanctification* and *transcendental-sanctification* systems. Other configurations are

possible but the important point is the involvement of multiple potential determinants.

A further important aspect in the following figures, then, is the significance of breadth in perspective. There are four different influence-categories on behaviour that might be considered, that is, there are at least four. Secondly, the place allocated to choice, or *willful-sanctification*, can actually hold a central role in considering the genesis of a state, and the change in a state, whether one is focusing on psychological change, moral change, cognitive change, metacognitive change, behavioural change, changes in beliefs, changes in knowledge, changes in strategy, changes in paradigms, or changes in worldviews. Choice is important. Preferentially important!

Figure 5

A major point in these scenarios, since choice is important, is that self-sanctification, or *willful-sanctification*, ought not to be overlooked. In fact, it can be the central point for the entire issue of doing good, or doing the right thing, or doing the better thing, or doing the best thing. As such, self-regulation offers an important conceptual construct for furthering this discussion of change.

3. Problematized Love: "I Love My Prophet"

Recently, a Toronto newscast captured a few placards that focused on "sound-bite" messages associated with Islamic protests. One intriguing message was broadcasting a particular claim: "I Love My Prophet." This is an intriguing message for several reasons. First, as a type of love it is possibly an example of a problematized love; it is certainly not the conventional view of love. Second, there seems to be a politicization of love here linked to Islam. Third, there are problematic correlates in Islamic doctrine that raise related questions regarding women, love, and religious beliefs (see Sultan, 2009). If the doctrinal claims were seriously flawed, could, or should, this purported appeal to "love" be considered as likewise possibly flawed?

Of course love of a prophet is not limited to Islam. Likely, there are cases of inordinate love to the prophet Joseph Smith, or Brigham Young. Clearly there are cases of remarkable love of Jesus; consider Mary Magdalene and Peter in the New Testament. There is the love expressed by later Christian mystics. Modern "prophets" attracted love; Jim Jones was loved; Charlie Manson was loved.

The questions that come to mind concern the religious framework for considering this love, along with the psychological framework and the biological framework. How might this notion "I Love My Prophet" align with an analysis of such an expression in a political context

using the religious framework? How might this notion align with an analysis using the

psychological framework? How might this notion align with an analysis using the biological

framework?

The Biological Framework

It would seem that this declared love of "the Prophet" could be seen as the *numinous*

love flagged in Table 1 under Dunbar. It is somewhat reminiscent of the mystical love addressed

earlier, and the pull of the charismatic individual (whether the charismatic individual has truly

positive attributes, or negative qualities that are seen as desirable). But more than this is the case

of the iconic love; an attachment to an internal construct of the ideal individual, an image or an

ideal that is constructed by the individual. Since it is a personally constructed image the

negatives can be seen as positive. Whether or not this constructed image the person holds maps

onto reality is an additional question. Obviously, it would be in the best interests of the

individual to ensure the image is accurate—valid, reliable, and valuable, if not veridical. If not,

deception ensues. In view of the possible deception, there is a case here for appealing to one's

own critical skills, as well as the systematic and critical thinking of authorities, to broaden

perspective and deal with biological propensities to self-deception (Trivers, 2011), theological

propensities to self deception (Bahnsen, 1995), psychological propensities to self-deception

(Mele, 1997), a confirmation bias (Nickerson,1998), and the multiplicity of belief constraints

and limitations we face.

Within the biological framework one suspects a deep seated mystical-type love, more

typical of females than males, rooted in female attraction to the charismatic, and consistent with

prominent emotional dominance, is in play here. At least at an initial level of analysis the

possible dominant influence of the female-brain should be considered as part of the

infrastructure. And, as Baron-Cohen (2002) contrasts male-brainedness with female-

brainedness, it is the male brain that seems more adept at systematizing, problem solving, and critique.

The Religious Framework

It is not immediately clear from the Augustinian perspective whether or not this love, "I Love My Prophet," would be considered a disordered love. Part of the problem is that one must first assume the Prophet is not really a prophet in order to find Augustinian warrant for disorder. On the other hand, is love of the prophet, any prophet, different from love of the neighbour, where neighbours might be out-groups as with Jews and Samaritans? Actually, these two loves (mystical love of the prophet vs love of one's neighbour) seem different; the mystical love seems more irrational, at least potentially.

Similarly, from the perspective of C.S. Lewis, is such a love, "I Love My Prophet," an example of a problematized love? Or, is it a legitimate manifestation of the command to love God and neighbour, that is, ἀγαπάω (Matt. 22:35-40)? Is it a misdirected manifestation of ἀγαπάω? If it is a *displacement* of a legitimate love, ἀγαπάω directed towards God or neighbour (Matt. 22:35-40), by a passionate love (not quite the sensual ἐράω but certainly emotional, adoring, and fervent like φιλέω) there may be a case to assume it is problematic? If there is a *melding* of loves—say, ἀγαπάω, φιλέω, and ἐράω—there may be a case to assume it is a problematic love.

In a Christian context a more fine-grained Biblical approach might serve to clarify when a possibly problematized love (i.e., mystical, numinous, charismatic, or iconic) of a religious figure is in view. This is a level of analysis beyond the biological (*biochemistry, neurology, imbalance, cognitive dysfunction, and so on). Is such a love a function of *disorder*, *melding*, *displacement,* at the religious level? Within the religious framework, this seems appropriate since the love being expressed by the claim "I Love My Prophet" exists in a religious context.

Two Biblical Models

There are two love-models in the NT that might have some bearing and relevance here. These two models might contribute to a position on love differentiated by its object (i.e., for God the Father, for Jesus, for others, for neighbours, for prophets, for kings, for teachers, for family, for friends, and so on). The first model is seen when Jesus reduces all of the law to two major love objectives: (1) loving God with all one's heart, mind, soul, and strength (Matt. 22:35-40; Mark 12: 30-31; Luke 10:25-29), and (2) loving neighbour as oneself (John 13:34). The second model is the dialogue between Jesus and Peter that might be utilizing two different levels of love (John 21:15-17).

Model I (Two Love Objects – The Two Love Commandments)

The first component of the two-loves law, as the root of all of the law's commandments, is from Deuteronomy: "You shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might" (Deut 6:5). Heart, soul, and might! The second component of the law is new: Jesus indicates that He gives a new commandment. The new commandment is that you love one another (John 13:34). Moreover, he does indicate in Matthew that this second component is "like" the first (see Matt 22:39). That said, there must be some analogous parallels in a love directed towards God and a love directed towards others.

One striking parallel, an alignable element, in the text is the use of the term ἀγαπήσεις, in both cases—love of God, and love of one another. In some approaches what would be noted here by this wording is the signal for the deeper love, the wider concern, and the higher regard, than what might be indicated by other loves—particularly φιλέω. But that the love of God and the love of neighbour would be the same caliber of love seems suspect. Surely the love of God is different from the love of neighbour. The love for God is the love of beauty; love of moral perfection; love of thankfulness for grace, knowledge, creation, opportunity, revelation,

language, hope, and so on; love of parentage or genesis, and more. Furthermore, the love of God is all encompassing (i.e., heart, mind, soul, and strength) which suggest it would include the cognitive, the affective, the personality, the attitudinal, the volitional, and more). The love of neighbour is, at best, also the love of God but through His proxy, His creation.

It follows that two non-alignable parallels immediately evident are: (1) the love of neighbour is comparable to love of self; this would not be the case with respect to the love of God, and (2) the love of God involves all of the heart, mind, soul and strength; this would not seem to be the case with respect to love of one's neighbour.

Matthew (Matt 22:)

> 35 One of them, a lawyer, asked Him *a question,* testing Him,
> 36   "Teacher, which is the great commandment in the Law?"
> 37   And He said to him, " 'YOU SHALL LOVE (ἀγαπήσεις) THE LORD YOUR GOD WITH ALL YOUR HEART, AND WITH ALL YOUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL YOUR MIND.'
> 38   "This is the great and foremost commandment.
> 39   "The second is like it, 'YOU SHALL LOVE (ἀγαπήσεις) YOUR NEIGHBOR AS YOURSELF.'
> 40   "On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the Prophets."

Mark (Mark 12:)

> 30 AND YOU SHALL LOVE THE LORD YOUR GOD WITH ALL YOUR HEART, AND WITH ALL YOUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL YOUR MIND, AND WITH ALL YOUR STRENGTH.'
> 31 "The second is this, 'YOU SHALL LOVE YOUR NEIGHBOR AS YOURSELF.' There is no other commandment greater than these."

Luke (Luke 10:)

> 25 And a lawyer stood up and put Him to the test, saying, "Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?"
> 26   And He said to him, "What is written in the Law? How does it read to you?"
> 27   And he answered, "YOU SHALL LOVE THE LORD YOUR GOD WITH ALL YOUR HEART, AND WITH ALL YOUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL YOUR STRENGTH, AND WITH ALL YOUR MIND; AND YOUR NEIGHBOR AS YOURSELF."
> 28   And He said to him, "You have answered correctly; DO THIS AND YOU WILL LIVE."
> 29   But wishing to justify himself, he said to Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?"

Aside from the textual problem—none of the Synoptic Gospels report the text from Deuteronomy with 21st century precision—the intent is clear. Yes, Matthew substitutes "mind" for "strength." Yes, Mark simply adds "mind" to the list, as does Luke. But the importance of

loving God with all your heart, all your soul, and all your strength, is clear. That the command was amplified by Jesus to include the text "all your mind," is probably not novel. Likely, in the Hebrew understanding 'mind' was a given inclusion with either heart or soul.

So, the extension of the commandments to include love (ἀγαπάω) of neighbour is a new command, but the same kind of love, or so it seems at one level. When the question arises (as in Luke 10:29) as to which individuals are to be regarded as one's "neighbour," Jesus points to an unlikely scenario: the story of the Good Samaritan. Was the Samaritan showing love or empathic compassion? Was this the ἀγαπάω form of love, or was it φιλέω, or even στοργή?

Another framing might look like the following: was this Samaritan's love cognitive (rational) or affective (compassional or passional)? Which kind of love is it that one finds in people who contend: "I Love My Prophet?" Is it the kind of love one acknowledges with utterances like: (1) I love my mom, (2) I love my President, (3) I love my teacher, (4) I love my therapist, (5) I love my minister, (6) I love my boss, (7) I love my Justin Beiber, (8) I love my platoon captain, and so on? Or are these loves different? Is this the mystical love—or the charismatic love—that seems to emerge more so in females, and likely rooted in biology? If it is this biologically rooted love of an ideal, is it one of the disordered loves that Augustine identifies? Or is this love a distorted love that C. S. Lewis might contend for as *displacements*, *melding*, and *reordering*?

Model II (Two Love Types --The Jesus/Peter Dialogue-- John 21:15-17)

The second model is the dialogue between Jesus and Peter regarding Peter's love for Jesus (John 21:15-17). Jesus asks three times if Peter loves him more than these "things." True enough, it is not clear what these "things" were but that is likely a minor point. The "things" may have been the fish and the bread for the just-finished breakfast. They may have

been the activity of fishing, the tools for fishing, and the apparent miracle of the 153 fish caught

(John 21:5-11). Regardless, Peter answers in the affirmative each time. He loves Jesus. But the

questions, and answers, are interesting. Moreover, it seems fair to ask: is a more fine-grained

analysis required? One interesting aspect of the dialogue is the use of two different terms for

love. The first two times Jesus asks the question He uses a specific Greek word (ἀγαπᾷς). The

third time that Jesus asks Peter the question, He switches to a different Greek word for love

(φιλεῖς). Is the switch theologically loaded, or is it simply a rhetorical shift between synonyms to

avoid dull repetition? Peter's answer doesn't change; he always answers using φιλῶ.

The Rhetorical Shift Position

Stählin (1974) seems to think a mere rhetorical shift here is a reasonable position. As he

sees it, the focus is more on love, relationship, forgiveness, and perhaps commissioning rather

than nuances in types of love.[1] That there were three questions reiterated to Peter does seem to

parallel, and possibly relate to, Peter's earlier threefold denial. Also, the occasion was the third

time Jesus had manifested himself post-resurrection (John 21:14). Thus, the three iterations for

the question may not be related to a failure to get the right answer on the first two attempts

indicated in the continued questioning. After all, Peter's answer doesn't change.

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[1] "We have a special instance of the love of the disciples when φιλέω occurs in the conversation between Jesus and Peter in Jn. 21:15–17. Worth noting here is the alternation of ἀγαπάω and φιλέω, not merely in the distribution to question ἀγαπᾷς με; and answer φιλῶ in the first two rounds of the dialogue but also in the switching from ἀγαπᾷς με; to φιλεῖς με; in the third round. Many exegetes have seen a fine distinction here, Peter being troubled because the third time Jesus said to him: φιλεῖς με; "dost thou care for me," instead of ἀγαπᾷς με; as before. But it is more like that in c. 21 as throughout the Gospel (→ n. 167) ἀγαπάω and φιλέω are synon.,[196] for the strict parallelism in the three rounds of conversation is relaxed a little by the use of other synonyms: βόσκω — ποιμαίνω, ἀρνίον — προβάτιον, σὺ οἶδας (v. 15f.)—σὺ γινώσκεις. Furthermore the little clause λέγει αὐτῷ τὸ τρίτον supports a parallel meaning, since it denotes "for the third time," not "the third time." The threefold questioning (→ VIII, 222, 22 ff.) of love, and its threefold affirmation, are elucidated by the threefold commission. A strong and incontestable love of the Lord is indispensable in him who is to represent Jesus in the pastoral ministry. This is why Peter must love Jesus πλέον τούτων (21:15), these being other disciples, not as those who also bear a special commission, but as the company of disciples.[200] The shepherd of the community must stand in a uniquely close relation of love with his Lord and theirs. The threefold questioning of the love of Peter for Jesus is certainly to be related, too, to the threefold denial of Peter, cf. Jn. 13:35; 18:17, 25–27. By threefold installation in the pastoral office Jesus proclaims to him forgiveness for his betrayal.[202] On this forgiveness and the special love of Peter for Jesus thereby required Jesus bases the twofold discipleship of Peter in his pastoral office and his death. Plainly the author wants this solemnly confirmed, exceptional love of Peter for Jesus to be regarded as a counterpart to the exceptional love of Jesus for the beloved disciple. In this way it would appear that he wants to relate the two disciples in a special manner, though one that we can no longer understand to-day, cf. Jn. 21:20–23." –(Stählin, 1974, p. 134-136).

The Theologically-Loaded Position

Nevertheless, one explores possibilities and asks: Is the switch from ἀγαπάω to φιλέω theologically more meaningful? Speculations might be rewarded. Peter's response to each question is consistent. Each time Peter responds to the questions of Jesus with the same Greek term (φιλῶ). There is no indication that he reconfigured his response to address a possible deeper meaning in the questions asked by Jesus as they were developed over three iterations by repetition, and by lexical change. On the one hand, the fact of the repetition might seem to suggest a search for a different response was in play. Furthermore, the lexical shift in words used by Jesus, from ἀγαπάω to φιλέω, might suggest a search for a different response was in play. Was Jesus trying to get Peter to respond differently by the second and third response? Was the desired response sought a form of ἀγαπάω? Would this be indicative of a stronger form of love, or a stronger and deeper love commitment? The answer to this question is "probably not" since the fact that the acceptance of the disciples' love was earlier recognized (John 16:17, see footnote below); and there the love in view, πεφιλήκατε, was rooted in φιλέω.

Still, it isn't clear since both terms are arguably interchangeable at numerous points, yet differentiated at points. Of interest, though, is the claim that φιλέω is never used for love of God in the New Testament (Stählin, 1974, p. 128). This "love of God" must be an objective genitive in Stählin's (1974) claim, since John 16:27 addresses the Father's love rooted in φιλέω, and the disciples' love rooted in φιλέω, but the disciple's love is directed to Jesus not the Father.

Furthermore, when people are commanded to love one another, or God, the love in view is not φιλέω or φιλία, but rather, ἀγαπάω and ἀγάπη (Matt. 22:35-40). This latter love in response to a commandment is possibly the deeper love, the proper ontological love that ought

to be one's natural love, or possibly the more general love as in the love for the world.[1] It is

different from the developed love of friendship and intimacy perhaps signalled by φιλέω.

From another perspective, was Jesus possibly pushing Peter for recognition of Himself as more than the Messiah? Could he have been pushing Peter for recognition of Himself as more than the Son of God? After all, this was a post resurrection experience and Peter had earlier already come to acknowledge Jesus as someone quite special—the Messiah, and the Son of God (Matt 16:16). It is an interesting question but we have no answer. Similarly, was Jesus pushing Peter to respond to himself with the deeper love, ἀγάπη, as one would respond to the Father (as seen in Matt. 22: 35-40)? Again, an interesting question but we have no answer?

From a different angle, if Jesus was honouring Peter's response as correct in using the Greek term (φιλῶ) then there may be a lesson for us here with respect to the kind of love we ought to be developing in responding to Jesus. But how would this comport with I Cor 13 with the focus on ἀγάπη as our model? Perhaps, I Cor 13 addresses the ontological state of love, a general approach to love, or attitude of love, while John 21:15-17 addresses the dialogical, relational love, φιλέω.

How might this apply to the potentially problematized love: "I Love My Prophet?" Peter's love for his prophet (the Messiah, the Son of God) was relational. He had an intimate

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[1] "According to Jn. 16:27 the disciples fully and completely met Jesus' claim that they should love Him: ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ πεφιλήκατε, and they did this by completely fulfilling His demand for faith. To believe in Jesus as the One who comes from God and acts and speaks in His name, to receive in Him the love of God (3:16), is to love Him. To this love of the disciples for Jesus corresponds the reciprocal love of God for the disciples: αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ φιλεῖ ὑμᾶς, which is obviously different from His love for the world, cf. 3:16: ἠγάπησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον. Yet one cannot say that φιλέω is used for God's special love for the disciples and ἀγαπάω for His general love for the world, for in 14:21, 23 the idea of 16:27 is expressed by ἀγαπάω. Jn. 16:27 is the only verse in the NT in which φιλέω is used for God's love for man. But there is full par. in the ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ φιλεῖ τὸν υἱόν of 5:20, another unique use of φιλέω, since elsewhere ἀγαπάω is used to denote the love of the Father for the Son, cf. Jn. 3:35; 10:17; 15:9; 17:23 f. → I, 52, 39 ff. Thus in the mutual relations of love which in Jn. sustain the circle of love between God, Christ and the disciples (→ n. 190; I, 53, 14 ff.), it is only occasionally that φιλέω is used to denote the love of God for the Son (5:20), the love of God for the disciples (16:27) and the love of the disciples for Jesus (16:27), whereas ἀγαπάω is always used to denote the love of Jesus for the disciples (13:1, 34; 14:21; 15:9, 12; cf. 11:5), the love of the disciples for one another (13:34; 15:12, 17), and esp. the love of Jesus for the Father (14:31). Neither φιλέω nor ἀγαπάω occurs to describe the love of the disciples for God (in contrast cf. Mk. 12:30 and par. → n. 19, 191), for John speaks instead only of their love for Jesus (Stählin, 1974, pp. 133-134)."

knowledge of Jesus. The Muslim carrying the placard has no such relationship with her prophet. This is like the idealized relationship with the charismatic figure. Dunbar had speculated that we "...are falling in love with an image we have constructed that is only partly informed by what is actually in front of us (2012, p. 205)." So there would be an imaginary relationship or a constructed relationship. In fact, there could be several types of such an imagined relationship: (1) constructed yet real, (2) constructed but faulty, and (3) constructed and ecclesial, would be three possibilities.

Constructed and ecclesial. One has an experience of relationship with authors read. I, for example, feel an affinity with Locke while reading him, and after reading him. The same for C. S. Lewis, Pascal, Luther, Calvin, Augustine, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Chesterton, Plantinga, William Lane Craig, John Lennox, Alister McGrath, and a host of others, dead and alive. It is like communion with them, being-in-church with them; it is ecclesial and consequently edifying. Yes, the relationship is rooted in the imagination albeit with cognitive components. It is more of a cognitive-first and emotional-second relationship. It is not like the attraction to the charismatic individuals, and mystical love, which would be emotional-first and cognitive-second relationships.

A similar imagined relationship would exist when reading authors not part of the ecclesia. There is a possible difference, however. For the Christian the former has a level of reality that the latter lacks. An imagined, constructed relationship that is transcendentally real is different from an imagined constructed relationship that is merely pragmatically valid. And if the Christian is right about his ecclesial communion, he has a form of true belief. If the Christian expresses a form of love for individuals in the ecclesia he experiences, then both terms, ἀγαπάω and φιλέω, would be appropriate, it seems.

Constructed yet real. Consider the imagined, constructed relationship with Jesus. For the Christian it has a level of reality that surpasses the imagined constructed relationship with the ecclesia. And, it has a level of reality that surpasses the imagined, constructed relationship with Paul, or Isaiah, or Pascal (heroes), and the imagined, constructed relationship with St. Francis, or Whitfield, or Wesley, or Edwards, or Spurgeon (charismatics). Again, though, both terms, ἀγαπάω and φιλέω, would be appropriate expressions of love with respect to Jesus.

Constructed but faulty. Then there are the imagined, constructed relationships that are not corresponding to reality. A relationship with Zeus, or channeling Rudolph Steiner, or walking with Mohammed, or hearing trees talk, or getting messages from the music of the Beatles, might be imagined constructions of relationships, but if they do not map onto reality they are faulty. No love would be warranted in such cases.

Whether the love expressed in "I Love My Prophet" is a warranted love, along the lines of ἀγαπάω or φιλέω, would depend on: (1) the existence of the Prophet (Mohammed in this case, or Joseph Smith for Mormons), that is, the current existence, and (2) the nature of the reciprocal relationship. A relationship with Mohammed seems out of the question as he left no systematic or personal communications for others. The Qur'an wouldn't count as it was purported to be a dictation from a source other than Mohammed. Moreover, there is no Islamic theology that argues for a current relationship between Muslims and Mohammed. Thus, the claim, "I Love My Prophet," seems to be love of an idea, or an ideology, or story, rather than a personal relationship or a response to the two foundations of the law: love of God and love of neighbour. In a religious framing then, such a love is a problematic love.

One way to conceptualize this issue of faulty construction and accurate construction is to consider the distinction between reality and fiction—actual history and the constructed story. Recounting a past is a "narrative" drawing upon liberty and license. Borrowing from psychology

here, when considering the formation of the self in psychology, Hirst, Manier and Apetroaia

(1997) draw upon Spence's (1982) distinction between historical truths and narrative truths.

They note that untrue narrative can have value at some level: "According to Spence,

psychotherapists need not plumb the historical truth of a past conflict to aid patients. Rather they

can assist patients by guiding them in making their narratives more coherent, even if these

revised narratives do not conform strictly to historical truth (1997, p. 164)." In effect, narrative,

with respect to one's theological reality, one's religious autobiography, can be a mix of fiction

and non-fiction[1]. There is a narrative-driven construction, or reconstruction of the historicized

self and others (see Hirst et al, 1997).

How narrative truths become entrenched opinions—that is, wrongly-believed historical

truths—is considered by Spence (1982) with attention to four points. First, is what might be

called *wording*, or putting the interpretation into a language with semantics, syntax, pragmatics,

and so on. Spence says: "...it would appear that putting the formulation into words helps the

patient 'see' in a new way and gives reality to what was previously unknown or misunderstood

(1982, p. 166)." However, it should be noted here that: (1) the "reality" Spence identifies is not

actual reality, or historical reality, rather, it is a narrative truth or pseudo-reality, and (2) the

'patient' is aligned within Spence's psychoanalytical framework, but quite readily this applies to

anyone involved in crafting a narrative truth—sexual, religious, egoistic, grandiose, or heroic.

The second point Spence notes is *time*. He writes: "If propositions are accepted for a

sufficiently long time period, they come to be treated as true because they gain confirmation

from repeated use (1982, p. 167)." The danger here for any truth-seeker is glaringly obvious.

Tell ourselves the lie often enough and we automatically come to accept it as truth.

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[1] Using this line of thinking: when a Muslim relates to a historical Mohammed, is that narrative truth
(reconstruction) or historical truth (the correspondence view of truth)? There is surely a case for considering a
breach between narrative and reality whether one's focus is epistemic, religious, or therapeutic.

The third point links to a form of *denial and mitigation of responsibility*. "A third reason why a construction may become true, in the narrative sense, is related to the issue of responsibility. Many interpretations about a patient's early childhood speak of actions or feelings about which he has no direct recollection. In a significant way he is not responsible for them. …The fault, as it were, is taken out of his hands. The psychological benefits of such an account may produce the belief that it must have happened that way; thus it becomes true (Spence, 1982, p. 167-168)." Similarly, accepting a narrative about religious figures (e.g., Mohammed, Joseph Smith, the Gnostic Jesus, the Aryan Jesus, and so on) can be a premature acceptance of a faulty construction. One comes to accept the untrue as true. Such a position might be acceptable for therapists, but certainly theorists, philosophers, theologians, scientists, and researchers ought not to be so duped. Nor should children, religious seekers, students, and citizens be permitted to be so duped.

The fourth point Spence offers is *disconfirming evidence*. He writes: "…many interpretations become true because there is no disconfirming evidence to be used against them. Quite apart from the issue of being needed (our first point), a construction rooted in a presumed early childhood experience will survive—no matter how thin the evidence—simply because there are no competitors (Spence, 1982, p. 167)." Similarly, a confirmation bias that buries, avoids, or denies, disconfirming evidence in a social or religious milieu will lead to faulty constructions, and faulty narratives. All four points argued by Spence point to the problems of: (1) assuming narrative truth is congruent with historical truth, (2) honestly facing the mechanism for, and entrenchment of, narrative truth, and (3) the potential psychological value of narrative truth albeit at the expense of authentic or accurate beliefs and knowledge. So, is there a possible, and similar, misinformation effect operative in some religious communities? Are beliefs being planted inadvertently? Is confabulation operative? Is there a

narrative truth distinct from authentic truth? Is narrative a construction of the self aimed at attaining equilibrium and coherence? Are there various sources of biographical misinformation that ought to be considered? Indeed! And a claim like "I Love My Prophet" is easily viewed as a constructed narrative that is faulty.

The Psychological Framework

There are psychological principles that might be operative here with respect to a problematic love. Sternberg's balance theory offers some insight. Baumeister's four roots of evil offers some insight. As well, there are some general psychological factors that could be informative.

Sternberg's Balance Theory.

Sternberg sees the beginning of foolishness in a problem with tacit knowledge which is considered to be in a *deficit* state. Is the Muslim who carries the placard with the message, "I Love My Prophet," in any way in a deficit state? Tacit knowledge is in part <u>procedural</u> (i.e., knowing how); does the Muslim placard bearer know how to access historical information, how to apply hermeneutical principles related to language, culture, and comparatives, how to guard against confirmation bias, how to apply critical thinking skills, and so on. Tacit knowledge is in part <u>instrumental</u> (i.e., possessing tools for achieving goals and valuables, or what one desires in the context of competing desires); does the Muslim placard bearer have the critical thinking tools and strategies appropriate to give the love-claim warrant? Does the placard bearer have the hermeneutical tools and the literary tools to get a "nod of approval" from the outsider? An outsider can give a "nod of approval" to one expressing a love for St Francis, but a love towards David Koresh tends to move the head on a different axis. When one lacks tacit knowledge the

imbalance that follows involves foolishness, faulty beliefs, disordered goals, disordered relationships, problematic behaviours, and problematized *loves*.

The three *dispositions* that interfere with tacit knowledge use are: a sense of omnipotence, a sense of omniscience, and a sense of invulnerability. Such dispositions—bad beliefs—would indicate a psychological state that was out of balance. Does the Muslim placard bearer show such dispositions? Do they hold a sense of omniscience either rooted in the Qur'an, or rooted in an immersion in a cultural and religious narrative, or rooted in a simple confirmation bias? It seems so! Do they hold a sense of omnipotence? It seems so in the transfer of power to and from Allah. Do they have a sense of invulnerability? It seems so given their slogans, their long term objectives, and the price they are willing to pay seen in their approach to death.

Wisdom, whether shown in beliefs, loves, desires, attitudes, or behaviours, involves balance: (1) between INTERESTS, intrapersonal interests, interpersonal interests, and extrapersonal interests (e.g., city, country, God), (2) between TIMEFRAMES, the short term and the long term, and (3) between ACTIONS, adaptation to an environment, shaping an environment, and selecting a new environment. All things considered, the Muslim placard bearer shows an imbalance with respect to deficits in *tacit* knowledge, deficits with respect to *dispositions* (too grandiose), and imbalance with respect to INTERESTS. Her interests are weighted in terms of the extrapersonal, hence an imbalance. Her ACTIONS are weighted towards shaping an environment rather than adapting to an environment or selecting a different environment, hence an imbalance.

From the Sternberg perspective balance would be seen in tentativeness, openness, examination, reconsideration, knowledge acquisition, argument, critique and so on. Balance

would be more likely to be evident in an article, an essay, a report, rather than four words on a placard.

Baumeister's Four Roots of Evil.

The particular root that may be informative is the third root for evil; it is ideology. In the name of an ideology people do things that are wrong, even evil. The classic example in our times is the ideology-driven Jihadists who flew planes into the Twin Towers in New York on September 11th 2001. Ideology can impel people to do things that are wrong, not just arguably wrong, but wrong at the very root of evil. Some arguably wrong things are innocuous (e.g., waving a placard with a statement such as "I Love My Prophet" when the "love" is a problematized love as well as "the prophet" being a problematized construct). Some wrong things are mildly detrimental (e.g., perhaps the inward self-deception, or the outward propaganda, correlated with waving a placard with a statement such as "I Love My Prophet"). Some wrong things are deadly (e.g., the love of a prophet preceding the Twin Towers Tragedy). Where does one draw the line? One accepts the innocuous, argues against the propaganda, and polices the potentially deadly.

Some Psychological Variables. A few psychological variables in play (e.g., emotions, transference, suggestibility, confirmation bias, crowd psychology, propaganda, hypnotism, learning theory, and so on) could be informative. What are some forces that impel love of a historical individual, or love of an imaginary individual? Psychological incentives like attractiveness! Attractive religious personalities! Attractive political personalities! Attractive popular figures!

- Consider attractive personalities on the negative end of a continuum, characters such as, Jim Jones or Charles Manson. Consider religious figures, such as Mohammed, Joseph Smith, Jesus, L. Ron Hubbard.

- Consider earlier political figures like Hitler, Mao, Castro, Che Guevara, and Lenin. Consider more contemporary political figures, such as Obama, JFK, Pierre Trudeau, and Winston Churchill.

- Consider the adoration of rock musicians, athletes, and Hollywood stars.

Attractiveness—real or imagined—draws one to the charismatic figures. While the ideological attractiveness may be basic, there are biological and psychological in play as well.

For example, there are psychological drivers linked to mechanisms like *transference*. In a *transference* state, positive feelings that would normally attach to a parent, or a lover, are attached to the therapist, a teacher, or a leader. In effect, the patient falls in love with the person on the pedestal—the therapist, the politician, or the guru. Obviously, *transference* can occur in non-therapeutic settings then; the student falls in love with the teacher, the parishioner falls in love with the priest, the audience falls in love with the rock star, and so on. These are disordered loves in an Augustinian view of displaced loves. Also, these are disordered loves using Lewis's four-loves framework since these are likely melded loves—a love where eros melds with admiration, or agape melds with charism.

Another somewhat related mechanism may be seen in the *Stockholm syndrome*. Here a captive develops a positive regard for the captor, and eventually, may even fall in love with the captor. Patty Hearst is the classic example. It is a disordered love, most likely.

Suppression or repression of critical faculties! Consider Mesmerism and hypnotism with respect to the suppression of critical thought. The effect in hypnotism is striking. Consider crowd psychology and the loss of critical thought as one becomes part of the mob. Consider the

power of propaganda, advertising, peer pressure, the white-lab-coat pressure, and the effects of media (film, music, and news).

Are these loves analogous to some base, such as, love of death, love of abnegation, love of intoxication, love of dissociation, love of altered states, that is, faulty loves? Of interest for a focus on problematized love is the two-pronged love—a love for God and a love for neighbour. When Jesus points to these two bases for love, there is no suggestion of foundational intermediate loves: (1) those which might be seen as honouring God (e.g., love for parents, love for prophets, love for priests and high priests, love for scribes, love for kings, love for angels, love for heroes like the Maccabees, Sampson, Gideon, Noah, Abraham, Joseph, and so on), nor (2) those who might be seen as dishonouring God (e.g., Caesar, Pilot, Herod, Judas, and so on). Also, there seems to be a distinction for those holding an office (e.g., Prophet, Magistrate, etc.) where the requirement is for honouring rather than loving the office holder.

4. Problematized Love: "Love" Of Jesus

People love their prophets as was addressed in the previous section. But such love can be problematic. People have expressed love for Jesus, Mohammed, Joseph Smith, Jim Jones, and Charles Manson, amongst others. For the Christian it is the love of Jesus that would be a major focal point. So why would this be a problematized love? Firstly, the love of Jesus can be construed as existing on many levels, and be of various types. Moreover, the same problems that exist with respect to the love of any charismatic figure could apply to a love relationship with Jesus, a parent, a spouse, or a child, as well. There could be a melding of loves, a displacement of love, a merging of loves (cf. Lewis), a disordered love hierarchy (cf. Augustine), a misalignment or an imbalance with respect to love (cf, Sternberg), an actionable love yet a love rooted in evil or manifested by evil (cf, Baumeister), or a damaged love (e.g., transference,

Stockholm syndrome, confabulated, etc.). Are some loves better than others in facilitating a

Christian goal? Which love relationships? Is it the love of Jesus that is the love that will be

conducive to salt and light?

What are the possible love-relationships with Jesus?

Type	Root	Description	Examples
		Table 4. Types of Possible Love Relationships With Jesus	
A-Type	(Of the will)	An agapé relationship of self sacrifice, and willful commitment.	Albert Schweitzer, Mother Theresa, Jean Vanier, ...
B-Type	(Of the emotion of romantic love)	A "fallen-in-love-with" relationship such that Jesus is the beloved.	Mary Magdalene, Mary of Bethany, New converts, poets, hymn writers, John, Francis Collins, Denis Lamoreaux, ...
C-Type	(Of the mind)	A cognitive relationship where one evaluates the arguments and sees the rational, evidential, and related epistemological drivers for relationship-building.	Calvin, Luther, Aquinas, Augustine, Paul, ...
D-Type	(Of the attachment process)	A dependency relationship where one sees the need for dependency. Learns to be dependent, and cultivates attachment	Peter, John, James, ...
E-Type	(Of the existential factors in life)	A relationship fostered by life's existential experiences of guilt, meaning, suffering, evil, death, etc.	Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Martin Luther King Jr., ...
F-Type	(Of the religious environment)	A familial relationship with Jesus, as kin, is acquired from one's own Christian family dynamics. The relationship just grows naturally.	Timothy, ...
P-Type	(Of the emotions)	A passional relationship driven by emotions other than romantic love—fear, friendship, companionship, joy, beauty, truth, etc.	Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, David, ...
W-Type	(Of common sense)	A wager type relationship built upon, probabilities, prudence, and inferences to the best explanation.	Pascal, Jordan, William James, Swinbourne, ...
R-Type	(Of reticence)	A reticent walk—halting, vacillating, tentative, revisioning, immature, of two minds, ...	Thomas, John-Mark, Nicodemus, Demas,

The best hope for the traditional apologist is directed at the C-Type relationship—the

cognitive arguments. But there may be relationship determinants that are equally important, if

not more important, that are rooted in love, in existential factors, in the environment, and in the

will.

While cognitive arguments can facilitate the C-Type relationship, what drives the other

types—those rooted in variants of love—emotions, existential issues, and environments? For

many, perhaps most, it is not so much the arguments offered but the stories offered that turn the

heart, mind, and will towards Jesus. It is the priority of love that leads to reformation, renewal, and revival. This seems to make a case for stories, story tellers, and prophets, as the root of reformation, renewal, and revival.

When one considers Sternberg's Taxonomy of metaphors for love stories as a filter for a relationship with Jesus, one is struck by the parallels. Many seem to apply with ease. The stories have drawing power and affirming power. They seem to appeal to the passions, the emotions, the feelings, and the intuitions with considerable force.

Is there a sense that reason is indeed the slave of the passions, as Hume claimed? It is a notorious view to locate our motivations in passions, but there seems to be such a case. And if so, it is the passions that will offer the best evangelistic hope, and the initial apologetic hope. Thus an appeal to Existentialism, to emotions, to feelings, and to intuitions holds promise. These belief drivers integrate emotions as both motivator and evidence. Then, this motivational thrust is integrated with reason. When combined (emotion and motivation with reason and evidence) a complex view of faith emerges (Williams, 2011).

Cook (2012) also sees the relevance of the existential in moving into the faith camp. Emotions, passions, hopes, and ultimately choices (via the will) are instrumental—even foundational—in opting for belief.

Cook is not alone. Spufford (2012) likewise looks to the emotions side of epistemology. After approximately 20 years as an atheist, he came back to the Christian camp. He admits that he came through the doorway of the emotions. Still, he wonders whether there is a God. And answers: "There may well not be. I don't know whether there is. And neither do you, and neither does Richard bloody Dawkins, and neither does anyone. It not being, as mentioned before, a knowable item. What I do know is that, when I am lucky, when I have managed to pay attention, when for once I have hushed my noise for a little while, it can feel as if there is one. And so it

makes emotional sense to proceed as if He`s there; to dare the conditional. And not timid death-fearing emotional sense, or cowering craven master-seeking sense, or censorious holier-than-thou sense, either. Hopeful sense. Realistic sense. Battered-about-but-still-trying sense (p. 221)." It seems fair to place Spufford into the emotional/existential epistemological camp, but he could also fit within the prudential camp, as easily.

A big question is the source of our emotions. Are we responsible for our passions/emotions? Solomon (2007) argues that we are responsible. If so, the epistemological weight falls upon the individual.

Biblical phrases, too, seem to attribute responsibility to humans. A comment from John that "Men loved darkness rather than light" is telling. Likewise, Jesus speaks to the invitation to come and the effect: "...but you would not." Choose love! All the love relationships!

5. Problematized Love: "Just Let People Love!"

The appeal to love sounds good. It is disarming! Let little Mozart love his music. "Let people love music, and practice obsessively, and sacrifice food, social life, childhood, and rational thought." The music is beautiful! It is reward enough! Let them follow their dreams!

In our free society: "Let people love food even to excess." Human freedom is a prized Western ideal. Many in society (e.g., educators, health care practitioners, parents, and politicians) might judge obesity (and disordered eating) to be significant problems, but there is little in the way of policing. "Let people love whatever they wish to love!"

"Let people love whomever they wish to love!" Here conventional heterosexuality raises no alarms and few caveats, but when love is extended (say polyandry, or incest, or homosexuality, or polygamy, or intergenerational sex) there are social and moral constraints surfacing. Now love emerges as a masked-factor with subtle, deeper tones. The surface level

claims that love is more important than politics, more important than opinions, and more

important than various ideologies (religious, psychological, cultural, etc.) sink. Is love the trump

card, really?

Love aligns with popular music, the popular Hollywood feel-good films, and centuries of

popular literature. The modern generation is in love with "love." Who could dare speak ill of

love? Nevertheless, it is fair to raise the question: does the construct of love, in various garbs,

provide good arguments against analogical comparisons: say polygamy and monogamy, or

pornography addiction and the persistent poet, or the newly penurious video-gamer and the

obese, or the reluctant smoker and the reluctant homosexual? With such analogical comparisons,

with respect to love, one could make the case that love is, in fact, a problem. If so, love might

not be the solution, not the trump card, suggested in the popular mindset. In fact, love would be

the problem.

How can it be the case that love is the problem? The claim is not new. Two thousand

years ago the apostle Paul noted: "the love of money is the root of all evil" (I Timothy 6:10). It

is not money that is the problem; it is "the love" in the human being that orients towards money

in a disordered way that is the problem. There are those who love bribes (Isa. 1:23), love

pleasure (Prov. 21:17), love wine (Prov. 21:17), love sleep (Isa. 56:10), love strife (Prov. 17:19),

and so on. In such scenarios love is not the solution, not the trump card. Love is the problem!

Paul further lists problems with love which are reminiscent of problematic sexual love.

In II Timothy 3 he lists some awkward characteristics like self love (φίλαυτος), a covetous type

of love (φιλάργυρος), a love lacking natural affection (ἄστοργος), a love of pleasure

(φιλήδονος), and the desire for what is forbidden (ἐπιθυμία). It looks like the fact that love can

be viewed as a problem has a history.

Furthermore, and beyond the simple semantic issues, there is an intriguing logical consideration, related to the general and the particular, which emerges from a conceptual analysis. Consider that in a homosexual dyad, prior to the love-of-a-person of the same sex, there is a love-of-type—the same-sex type. In effect, love-of-type precedes love of a particular person. Love-of-type is a selection filter with consequent complications. Similarly, love of money is a selection filter that presages problematic relationships with money (*acquiring* as in theft or by burdensome interest rates; *hoarding* as opposed to wise savings and use; or, *spending* with recklessness or compulsively). Conceptual analyses add layers of complexities for all varieties of love.

Given the priority of love-of-type in homosexuality, and the call for deeper layers of analysis, one wonders if there might be what could be called an "autoandrophilic" quality to homosexual attractions (and homosexual, female-to-male transsexuals). The attraction would be to an idealized masculine self. This seems to be the case with autogynephilic transsexuals (or homosexuals) who are attracted to themselves as a perceived female (Blanchard 2005). The layers of analysis deepen.

Another observation involves reflecting on types-of-love like the four loves addressed by C. S. Lewis (Lewis, 1960). The *agape* love in Paul's famous Corinthian formulation has some markers that, at least, raise the question about the qualities of homosexualized love (with the emphasis on the sexual, that is, *eros*) as distinct from same-sex friendship (with the emphasis on brotherly love, *phileo*, and willful love, *agape* love). Paul notes of love: "… love does not brag, and is not arrogant, does not act unbecomingly; it does not seek its own… does not rejoice in unrighteousness, but rejoices with truth; bears all things…" (I Cor 13: 4-7, NASB). I'm not sure there is a consensus that all forms of sexualized love align with these markers. For example, does love of pornography map onto Paul's markers? Does love of alcohol map onto Paul's

markers? Love of gambling? Does homosexuality easily map onto Paul's view when one considers such things as: affect, attire, Pride Parades, and advocacy? So, again, love could be on the problem side-of-the-fence rather than the "trump card" offered up by the "Love" criticism. Upon closer inspection, at least one should be open to consider the equivocation fallacy with respect to the term "love."

The appeal to "love" in Christian moral thought as a vehicle for consideration of appropriate evaluations of homosexuality as a problematized love (e.g., Ward, 2005) has a similar flaw. Ward writes: "…the one thing that does seem clear in the New Testament is Paul's teaching that Christ is 'the end of the law', that 'the letter kills but the Spirit gives life', and that the whole law is summed up in love of neighbour. If Paul teaches that the whole law has been set aside by Christ then appeal to the law to back up a moral view has been rendered impossible (p. 25)." The problem with Ward's position is at least threefold. First, where Ward sees the whole law as summed up by "love of neighbour," others see this as half of the law only, the second half. After all, Jesus did go to the first half, first, when summarizing the law—namely, "love of God." Love of God first would align with Augustine's position for a proper ordering of love. Ward's view focusing on the neighbour seems to have a social-justice bias that would be potentially limiting for Augustine. Second, there are *categories* of law (e.g., moral law, ceremonial law, natural law, physical law, covenantal law, situational laws, culturally determined laws …) that should be factored into the analyses. Third, there are *functions* of law (salvation, education, protection, revelation, and so on) that should be factored into the analyses. When Ward deals with the Sabbath law from the Ten Commandments as somewhat analogous to judgments regarding homosexuality there may be a propensity to entrapment, or self-deception, via an equivocation fallacy. He doesn't situate the claim within the broad domain of law where there are categories of law and functions of law to consider.

True, Ward does seem to admit an uncertainty regarding the distinction between a

primitive taboo and a universal moral command on the topic, but he tilts towards "primitive

taboo" for both legs of the analogy. He writes: "My conclusion is that the question of

acceptability of homosexual practice cannot be decided by appeal to the law, which is

superseded, or to the explicit teaching of Jesus, which is unspecific. It is to be decided by the

New Testament criterion of whether homosexual love shows true love of neighbour, whether it

respects human personhood, and whether it expresses the compassionate and self-giving love

that was seen in Jesus (2005, pp. 25-26)." We are back to love as a trump card.

My first reaction to his claim would be to raise analogies. Analogies question whether

this reasoning, and these criteria, could apply equally well to the incestuous love relations

possible (e.g., father-daughter, brother-sister, sister-sister)? It seems to me it/they could apply

equally well. Love, respect, compassion, and self-giving love would work here. Consider the

following thought experiment posed by Haidt (2006, pp. 21-22) for his students:

> "Julie and Mark are sister and brother. They are travelling together in France on summer
> vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They
> decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least, it
> would be a new experience for each of them. Julie is already taking birth control pills, but
> Mark uses a condom, too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but decide not to
> do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to
> each other.
>
> Do you think it is acceptable for two consenting adults, who happen to be siblings, to
> make love? How would you justify your judgment?"

Ethically, it is difficult to judge Julie and Mark on the bases of intentions (good intentions), or

consequences (no detrimental biological or emotional consequences follow); so, one reverts to

other arguments: the love claim. Actually, these other arguments can reflect a deontological

criterion—laws, codes, and rules, etc.—which can offer a first rate criterion, the wisdom of the

ages, the wisdom of authorities, the wisdom of deep reflection, the wisdom of revelation. What trumps what?

As a further analogy, and my second question: what about polygamy? Would Ward's principle apply to polygamy? It seems to me it could. Love, respect, compassion, and self-giving love would work here too. Indeed, love in the Old Testament polygamous relations might at times be considered respectful, compassionate and self-giving (consider Jacob, and Leah and Rachel) though differentiated by degrees.

My third question, and much more dramatic, would be to wonder if this principle could apply to zoosexuality analogously? It seems to me it could in view of the related discussions in journals on sexual orientations related to animals. There are arguments advanced for zoosexuality (Miletski, 2005a) with striking historical and conceptual parallels to homosexuality as an orientation (Miletski, 2005b; Beetz, 2005). Likely, there is a case that love, respect, compassion, and self-giving love would work here as well. Overall, Ward seems to be operating on a sandy foundation.

Ward does look for safeguards like "loyalty" and "total commitment." But these could apply to incest, polygamy and zoosexuality as well. He seems to make a factual error, moreover, when assuming essentialism; he assumes "…a sexual relationship between two people of the same sex who are by nature attracted to one another is acceptable and natural (Ward, 2005, p. 26)." As argued earlier (Volume II), there is a compelling case to be made that it would be more accurate to specify: it is not nature (i.e., essentialism), but rather an acquired attraction, or a learned attraction, or an entrenched attraction, with various determinants in the mix.

And then there's necrophilia. One wonders if Ward would welcome this diversity of argumentation, this challenge to his position. Indeed there is a recent story circulating about an Islamic Imam indicating that sex with one's dead wife is defensible. See Raymond Ibrahim's

write up in FrontPage Magazine, May 1st 2012 (http://www.raymondibrahim.com/11630/islam-death-sex-necrophilia). This too is found in the animal kingdom (Bagemihl, 1999) which would make it natural. This too might have ties to love.

 "Let people love" might not be the best argument. At least there are reasons for mounting arguments which challenge the idea. Improper order (Augustine), imbalance (Sternberg), displaced love (Lewis), informative analogies (Holyoak & Thagard; Gentner & Markam) argue for a problematized love in the statement: "just let people love whoever, or whatever, they wish." But such a statement doesn't seem to have the hallmark of wisdom.

6. Problematized Love: "Loving An Object Differs From Loving a Person!"

Shifting to smoking, consider love and smoking. It seems to be a commonplace notion that some people show an inordinate "love of smoking," and even a love of the particular, the cigarette. Perhaps it is an acquired love, but expressions like the following are not uncommon: "I'd love a cigarette right now," or "I love that first drag." Such expressions do not cast smoking in a sanctified light. Love is not a great sanctifier! At least, not all forms of love or stages of love can be considered as a pre-eminent rationale for supporting that which "the heart wants."

The claim here is a principled objection to the use of a "smoking orientation" as an analogy for a "sexual orientation." The critic is assuming offense would exist in drawing a parallel between a human-human relationship and a human-object relationship. To dismiss the argument based on such a principle is neither fair to analogical thinking, nor to thinking in general. To dismiss the analogy on a simple non-alignable point prior to any consideration of the argument, is to commit a form of the genetic fallacy—assuming no good argument can emerge from a distasteful source inferred from one holding a "distasteful" foundational principle. Yet

the history of science is replete with principles, premises, and hypotheses readily laughed at, discounted, and trashed prior to their begrudgingly being exonerated, and accepted.

So the question to be addressed here is as follows: Can there be a legitimate analogy between person-person and person-object relationships? Given the categorical difference between persons and objects, one suspects the answer should be "no." This is what the critic intimates. But, consider the robust observation that "objects" of affection (liking, bonding, obsession, love, etc.) can be persons (e.g., a lover, a parent, a child), things (e.g., a car, a piano), abstractions (e.g., music, mathematics), images (e.g., MD, PhD, "prettiness," "cool"), or places (e.g., a city, one's country). Moreover, people are readily objectified—a person is seen as an "object" of affection in common English parlance. The objection, then, based on a distinction between objects and subjects (where one is attached to a cigarette as opposed to a person) could be mitigated in several ways: (1) by elevating material objects, (2) by deconstructing the "person-as-subject," or (3) by dissociating the bonding mechanism from the end-event. These techniques are elaborated in the following analyses.

Elevating the Material Object

Use of Martin Buber's phrasing of I-Thou versus I-It has some potential to contribute to the issue. An I-Thou relationship, which we normally assume to be between two persons, is not just a relationship between two persons. Buber (1958), himself, does acknowledge the possibility of I-Thou relationships with "things that come to meet us in nature (p. 124)." What determines an elevated relationship with a thing (I-Thou) is tied to "mutuality," "reciprocity," and perhaps will, in the form of seeing, or saying, a "thing" has a "Thou" quality. If an "It" is imbued with power it would suggest relationship, with associative demands, and possibly

contain elements of "reciprocity" and "mutuality." Perhaps a classic "It" rising to the level of

"Thou" is heroin in the Simon and Garfunkel song "Bridge Over Troubled Water."

Examples of idolatry can be seen as illustrating the elevation of a material thing to

something with a quasi-spiritual nature. Such material objects take on a "Thou-ness" for the

worshipper. Likewise, some North American native cultures attribute a "Thou-ness" to animals,

trees, places, and even rocks. There is a common sense basis to such a relationship given

Buber's attributes of "reciprocity" and "mutuality," both of which can exist in a relationship

with things. Reciprocity would be easy to acknowledge between a tree and a person. The person

tends to the trees and the trees reciprocate with offers of food, shade, building material, fuel, and

so on. Then there are objects like alcohol, peyote, smoke, and incense that can take on a quasi-

religious reverence as well.

Less dramatically, people metaphorically elevate material objects to "Thou-ness" –a car

gets special affection ("Old Betsy," "she never lets me down"), a musician obsesses over an

instrument (e.g., Glenn Gould and his piano). Psychological ascriptions of "Thou-ness," bestow

power on objects with elements of attraction, obsession, affection, bonding, and even love. In

affairs with things, animals, nature, people, and perhaps "spirits" like alcohol, and other

addictive objects, a "thing" has been elevated to a place of power, a place of reciprocity, a Thou-

ness. So, perhaps there is a not-so-unreasonable case to consider the analogous relationship

between a human-human bond and a human-object bond.

Deconstructing the "Person-as-Subject"

People can be treated as subjects or objects—that is, as a Thou or as an It. A principled

aversion to treating people as objects (Buber, 1958) would be too premature, or too narrow,

since people, in fact, are both subjects and objects. Indeed, in a naturalist worldview people are foremost material, and any epiphenomenal aspect to the person is based on the material, and secondary to the material. This would mitigate, if not nullify, concern, by assigning ontological priority to the object, the It. In many religious worldviews there would be an ontological priority (and an axiological priority) assigned to the subject, the Thou. The It-ness would be secondary. In both worldviews Thou and It are important but the order of importance is reversed, and compartmentalizing person-as-subject and person-as-object is readily possible.

Even in a religious worldview assuming dualism, there is a case for a type of priority of It-ness, or the material. Buber argues that Thou-ness precedes It-ness, or the I-Thou precedes the I-It in human development (see page 23 of Friedman's introductory essay to Buber's The Knowledge of Man, Selected Essays, 1965). Yet, clearly It-ness precedes Thou-ness phylogenetically, ontogenetically, and pragmatogenetically. Phylogenetically, the materiality of a cell in an amoeba is prior to, and distinct from, any non-materiality inferred for the human mind. Ontogenetically, the materiality of a cell is prior to the mind, although one supposes there could be arguments to the contrary (e.g., reincarnation, Divine foreknowledge, determinism). Moreover, in personal development there are stages in the developmental cycle (blastocyst, embryo, fetus, neonate, infant, toddler, child, adolescent, adult) where the person is more likely to be referred to as an "It" rather than a "Thou." Based on a philosophical premise, then, one might ascribe "Thou-ness" to every stage; but, on an "acquaintanceship" premise the first three stages are more likely to be described as "It."

In the development of relationship (termed pragmatogenetic) one moves from It-ness to Thou-ness, and perhaps, finally to "We-ness." "It-ness" precedes Thou-ness in key aspects of relationship formation, at least, sexual relationship formation. It-ness as a property is a selection criterion for both heterosexual and homosexual relationships. One property of a person is sex,

and one excludes or includes persons (for play, for friendship, for romantic relationship, and so on) on the basis of that property. Other properties like age, language, height (non-sibling, non-child, non-smoker, non-drinker), can, and do, function as selection criteria as well. Arguably, heterosexual attraction, homosexual attraction, and a smoking attraction, do fall into an I-It category, with It-ness preceding Thou-ness. When a person opts for a life partner, or a temporary partner, or a cigarette, they have certain It-ness properties specified as fundamental prerequisites.

A General Attachment Mechanism

It is not unreasonable to consider the possibility that the psychological mechanism for attachments to people would overlap with the mechanism for attachments to objects. The mechanism for attachment to objects is typically considered from three different theoretical perspectives. *Psychoanalytic theory* offers a perspective that holds attachment to objects is connected to the transition between the child's external world and internal world facilitating a sense of self and a sense of control. *Ethological theory* holds the object is a substitute for the mother, imprinted in some species (like the gosling that imprints on a ball rolling across its path upon hatching), and acquired in others (looking at Harlow's mother-deprived monkeys forming attachments to a furry or cloth-like object). The third perspective, *social learning theory*, sees the softness and warmth of the material as rewarding in itself, but also the object's pairing (in the classical conditioning sense) with the maternal rewarding presence.

Some combination of ethological theory and social learning theory likely underpins both attachment to mothers and attachment to objects. To argue then that the mechanism for attachment may be the same for both attachment to persons and attachment objects is possible. Interestingly, attachment phenomena for humans may be seen in well known attachments to

teddy bears and blankets, and perhaps explained by social learning theory. In addition to these normal or typical attachments there are the attachment problems seen at times which can be quite informative. For example, attachment problems are seen in autistic individuals and neglected babies, and these problems seem to point to a common mechanism for attachment to people and attachment to objects. In autistic individuals the problem of attachment to people (lack of eye contact, lack of affection, resistance to parents) is correlated with peculiar attachments to things (shiny objects, moving objects, spinning objects, string, rubber bands, parts of a toy rather than the toy, etc.). The correlation between peculiar human attachments and peculiar object attachments at the very least provides a reasonable basis for considering that the mechanism is the same, or linked. If the attachment mechanism is the same for both objects and persons, then there is a case for considering parallels between a smoking orientation (attachment to smokes) and a sexual orientation (attachment to folks), is there not?

Object aversion may point in a common direction as well. Some people have a strong aversion to smoking and others have a strong aversion to the opposite sex. Is this linkable to social learning theory? Yes. When a loud noise is paired with a vacuum cleaner or a piece of white fur the child learns, via classical conditioning, to fear associated objects. If a noxious stimulus is removed by a same-sex sibling, parent, or peer, is there a preferential bonding occurring for a same-sex person (operant conditioning in the form of negative reinforcement)? The first law of operant conditioning is: "behaviour that is followed by a good effect tends to be repeated." If some good effect follows a move towards a same-sex person, that behaviour is likely to be repeated, and strengthened. The second law of operant conditioning is: "behaviour that is followed by no effect tends to be extinguished." A move towards a person of the opposite sex that is not rewarded (or is punished) is likely to fizzle or, if punished, be suppressed. While

an analysis of initial bonding experiences is not possible the laws still apply and merit

consideration in social learning theory of attachments to people and objects.

In summary, the high view of persons, concurrent with a low view of objects, needs to

be tempered somewhat. Person as subject, and as a Thou, can be reduced to an "It" temporally,

logically, and honourably. Secondly, an object can be elevated in some cases to a "Thou-ness."

Thus, objectifying a person for the purpose of analogous thinking is arguably not inappropriate.

Furthermore, one can argue that attachments based on learning (classical conditioning, operant

conditioning, and social learning theory), are feasible as an explanatory mechanism that could

apply to both objects and people. These three considerations—objects, subjects, and the

common mechanism of attachment—support the analogy of a smoking orientation for a sexual

orientation, or at the very least, diffuse the argument against the analogy based on the subject

versus object contrast.

As a problematized love, love of an object might be appropriate for Augustine if there is

a proper ordering of love with God first. From a C. S. Lewis perspective, love of an object might

be appropriate if there is no displacement of the basic four loves: *phileo, storge, eros,* and

agape.

7. Problematized Love: The Memory of Early "Love"

In this concern regarding a problematized love there is an emphasis on both the concept

of "early" and the concept of "memory," hence, *early-memory*. Homosexuals often report an

early attraction to same-sex individuals, *early* gender nonconformity, and *early* awareness of

homosexuality (Remafedi, 1999). The claim is offered perhaps consciously, or perhaps

unconsciously, to bolster an essentialist view of homosexuality. However, one wonders: Is the

claim a quasi-justification to lessen the importance of environmental, psychological, learning, and intentionality (i.e., choice) variables in what would be acquired homosexuality or constructionist homosexuality, rather than an essentialist homosexuality?

When the construct of cognitive memory itself is added to the mix and considered from a cognitive perspective there is a further concern. Making an allowance for both the nature of memory and the effects of time, the homosexual claim of *early-memories* of same-sex attraction is less weighty than it first appears to be. The following discussion is presented to consider the merits of an *early-memories* argument.

Multiple-Perspective-Taking

If one is assuming that an *early-memory* claim has merit, then memory becomes a key conceptual issue here. Is memory-recall truly as reliable and accurate as seems to be assumed in the claim of *early-memory* of homosexual markers? To consider this *early-memory* (essentialist) objection, it is appropriate to get additional ideas onto the table here, that is, ideas that might present a challenge to memories recalled. As may be seen in the Table (Table 6) there are a number of concepts and constructs that could, or should, be considered when taking into account a time-locked explanation of early memory for sexual attraction.

Table 6. Showing additional factors that could be considered, or should be considered, when examining an *early-memory* hypothesis for any information accessed.	
Memory as recall	The notion that memory recall is the accurate accessing of events (like watching a video tape, or listening to an audio tape) is popular as a superficial approach to memory, but it is psychologically suspect in cognitive psychology.
Memory as reconstruction	Memories are reconstructions of events using available neural and cognitive architecture that has been (and is being) influenced by various contextual variables and fluctuations (internal to the individual, and external, but situational for the individual).
Self-deception	We deceive ourselves, at times (see Mele, 1997; Trivers, 2011; and the discussion in Volume 1)

Rationalization	We rationalize, regularly.
Denial	We deny things, routinely.
Bias	We are prone to a confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). See the discussion.
Confabulation	We have a neurological/cognitive design feature to confabulate. It is a normal component of learning. We construct information to fill in gaps in order to get a coherent explanation for our existing data set. (See Gazzaniga, 1985)
Exotic becomes erotic	If the exotic becomes erotic (Bem, 2001) is it possible that an early memory of erotic attraction is really an early memory of attraction to the exotic?
Exotic … toxic	Are things that are considered toxic mitigated in some ways by denial or rationalization etc.?
Taboo … toxic	Are things that are considered taboo mitigated in some ways by denial or rationalization etc.?
Accommodation	The Piagetian notion that we change our cognitive structures (accommodation) to better align with reality and facilitate the assimilation of new information has implications here. In essence we might be the same person with respect to ontogeny at age three and age 13, but we are not the same "person" in terms of cognitive structures, frameworks, knowledge, and beliefs.
Memory planting	This notion arises from an interesting body of research on seeding memories that are false yet come to be believed as true and accurate (see Loftus, 2003).
Decalage	Our apparent memories can fluctuate as a function of a cognitive level of development. They are coloured by a particular level of cognitive development. Their accuracy is contingent on a proper level of cognitive infra-structure.

As may be seen in the figure (Figure 7), when considering the number of concepts and constructs that could, or should, be considered when looking for an explanation of early memory for sexual attraction, there could be different levels of credit or belief-weighting assigned to each notion. Many of these concepts do present a challenge to the notion of an early memory claim for sexual attraction. These concepts range from "memory as pure recall" to various accommodations and caveats that paint memory as suspect in varying degrees. Each idea can be weighted in terms of credibility, or concern—a weighting not based on empirical tests so much as the conceptual analyses, and background and biases like the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), that one brings to the analysis. Thus a consideration of the various constructs would be warranted particularly when arguments are being made based on early memories.

Belief Allocation
To Constructs of Early Memory of Attraction

Figure 7. Showing the greater weightings for belief allocation tied to Reconstruction, Confabulation, Decalage, and Memory Planting with respect to trusting memory claims.

By weighting the "Recall" explanation at 20% (arbitrarily by the way), with respect to allocated belief, one is assigning substantial doubt to this formulation. Why? Well, memory is more reconstruction than recall according to older and current psychological approaches to memory (see Bartlett, 1932/1995; Loftus, 2003); thus the Reconstruction bar is set higher, arbitrarily at 40%, showing more credibility deserves to be allocated to this formulation of memory. If events are being reconstructed by an adult or adolescent, current cognitive context (i.e., semantic memory, episodic memory, procedural memory, declarative knowledge, cognitive structures, and so on) will likely influence the reconstruction. Context may be less critical if the event is contemporaneous, but quite critical if the event was years or decades earlier. Bias, suggestibility, and social influences are possibly tilting the memory access in a particular preferential direction. Undeniably, the fact that such an age difference exists (age 3 years versus age 23 years) ensures: (1) different cognitive structures would be operative at the different time points, (2) different contextual variables would be operative at the different time-points, and (3)

different critical factors would be utilized at different time-points. In line with this reconstruction, cognitive practices like self-deception, rationalization, denial, confirmation bias, can be operative, and need to be guarded against by awareness of limitations, critical thinking, multiple-perspective-taking, and methodological cynicism. Get all ideas on the table; consider all arguments; be skeptical. Be critical. Then, go with the best argument, the cognitive argument not the emotional argument, not the humane argument, and not the compassionate argument. In the figure we see four other aspects of belief formation that may be important here in tempering judgments about early memory: confirmation bias, confabulation, decalage, and memory planting.

Confirmation Bias

It is a human tendency to *look for information,* and to *interpret information*, supportive of our current beliefs, favoured beliefs, and chosen beliefs. And, it is a human tendency to *avoid information* (i.e., facts, models, hypotheses, and theories) not supportive of our current, favoured, and chosen beliefs. These tendencies fold into a bias, a "confirmation bias," favouring our *active position.* The *active position* we hold can be our preferred position, or just our current position (Nickerson, 1998).

Mechanics. Nickerson (1998) notes a number of specific mechanics operative in the confirmation bias which restrict understanding: restricted attention to a favored hypothesis, or a single hypothesis. Then there is partisan treatment of evidence supporting existing beliefs, selection of primarily positive cases, undue weighting of confirmatory instances, blindspots evident in seeing only what one is looking for, seeing "illusory correlations," and more.

Causes of the Confirmation Bias. Nickerson (1998) offers a few reasons to help elucidate the possible drivers of confirmation bias. First, is the notion of *Wanting to Believe*, the

Pollyanna principle, possibly rooted in rewards rooted in rewards (material rewards, ego rewards, ideological rewards in the form of triumphalism, or a sense of justice). Secondly, there is a variant of the "desire to believe" in the propensity to believe; it is called "*a principle of credulity*" by both Reid (1818/2011), and more recently Swinburne (2013). Belief comes naturally. Thirdly, there are *Cognitive Restrictions.* People have a tendency of people to focus on one hypothesis at a time whether gathering information or just thinking about causality. Plausible alternatives are not on the table. This is a classic failure related to *virtue epistemology*! Fourthly, there are Conditional Reference Frames (imagination, speculation, debate, researching the pro side of an issue, etc). The frames one works with create biases. Fifthly, there is the human wish to avoid making a mistake. Type 1 Errors (i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis inappropriately) and Type 2 Errors (i.e., accepting the null hypothesis inappropriately) are considerations for the pragmatic decision makers.

   Problems of the Confirmation Bias. The problems can be cast as *methodological* or *moral*. The confirmation bias is a *methodological* problem addressed by those who see attempts at refutation as the hallmark of scientific progress (e.g., Popper, 1965). Popper's solution is to work intentionally to refute hypotheses rather than seek to confirm them. The objective is verisimilitude which is viewed as more reasonable than truth-finding. Thus, what are the arguments that might be mounted to refute the hypothesis of memory of early love, or early-memory of homosexuality?

   If we don't know which position is right, it is fitting that we consider: (1) which position has the better arguments, (2) which position has the better defense mechanisms in place, (3) which position can withstand better the proposed defeaters, (4) which position has abduction and the cumulative case effect working for it, and (5) which position has the more prudential outcomes.

Confabulation

One critical notion, and challenge, to get onto the table, would be the confabulation processes we are all prone to utilize (note the high weighting for confabulation in the above figure). In our attempts to justify, to explain, to fill in the gaps, to build a narrative, and so on, we confabulate. To deal with problems of limited and spotty data based on early recall, or ignorance, we confabulate. Confabulation responses are seen in children's responses to make sense of the world, to build knowledge, to generate hypotheses, to invent, to create, and so on. It's normal. The neurological mechanism, it has been argued, is linked to a left hemisphere propensity to confabulate in order to make sense of fragments of information (see particularly chapter 5 of Gazzaniga, 1985). We make up models, hypotheses, theories and so on in an attempt to integrate the information we have currently at our disposal. If something doesn't logically fit with the theory, we have ways of disposing of it, or making it fit. We confabulate!

Faulty appearances in response to brain stimulation (Delgado, 1969; Penfield, 1975) represent aspects of confabulation. The confabulation response is seen dramatically in pathological cases like Korsokoff's syndrome, or the brain damaged. Gazzaniga reports a case (1985, p. 87) where a woman with a right hemisphere lesion experiences a "translocation of space" problem. Though in the hospital in New York she insists, and believes, she is at home in Maine. She carries on intelligent conversations yet when asked "what are those things over there?" she accurately responds, "elevators." Then adds: "Do you know what it cost me to have those put in my house?" The left hemisphere is at work here making sense of the data encountered, …confabulating. Is it possible that the brain (particularly the left hemisphere) of the adult confabulates stories, and memories, from childhood that help make sense of a current belief? Yes.

In addition to the neurological literature underpinning confabulation there are psychological theories that are quite striking. Wegner (2002) discusses the impact of cognitive dissonance theory and self-perception theory as they relate to confabulation (see pages 171-184). He discusses (and cites) a couple of simple studies (a role playing activity in one case, and an essay writing activity in another case where people defend a silly position for pay—50 cents vs $2.50). The important point to note here is captured in his quote: "Performing a dissonant act under conditions designed to arouse a feeling of choice made people become more positive toward the topic they were paid less to espouse. These results suggest that people will become more positive toward their action, the more negative the consequences of it that they knew in advance of choosing it. This curious turn of events—in which people come to like something more the less rewarding it is—is the hallmark of dissonance phenomena ... (p. 174)." Or this quote from Wegner (2002): "So, for instance, dissonance forces might lead one to become particularly happy with an automobile one had purchased while knowing that it needed an engine overhaul ('It must be a marvelous car indeed if I bought it even with that engine problem') (p. 175)." These post hoc confabulation phenomena offer a challenge to the credibility of "early memory" claims for homosexuality.

Wegner's discussion of self-perception theory is even more striking at points. He cites a study by Bem and McConnell (1970) where people wrote essays contrary to their opinions. Then they were then asked to report their prior opinions. They couldn't. "What happened apparently was that people looking back after they had written the essay had no conscious memory of their pre-essay attitudes. It is as though the confabulation of intention erases its tracks, leaving people with no memory of ever having wanted other than what they currently see as their intention (p. 178). Such an effect surely presents grounds for considering the "early memory" claims of the homosexual with some suspicion.

Decalage

When the developmental age span (infant through adult) is a factor there is a Piagetian "accommodation" process involved such that cognitive structures, and knowledge structures, are being adjusted in line with development. What one knows in one set of cognitive structures (say at age 5) is different in a different set of cognitive structures (say at age 9 or 10 or 15). Indeed, it can be striking to get a report from a child on a story, for example, at age 5, and then ask for the same report on the story at age 7, and again at age 10. Three different stories can emerge, if the story can even be recalled. This applies to personal stories and well known general stories (e.g., "The Three Little Pigs"). Vertical decalage (cycles of gains and losses, with fluctuation of knowledge), has implications for trusting early memories. Uneven patterns of development influence cognitive interpretation and cognitive structures, which then influences memory construction and reconstruction. Recall of early memories warrants critical consideration in a psychological context of memory. In essence then, there is a case that there is sufficient reason, if not more than sufficient reason, to be suspicious of early memories claims, and reconstructed stories. To uncritically accept early memories, to trust them, seems naive.

Make-believe Memories

Make-believe memories, like real memories, can be conscious or unconscious. And it seems they can be accepted or rejected. Furthermore, these make-believe memories can be transient; that is, conscious at time 1, but unconscious at a later time, time 2. Memories fluctuate which does raise the question of reliability.

The question of validity is the more important issue here though; this is seen in a consideration of memory-planting. False memories, faulty memories, idealized memories,

suggested memories can fool us and lead us into false beliefs. Lawton (2007) in an issue of New Scientist, considers such false beliefs to be what he terms "Mind Tricks." One story of made-up memories that he cites is the story of Elizabeth Loftus implanting a false memory in Alan Alda, a memory that he had made himself sick as a child once from eating too many eggs. It reads like an urban legend, but the evidence for memory planting and suggestibility that Loftus has gathered is compelling (Loftus & Ketchum, 1994; Loftus, 2003). Given Loftus's own description of the event (2003), and knowing Alan Alda's sense of humour, one wonders how serious he was in his reporting. In the text, however, it is implied that he was quite serious. Memories can be planted.

While Loftus' work is best known as tied to false memories related to eye-witness testimony, the false-memory syndrome, and the "misinformation effect," she does address, peripherally, autobiography. Even without intentional memory-planting, there is clearly a great deal of memory reconstruction going on that is false in personal autobiography. Loftus, herself, wonders about (1) the physicist Edward Teller criticized for his selective memory and "vividly remembering events that never happened (2003, p. 872)," and (2) Binjamin Wilkomirski's "false account of a small child's ordeal in the Holocaust…".

Similarly, one wonders about the challenge to Edward Said's autobiographical reporting of fabrications of his early life as well (Weiner, 2000). Were these deliberate lies, or confabulations, or typical memory reconstructions, or planted beliefs? How suspicious should we be?

Quite suspicious, apparently! We should be suspicious if these autobiographical constructions are well-intentioned examples of a misinformation effect—an effect driven by hopes, friends, parents, media, rationalizations, organizations, teachers, cognitive immaturity, confabulation, and so on. What impels these false constructions? A case for unconscious

reconstructions can be argued, as above. But it would be premature to dismiss the possibility of conscious, intentional, reconstructions.

After reading Katsoulis's (2009) accounts of literary hoaxes one can easily generate quite a list of possible sources (i.e., motivators, drivers, rationalizations, excuses) of faulty biographical constructions:

- some grow out of malevolence
- some grow out of pranksterism (p. 270)
- some grow out of loneliness
- some grow out of patriotism (p. 53)
- some grow out of racism (p.47-53)
- some grow out of identity problems
- some grow out of a fantasist imagination (p. 250)
- some grow out of romanticizing (e.g., native cultures, p. 79-96)
- some grow out of greed (many are money-making ventures)
- some grow out of dreams, literal dreams (p.222-223)
- some grow out of spiritualistic channeling (p. 99)
- some grow out of conflation (p. 239)
- some grow out of "alternative truths" (p. 246)
- some are intended to bring happiness (p. 251)
- some are "working through trauma" (p.252)
- some are helping others (p.177) or helping God (p. 256)
- some are challenging religious ideology (p. 278-284)
- some might flag revenge
- some might be designed to support ideology (e.g. homosexuality, p. 264-270)

Most of these sources of biographical reconstruction seem tied to identity enhancement. If one has an immature identity, an identity in the process of construction, an imaginary identity, or a romantic identity, the case for identity enhancement makes some sense. But his does not mitigate, or exonerate, the individual who has, in effect, an illusory identity and technically a dysfunctional identity.

One way to conceptualize this issue of faulty memory and accurate memory is to consider the distinction between actual history and the constructed story. Recounting one's past is "narrative" which implies liberty and license. In psychology, when considering the formation

of the self, Hirst, Manier and Apetroaia (1997) draw upon Spence's (1982) distinction between historical truths and narrative truths. As Hirst, et al put it: "According to Spence, psychotherapists need not plumb the historical truth of a past conflict to aid patients. Rather they can assist patients by guiding them in making their narratives more coherent, even if these revised narratives do not conform strictly to historical truth (1997, p. 164)." In effect, narrative, with respect to one's autobiography, can be a mix of fiction and non-fiction[1]. There is a narrative-driven construction, or reconstruction of the "remembered" self (Hirst et al, 1997).

How narrative truths become entrenched opinions—that is, wrongly-believed historical truths—is considered by Spence (1982) with attention to four points. First, is what might be called "wording," or putting the interpretation into a language with semantics, syntax, pragmatics, and so on. Spence says: "...it would appear that putting the formulation into words helps the patient 'see' in a new way and gives reality to what was previously unknown or misunderstood (1982, p. 166)." However, it should be noted here that: (1) the "reality" Spence identifies is not actual reality, or historical reality, rather, it is a narrative truth or pseudo-reality, and (2) the 'patient' is aligned within Spence's psychoanalytical framework, but quite readily this applies to anyone involved in crafting a narrative truth.

The second point Spence notes is time. He writes: "If propositions are accepted for a sufficiently long time period, they come to be treated as true because they gain confirmation from repeated use (1982. P. 167)." The danger here for any truth-seeker is glaringly obvious.

The third point links to a form of denial. "A third reason why a construction may become true, in the narrative sense, is related to the issue of responsibility. Many interpretations about a patient's early childhood speak of actions or feelings about which he has no direct

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[1] Using this line of thinking: when a homosexual remembers early same-sex attraction, is that narrative truth (reconstruction) or historical truth (the correspondence view of truth)? There is surely a case for considering a breach between narrative and reality whether one's focus is epistemic or therapeutic.

recollection. In a significant way he is not responsible for them. …The fault, as it were, is taken out of his hands. The psychological benefits of such an account may produce the belief that it must have happened that way; thus it becomes true (Spence, 1982, p. 167-168)." One comes to accept the untrue as true. Such a position might be acceptable for therapists, but certainly theorists, philosophers, theologians, scientists, and researchers ought not be so duped.

The fourth point Spence offers is disconfirming evidence. He writes: "…many interpretations become true because there is no disconfirming evidence to be used against them. Quite apart from the issue of being needed (our first point), a construction rooted in a presumed early childhood experience will survive—no matter how thin the evidence—simply because there are no competitors (Spence, 1982, p. 167)." All four points argued by Spence point to the problem of: (1) assuming narrative truth is congruent with historical truth, (2) facing the mechanism for, and entrenchment of, narrative truth, and (3) the potential psychological value of narrative truth albeit at the expense of authentic or accurate beliefs and knowledge.

So, is there a possible, and similar, misinformation effect operative in some homosexuals and the homosexual community? Are beliefs being planted inadvertently? Is confabulation operative? Is there a narrative truth distinct from authentic truth? Is narrative a construction of the self aimed at attaining equilibrium and coherence? Are there various sources of biographical misinformation that ought to be considered? When a prominent researcher like Savin-Williams advises caution regarding what we communicate to the homosexual community because of the power of suggestion, we get a sense of the need for caution. With respect to suicide and homosexuality, for example, Savin-Williams (2001) writes: "Perhaps they believe the exaggerated popular culture and gay press news bulletins of high suicidality among gay youths. That is, some youths may come to subscribe to a "suffering suicidal" script, a myth stating that suicide is a rite of passage for being young and gay… (p. 989)." An idea planted?

Then there is the caution recommended by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH, no date) concerned that media reporting plants ideas with potentially dangerous suggestibility consequences.

Given the above discussion points around accessing personal autobiographical claims of early memories related to sexual attraction, which is the most scholarly response to claims of an early memory of same-sex attraction, or opposite-sex aversion? Accept? Or, be suspicious? Clearly the critical response, the suspended judgment, or a suspicious approach, is not outside the normal scholarly approach. Moreover, in view of the limitations addressed earlier (Entrenched Learnings – Vol. II) with respect to gender-identity disorder linked to early memories, caution is warranted. This would be especially the case where examples of change are documented (for example, see Maxmen, et al, 2009, p. 471).

8. Problematized Love: Early 'Love of Gender-Discordant Style'

Focusing on feminization qualities could have the unfortunate consequence of limiting thinking about homosexuality. As discussed in Volume I, action-identification theory proposes deterioration in thinking as constraints mount (constraints that could be viewed as personal, cognitive, social, moral, political, and so on). Moreover, the action-identification can apply to judgments about self (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1987) or judgments about others (Kozak, et al, 2006); thus, both homosexuals, and researchers could be vulnerable to defaulting to lower levels of thinking in the face of specific, and currently popular, constraints (e.g., political correctness, compassion, tolerance, creeds, laws, love, happiness, ethical principles, and so on).

There is a need to ensure broad thinking, to get multiple-perspective-taking operative as a guiding principle, and to get all ideas on the table as discussed earlier. A move in that direction

with respect to thinking about the feminization contention can be achieved by getting various thinking strands on the table. As a means to diffuse the feminization objection, or to invite further reflection, the following strategies are offered here: (1) asking questions, (2) thinking teleologically, (3) considering the narrative, (4) considering the importance of learning, and (5) considering analogies.

Asking Questions

Consider the following six questions. These six questions at the very least serve to broaden one's perspective with respect to femininization claims.

(1) Is a male homosexual a female *closeted* in a male body (QT1)?

(2) Is a male homosexual a male *enrapt with the male body* (QT2)?

(3) Is a male homosexual simply a "self" *constructed* like other selves are constructed (QT3)?

(4) Is a male homosexual an *adaptive construction* to deal with personal and social constraints (QT4)?

(5) Is a male homosexual an *emergent and transcendent* phenomenon (Q T5)?

(6) Is a male homosexual a male *enrapt with one's internal feminine* (i.e., anima, psychology, body type, etc., along the lines of Blanchard's theory of autogynophilia) (QT6)?

Several of these questions serve to point to alternate considerations with respect to the feminine qualities flagged in the objection. Only two of the questions likely align with feminization (QT1 and QT6). Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that one ought to consider more than just a feminine qualities argument. Moreover, there are frameworks of analysis that might question one particular focus on the specifics of feminine qualities.

Considering Teleology

The questions itemized above have a teleological sense to them—an end-point or purpose that governs each trajectory. Considering these questions in terms of the five teleologies offered in Morton (unpublished manuscript) by Stacey et al (2000), helps situate the questions, and their teleological underpinning. This serves to broaden the focus beyond the simple feminine attributes. Revisiting the earlier table (Table 16 in Morton, unpublished manuscript) here allows for teleological reflection on the six questions posed. Where do the questions and answers seem to fit in terms of this systems thinking? Two of them (QT1 and QT6) seem to have a link to a particular teleology friendly to feminine qualities.

Table 7. Framing the teleological nature for change in the direction of a knowable future. From Stacey et al. (2000).			
	Secular Natural Law Teleology	Rationalist Teleology	Formative Teleology
"Movement toward a future that is:"	"a repetition of the past"	"a goal chosen by reasoning autonomous humans"	"a mature form implied at the start of movement…"
"Movement …in order to:"	"reveal or discover hidden order, …sustain an optimal state"	"realize chosen goals"	"reveal, realize or sustain a mature or final form of identity, of self…."
"The cause of movement is:"	"universal, timeless laws or rules…"	Reason, ethical universals, values, motivation	"…unfolding a whole that is already enfolded…"
"Nature and origin of change:"	"corrective, 'getting it right,'… fitting"	"designed change through rational exercise of human choice to get it right in terms of universals"	"shift from one given form to another…" "Stages of development"
Freedom and Constraints	Freedom in conforming to natural laws	"freedom finds concrete expression on the basis of ethical universals"	"…constrained by given forms"

The "Formative Teleology" aligns with (1) the QT1 question, in that the homosexual orientation is an unfolding of that which is inherent in the individual, namely the female trapped in the male body, and (2) the QT6 question, in that again the homosexual orientation is seen as an unfolding of that which is inherent in the individual, namely, the person in love (obsessed, infatuated or enamoured) with one's own female side, and thus female qualities. The unfolding

of that which is inherent is the key. There is a shift from one form to another with an aim for

"maturity" in the unfolding.

However, there are four other teleologies that can broaden thinking, pushing thinking

beyond simple feminine qualities. The Rationalist Teleology aligns with the QT2 and QT3

questions, in that there is rational construction occurring. Reason, ethical values, universals, and

choices here would underpin the homosexual formation. Clearly, one teleology best aligns with

an essentialist position (The Formative Teleology) while the other (The Rationalist Teleology)

aligns with a more social constructionist position (with intention and thus choice), or at least a

position stressing learning (possibly independent of intention).

The Secular Natural Law Teleology serves to offer laws and constraints that guide the

flow regardless of the priority of the Rationalist or the Formative. It should be considered as a

factor, but it doesn't seem to align with any particular question of the six listed. Rather, it is a

consideration in play for all six questions.

The other two questions (QT4 and QT5) align with the final two teleologies from Stacey

et al (2000). Revisiting Table 17 (from Morton, unpublished manuscript) here facilitates this

thinking about these two remaining possibilities. Is a male homosexual an adaptive construction

to deal with personal and social constraints (QT4)? As may be seen in Table 2 the Adaptionist

Teleology seems to fit this question. The Adaptiionist Teleology aligns with the QT4 question,

in that the homosexual orientation is a survival mechanism of sorts.

Table 8. Framing the Teleological Nature for Change in the Direction of an Unknowable Future. From Stacey et al. (2000).		
	Transformational Teleology	Adaptionist Teleology
"Movement toward a future that is:"	"under perpetual construction… no mature or final state, only perpetual iteration of identity and difference, continuity and transformation…"	"a stable state adapted to an environment…"
"Movement …in order to:"	"express continuity and transformation of individual and collective identity… the	"survive as an individual entity…"

	creation of the novel…”	
“The cause of movement is:”	“processes of micro interactions in the living present forming and being formed by themselves… Meaning arises in the present as does choice and intention…”	“…random variation …natural selection … Meaning lies in the future selected adapted state”
“Nature and origin of change:”	“gradual or abrupt changes in identity, or no change…”	“gradual change due to small chance variations…”
Freedom and Constraints	“both freedom and constraint arise in spontaneity and diversity of micro interactions; conflicting constraints…”	“freedom arising by chance, constrained by competition”

Is a male homosexual an emergent and transcendent phenomenon (QT5)? Considering such morphings from heterosexual to homosexual, or to transsexual, there does seem to be some semblance of an emergent phenomena. The Transformational Teleology aligns with the QT5 question with something new emerging.

The Rationalist Teleology seems to strongly incorporate choice, accountability, values, and universals. It is this formulation that coheres with the arguments presented in Volume II. It is this formulation which underpins responses to challenges raised and addressed in Volume III. It is this formulation that seems at home in the creedal paradigms.

Mapping the two paradigms, naturalism and creedalism, onto these five teleologies, is easy. In one paradigm, *the naturalist paradigm*, the Formative Teleology dominates as researchers are interested in the descriptions of what is happening primarily, and then, secondarily, in what the biological drivers are. In *the creedal paradigms* the scholar is interested in the naturalist's data, hypotheses, and theories, but situated in various belief systems. When combined, the information follows most easily the logical processes of abduction, and then inference to the best explanation. It had been argued that the Rationalist Teleology is the better explanation. Of the five teleologies, the Rationalist Teleology still seems most prominent, that is, the one with most warrant, from the creedal perspective.

Considering the Feminization Narrative

I suspect two limitations to the feminization narrative are worth considering here: first, there can be a principled defaulting to the biological or naturalist paradigm; second, there can be an implied *negating of the feminine in normal male heterosexuality*. First, with respect to "*defaulting to the biological*," it is clear the feminization narrative considers certain feminine qualities that a male homosexual manifests as typical female attributes, attributes, or correlates, that reflect a feminine-type identity—feminine interests, preoccupations, speech patterns, gait, careers, eating disorders, depression, and so on. These align with the QT1 question and the QT6 question asked above. The manifestation of feminine qualities in childhood—like dressing in female clothes, wearing mom's high heels, adopting feminine roles in play, avoiding rough-and-tumble play, playing with dolls, expressing a wish to be a girl—could certainly be seen as somewhat supportive of the manifestation of a generally feminine nature or feminine-fascination. Moreover, if these qualities were seen to surface early in life one might suspect a biological basis (see Bailey, 2003) aligning with a Formative Teleology. This "*defaulting to the biological*," is at the level of a philosophical presumption. One can appreciate naturalists' (like Bailey) having a general commitment to biological explanations (whether genetic or hormonal); it is logical for a naturalist. Consider comments like "this smells genetic to me (Bailey, 2003, p. 171)" with respect to cross-dressing, or "I'm betting on biology (Bailey, 2003, p. 172)" with respect to paraphilias, at least the more dangerous paraphilias. Or consider a quote like "…all behaviours are 'biologically determined' in the sense that all events are caused, and behavioural events are caused by brain states which are 'biological' (Bailey, 1995, p. 104)." This is a fundamental philosophical position. Indeed, it is a consistent premise of naturalism to accept diversity, to describe it, to value it, and to situate it biologically. However, as discussed in Volume II, there are good reasons for questioning the biological drivers (both genetic and

hormonal) of a sexual orientation. While a naturalist like Bailey leans to the natural, I don't see any counterbalancing creedal paradigm (with the possible exception of pragmatism or humanism) in Bailey that would be amenable to a different interpretation.

Secondly, though, with respect to "*negating of the feminine in normal male heterosexuality*" feminization descriptions, or feminine qualities, are surely distributed in each human being along a continuum rather than dichotomously. Such diverse qualities in varying degrees, or continua, are overlaid on the biological sex dichotomy. Consequently, some males have more of a feminine quality on a particular variable (e.g., fashion sense) than others. Some females have more of a masculine quality on a particular variable (e.g., rough-and-tumble play) than others. Such qualities and differences are descriptively interesting, psychologically normal, humanly enriching, and morally neutral. Moreover, the possible source of such differences is interesting on various ends of spectra (e.g., personal vs. abstract, or psychological vs. theological, or narrative vs. empirical, or opinions vs. theories). Of particular interest here, and unanswered, is the question: does feminization of the male necessarily capture the key feminine variable of interest, a sexual orientation towards the male, that is, a homosexual orientation?

A third point of interest is the source of the reports of feminization. Rather than relying totally on the reports of homosexuals regarding their gender-atypical behaviour (males with feminine qualities, and females with masculine qualities), reports which can be faulty memories (as considered in objection # 2), confabulations, or even lies, there are the more reliable reports of parents to consider. Although Bailey (2003) presents a substantive case for the existence of early feminine behaviours in young children who go on to show a homosexual orientation (and male to female transgendering) there are a few points that can be tabled here to raise the caution flag.

First, the reports of Gender Identity Disorder related to male femininization discussed in Morton (unpublished manuscript)were forceful. Yet, they were not absolutely compelling; as noted earlier, 25% of male children with feminization tendencies went on to develop normal heterosexual relationships (see American Psychiatric Association, 1994, DSM 4th edition, page 536).

Secondly, there are clinical reports of dramatic changes in such stereotyped behaviours (e.g., Maxmen, et al, 2009) in response to therapeutic interventions. So, it seems reasonable to infer that feminization is not an assured determinant. At best it is a correlate.

And thirdly, feminine qualities and masculine qualities are not dichotomous. They flow along a continuum, and enriching array for each human being.

Considering The Importance Of Learning Theory

The importance of learning theory was addressed in Morton (unpublished manuscript)with respect to opponent-process theory, action-identification theory, ironic-effects theory, ideomotor theory of action, models of learning, and approaches to teaching. These together contribute to a strong case for considering the significance of learning in the acquisition of psychological qualities. While Bailey, for one, continually reiterates his commitment (or bias) towards a biological explanation he does at least entertain the possibility of environmental drivers possibly tied to learning. Cognitive resources, addiction, constraints, ironic effects theory, self deception, multiplier effects, mind, and agency all raise flags for consideration within a context for learning. Many aspects of the feminization narrative could be considered in terms of learning theory. It is a credible competing approach for any person disenchanted with the hard determinism of the naturalist. As discussed in Volume II, learning theory is a

formidable factor that ought to be a first-order consideration in understanding the variegated attributes of the human person.

Considering Analogies (Reflecting on Curiosity)

Given the psychological and philosophical arguments presented for analogical thinking in Volume II, there is clearly a credible case for using analogies to help clarify issues, and help clarify thinking about issues. A particular analogy to the acquisition of feminine qualities will be presented below. That analogy serves to diffuse the objection raised via the feminine qualities narrative. Admittedly, the analogy does not defeat the objection, but it does temper it. So, what is that analogy?

First, it is necessary to situate the analogy. A particular construct that can facilitate analogical reflection on the feminization narrative is curiosity. Curiosity is an important motivator. It would be the *importance* of curiosity, and the *psychology* of curiosity[1], in human behaviour that serves to help one better understand the acquisition of feminization behaviours and beliefs. People are curious; males who are curious explore feminine behaviours. If one can see this, then the next logical step is to see how curiosity (as *important* and *psychological*) can further function as a mechanism underpinning the acquisition of a homosexual orientation, a smoking orientation, and a host of other apparent anomalies, and achievements. Curiosity is an important determinant of behaviours; then passions may follow, and these may eventuate in the sense of self. A dramatic illustration (offered here as an analogy) is presented by Kashdan (2009) in his description of Kyle, a child fascinated by vacuum cleaners since infancy. His

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[1] I owe my curiosity about "curiosity" as an important construct to Adam Stibbards—a former PhD student of mine in a course on Cognition and Learning. He wrote an excellent paper titled "Curiosity and Learning: An Exploration of Perspectives, Outcomes and Policy in Education." It prompted me to access the references he used, particularly Kashdan (2009). I'm glad I did.

parents tuned in to his curiosity and didn't try to constrain it as it seemed to be, likely, harmless.

Given Kyle's interest, they gave him his first toy vacuum at age one. Then:

> "At the age of two, Kyle dressed up as a Dirt Devil for Halloween. Soon Kyle began to incorporate vacuums into every aspect of his life. At school, his artwork had vacuum themes such as (the first?) vacuum calendar. At home he created vacuums out of cardboard and Lego pieces. By the time he was in elementary school, Kyle was vacuuming his classroom and principal's office during recess…. When Kyle is not in school he can be found vacuuming his house, up to five times each day (Kashdan, 2009, p. 212)."

The behavioural idiosyncrasies and interests continued, and the passion grew. The point here is that curiosity early in life can lead to peculiar trajectories that are best characterized by learning theory as opposed to genes or hormones. It doesn't seem to be unreasonable to map curiosity related to females (i.e., female attire, roles, anatomy, sounds, scents, mannerisms, and so on) onto young children who go on to pursue such interests passionately. The mechanics of the analogy between a fascination with the vacuum cleaner and a fascination with the feminine seem similar.

An equation that Kashdan (2009) offers is as follows: "Novelty+Open and receptive attitude=new information being integrated into the self and personal growth (p. 52)." That's a pretty good equation for placing novelty and curiosity in the causal pathway. A more reasonable equation given the content and questions considered in this book (and Morton, unpublished manuscript) would be more complex:

> (Novelty+Open and receptive attitude)+(*Agency+Opponent Processes+Multiplier Effects+Biological Determinants+ Feelings+Beliefs+Better Beliefs+Knowledge+Wisdom*)+/-(*Parental and Social Constraints*)+/-(*Ironic Effects*)=new information being integrated into the self-forming.

I use the outcome "self-forming" rather than "self and personal growth evident" in this equation because a good end ought not to be assumed. The same mechanics and processes are trickier when the person wants a questionable outcome. There are products of curiosity and learning that

Kashdan flags as "The Dark Side of Curiosity" (see Kashdan, 2009, chapter 8). Pornography, sadism, zoosexuality, pedophilia, and so on, are not good outcomes. Learned selves like a homosexuality orientation, or smoking, or gender reassignment, or amputation fetishes, might not be good outcomes either. What makes for a good outcome?

Happiness seems to be a key criterion to label an outcome a "good outcome." However, using a happiness criterion one could likely affirm many outcomes as positive, and even many suspect outcomes. Kyle seems happy with a career being mapped out that serves his interests, and encourages creativity—a fulfilled vacuum, ironically. Some are happy eating to excess. Are gamblers happy? Are video-gaming addicts happy? Are sex addicts happy? Are bullies happy? Many would answer "yes" to these questions.

Furthermore, with respect to Kyle one could see a "good outcome" indicated just by using a diversity criterion, as opposed to a *happiness criterion*. That is, diversity itself is valuable in an ethological paradigm; valuing all diversity aligns with the philosophical naturalism paradigm.

There is more to be considered on the *happiness criterion* in Objection #16. For now there does seem to be grounds for not buying into the femininity narrative. This is not to discount the possible feminizing effects of biological prenatal hormones. The point is that such effects do not necessarily translate into homosexuality or transgendering. They are secondary influences. Learning is a major influence. And as seen in the equation above, the determinant-structure, or constellation, can be quite complex.

9. Problematized Love: Loving a Psychological or Ontological State

Loving a state such as a nicotine-induced state, or an alcohol-induced state, or the rush from the roulette win, is understandable. More troubling is the one who love's suffering or at least parading the claim of suffering; it can serve to give someone control over others. It would be a problematic love. At a darker level one can ask if loving a state of death is a problematized love. Those in chronic, intractable pain could love death. Those in psychological pain could come to love death. Those who see death as martyrdom, and God-pleasing, could come to love death. Suicide bombers (and the culture supporting them) are classic examples here. Those who see death as a tool to advance some sort of gain—material, ego, ideological, or justice—could love death. So, is love possibly a factor in suicidality? Possibly love is implicated in suicide. Love lost can trigger suicidal behaviour. Arguably, obesity—the love of food to an excess— seems suicidal in that it is somewhat self-destructive. Suicidal activity (ideation and parasuicide) can be control mechanisms of others, messages to others, experimentation with death, fascination with death, obsession with death, or a problematic love-relationship with death.

Considering suicidality as a problematized love using the Augustinian lens there is a disordering of the virtues, particularly temperance, prudence, and fortitude. Using the Baumeister lens, the "gain" sought is an evil root, and the possibility of lashing out to those who have hurt them (schadenfreude and justice) can be a root of evil. Using the analogical lens, one could compare the suicidality of various pairings (e.g., the obese and the homosexual; the depressed and the homosexual; the jilted-lover and the homosexual; the distraught victim of bullying and the homosexual, etc.). Are the pairings similar? Are the mutually informative? What's the story with purported homosexual suicidality, for example? Does homosexual suicidality make a good analogical base?

Is the claim that homosexuals are suffering increased rates of suicide true, and thus an informative analogical base? Certainly, purported suicidality in the young homosexual group is

an appeal to the heart, to compassion, and to the emotions. That said, it is fair to consider the contention factually, and as a context for a well-framed position and response.

Is love a factor in homosexual suicidality? This question is based on the notion that social oppression of homosexuals leads to increased incidence of problems like suicide and depression. Bailey (1999), commenting on two published studies in the Archives of General Psychiatry (Fergusson, Horwood, & Beautrais, 1999; Herrell, Goldberg, True, Ramakrishnan, Lyons, Eisen, & Tsuang, 1999) writes "…both converge on the same unhappy conclusion: homosexual people are at a substantially higher risk for some forms of emotional problems, including suicidality, major depression, and anxiety disorder (p. 883)." Remefedi (1999a, 1999b) likewise flags the increased problems. Thus, one emerging case seems to be leading to an implication along the lines of: any activity (academic, political or personal) which might increase oppression ought to be discouraged, suppressed, or avoided. However, one can ask: is this a good argument or good reasoning? Is there a case for an answer such as "No" to the question of whether this is a good argument?

Bailey's Contention On The Suicidality State

Bailey (1999) himself, contends it would be premature to conclude that "…widespread prejudice against homosexual people causes them to be unhappy or worse, mentally ill (p. 883)." For such a hypothesis to gain standing, what one can infer from Bailey's caution and comments, and from a balanced scientific perspective, is that one should like to see:

(1) *Evidence for a triggering relationship* where issues related to non-acceptance, or oppression, were followed by "suicidal episodes."

(2) *Comparisons with heterosexual people* who, when experiencing similar-magnitude stressors, manifested similar, subsequent suicidality episodes.

(3) *A fine-tuned conceptual analysis of a "developmental error" hypothesis* comparing two groups (homosexuals and those disposed to suicidality and depression) with respect to "indicators of developmental instability such as fluctuating asymmetry, left-handedness, and minor physical anomalies (Bailey, 1999, p. 884)."

(4) *A sex-typed analysis, or exploration, of mental disorders*. Stewart (no date) notes a female pattern with women more prone to anxiety and depression while men are more prone to addictive and personality disorders. Why are homosexual males more prone to problems typically found in females (e.g., eating disorders, neuroticism, depression and parasuicide). Prenatal hormonal-precursors may be influential, though not determinative. Generally the incidence of suicide is about five times higher for males than for females; yet, females show higher rates of parasuicides. Male homosexuals don't complete more suicides than male heterosexuals (proportionally) but they do show a higher parasuicide rate, and thus a female pattern. Interesting, but an undifferentiated suicide rate does challenge a suicide argument.

(5) *Analyses of consequences of lifestyle differences* like receptive anal sex and promiscuity should be considered.

(6) *One should consider the coherence of symptoms*. That is, as Bailey asks, "Perhaps social ostracism causes gay men and lesbians to become depressed, but why would it cause gay men to have eating disorders (p. 884)?"

These six points drawn from Bailey do argue for temperance in claims that "oppression of homosexuals," or "homophobia" causes mental illness or suicide.

Savin-William's Contention On The Suicidality State

A further argument emerges from Savin-Williams (2001) study which raises question about methodology and psychometrics (reliability and validity) in existing research on homosexuality and suicide. From his two studies he concludes: "Consistent with previous findings, results from the two studies indicate that sexual-minority youths report higher rates of suicide attempts than do heterosexual youths. However, because many of these reports were false and because life-threatening true attempts did not vary by sexual orientation, the assertion that sexual-minority youths as a class of individuals are at increased risk for suicide is not warranted (p. 989)." Such data present a substantive challenge to the notion, and claims, that suicides in the homosexual group are a consequence of "homophobia."

Additional Contentious Questions

Additional questions that challenge the suicidality objection can be asked here. These questions seem to diffuse the case, and claims, that "homophobia" is a source of suicide in homosexuals, a source that justifies the politically correct position of "silence."

(1)   *The oppression question.* Why don't other oppressed groups (i.e., Blacks-see Gibbs 1997, Spring Issue, Suicide Life Threat Behavior 27, 68) show increased suicide rates? Also see the Sanchez (1998) report noting the dramatic increase in Black suicides. The striking fact in the data—in spite of an increase in suicide rates—is the still lower incidence when compared to whites. Why would Blacks be lower as they would seem to experience similar oppression to that which homosexuals lay claim? In a sense this does relate back to point #2 raised from Bailey's critique. Why don't "similar magnitude stressors" generate a similar suicidality pattern?

Also see the NIMH (no date (b)) report rates for Whites, Blacks, American Indian and Alaska natives, Asian and Hispanic groups for 2004. Whites are the highest with 12.9 per 100,000. The American Indian and Alaskan natives were comparable at 12.4 per 100,000. Much lower were Blacks (5.3), Asians (5.8), and Hispanics (5.9). Again, why don't "similar magnitude stressors" generate a similar suicidality pattern?

There may be a problem with the NIMH (no date (b)) stats reported above with respect to aboriginal groups. These statistics don't align with another NIMH report (no date (c)) indicating high aboriginal rates (2.5 times higher than the national average, and even higher in some subgroups). The inconsistency at least calls for caution. But the issue with Blacks and Hispanics does remain. Why aboriginal groups fare less well than Blacks, and Hispanics, and whites for that matter is another question. Is there a zenophobia for some groups but not others with differential, and consequential, rates of suicide, and parasuicide? Such a claim does seem to be a bit of a logical stretch.

(2)   *Historical shifts in social approbation.* Why don't the suicide rates drop with the current *historical shifts in reduced social approbation*? Or do they drop? If social approbation has dropped, one could logically expect suicide rates to drop as well? Laumann et al (1994) note that prior to their survey (i.e., from 1972 to 1991) the General Social Survey data showed that over 70% of the adult population in the US reported that "homosexuality is always wrong." However, 10 years after the Laumann et al (1994) claim we see that by 2004 this percentage had dropped to 56.1%. Such a change could correlate with a decrease in suicidality rates. Actually, suicide rates might be dropping. Leistikow (2003) notes a drop of 30% in California from 1990 to 1999. However, this is a drop in the general population rate and Leistikow links it to a per

capita drop in cigarette consumption of 50%. The logic underpinning such a connection is not immediately evident. The interesting question concerns the pattern for homosexuals.

General suicide rates vary as a function of many variables. Suicides in Canada (Statistics Canada, no date) do not appear to be indicating a decreasing pattern from 2001 to 2005 in the youthful age groups 15-19 and 20 to 24 (age group15 to 19: 2001=207, 2002=215, 2003=216, 2004=210, 2005=213; age group 20 to 24: 2001=296, 2002=277, 2003=306, 2004=270, 2005=296). This pattern seems relatively stable. However, a report in 1998 (Canadian Mental Health Association, 1998) addressing rates in Canada from the 1950s to 1996 note a threefold increase over those decades. Yet, these differences vary as a function of time and province, with three provinces (Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia) showing "…a steady decrease in suicide rates in recent decades." Indeed, an examination of the correlates of suicide rate changes should be an interesting and productive research area if appropriate controls can be established for the plethora of confounding variables. Of course a major problem is sectioning homosexual suicide rates from the general population rates. Partly because homosexuality is not considered to be a major risk factor for suicide (Maxmen, et al, 2009) trends over time are not easy to compile.

(3)   *Specific geographic areas*. A similar question to #2 above is: "Why don't the rates shift downward in areas where approbation is less marked (e.g., San Francisco)?" Narrowing the focus might partially address research concerns. Maybe rates do shift in a reduced direction where approbation is reduced; this might be the case if Leistokow's (2003) claim would allow California to serve as a proxy for San Francisco. It would seem, then, there is a way to make a case, or support a case, for homophobic effects on suicide and parasuicide by pursuing research in these specific areas with respect to differential historical times and geographical places.

(4)   *Correlate vs consequence.* Is suicide, or suicidality, a consequence of homosexual

oppression or only a correlate? If a correlate, what does the larger correlational cluster look like,

and what are the causal pathways and mechanisms that can be offered to link them? Is

depression a consequence of homosexuality or are we dealing with two effects related to some

lower common substrate? Is depression a causal mechanism of suicidality but independent of

sexual orientation? Does depression follow from homosexuality or parallel homosexuality? Is

serotonergic abnormality a causal mechanism instrumental in depression or suicide? Is

conscience an instrumental mechanism?

Is it possible that suicidality is a consequence of homosexuality rather than a

consequence of oppression or depression? Such a case can be offered logically, in part, from the

investigations, and speculations, on contagion—see the NIMH (no date (a)) report "Reporting

on Suicide: Recommendations for the Media." Suicidality propaganda and ideology get high

profile media attention in the homosexual community which then links to a contagion effect.

This is a notion of harm that Savin-Williams (2001) flags as well with "…youths attempting

suicide to prove their gayness… (p. 990)."

(5)   *Co-morbidity*? Do correlates actually point to a third factor (e.g., depression, or…) as

primary, and thus introduce the notion of either co-morbidity in the causal mechanisms, or

collective determinants in the causal mechanisms? Regarding co-morbidity (NIMH, no date (a))

over 90% of suicide victims have a psychiatric illness at the time of their death (e.g., mood

disorders and substance abuse being the two most common). Regarding collective determinants

or influences, correlates related to shame, sexual abuse, loss of a relationship, substance abuse,

academic difficulties, family problems, and so on, have been related to suicide and by extension

to homosexuality-based suicidality. At the very least, such considerations, serve to mitigate the overt claim that homophobia leads to suicide.

(6)   *Smoking*. Concerning substance abuse, can smoking of all things lead to increased suicide? Or is smoking merely a correlate of suicide and more likely tied to a common mechanism like depression? Stewart, Gucciardi and Grace (no date) report an Odds Ratio that was almost double for men and 1.46 for women showing daily smoking as a correlate of a depressive episode, and this in spite of the fact that nicotine is considered an antidepressant. Further, Leistokow (2003) writes a "minority report" in the International Journal of Epidemiology in response to papers dissociating smoking and suicide. His report at the very least would indicate it is premature to conclude that smoking is not causally linked to suicide, or, at least, the precursors of suicide. This makes some sense given that smoking behaviours are often temporally prior to depressive episodes, and developmentally early in the life course. He seems to have a tenable case empirically and logically. One interesting statistic, if true even partially, deserves some serious reflection. It is reported on a website that about 90% of suicides are smokers (http://medicolegal.tripod.com/preventsuicide.htm). The report meanders and seems weak, but it does cite some interesting historical sources. If the 90% figure is an overestimate, what is the actual percentage, one wonders? What is typically reported are rates of smoking. Some reports note smokers suicidality (attempts or ideation) outnumber non smokers suicidality at a rate of 4 to 1 (see Brady, 2004). Would this be indicative of an 80% rate? Others report Odds Ratios of 2.6 for suicide attempts (Malone, Waternaux, Haas, Cooper Li, and Mann, 2003). One actual study of suicide victims, as opposed to parasuicides, examined nicotine and cotinine levels in 87 deceased individuals (Moriya, Hashimoto, & Furumiya (2007). The smoking rate for deceased individuals was 77.8% for those committing suicide but only 42% for

those non-suicides. It would seem that an estimate of 90% is too high, nevertheless, the actual rates appear to be quite high. Is it possible that smoking is a more striking precursor of suicide than homosexuality or homophobia?

(7)   *Caution*. Critiques of existing research do seem to suggest caution is warranted. While Gibson's (1989) paper is often presented as seminal and his 30% statistic (that 30% of suicides are homosexuals) has staying power (see Remafedi, 1999a) there are critical evaluations that ought not to be dismissed merely because one does not like the source (like LaBarbera, 2003), the caveats, or the questions raised. What does seem less opaque from the research is that parasuicides are higher in the homosexual population. And, for completed suicides, Gibson's 30% rate is suspect whether one refers to positional critiques like LaBarbera (no date), conceptual critiques like Bailey (1999), or empirical critiques like Savin-Williams (2001).

Given the above discussion points it seems that Bailey's (1999) advice is sound and that it would be premature to conclude that "…widespread prejudice against homosexual people causes them to be unhappy or worse, mentally ill (p. 883)" to the point of causing suicide.

10. Problematized Love: Love As Feeling—Stories that Something '*Feels Right*'

Lots of things can "feel right," or have a "feels right" component. Eating feels right? Theft can feel right for the one who has a Marxist sense of money. Intergeneration sex can feel right for some. Violence can feel right for those sensing injustice. What about homosexuality as an example? The concern here is framed in terms of: (1) the number of stories one hears that homosexuality "feels right," (2) the cultural and demographic diversity of those reporting the

stories, (3) the importance of feelings, and (4) the priority of feelings. Points number 1 and 2 are a given; one could just as easily make the claim that smoking "feels right" for some individuals, and if they are not smoking they don't "feel right," in spite of the knowledge they possess that smoking is arguably wrong from a health perspective, or a social perspective. Such stories would be plentiful, demographically diverse, but not particularly compelling. Thus, the more fundamental issues are the importance of feelings and the priority of feelings.

The Priority of Personal Feelings

A typical story one might encounter in the homosexual literature is a story which casts feelings alongside thinking, with a palpable predisposition to weight the importance of feelings, and the priority of feelings, as trump cards. To illustrate, consider the story of a religious person claiming strong homosexual feelings to which he gives priority in spite of a contrary knowledge base: (1) his knowledge from authorities like parent's admonitions and their voiced concerns, (2) his knowledge of societal positions, attitudes, and restraints, (3) his internal knowledge linked to design, teleology, generalities, common sense, and synderesis, and (4) his knowledge of religious texts subscribed to, like the biblical text (e.g., Romans chapter 1), the Torah (Leviticus chapter 20), the Quran (Sura 4:16-18, Sura 27:55), and so on. Then, at times, in spite of the knowledge base, and after frustrating attempts to reform, or reorient (e.g., White, 1994), the story teller seems to default to the priority of feelings—whether by a collapse, fatigue or choice.

This is understandable given the earlier discussion of entrenchment in Morton (unpublished manuscript b) via opponent-process theory, action-identification theory, ironic effects theory, and so on. In such a situation there is a need to either (1) diffuse the cognitive side of the issue and the argument, that is, diffuse the cognitive dissonance, or (2) accept the intractable state which is a product of the entrenchment process. Rationalization, denial, self-

deception, suppression, and so on, can rise to positions of power in an attempt to deal with any cognitive dissonance. Such rationalization can raise feelings to a position of prominence. To illustrate, when considering a religious text like the Bible, and biblical references to homosexuality, how is one to deal cognitively, and rationally, with a text like the Pauline text below, in a manner that would allow the priority of feelings to make sense?

> Romans 1:21 For even though they knew God, they did not honor Him as God, or give thanks; but they became futile in their speculations, and their foolish heart was darkened. 22 Professing to be wise, they became fools, 23 and exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for an image in the form of corruptible man and of birds and four-footed animals and crawling creatures.**24** Therefore God gave them over in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, that their bodies might be dishonored among them. 25 For they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen.
>
> 26 For this reason God gave them over to degrading passions; for their women exchanged the natural function for that which is unnatural, 27 and in the same way also the men abandoned the natural function of the woman and burned in their desire toward one another, men with men committing indecent acts and receiving in their own persons the due penalty of their error.

A defaulting to feelings as authoritative would be one option to deal with the conflict. Is such an option a rationalization? It would seem so.

Or consider the conservative homosexual Jew confronting the Torah (Leviticus 20):

> Leviticus 20:13 'If *there is* a man who lies with a male as those who lie with a woman, both of them have committed a detestable act; they shall surely be put to death. Their bloodguiltiness is upon them. 14 'If *there is* a man who marries a woman and her mother, it is immorality; both he and they shall be burned with fire, that there may be no immorality in your midst. 15 'If *there is* a man who lies with an animal, he shall surely be put to death; you shall also kill the animal. 16 'If *there is* a woman who approaches any animal to mate with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal; they shall surely be put to death. Their bloodguiltiness is upon them.

Does this Jewish homosexual person have a vested interest in gravitating towards Jewish groups with less stringent views for interpreting the Torah (e.g. Reconstructionist Jews and Reform Jews)? Is it a priority given to feelings that drives beliefs and therefore knowledge-claims? If so, that is, if priority has been given to feelings, has the knowledge claim been nullified by *dismissal*, by *rationalization*, or by *explanation*?

Or consider the homosexual Muslim reading the Koran (Sura 4:16-18, Sura 27:55) and the Hadith, yet developing a lifestyle in opposition to the general tenor of Islamic scholars (e.g., Irshad Manji, 2003). Is the religious authority secondary to feelings? Is the response *rationalization* or *dismissal* of the text? Is there a claim of a more legitimate interpretation of the text? Is it a rational and compelling analysis of the text? It seems either rationalization or dismissal could be the case; what seems to fall short here is the appeal to an alternate *explanation* of the text, that really wins the rational argument. Overall, it seems unlikely that there is an adequate explanation of the text that is supportive of homosexuality.

> Sura 4:16-18 "If two men among you are guilty of lewdness, punish them both, if they repent and amend, leave them alone; for Allah is Oft-returning, Most Merciful. Allah accepts the repentance of those who do evil in ignorance and repent soon afterwards; to them will Allah turn in mercy: for Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom. Of no effect is the repentance of those who continue to do evil, until Death faces one of them, and he says, 'Now have I repented indeed;' nor of those who die rejecting the Faith: for them We have prepared a punishment most grievous."

Are these three religious individuals (the Christian, the Jew, and the Muslim) caught in a classic case of cognitive dissonance? Is it a dissonance reduced by elevating feelings and mitigating cognition? One has knowledge which emerges from personal experience in the form of feelings and intuitions which conflicts with knowledge emerging from a broader cognitive domain (cultural, religious, rational, teleological, conventional, etc.), and these two general knowledge sources conflict. The essence of the situation here is that feelings are more important

than reasoned-thoughts (or feelings-based beliefs are more important than reason-based beliefs). To allocate more credence to feelings-based knowing one would need an argument to elevate feelings-based knowing or an argument to diminish reason-based knowing.

To diminish reason-based knowing, for example, one might contend that we in the 21st Century are in a better position to judge the development of knowledge because we are in a better scholarly position than archaic figures like Paul, or Moses, or Mohammed. True enough, if one assumes scriptures are not authoritative because they are not inspired. *Dismissal* is all that is needed in such a situation; there is no need for *rationalizing*, or *explaining*. However, if one imbues a particular tradition tied to scripture with some form of authority there is a need for explanation.

The alternative is to elevate feelings-based beliefs. Does a knowledge-claim that feelings-based knowing is better than thought-based knowing warrant acceptance? While the gist of the "feelings" argument is that feelings are more important than thoughts (or feelings-based knowing is more important than reason-based knowing), it is situated in a context—a bias to resolve cognitive dissonance by avoiding reasoned arguments, that is, by defaulting to the emotional feelings. At one level the approach does reflect a reluctance to live with cognitive dissonance.

However, cognitive dissonance is not necessarily a negative state, or a "bad thing" to avoid at all costs; it might be considered as somewhat similar to, or analogous to, pain. The alleviation of pain is important at one level but it is less important than the understanding of the cause of the pain, is it not? Is it not better to deal ultimately with the cause rather than the symptom of pain? In responding to cognitive dissonance the alleviation of the dissonance is one response (whether by denial, suppression, rationalization, and so on), whereas better responses might be found (1) in bearing with the dissonance until a reasonable resolution can be attained,

or (2) in understanding the dissonance so that a correct diagnosis is made, and a correct proscription or prescription can follow. Dissonance, like pain, is a friend, not an enemy.

The Priority of Position

Priorities can be configured on multiple dimensions. Such dimensions may help frame the issue of "a priority of feeling" on a feeling versus reason continuum. On the feelings-reason continuum priority can be assigned to the feeling-end for humane and compassionate responses, but the reason-end for scholarly and systematic, epistemic responses. The present concern with respect to the "priority of feelings" with feeling-based knowledge being given more weight than reason-based knowledge has raised the reasonable question: Should feelings-based knowing be given more weight than reason-based knowing? Do feelings have pre-emptive importance?

What else has positional importance that might impact a weighting with respect to feelings? That is, a "priority of position" contention could be framed in terms of increasing epistemological weight—not just on a feelings-reasons continuum—but along various positional continua. To illustrate consider the following framings of "priority" of position: (a) *temporal priority* (i.e., the original argument carries weight, at least seminal weight, later arguments can be politicized and viewed as mitigated because of the tendency to use and abuse the arguments; and therefore later arguments are of lesser importance. Alternatively some might argue that later arguments are more compelling and of more importance because of refinement, and having withstood the "test of time.") (the temporal priority of feelings regarding a homosexual orientation seems suspect), (b) *natural priority* (i.e., on a three-point continuum there would be three levels here: at one end of the continuum nature is viewed as a prototype or proxy for authority, such that the descriptive becomes prescriptive, as opposed to a medial view where nature is viewed as a teacher, or a polar opposite view where nature is discounted) (the natural

priority regarding a homosexual orientation seems suspect as does the polar opposite; nature is reasonably viewed as a teacher, and thus the emphasis is on the cognitive), (c) *developmental priority* (i.e., while early positions are foundational for later positions, there would likely be a thoughtful priority or preference given to later positions, in that, later positions are typically more cognitively sophisticated) (the developmental priority of feelings regarding a homosexual orientation seems suspect in view of the later more sophistical views constructed), (d) *ontological priority* (i.e., the higher authority has priority, for example, the parent, the police, the state, God, are viewed as increasingly more authoritative by virtue of the power inherent in the hierarchy and the wisdom inherent in the hierarchy; in the present contention for the "feelings" being seen as the higher ontological authority, it is reasonable to feel that this is a dubious position ontologically), and (e) *personal priority* (i.e., intuitions, self-referential knowledge, feelings, conscience, synderesis, experience, knowledge constructions, may align with different degrees of conviction, and override reason) (the personal priority of feelings regarding a homosexual orientation seems valid at one level, for example "intuition," but suspect when constrained by a failure to include the full range of personal variables, for example, conscience, synderesis, experiences, knowledge, personality, and so on).

Considering these multiple sources of positional priority, and how they support assigning a "priority to feelings" leads to the following critical suspicion: a focus on feelings is too narrow. A thoughtful examination of the issue suggests there is a case that feelings may not be the prior authority, or overriding criterion, for making a judgment or forming a belief. Indeed, it seems to be one of the weaker sources of belief.   Priority, itself, may or may not carry epistemic weight. Consider the various aspects of priority configured in the following table (Table 10). At times appeals to priority are clearly suspect.

What seems clear here is that a "priority of feelings" may be suspect. Indeed, any deferring to priority is suspect. There is an argument to be made that beliefs based on feelings need close scrutiny, as they may be reasonable, and they may be unreasonable. In fact, all priorities are suspect; it is the later analyses and formulations based on reason that are seen to carry the most weight.

Table 10. Showing Types of Priority, the Poles Anchoring these Types of Priority, and a Judgment about the Value of Adopting the Priority Position.

Types of Priority	Poles Apart	Applied
(a) of *temporal priority* (i.e., the original argument carries weight, at least seminal weight, later arguments are politicized; and therefore later arguments are of lesser importance, or ...as some might argue, of more importance),	**Initially**, it feels good in a rebellious sense to do it (say smoke), it gains me friends, and status, and an elated sense of well-being. **Later** arguments are more rational being driven by reasons related to cost, health deterioration, power, etc.	The latter trumps the former, that is, the temporal priority position.
(b) **of** *natural priority* (i.e., there are three levels here: nature is discounted, nature is viewed as a teacher, or nature is viewed as a prototype or proxy for authority, such that the descriptive becomes prescriptive,	**Level 1** because something occurs in nature it gains weight (e.g., polygamy of deer, Coprophilia as an animal behaviour, etc... **Level 2**, one sees the folly of assigning priority to nature given the inconsistencies and the actual things that do occur in nature (e.g., species eating their young, or killing their mate after copulation...)	The latter trumps the former, that is, the natural priority position.
(c) of *cognitive developmental priority* (i.e., later stages of thinking are more in line with truth and knowledge	**Preoperational thinking,** because something occurs first it gains weight, as a foundation **Formal operational thinking** because something is more aligned with knowledge building it gains weight	The latter trumps the former, that is, the mature thinker has the advantage.
(d) of *psychological developmental priority* (i.e., later positions are more reasonable because one has more experience and knowledge to form a judgment),	**Youth** The young Heidegger, or the young Stalin, considering a career, or call, to ministry. The young Hitler pursuing art. **Aged**—the mature Stalin of purges and the Gulag, the mature Heidegger as a Nazi... the mature Hitler as a Nietzschean?	The latter should not trump the former since the latter is malevolent. But the latter is the most important consideration.
(e) of *ontological priority* (i.e., the higher authority has priority, for example, the parent, the police, the state, God, are viewed as increasingly more authoritative by virtue of the power inherent in the hierarchy),	One's **parent** says it's okay to eat pork. One's **God** (or god-construct) says do not eat pork.	The latter should trump the former if true but not if the latter is false.
(f) of *personal priority* (i.e., intuitions, self-referential knowledge, feelings, conscience, synderesis, experience, knowledge constructions, may align with different degrees of conviction).	One's **feelings** indicate the stick in the water is bent. One's **experience and knowledge** support the inference that the stick is not bent.	The latter trumps the former.

A Digression on Ontological Priority

Given the contrast between feelings and purported revelation in the earlier theological

discussion (and the contrast between feelings and rational thought) the issue of the ontological

priority of authority is particularly relevant. In a religious context the competition is between

three authorities: one's feelings, or feelings-based knowledge (FK), divine revelation (VK), or

reason-based knowledge (RK). Of course, if there is no God, or the purported revelation did not originate with God, the authoritative revelation reduces to mere opinion, or opinionated knowledge (OK), and the issue reduces to a competition between feelings and reason, FK and RK. In this case, temporal priority, developmental priority, or personal priority, might intervene as authoritative since ontological priority is easily dismissible on the grounds of rational arguments. On the other hand, if at least one of the sacred texts (the Bible, the Torah, or the Quran) is in an authoritative position, and revelatory, it is difficult to make the case that feelings-based knowledge has priority.

One religion which does seem to give priority to feelings is Mormonism. When a Mormon elder is confronted with arguments (based on logic, history, linguistic evidence, competing explanations, genetics, counterfactuals, and so on) that would be defeaters of specific truth claims under normal conditions, what does the Mormon do? They default to feelings. There is typically and normally a defaulting by the Mormon, a defaulting to "a warming in the bosom" which serves to trump the contrary evidence, if not nullify it.

Some (e.g., Loftus, 2006) would argue in a similar fashion that Christianity, or sections of Christianity, give a similar priority to an internal "witness of the Spirit," the activity of the Holy Spirit testifying to the individual of the truth. However, for most Christian traditions the "witness of the spirit" does not have priority; it too must be tested and cohere with other sources of knowledge—the Bible in Protestant traditions, or the teaching magisterium in the Roman Catholic tradition.

Feelings should be suspect, in principle. The proverb reads:

> "There is a way *which seems* right to a man, But its end is the way of death" (Proverbs 16:25 NASB).

In the proverb, a feeling, or a degree of knowledge, can seem adequate but it is surely not adequate if the end thereof is to be led astray. Thus, the proverbial call to wisdom, to think, to change one's thinking, to repentance (metanoia), to test the spirits, to "reason together," to love with the heart, mind, soul, and strength, is a call to think, actually a call to clear thinking. The parent that believes prayer is the right solution to treat a child with diabetes might be a graphic illustration of the folly seen in this proverb. The person who feels he is traveling north, and homeward, in the unfamiliar woods, might be actually traveling south, and further from civilization. Basically, trusting one's feelings is not normally a good idea.

Ontological priority then requires reason, argument, evidence, logic, coherence, and so on, to establish its claim to being a legitimate and credible priority. The consequences related to ontological priority are paramount. In the Jewish scenario (in Leviticus) the consequences of feelings-driven homosexual behaviour is death in the Jewish state. In the Islamic scenario repentance (a change in behaviour) is permissible, otherwise a "punishment most grievous awaits." In the Christian scenario (Romans) the power and hold of sin is acknowledged, the difficulty and even impossibility of change is acknowledged, forgiveness is offered as a function of God's grace, contingent upon faith and repentance (i.e., a changed mind), with the promise of progressive improvement over time, also a function of grace. If they are all wrong, "let's eat drink and be merry…" If one of them is right one ought to invest some serious thinking in wrestling with the arguments and the evidence.

The Psychological Priority of Feelings

When something "just feels right" there is certainly a push, or incentive, to assume it is right. The logical fallacy here might be a variant on the "is/ought" fallacy. Just because something is doesn't mean it ought to be, or it ought to serve as a guide or teacher. Though

Damasio (1994, 1999) makes an interesting, and an important, case for the priority of feelings. But, an appropriate rejoinder would be "important, yes; priority, no!" Damasio addresses varieties of feelings. At one level there are Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, Disgust, which at a secondary level may be seen in Euphoria, Melancholy, Rage, Shyness, Shame, respectively. Should such feelings be determinants, or informants, or constituents of a belief? I suspect the reasonable response would be: informants, influences, and constituents, "yes," determinant, "no."

One way to help clarify the place of feelings in determining a reliable level of knowledge may be facilitated by considering what induces feelings, or feeling-based knowing (FK). The representation below (Figure 8) considers feeling-driven knowledge along three source axes: biological, social, and cognitive, on a feeling/cognitive continuum. The distance from the feeling is indicated by the position of the cells. Thus, on the biological axis, biology can drive both feeling and knowing. Similarly, on the social axis there are situational factors that affect the feeling end of the continuum and the cognitive end of the continuum. Even on the cognitive axis there are influences on the feeling end of the continuum and on the knowing end of the continuum. As the figure portrays all axes can have an influence on feelings and it is the social axis that seems to have the balanced, or competitive, influence on feelings.

	The Feeling End of the Continuum			Knowing	The Cognitive End of the Continuum		
	Inducing Feeling and Feeling-Based Knowing						
	→ → →				← ← ←		
Biological Axis	Organismic -Body-state -Hemisphericity -Background Feeling -Somatic Markers			Feels Right	Synderesis -Hard-wired -Natural		
Social Axis		Situational Depression Irrationality Circadian Hormones Endorphins		Feels Wrong		Conscience Culture Religion Parents Peers	
Cognitive Axis			Learned Operant Classical Social (Bandura)				Reason Theory of mind Theory of God's mind

Figure 8. In this configuration some aspects of biological influencers are closer, or more potent, with respect to influencing feeling-based knowing than others. Similarly, some aspects of the cognitive axis are more likely to be impacting feeling-based knowing than other aspects.

Another way to flag the issue is to point out that description does not imply prescription.

11. Problematized Love: Love and Choice: "Did You Choose Love of Type?"

This comment/question is often advanced as an argument against choice. For example, certainly heterosexuals did not choose to be attracted to the opposite sex did they? Upon reflection it seems fair to ask the question: is there any argument to be made that heterosexuality is, indeed, a choice? Several lines of argument might lead to an affirmative answer.

First there is the analogy of *language*. We are all pre-programmed to learn language given a common deep structure for language and a language acquisition device, or LAD, as Chomsky claims (Chomsky, 1965); but, the type of language we learn (French, Arabic, English)

is a surface structure phenomenon. That is, we learn our native language, from our environmental influences, and the choices we make in response to that environment. We don't have the sense that we chose to learn English, but certainly we did make choices that facilitated the learning of English. Then, we push on to the next level and the reading of English. If there are defective opportunities to make good choices (e.g., feral children, autism, word games, models, and so on) our choices can lead to language deficits. This would be similar to acquired orientations, and orientation differences.

When applying this language learning analogy to sexual orientation we see it leads to a reasonable comparison. Just as human language has a deep structure, and a surface structure, so too might a sexual orientation show a deep structure and a surface structure. Choice, amongst a constellation of variables, is operative at the surface level for choosing language learning activities, and choice is operative when choosing sexual orientation activities. That most people choose a heterosexual orientation is not unreasonable given the social, cultural, logical and cognitive variables at play in the mix. That people lack the "sense" of choice is not unreasonable as: (1) choice atrophies over time as discussed earlier, (2) choice can be dwarfed perceptually by other high-profile variables (e.g., parents, peers, media, culture, religion) in the mix, and (3) choice faces the confounding explanatory work of the brain's hypothesizing, confabulating, rationalizing, and constructing of a self, or a set of competing selves.

Second, there is the issue of the *orientation-template*. We orient towards various categories. Males might have a search mechanism for a preferential body-part-type (e.g., leg-man vs breast-man, etc.), or colour-type (e.g., brunette vs blonde), or size-type (e.g., thin vs fat), or maternal-model (e.g., like mom vs unlike mom, etc.), or gender-type (e.g., masculine vs feminine), or sex-type (e.g., male vs female). Likely, a first level of screening to filter out

partner candidates is the sex-type[1]. Are these templates learned? If the heterosexual template is hard-wired can it be circumvented as surface level learning engages the environments with operators like chance, or expediency, or choice? It would seem reasonable to posit such a position, especially if one draws upon animal studies (Bagemihl, 1999).

So it is quite possible that heterosexuality is a learned orientation. It falls to the majority because society (families, culture, models, media, educational institutions, peers, and so on) offer rewards and constraints that facilitate learning the traditional outlet. Wasn't it Kinsey who argued these are all just "outlets?"

12. Problematized Love: Love and Essence: "It's an Issue of Wiring!"

Wiring and Essentialism

When someone makes the claim that "wiring argues against your analogy," this resonates. It makes some sense intuitively, observationally, and logically, as one clearly has good grounds for not accepting that smoking is wired, whereas, sexual attraction does seem, intuitively, to be wired. This is a reasonable criticism, but it does not stand for a few reasons which can serve as challenges to the criticism.

While the claim of "wiring" aligns with the essentialism positions (see Stein, 1992, 1999), these positions are not at a consensus level as one can see from Stein's discussion of the construct. The "wired" positions have been challenged by considering the weights of various determinants (i.e., the minimalist position regarding the importance of genetic determinants, the considerable importance of the environment, the caution warranted in considering personal histories, and the philosophical importance of choices), and by consideration of the analogies

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[1] For those who argue that it is a love issue—that is, person A loves person B—and no one should veto that, or we should all bow to love, or defer to love, it is relatively clear that sex-type selection preceded person selection. Any love issue is cognitively a distracter, and temporally secondary.

like smoking, eating-problems, suicidal ideation, musical proficiency, and athletic prowess, all

of which can be tied to learning and multiplier effects. Thus, much or the argumentation in has

presented a challenge to a fixed causation mechanism related to wiring.

Neuroplasticity

Further more, there is the current view of neuroplasticity which supports some

rethinking of the notions of "wiring." Clearly there is a wired infrastructure that humans bring to

behaviours as well as the building of structures related to knowledge, beliefs, emotions, choices,

and selves. But equally interesting is the plasticity of the "wiring."

Even if there is a wiring component for sexual orientation, a wiring component that is

missing from a smoking orientation, the current thinking on neuroplasticity points to scenarios

where learning can trump wiring. In the not too distant past neuroplasticity was considered in

two forms—one for the young, immature brain and the other for the mature brain. For the

immature brain neuroplasticity was accepted wisdom, but it was determined by the brain's

inherent developmental programming power itself. It was bottom-up clearly, given that the brain

damage that interfered with the developmental blueprint led to alternate wiring routes,

functional routes; but it was also top-down given the rewiring occurring in meaningful ways. A

most dramatic illustration would be the shift of left hemisphere processes to the right

hemisphere following left hemispherectomy, if the patient was young enough. For the more

mature brain, however, say late adolescence, neuroplasticity was viewed as minimal, if not

impossible. Early efforts to retrain damaged brains by using, for example, a "patterning"

technique advocated by therapists like Glenn Doman and Carl Delacato (Delacato, 1963) had a

certain logic underpinning the practices, but not much in the way of research support, or

theoretical coherence.

Now, more than 40 years later, though "patterning" is still practiced in some quarters, and still suspect, the issue of neuroplasticity for the mature brain is resurfacing in interesting venues. Consider, for example, the following: Doidge (2007) "The brain that changes itself;" Schwartz and Begley (2002) "The mind and the brain;" LeDoux (2002) "Synaptic self," and, Beauregard and O'Leary (2007) "The spiritual brain," as indicators of the renewed interest in applications linked to neuroplasticity in the adult. In chapter 8 of the Schwartz and Begley book they deal with the "Quantum Brain," in a fashion that argues for getting the ideas onto the table for consideration. They offer an interesting reconsideration of materialism and naturalism. Similar critiques are found in Beauregard and O'Leary (2007), and Beauregard (2004) Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. There is a case for entertaining these new ideas on the table placed there by the top-down group—ideas that the mind does affect the brain. That the mind is not simply epiphenomenal or emergent aligns with these new directions empowering the mind. Indeed, "…a whiff of dualism is once again rising…." as Schwartz and Begley phrase it (2002, p. 49).

Keep all views and worldviews on the table. This is a principle advocated repeatedly in this book, and Volume I. Structure competition! Of the basic worldviews, hopefully one emerges as sufficiently compelling, sufficiently interesting, and sufficiently reasonable, to be on the table as a challenge to the notion of "wiring." Moreover, the challenger might offer more hope, and it might be the view with more warrant.

In one formulation, the two basic worldviews can be configured as follows: (1) Matter precedes mind (cosmologically, and personally, or ontologically) –philosophical naturalism, or (2) Mind precedes matter (cosmologically, and at the personal level: teleologically, atemporally, and qualitatively) –philosophical idealism. In this second view the phenomenon of "mind over matter" is seen as a serious consideration. The acts of the mind are real and transcend the brain;

but more dramatic, the acts of the mind impact the brain and change the brain. Thus, for those operating in this camp the view is that the mind can be instrumental in healing the brain and changing the brain.

For those who adhere to the philosophical naturalist's camp, with matter preceding mind, there are various configurations of explanation. Four are drawn from Schwartz and Begley (2002) as they report in "The Mind and The Brain." The first is Functionalism (or "mentalistic materialism" as Bogen terms it). Here the mind is viewed as just brain states. The Churchlands and Dennett would be representatives of this configuration according to Schwartz and Begley (2002). The second formulation would be Epiphenomenalism. The mind arises from the brain, it is viewed as a real phenomenon, but phenomena can have no effect on the physical world. Consequently the mind, as a phenomenon, cannot affect the brain which is part of the physical world.

The third formulation is moving towards a more empowered mind. In Emergent Materialism, or Emergental Mentalism, "mind arises from brain in a way that cannot be fully predicted from or reduced to brain processes" (Schwartz & Begley, 2002, p. 41). In this view some mental states can generate new mental states, change mental states, shape mental states as well as impact cerebral states, and apparently cerebral structure. Schwartz and Begley see the pioneer Roger Sperry, as far back as the 1960s, noting causal efficacy in ideas and ideals. The causal potency "...becomes just as real as that of a molecule, a cell, or a nerve impulse" which they report as a direct quote from Sperry (Schwartz & Begley, 2002, p. 43).

Sperry does indeed seem to attribute causal power to the mind. He writes "...the emergent properties in the present view are not interpreted to be mere passive, parallel correlates, or passive aspects or by-products of cortical events, but as active causal determinants essential to the normal cerebral control (Sperry, 1990, p. 384)." Consciousness is not reducible

to, nor identical with, neural events, or as it is phrased in a colourful manner by Sperry, "The meaning of the message will not be found in the chemistry of the ink (p. 385)." He further notes that it is not mystical; rather it is a system function where the power of a system is different from the parts. He writes: "The whole has properties as a system that are not reducible to the properties of the parts, and the properties at higher levels exert causal control over those at lower levels. In the case of brain function, the conscious properties of high-order brain activity determine the course of the neural events at lower levels (Sperry 1990, p. 384)." In this configuration there does seem to be a case for the claim that wiring is transcended, or can be transcended.

The fourth configuration, Agnostic Physicalism, seems to have a tentative component. Schwartz and Begley write of this view: "...those who subscribe to this worldview do not deny the existence of nonmaterial forces.... Rather, they regard such influences, if they exist, as capable of affecting mental states only as they first influence observable cerebral states (2002, p. 44)." They note that William James would fit in this camp.

Finally, there is Dualistic Interactionism, a configuration that moves to the worldview stressing mind. Mind is not reducible to the brain, but it uses the brain for expression. Noting adherents of this view Schwartz and Begley (2002) write: "John Eccles who along with the philosopher Karl Popper for many years gallantly championed this view, put it this way not long before his death: 'The essential feature of dualistic-interactionism is that the mind and the brain are independent entities ...and that they interact by quantum physics' (p. 45)." This view attributes clear power and agency to the human person. Consistent with this view, Beauregard, Levesque and Paquette (2004) argue for "...a new view in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience that recognize the human agentic capacities and take into account these capacities and self-consciousness to explain the interaction between mind processes and brain processes

(p. 186)." Schwartz, Stapp and Beauregard (2004) argue that "...neuropsychology is greatly simplified by accepting the fact that brains must in principle be treated quantum mechanically. Accepting that obvious fact means that the huge deferred-to-the-future question of how mind is connected to a classically described brain must, in principle, be replaced by the already resolved question of how mind is connected to a quantum mechanically described brain (p. 234)." Implications extend to mental healing of brain-based problems (Doidge, 2007), spirituality (Beauregard & O'Leary, 2007), and the rigidity of any existent wiring in the brain. There is a case, then, that wiring is plastic, and malleable. Learning changes brains. That choosing changes brains, changes wiring, is not a big step from here.

Metaphors (wiring, motoring, reading)

Essentially, "wiring" is a metaphor to try and capture the nature of the brain-base by some electronic device like a computer, a radio, or a television. The wiring notion is intended to represent that the state is both complicated and fixed. The brain, however, is more complex than a radio, or a computer—it operates on electrical principles, but also on biochemical principles, interactive systems, feedback principles, and psychological principles (both bottom-up, in the form of memory, for example, and top-down, in the form of intention and will, for example). Moreover there is an argument for a place for principles related to quantum mechanics (Schwartz & Begley, 2002). The notion of rewiring in a radio metaphor is different from the reworking that would go on in a more complicated organization. In more complicated organizations there could be redeployment, redesign, regrouping, reassignment, reworking, revisiting, as in a military metaphor, or a dissertation metaphor. Wiring is a stagnant metaphor for the brain; a more dynamic metaphor is needed, something like a military metaphor, or a business metaphor, or an automotive metaphor.

Actually a "motoring" metaphor for the brain might be richer, and better, than a simple "wiring" metaphor. The construction and use of the automobile incorporates design, and redesign, deployment and redeployment of resources, cost/benefit analyses, tradeoffs (e.g., less top-end speed for more fuel efficiency, less protective devices which add weight for more fuel efficiency, etc.), regrouping, reassignment, reworking, revisiting, and so on. . . While the wiring in a radio doesn't change, the changes in the auto industry to facilitate motoring are dynamic.

The arguments developed in Morton (unpublished manuscript)regarding the contributions of biology, the contributions of the environment, the impact of biology interacting with environmental variables, personal variables, and choice, all served to make the case that some type of wiring is only part of the causal infrastructure. And this wiring infrastructure is viewed as a minor part at that, for both homosexuality and smoking.

To illustrate with another metaphor: *reading* is an overlay on language; in a sense then reading is unnatural. Language is natural because we are wired to learn language and everyone, as a rule, learns language. Reading is secondary; it is learned by some, but not others; consequently, reading has a quality that one could call unnatural in the sense that it is secondary to language. Nevertheless, reading does strike one as natural in a literate culture where reading is pervasive. It can strike one as perhaps even wired. Well, in a sense reading is wired, but it is wired into the brain as a result of an infrastructure and a learning overlay. So maybe reading can serve as a bridge, or analogy, or caveat, for understanding how orientations like smoking and a sexuality orientation can be overlays on a biological infrastructure.

The bottom line is that "wiring" is a consideration, but it is not the trump card that is offered up by this objection. There is a need to get beyond low level thinking related to mechanisms that smudge teleology (in favour of emergent phenomena), shelve education (in

favour of chance and natural selection drivers), and deny human responsibility (in favour of externalizing causality).

13. Problematized Love: The Issue of Psycho-Social-Religious Supportive Trends

This argument derives from the seismic shifts in culture, and more particularly in traditional religions, where two camps are emerging—one strongly pro-homosexuality in line with cultural shifts and hermeneutical principles of the Spirit, of love, of justice, of equity, and so on, and the other camp strongly in line with traditional positions and a traditional, grammatico-historical, hermeneutical approach oriented towards propositional truths. The trajectory towards acceptance of homosexuality (as distinct from the acceptance of homosexuals which, arguably, both religious camps support) is opposite to the trajectory towards rejection of smoking.

While the opposite pattern between these two elements of the smoking/homosexuality analogy (i.e., rejection of smoking approaching the majority level, and acceptance of homosexuality approaching the majority level) is interesting, it is not really an argument against the analogy given the vicissitudes of acceptance and rejection for both smoking and homosexuality at different historical points in time. Moreover, the analogy only weakens with respect to a particular element if homosexuality reaches a value-neutral status, or value-positive status, since these are status-levels that seem to be beyond smoking currently. That is, many of us are not particularly concerned if others smoke, particularly when it does not impact us directly (say via second-hand smoke). So it is also the case with homosexuality, we are not concerned if others opt for homosexuality. Similarly, many of us are not particularly concerned

if others smoke even when it does impact us directly (say medical care costs); this is just a nebulous given that it is best to live with. So it is also the case with homosexuality. Even more dramatically, many of us are not particularly concerned if others smoke even when it does impact others directly (the smoker, their families, the revenues for the tobacco industry, and so on); this is just one concern lost in a plethora of more immediate concerns or more pressing concerns. So it is also the case with homosexuality.

However, there is a place of concern. Many of us are concerned at the epistemological level, the scientific level, the research level, the empirical level, when claims fail to correspond with evidence, argument, and reality. This holds when the topic is smoking. This holds when the topic is homosexuality.

Yes, there is a shift towards acceptance of homosexuality in both culture and Christianity; and this shift does warrant consideration. At the cultural level, the observation of an attitudinal change in US surveys as discussed earlier showed that prior to the Laumann et al (1994) survey (i.e., from 1972 to 1991) the General Social Survey data indicated that over 70% of the adult population in the US reported that "homosexuality is always wrong." Ten years later (i.e., 2004) this percentage had dropped to 56.1%, still a majority but indicative of a substantial shift and trend. Likewise, Coxon (2005) noted that in the UK there was a shift from 70% in 1985 (thinking homosexuality was always or mostly wrong) to 47% in 2002. This dramatic cultural trend is even higher for the young and the more educated (Coxon, 2005). Two points to make here might advise caution in the conclusions that could be drawn. Linking "positive valuation" of homosexuality with youth and higher education, can be problematic for a couple of reasons: (1) the young and more educated have often been wrong (witness the dramatic student support of National Socialism in Nazi Germany), and (2) it is a logical fallacy to appeal

to the crowd (any crowd), or consensus, as a source of knowledge or truth. So the real issues are the arguments underpinning the attitudes and the attitudinal shifts.

In dealing with the objection offered here—that is, "The Trends in Contemporary Christianity Argue Against Your Analogy"—the arguments which underpin the attitude-shift can be considered in the broad context of Christian truth claims. It is contended by more liberal Christian schools-of-thought that the traditional Christian view of "homosexuality as wrong" (i.e., sinful, at the very least in the sense of "missing the mark") has itself missed the mark. Homosexuality has been moved by some to a category of "wrong" comparable to ceremonial taboos (like Sabbath-breaking, or mixing materials, or bad manners like inhospitality) as opposed to "middle vices" (e.g., sloth, gluttony, avarice, lust) or serious vices (e.g., cruelty, adultery, murder). This is not necessarily historically new as Boswell (1980) describes medieval attitudes towards homosexuality in the church that seem as minimalist as many in contemporary camps. And then there are others for whom homosexuality has been moved to a category of "pedestal"—a state to be celebrated. How does one get to such religious reconfigurations?

What are the principles driving this reconfiguration? There are psycho-social principles (e.g., culture, nature, research, harm, etc.). There are hermeneutical principles (i.e., rules for interpreting biblical texts and biblical stories); there are theological principles (dealing with biblical constructs like love, grace, and Spirit). Then there are principles of human rights (fundamental rights, equality, justice, inclusiveness, and so on). All of these may come into play. Beyond these variables, a striking principle, a paramount principle, that seems covert and pervasive is the assumption of essentialism—the assumption that homosexuality is the result of biological wiring, or divine design, or a causal chain independent of the person.

Essentialism seems to be a hermeneutical given. Reading through Nedelsky and Hutchinson's (2008) account of homosexuality and the United Church of Canada from 1960 to

2006 one sees policies reflecting attitudinal changes which focus more on rights, equality, dignity, inclusion and dialogue rather than a focus on the phenomenon of homosexuality or the fundamental ontology of homosexuality—as considered psychologically, biologically, culturally, and theologically. Analogically relevant questions, and grounds for a reflective pause, could be: Would the same focus on rights, equality, dignity, inclusion and dialogue be offered with respect to such couplings as brother-sister, father-daughter, polygamy, zoosexuality, intergenerational sexuality, and so on? Such questions hearken back to the earlier discussion (in Morton, unpublished manuscript) of questions asked by Goldberg (1991) when he reflected on wishes replacing thought. Goldberg had raised the question of analogies to homosexuality, on purely logical grounds, analogies such as coprophilia and necrophilia; moreover, he raised them as logical questions, totally divorced from any moral judgment.

Some Psycho-social Guidelines

Consider a few of the *psycho-social guidelines* (e.g., research, nature, harm, etc.) that have been advanced. The research question, particularly related to the essentialism principle of homosexuality, has been addressed earlier (in Morton, unpublished manuscript) in relation to the problematic limitations of biological determinants of homosexuality. Essentialism is minimized as a scholarly position by the existing research. The causes of homosexuality are complex and clearly environmental determinants play a prominent role—a role more striking than biological influences.

Harm, too, has been advanced from a religious perspective as a criterion to consider when judging homosexuality (Percy, 2005). Percy writes: "To argue for homosexuality being sinful, therefore, one would need to show that it was somehow explicitly harmful, and this is where I along with many other Christians struggle (p. 216)." Again, wouldn't the same argument apply to incest, polygamy, zoosexuality, intergenerational sexuality, coprophilia,

necrophilia, and so on? If there was a case to be made that these may not be harmful to others—as in intergenerational child sexual abuse (e.g., Rind, Tromovitch & Bauserman, 1998, who had difficulty separating "slightly less well adjusted" harm from sexual abuse from family environment confounds), brother –sister incest (Haidt, 2006, pp. 21-22), coprophilia and necrophilia (Goldman, 1991), and even zoosexuality where no human obviously would be harmed—would they gain an equivalent status to homosexuality?

And further, if there was a case to be made that an attitude of "judgment" imposed on such practitioners (regarding incest, polygamy, zoosexuality, intergenerational sexuality, coprophilia, necrophilia) was harmful to them would they gain an equivalent status to homosexuality? Surely there is a criterion more fundamental than harm to consider. Yes, there is at least a place for considering harm, but should it be central?

To elaborate a little, even if there was harm as a consequence, that would not necessarily argue for negating homosexuality. There are lesser harms and greater harms; there are individual harms and social harms; there are externalizing harms and internalizing harms. Targeting harm as key is too simplistic. To illustrate, as indicated earlier in Volume II, Somerville (2009) contextualizes diversity with terms like "harm," "good," and "moral regret," to attain balance between individualism and community concern, between secular and religious concern, between science and religion concerns, between religion and religion concerns, between freedom and restraint concerns. "Moral regret" is seen in her illustration: "It requires that when, for reasons of ethics, something we do or stand for offends or hurts others—for instance, my opposition to same sex marriage—we should deeply regret that our doing so causes others pain (Somerville, 2009, p. 4)." Nevertheless, her specific concern seems to be the potentially greater harm done to "…freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of conscience, and academic freedom…

(p. 4)." Harm is a complex phenomenon, but not necessarily the fundamental guiding principle for questions related to knowledge, wisdom, and truth.

Percy (2005) branches from harm to nature as a principle for consideration. When addressing whether homosexuality is contrary to nature he claims "For a start it plainly isn't. As many who study zoology will confirm, homosexuality is a minority but naturally occurring phenomenon amongst mammals. The idea that homosexuality is 'natural' within nature, so to speak, raises problems for those who wish to describe the orientation as deviant or sinful (p. 216)." Coxon (2005) makes the similar point referring to Bagemihl (1999) and the possibility of a positive evolutionary function in homosexuality.

The problem with these appeals to nature by Percy (2005) and Coxon (2005) is that they prove too much. Reading Bagemihl's (1999) documentation of homosexuality in the animal kingdom, clearly can be made to show a case for homosexuality; however, the same case can be made from Bagemihl for necrophilia, pedophilia, zoosexuality, adultery, and incest, as these data parallel the homosexual data. One doesn't read Percy and Coxon writing in support of these variants, although there are academic arguments, and appeals to logic, for zoosexuality, intergenerational sex, necrophilia ,and so on, as discussed earlier in Volume II.

Some Hermeneutical and Theological Principles For Consideration

Three considerations here present a challenge, or caution, to the argument in the objection: (1) on-going *dialogue* related to the biblical texts, (2) *examination* of the biblical stories, and (3) *exploring contexts* of critiques. Each can be briefly considered to support the claim that the Objection is suspect.

On-going *dialogue.* First, regarding the on-going *dialogue* related to the biblical texts there is a brief examination of the high-profile biblical texts (Gen. 19: 1-29 Lev. 20:13, Rom 1:

18-32). These are texts that cast homosexuality in a negative light, particularly the Pauline text in Romans. There would seem to be three options to attempt to deal with these texts: *dismiss* the texts, *rationalize* the information in the texts, or *explain* the texts.

One might *dismiss* this text in Paul`s letter to the Romans as non-applicable to a new worldview one has adopted. In this case it is likely a worldview has been abandoned (i.e., a particular traditional religious worldview), and a new worldview has been adopted (e.g., a naturalist worldview, or a liberal religious worldview). The text is only relevant if one functions with a viable, traditional religious worldview, but the text is irrelevant for the person with a naturalistic worldview, or the text is diffused for a person with a "liberal" religious worldview.

Explanations of the text that attempt to justify homosexuality and maintain Biblical integrity at the same time, seem more like attempts to *rationalize* than explain. The strained interpretations (e.g., Paul was referring to pedophilia, or temple prostitution, or Paul was referring to those acting contrary to their nature, whereby the male homosexual would be acting contrary to nature when sexually involved with a female) seem more like rationalizations. The self-deception which many would see as evident here aligns with the earlier discussion in Morton (unpublished manuscript)related to problematic beliefs, particularly action-identification theory and dissonance theory.

Attempts to *explain* the text that have a more scholarly thrust strive to rise above rationalization. If rational arguments are offered with historical evidences, then there is a case for consideration of the arguments in a scholarly fashion. Thus, the third option of attempting to *explain* the text has the form of an argument, or discussion, at least. A scholar like Boswell (1980) does present a well documented work that is interesting to read and worth consideration. However, if the content is vulnerable to serious, balanced, and compassionate criticism, as it is (see Hays, 1986; Schmidt, 1995), then at best, we have competing explanations. And some

explanations are more compelling than others. Within a Christian worldview it seems that the critique by Hays (1986) tilts toward the more purist, rational side, while the position of Boswell (1980) tilts towards the "feelings" or emotionally-based inferences.

Of a lesser caliber, but with clearer lines of demarcation, other scholarly offerings support a conclusion that we are often dealing with eisegesis rather than exegesis in the proffered explanation. To illustrate this issue, consider the on-line dialogue that emerged between Helminiak and Olliff and Hodges. First, Helminiak (1994, 2000) published his book on the Bible and homosexuality. The reasoned response of Olliff and Hodges (no date) from a Christian Reformed position followed; then Helminiak offered a rebuttal (no date) to the response. Finally, the response of Olliff and Hodges to the rebuttal (no date) followed. It becomes quickly clear that a case can be made that Helminiak's apparent scholarly approach has the ring of a strong bias driving a rationalization of the text—or eisegesis—rather than an exegesis of the text. Olliff and Hodges are arguably on much firmer rational ground. Emotional bias may be crowding out clear thinking in the case of Helminiak.

A further illustration where one senses a strong affinity to arguments and exegesis that appear humane can be seen in McIntyre (1997); then, in the same themed-journal, one reads the other side of the issue and the emotional tone seems less compelling (Haus, 1997; Turner, 1997). Yes, there are two sides to these issues. Yes, there can be good arguments on both sides. But who has the better arguments, the better rational arguments? Surely reason ought to trump feelings, biases, bad arguments, and where appropriate, preferential principles that serve as screening filters (e.g., equality, dignity, rights, social justice, and so on) as such constructs are likely to lead one astray if they rule.

Thus a hermeneutical principle of love, or following the Spirit, or expanding inclusion, can actually do a disservice to self, to the suffering, to the community, to knowledge, and

ultimately to God, if truth is secondary. The first obligation is to get the author`s message in a

context of the larger revelation. This aligns with reason.

     Examination of biblical stories. Biblical stories have been offered as pro-homosexual

(e.g., David and Jonathan, the centurion and his servant, and Jesus and John) but they may be

examples, rather, of a hermeneutical principle influencing interpretation, namely, a

homosexualizing, or homo-affirming, principle. Such a principle did seem to be driving the case

that Helminiak was attempting in the previous dialogue. If the stories do not stand up to scrutiny

the objection offered here (i.e., an objection to the analogy based on Christian trends) is

weakened.

     Sharp (2005) raises the issue of one story, the story of David (i.e., the relationship

between David and Jonathan) in a footnote of a discussion on hermeneutics, context, and

prooftexting in a postmodern garb. The chapter is interesting. However, she seems to have

adopted a homosexualizing hermeneutical principle in considering the story of David and

Jonathan (I Sam 18).

     The text of the story is as follows:

> I Sam.18:1 Now it came about when he had finished speaking to Saul, that the
> soul of Jonathan was knit to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as
> himself. 2 And Saul took him that day and did not let him return to his father's
> house. 3 Then Jonathan made a covenant with David because he loved him as
> himself. 4 And Jonathan stripped himself of the robe that was on him and gave it
> to David, with his armor, including his sword and his bow and his belt. 5 So
> David went out wherever Saul sent him, *and* prospered; and Saul set him over the
> men of war. And it was pleasing in the sight of all the people and also in the sight
> of Saul's servants. (NASB)

What seems clear, first, is that David was pleasing to everyone—to Saul, to the people,

to Saul's servants, and to Jonathan. Secondly, Jonathan and David bonded in a profound

way with souls "knit" together; Jonathan shows the love that echoes Jesus rephrasing of

the second summary statement of the commandments (…you shall love your neighbor as

yourself). Since the use of the word for love (a-hab-aw) here can be used for five

scenarios according to Strong's Concordance, it seems to be a leap to go straight to the

sexual aspect of love.

  1a) human love for human object
      1a1) of man toward man
      1a2) of man toward himself
      1a3) between man and woman
      1a4) sexual desire
  2) God's love to His people

Furthermore, the fact that Jonathan disrobed likely is symbolic of something with respect to

power, or protocol, rather than sex. After all he gave David his armour, sword, bow, and belt as

well. It wasn't the disrobing that was the key feature; rather, it was the giving that was most

likely key. Indeed, we saw that earlier David received Saul's great love and his armour: "Then

David came to Saul and attended him, and Saul loved him greatly; and he became his armor

bearer." (II Sam 16:21, NASB).

The fact that David's eulogy of his "brother" Jonathan speaks of a love greater than "the

love of women" need not be grounds for jumping immediately to the sexual connotation.

  "I am distressed for you, my brother Jonathan;
  You have been very pleasant to me.
  Your love to me was more wonderful
  Than the love of women." (II Sam 1:26, NASB)

Rather, one could readily infer that that friendship, brotherly love, self-sacrificing, agape-type

love, the soldier's love of comrades on the battlefield, could be in view here. It doesn't seem to

be a rationalization to think this love could surpass "the love of women." It would be an intense

bond, and in some reasonable ways, be seen to surpass marital love, or sexual eros.

Sharp, and others who see a homosexual relationship between Jonathan and David are

stretching the text. They are using a homosexualizing hermeneutic one suspects. Of course, they

could counter argue that those who deny the sexual overtones are using a non-homosexual principle. I don't see that bias in exegetes, though, as there is no aversion to casting David in a sinful light; any homosexual activity, or orientation, on David's part arguably pales in comparison to his adultery and murder. A rationalized defence of David is not necessary.

A second story aligning with a homosexualizing hermeneutic refers to the centurion's servant. The suggestion is made that the servant is the homosexual lover of the centurion. After all, why would a centurion be so concerned about a servant? Matthew describes the servant as a pais (a youth) while Luke describes the servant as a doulos (a servant). Isherwood (2005) seems to support claims that the term "pais" can be used as a term for "boyfriend." She contends that Jennings (2003) makes a persuasive case for such an interpretation. But, is there a case to be made that this was a homosexual relationship, even possibly, independent of a homosexualizing, hermeneutical principle?

There is no doubt that Isherwood (2005) sees Jennings in the pro-homosexual garb. She writes: "He proposes a gay positive reading of scripture, which is not the same as a non-homophobic reading of scripture. A gay positive reading does not assume a heterosexual orientation of characters in stories, or the 'normative' nature of marriage and family relations between people (2005, p. 53)." This is clearly a homosexualizing hermeneutical principle. A lengthy quote from Isherwood on Jennings may help capture the problem. She writes:

> "Jennings makes a persuasive case that the way in which Matthew employs the story of the Centurion's Lad (8:5-13) is deliberately provocative. Matthew uses the word *pais* not *doulos* as used by Luke; the former means 'boy-lover' or 'boyfriend', while the latter means 'slave.' Is this a mistake? Jennings does not think so, and points to various, hitherto insufficiently realized, radical elements in the gospel. He argues,

for example, that when Matthew refers to the magi (see chapter 2), he is defying Jewish custom, which demands that such sorcerers be scorned. Far from despising them, they are placed centrally as those who recognize and pay homage to Jesus. Similarly, when he introduces the reader to the Syrophoenecian woman she is referred to as a dog', *kunarios*, a cultic prostitute, a person connected with a sexual irregularity (15:21-28), yet, it is this woman who is shown as the one with insight. So to also include a reference to pederasty, through the introduction of the Centurion's boy, would complete the trio of things the orthodox Jew would shy away from (p. 57)."

Several critical reactions to the quote can be seen to show how Jennings (and Isherwood) are adopting a homosexualizing hermeneutical principle rather than dealing with the text at face value. First, one has lexical trouble finding a meaning for *pais* as "boyfriend" or "boy-lover." It just isn't there in Strong's Concordance or Young's Concordance. Nor is it hinted at in older lexicons like Giles' (1840) or Liddell and Scott (1889/1972). Nor is it found in the etymological discussion by Oepke (1967) in the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (TDNT). The use of *pais* can apply to child (boy or girl), infants, servant, slave, attendant, or son. The fact that the Authorized Version New Testament translators most frequent translation of *pais* was servant, does seem to suggest a lexical weighting in that direction. To get to "boy-lover" is clearly driven by a homosexualizing hermeneutical principle.

The second prong of Jennings argument for the provocativeness of Matthew was the reference to the magi. He assumes the magi are sorcerers. This might be too simplistic. The etymology of the term magi unfolds along several lines. In the TDNT Delling's (1967) comments on *magos* point to four configurations which he claims are evident in every age: (1) "a member of the Persian priestly caste," (2) "the possessor and user of supernatural knowledge

and ability," (3) "Magician", and (4) "deceiver or seducer." The meanings for #1 and #2 have potential to offer a view beyond sorcerer. Indeed #2 can point to wisdom; it can be tied to philosophy, education, and the bonds between philosophy and religion. Delling notes that Philo accepts magein "only as (scientific) research." True enough, at one level Jews were forbidden to have anything to do with the magi, but this may be as identified as #3 and #4. After all, Jews during their captivity were interacting with the Babylonian magi, and Daniel seems to have adopted some of the magi practices. In Daniel, four types of court counselors are mentioned as resources for addressing the dreams of Nebuchadnezzar—"…the magicians, the conjurers, the sorcerers, and the Chaldeans (Dan 2:2, NASB)." Additionally, the influence of Daniel's legacy in Babylon may be a contributing source for the insightful knowledge of the magi—these Jewish wise men who remained in Babylon after their captivity ended. They travel to Israel for the birth of the King, their Jewish messiah, as prophesied by Daniel while in Babylon. Yes, magic would be a problem, but, insight, scholarship and knowledge wouldn't.

Thus, actually, an equally reasonable inference about the magi is that they were "wise" Jewish scholars living in Babylon—that is, remnants of the diaspora from a time when Jews were transported to Babylon hundreds of years earlier. Not all Jews returned to Israel when given the opportunity. These wise Jewish scholars from the east would have the opportunity to study Hebrew texts, Hebrew history, and Hebrew prophecies, along with planetary motions, and any speculations about the meanings of such motions, however impure. If they were Jews from the east, this would explain why they would get an audience with Herod. If they drew inferences from Daniel's prophecies there is a case they could have grounds for showing up in Israel when they did. The real enigma for the 21st Century scholar is what they were seeing in the heavens

and how they interpreted what they saw.[1] Was it magical? Was it sorcery? Or was it something more knowledge-based, something quite reasonable?

The third prong in the Jennings' thesis is the Syrophoenecian or Canaanite woman. Did Matthew include this to be provocative towards the Jews? It is a puzzling story, on one level, since Jesus is cast in the garb of exclusivism, which doesn't resonate with our liberal, multicultural, egalitarian views. Where Jennings sees this as merely provocative, he seems to miss the fact that God's working with the Jews was temporally exclusivistic. The kingdom was being offered to the Jews—formally on Palm Sunday. Yes, there were individuals drawn into the Judaic fold (e.g., Ruth and Rahab), but it was unique. The argument often unfolds along the lines of: the offer to the Gentiles followed the Jewish rejection, though it was evident in the promise to Abraham.

The reference to a *dog—*comparing the woman to a dog—is offered by Jennings as a stark offensive term. Indeed, it does seem initially offensive to our sensibilities, in spite of the fact that it does present a striking metaphor. However, the term for dog here is from κυνάριον which actually refers to a young dog; as such, it is less pejorative. Furthermore, reflecting on the analogy invites consideration of the relationship of the place of the "little dog" in the family along several lines: (1) these little dogs in families are often fed from the table in a North American culture, and perhaps this is the case in many cultures, (2) these little dogs are loved by their owners, and (3) Jesus earlier spoke of God caring for even lowly animals (e.g. sparrows) and God feeding animals (e.g., ravens). If Matthew, or Jesus, was looking for the offensive term, as their objective, either one of them could have opted for the term κύων (as in Matt. 7:6, Phil. 3:2, Rev. 22:15).

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[1] For an interesting case regarding what the magi might have been basing their responses on see the Bethlehem Star http://www.bethlehemstar.net/. The case was compiled by an interested lawyer, and it goes beyond astrology.

Finally, regarding Jennings' pejorative labels (i.e., "a cultic prostitute, a person connected with a sexual irregularity"), it is just not clear how Jennings, or Isherwood, gets to that level of inference from this text. It seems that the more parsimonious point here addresses: (1) the theological distinction at that time between Jews and Gentiles and (2) her faith and insight, evidenced by her argument. Although Jesus ministry at this point was to the Jews, he honoured faith, even the faith of the peripheral family members, metaphorically seen as in the family pet. Any authorial intent on Matthew's part to provoke the Jews seems tangential at best.

Jennings and Isherwood, seem more intrigued by a homosexualizing hermeneutical principle than the principle message. One further illustration is seen in the presentation of the "…nude youth referred to in the Garden of Gethsemane (Mark 14:50-52). The use of the Greek words, neaniskos and gymnos, give a strong suggestion that this boy covered only in a linen cloth may have been a boy prostitute (Isherwood, 2005, p. 55)." To further the homosexualizing claim Isherwood refers to the gospel "Secret Mark," and a letter written by Clement of Alexandria which "…warned readers against scandalous readings of the material about the youth and Jesus. This scandalous reading is attributed to the Carpocratians, a group who rejected the ascetic and anti-erotic teaching of the growing church. Even when Clement edits the text we are left with some material hard to explain. The story about the raising of the young man who was in the tomb emphasizes the exchange of looks of love between Jesus and the youth, after which the youth begs to be with him. Jesus goes to his house where he stays for a number of days, and in the evening of the sixth night, the young man goes to him wearing only a linen cloth 'and remained with him that night for Jesus taught him the mystery of the kingdom of God …arising he returned to the other side of the Jordan.' Clement edited the text that read that Jesus and the youth were in this instruction 'naked man to naked man.'"

What casts this whole homosexualized claim in serious doubt is the fact that Morton Smith's purported discovery of the gospel "Secret Mark" was an apparent hoax (Katsoulis, 2009). In fact, reading through Carlson's (2005) careful account of the "Secret Mark" story, and using abductive reasoning, compels the reader to follow a critical path and conclude it was a hoax. The cumulative criticism—the history, absence of actual documents for examination, handwriting analyses of photographs, internal evidence, the slippery language of the author (or what Carlson called "guarded language"), the self-identifying hints of the hoax, and the nature of hoaxes—leaves the reader logically adopting the position that Morton Smith was perpetrating a hoax, or a deception designed to facilitate a career aspiration, or a deception designed to bolster a contemporary ideological belief.

Overall, the claim that there is a valid or authentic homosexualizing hermeneutical principle to be used in considering the biblical text seems unwarranted. The evidence doesn't support such a claim. Consequently, it seems fair to challenge the objection that the trend in Christian thinking is pro-homosexuality.

14. Problematized Love: The Issue of "Diversity"-- Love and Getting Along

There is no doubt we live in a world characterized by diversity. We are all different. Each snowflake is different, or so the story goes. In a naturalist's worldview diversity makes considerable sense; and the exploration of diversity as a descriptive scientific endeavour also makes sense. Indeed, the ethologists would go so far as to argue for diversity, the more diversity the better. Cultivating diversity can be good. Diversity is good in the ethologist's view because diversity is more likely to ensure the perpetuation of strengths, and potential strengths, in the species, and thus, the survivability of a species. At this naturalist level diversity does present a

challenge to the analogy. But this is the case only in so far as both a homosexual orientation and a smoking orientation can be approached as merely descriptive; potentially, both homosexuality and smoking arguably could offer some biological survival value for the species as was suggested in the earlier discussion in Volume II.

When the diversity argument goes creedal the judgment is similar with respect to value but different with respect to the inferences drawn. In Kugle's (2010) reflection on homosexuality in Islam one sees that he argues for acceptance based, in large part, on a principle of diversity, and equality. Diversity is mentioned on the first page of the book; and diversity is the bridging sentence to the last paragraph in the book. Diversity represents a hermeneutical principle, or what Kugle terms "progressive approaches to interpretation (2010, p. 41)." Everyone is different from everyone else, yet all are equal before God. This sounds reasonable; but, there are levels of analysis one could advance and draw upon here.

People are Different

Yes, people are different. However, this ought not to be grounds for distracting one from: (1) positing the obvious "sameness" qualities of human beings, that is, both a general psychology, and a differential psychology; (2) exploring the roots, nature, development, and mechanics of the differences, that is, exploring differential psychology but within a broader context of general psychology and developmental psychology; and (3) noting broader, and perhaps flawed inferences which are drawn from diversity.

With respect to the first point, it is a rather straightforward observation that human beings have sameness with respect to acquiring language, developing physical systems, following a general developmental trajectory, bonding socially, loving, grieving, acting immorally, rationalizing, engaging in self-deception, lusting, coveting, and so on. Clearly, first

diversity must be contextualized with respect to similarities, and general psychology, if one expects to then consider a coherent differential psychology.

With respect to the second point, diversity considerations place interesting theoretical notions on the table that expand thinking and perspective. To illustrate, Schumann (2004) considers the nature of differences, and the sources of differences, at several levels. Differences, he contends, are influenced by the following: (1) genes, (2) then the environment operating via developmental selection (referencing adhesion molecules and chemical influences leading to variations at the microstructure level establishing a "primary repertoire"), (3) experiential selection (operating on the "primary repertoire" where the environment then selects certain neural circuits in the brain that will come to support particular signals or set of signals) , (4) degeneracy (when there are multiple structurally different neural systems that can produce the same output, the structure of the alternate systems can differ in individuals), and (5) the individual development of preferences and aversions (given homeostatic values and sociostatic values) which are acquired. Schumann notes that his Darwinian or selectionist view of learning is somewhat opposed to the common view of learning as intentional; yet, he does allow for intentions in learning. Although allowing for intentionality, teaching in his view seems to be more the provision of opportunity than the idealistic notions of attaining any type of rightness or excellence. He most clearly aligns with the ethologists who see potential value in the "different" (e.g., nerds or the autistic).

A primary concern with Schumann's approach is the downplaying of agency, free-will, choices, and responsibility, when such weight is assigned to the biological substrate, the developmental history, and the selected qualities. So, yes people are different but there are two caveats to offer here. First, people are also the same on many levels. Second, people are

responsible on many levels as free agents. In support of the second claim, revisit Chapter 4, on the Issue of Choice, in Volume II.

With respect to the third point, and equally challenging for Kugle's argument, is the observation that diversity can prove too much for the advocate who resorts to diversity-based arguments. Inferences from diversity, when treated selectively, lead in a narrow direction; when such inferences are broadened, the implications can be seen as suspect. As discussed earlier in Volume II, with respect to Bagemihl's (1999) research an argument from diversity can be used to support necrophilia, pedophilia, zoosexuality, incest, and so on. While one can agree that such "orientations" do not, or should not, mitigate acknowledgment of equality, compassion, dignity, service, justice, and so on, they do raise the question of knowledge, wisdom, understanding, and sound judgments.

Kugle's (2010) arguing for diversity is not particularly compelling. He appeals to "person" as something that seems to imply value by proxy—a caveat. He does specify that diversity applies to "encountering another person in a way that unites body, soul, and spirit. Sexual acts bring us as close as possible to 'tasting' another person, not just in bodily sensations, but also in comprehending the other person's sense of self (2010, pp. 44-45)." While this "person" caveat might disqualify one type of diversity (i.e., diversity related to orientations to zoosexuality, coprophilia, and necrophilia, that is non-person dyads), it does not seem to do so for another type of diversity (i.e., person-person dyads related to incest, pedophilia, polygamy, concubinage, and perhaps even adultery). Simply deferring to diversity is not adequate.

As with Christian approaches that draw upon a homosexualizing hermeneutical principle (see Objection #13), so this nod to "diversity" seems to be a homosexualizing hermeneutical principle in Kugle's (2010) Islamic approach to sexual orientation. At least that seems to be the more parsimonious inference.

People Are Equal

Yes, people are "equal," but this does not preclude us from a formal recognition of a hierarchy in human beings—a hierarchy that could be based on age, intelligence, wealth, strength, musical proficiency, sociability, compassion, and so on. One simultaneously assumes both equality and difference, where equality is an abstract construct and principle. The naturalist sees differences in strength, attractiveness, in motor skills, and so on, which might mitigate equality at one level, but the naturalist likely subscribes to equality before the laws of the land. The creedalist posits differences in real attributes, but simultaneously posits equality in law and in fundamental ontology. Did God favour the Jews over the Gentiles? In the Judeo-Christian tradition it seems so, at one point. Does Allah favour Moslems over apostates or atheists? It seems a reasonable inference at some level for a Moslem to adopt.

Does a mother favour her child over her neighbour's child? Most would not argue with the claim that the mother does favour her own child even when acknowledging the equality of human beings. So again, diversity and equality must be properly contextualized. This is especially important here where diversity is being offered as a hermeneutical principle. Diversity and equality coexist, but diversity does not trump knowledge, truth and wisdom.

The appeal to equality sounds good initially, emotionally, and in principle. It resonates! But when the appeal to equality is considered in some contexts it warrants additional analyses, and broader reflection. To illustrate, the appeal to equality is high profile on signs of protesters marching for homosexual marriage in California. It resonates! But the same logic would apply to marriage rights for brother and sister, for example. Surely they should be considered equal; they love each other, they support one another, they are human, they desire happiness, they bleed when cut. Then, there is the next step: would the logic of equality not apply to marriage

rights for brother-and-brother as well? One could respond that there are sound genetic reasons why authorities should proscribe marriage for brothers and sisters. True, but suppose there was a condition such as voluntary sterilization; would the equality principle now support such a marriage? This is similar to the thought-problem raised by Haidt (2006, pp. 20-21) in a similar scenario (brother/sister sex) in The Happiness Hypothesis where arguments are made after the judgment is made in order to support the judgment; that is, what amounts to rationalization reigns.

Would the logic of equality not apply to marriage rights for the polygamous and the polyandrous as well? While an appeal to equality has yet to be extended to zoosexual relationships the conceptual foundations exist (Miletski, 2005a, 2005b; Beetz, 2005). Does the "appeal to equality argument" actually prove too much? Arguably, it invariably proves too much.

It seems fair to hold that diversity does not serve as a defeater for the analogy between a homosexual orientation and a smoking orientation; nor does equality, nullify diversity and hierarchy. What diversity seems to offer is a call for careful consideration, a call for thoughtful conceptual analysis, a call for deliverance from the darker diversities (diverse qualities) humans have acquired, albeit, with a clear commitment to compassion and human dignity.

15. Problematized Love: The Issue of "Happiness" as a Purpose

This "happiness criterion" is a relatively common assumption. Basically, the claim reduces to *whatever makes people happy is good*. If it makes you happy then it is okay (sometimes stated with the caveat "as long as no one is harmed"). The argument might not be as sound, as it first seems. As an example of someone who resorts to the happiness criterion

consider Bailey (2003). Bailey's appeal to happiness as a criterion for acceptance certainly

appeals to the heart. Happy parents, happy people, and a happy world, are apparently desirable

states. After all, who could argue with that objective? Parents want their children to be happy.

On page 12 of his 2003 book Bailey notes the wishes of a mother for her feminine son:

> "She did not like the way the psychologist seemed to assume that homosexuality
>
> would be a bad outcome. In her own mind, the issue was more complicated—she
>
> wanted Danny to be happy, and if he could be both happy and gay, she would love
>
> and accept him all the same."

Happiness is paramount; alright, but there are undertones here of ends justifying means, are

there not?

In a similar vein to Danny's mother's wish, Bailey refers to a major gender-identity

theorist (i.e., Zucker) who posits disagreement with the Right's emphasis on preventing

homosexuality for two reasons: "Zucker does not consider this an important clinical goal

because he thinks that homosexual people can be as happy as heterosexual people, and

regardless, he doubts that therapy to prevent homosexuality works (Bailey, 2003, p. 29)." So

again, it is not unusual in the academic community, the parental community, and the social

community, to advance *happiness* as a key trump card.

In sex assignment surgery *happiness* is a key consideration. When taking into account

the issue of sex assignment following cloacal exstrophy, Bailey comments on genetically male

children who were raised as females, but then reverted back to males upon the subsequent

revelation of their true genetic sex. "Reiner's results all point to the superiority of male

assignment for cloacal exstrophy cases born male. This is obvious for those who changed back

to boys. I spoke to parents of three of these children, and all said their children were much

happier as boys than they had been as girls. Interestingly, only one of these parents said her

child had seemed unhappy as a girl. The other two characterized their children as basically happy before and yet much happier after becoming boys (Bailey, 2003, p. 51)." Happiness is at the forefront here, but it is a happiness premised on, or consistent with, natural biological underpinnings; the happiness was likely secondary to broader psychological harmony. Possibly, these children who switched would have opted to switch to their biological male pattern even if there was not increased happiness.

In a different context Bailey's bias comes across with a comment like: "By the kind of utilitarian analysis I am partial to, let us ask, which ending would leave the world a happier place… (2003, p. 191)." This happiness criterion, or touchstone, might benefit from additional reflection, however. If smokers claim to be happy when smoking, should we leave them alone, and abandon arguments against smoking? Should we support their smoking objectives? "Yes" is a viable conclusion if simple happiness is the criterion from which one reasons. More complex: if smokers help make tobacco executives, and employees, happy, leading to a great increase of happiness, should we leave them alone? Yes, the case could be made. If those practicing zoosexuality claim it is an orientation bringing them happiness, and does not harm another human being, should we leave them alone? If a person has an amputation fetish (See Bailey, 2003, p. 201 and 206), which could make them happy, should we leave them alone to pursue their happiness? Or, is there something more than happiness that warrants consideration, especially with some of these potentially controversial areas?

One might be surprised at this point in the claim that Bailey does not argue for, or against, a happiness orientation, yet such an orientation could be resident in one's biology. Given his earlier comment rooting everything in biology, surely happiness is rooted in biology too (see Haidt, 2006). Bailey is a fundamental, biological determinist claiming "…all behaviours are 'biologically determined' in the sense that all events are caused, and behavioural

events are caused by brain states which are 'biological' (Bailey, 1995, p. 104)." True, happiness

is not necessarily a behavioural event, but in The Happiness Hypothesis, Haidt (2006) does flag

the importance of biology: "In the 1990s, the two big findings of happiness research (strong

relation to genes, weak relation to environment) hit the psychological community hard… (p.

90)." As he comments on page 86 "In the long run, it doesn't much matter what happens to you.

Good fortune or bad, you will always return to your happiness set point—your brain's default

level of happiness—which was determined largely by your genes."

So the question to ask here is: is there something more important than happiness in

considering a mix of our ontological and motivational drivers? Yes, several considerations. For

one thing, ethical thinking, or an ethical framework, seems to get by-passed in a process that

focuses on happiness alone. In ethical thinking one is focused on intentions, consequences

and/or deontology. The parent wants the child to be happy, and if the homosexual relationship is

claimed to lead to a particular *consequence*—happiness—the parent is supportive, as Bailey

noted above. The parent and child are functioning like the consequentialist, the pragmatist. This

seems to be Bailey's philosophical position as well. There is more, however. This can be noted

first with respect to consequences. Consider smoking: the child claims he is happy smoking and

expects the parent to be supportive. Many parents are supportive, albeit, often reluctantly. It is

easy to see here, though, that happiness is not the only consequence in the mix. There are

addictive consequences, health consequences, social consequences, religious consequences,

financial consequences, and so on. Happiness as a pre-eminent consequence is eminently

shallow.

The second factor in ethical consideration is intent. If the child's *intention* is to be happy,

the parent and the child are functioning to give weight to one's good intention. The person's

motive is good, there is no intended malevolence. The person's motive might be idealized in the

form of love, relationship, stability, satisfaction, pleasure, self-esteem, and so on. The intentions are good. The problems arise when the intention, upon deeper examination, is seen to be limited, perhaps a rationalization, steeped in denial, premature, narrow, lacking foresight, and so on. Happiness as a pre-eminent intention is intentionally shallow.

The deontologist, at the third level, sees that some things are wrong in principle. Zoosexuality is listed as wrong regardless of intention and consequence. Incest is listed as wrong regardless of intention and consequence. Smoking is seen as wrong regardless of intention and consequence. The deontological approach looks to rules, social laws, psychological laws, natural laws, codes, and principled, reasonable arguments for guidance. Happiness as a pre-eminent rule is suspect. Would not the wise one consider all three components of ethical thinking when considering happiness as one's goal? Deeply?

Then there is the reflective framing that draws upon a wider literature base. Happiness is not the ideal we might initially think it is in our knee-jerk analysis. In broader analyses, and reflections, as in The Happiness Hypothesis, we see someone like Haidt (2006) making compelling arguments for an expanded perspective of happiness. He points to the value of suffering, the value of adversity (even the need for adversity), the value of stress (like eustress), and the intriguing literature on "posttraumatic growth." He draws upon the wisdom of the sages of the ages who point to the value in suffering (quoting the Apostle Paul, the Dali Lama, Nietzsche, Meng Tzu, Shakespeare, and so on). His review serves to dim happiness.

Haidt also develops reasonable psychological framing from conceptual and empirical research (see Haidt's chapter 7 on "The Uses of Adversity," and chapter 5 "The Pursuit of Happiness"). Thus, the ethical considerations, the broad literature on suffering (philosophical, psychological and religious), the psychological framing offered by Haidt (2006) present a

significant challenge to a simplistic approach arguing for happiness as the important, and reasonable, ontological and existential motivator.

One further caveat regarding the aspiration to happiness as an existential, or ontological, determinant can be drawn from parallels between Baumeister's (1997) four causes of evil, and the pursuit of happiness. Baumeister sees the four causes of evil as: (1) what could be called "Acquisition" (greed, lust, ambition, where ends are more important than means), (2) what could be called "Pride" (although Baumeister labels it "egotism and revenge" and ties it to self-concept and inflated self esteem), (3) what could be called "Good Intentions" (Baumeister flags it as Idealism) as in Nazi philosophy, the Marxist agenda in the Soviet Union, or the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, where all acts were rooted in idealism, and (4) "Fun" (there is a dark side to fun, as can be seen in torture, bullying, sadism, rape, abuse of animals, and so on (Kashdan, 2009). All of these causes of evil can be tied to happiness—acquisition, pride, idealism, and fun. Clearly something more than simple happiness ought to drive one's analysis of happiness as motive, happiness as criterion, or happiness as justification.

16. Problematized Love: The Issue of "Being Simply Sensitive"

The basic idea here—and it seems to be a moral claim—is that one should pull back criticism or commentary that might hurt another, embarrass another, or harm another, with harm being the red flag issue. At a broad level, a *psychology of harm* is equated with all forms of oppression (ranging from bad manners and boorish behaviour on a mild end of a concern-continuum, then developmental bullying and emotional diatribes at a moderate point of the concern-continuum, to systemic discrimination, hostile bullying, racism, violence, disease, and environmental catastrophes at a critical end of a concern-continuum). Moreover, the notion of

harm is extended by some ethicists to include not just human beings, but all sentient life forms (e.g., Singer, 2006, 2009), and extended by others to include the environment or even the planet itself (most famously seen in Al Gore's "An Inconvenient Truth").

Indeed, one ought to be sensitive to other people and their feelings. It is clear that there is a compelling interest in empathy in current psycho-social and philosophical thought. To illustrate the current interest, de Waal (2009) sees empathy as the major theme of our age, and Rifkin (2009), more dramatically, compares this current empathy age to an eclipse—an eclipse of the Age of Reason. As such, empathy is philosophically prominent. It is the source of one's internal sensitivity to the feelings of others—the empathic person recoils from harming. However, in the empathy-mix there are factors related to morality, beliefs, ideology, thinking, reasoning, and worldviews. In this broader context, empathy is not the trump card.

Yes, one ought to work to diffuse structures, policies and practices that lead to *unfair advantage* (malevolence) which could be viewed as systemic harm (whether the system is government policy, a bully/bullied dyad, a bias in health care, or a dysfunctional family); but also on the table are the do-good policies (benevolence) which address differences and actually can lead to *iatragenic impacts—disadvantages* also viewed as systemic harm. Both malevolent acts and benevolent acts can lead to harm. So, there is a flip side. In a sense, focusing on harm alone might be a blurred focus, a cognitively dysfunctional focus.

The question asked here then is: Are there arguments that could be brought forward, arguments that suggest a more nuanced approach, or reasoned approach, would be worth reflection when considering harm? There are arguments, reflections, and claims that merit consideration, arguments that broaden the focus. These arguments can be framed as constraints consistent with common sense, reason, psychology, philosophy, or just empirical particulars.

The arguments developed here should not be construed as permission for malevolence, or grounds for ignoring malevolence, or some cognitive justification for minimizing malevolence, whether that malevolence is environmental catastrophe, criminal corporations, fraud, racism, bullying, bad manners, or boorish insensitivity. Rather, the arguments are intended to serve to expand perspective and knowledge, as well as temper judgments. There is a paradox that seems to emerge: a call to ameliorate harm, and oppression, in all its forms, and a call to consider the value of suffering in its varied forms. The following five framings serve to situate this paradox of harm.

The Common Sense Frame

At a common sense level one asks: should hurt feelings trump empirical evidential claims, theoretical claims, and truth claims? The reasonable answer at an initial, emotional level would be: "Yes, …at times." For example, conversations at the dinner table, at family gatherings, or other social venues are times when simple sensitivity arguably trumps a truth claim. But it is temporary, and situational.

Also, at a common sense level one asks: should all students get an A+ grade for their work because it hurts some students when they get a B, or a C, or even an A-, especially when the lower grade indicates someone is lower on the ability continuum? Likely, the widespread phenomenon of grade inflation is influenced by the human propensity to avoid hurting others. Yet reason would trump, or should trump, any propensity to non-validity.

In more academic venues, emotions are not trump cards. Thus, permitting a claim that some people find offensive competes with censoring the claim out of a respect motivated by "simple sensitivity." For example, in newspaper articles, in university classrooms, in research colloquia, in journals, in books, in sermons (in mosques, in churches, in synagogues) sensitivity should be secondary to argument. The appeal to sensitivity should not be allowed to serve as a

cognitive thought-stopper, or a policing vehicle, particularly in venues whose purpose is to further thought and free thought.

The Reason Frame

As indicated in Volume II, Somerville (2009) takes terms like "harm," "good," and "moral regret," and then contextualizes them within the concept of "diversity" in an attempt to attain balance between competing concerns (e.g., individualism and community concerns, secular and religious concerns, science and religion concerns, religion and religion concerns, and freedom and restraint concerns). "Moral regret" is a construct consistent with sensitivity without censorship. It is seen in Somerville's illustration: "It requires that when, for reasons of ethics, something we do or stand for offends or hurts others—for instance, my opposition to same sex marriage—we should deeply regret that our doing so causes others pain (Somerville, 2009, p. 4)." Moral regret, yes; nevertheless, her specific concern seems to be the potentially greater harm done to "…freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of conscience, and academic freedom… (p. 4)." Harm is a philosophical and psychological construct that requires context; it is not necessarily the fundamental guiding principle for questions related to knowledge, wisdom, and truth. There is a hierarchy of harm that one needs to consider. A simple illustration of the harm hierarchy is seen with the surgeon who harms the skin, muscles and uterus of the mother, but delivers the distressed baby. Lesser harms can prevent greater harms.

In a more sophisticated elaboration—beyond Somerville's critique, or the common sense critique—one could argue for three considerations that permit a potentially productive reframing of the harm, or hurting, or sensitivity, criticism. These additional considerations enrich the issues. These additional considerations are cast as: (1) psychological considerations, (2) philosophical or worldview considerations, and (3) consideration of particulars.

The Psychological Frame

What is put forth for consideration at this psychological level is the literature on posttraumatic growth. Given this literature, there is a case to be made that harm and oppression (which can range from war trauma, to health trauma, to systemic trauma, to social trauma, to interpersonal trauma, and so on) can be a "good" thing given the consequences. That is, it is viewed as good in the sense that there are good outcomes from bad events? O'Leary, Alday and Ickovics (1998) present a series of models designed to map or track the positive effects often seen emerging from traumatic events. The models are encouraging in that they draw upon empirical support, they show logical coherence, and, they show that growth stories, or positive outcomes, are not unique phenomena, nor rationalizations designed to circumvent dealing with, or preventing, harm. Rather, the research is allowing for a more nuanced approach to things which oppress: war, cancer, AIDS, abuse, racism, rape, death of a child or spouse, earthquakes, and so on, with a logical extension to less dramatic traumas like bullying, social rejection, criticism, bad habits, and peculiar but harmful curiosities. The models are informative.

Tedeschi, Park and Calhoun (1998) address the conceptual issues associated with the topic of posttraumatic growth. The numbers they report in their chapter are striking. For example, they report on the seminal work of Finkel in the 1970's related to the concept of "strens," which are events promoting health and growth, and usually positive. Noticing that some events (36%) had elements of the positive and the negative (i.e. trauma) pushed Finkel to look at how such traumas are converted to something positive. He indicated that two-thirds of his college student sample reported conversions, where traumas were converted to strens. The negatives became positives in a meaningful sense. This is striking.

Tedeschi et al (1998) note a follow up study by Ebersole and Flores (1989) who reported that in their sample of students the impact of negative events was described as positive for 42% of the sample, and most of them noted as a consequence something intriguing: a life-meaning-change. The outcomes are not necessarily minor effects, they can be major transformations. This is striking.

Schaefer and Moos (1998) refer to a study by Rieker, Edbril and Garnick (1985) who comment that more than half of their sample of men with advanced testicular cancer reported improved life functioning (better outlook on life, better relationships, less fear of death) after diagnosis. This is striking!

Whether finding the positives in the suffering from the right-up-front work in the field with those experiencing major trauma, as pediatric oncologist Diane Komp (1993) reports, or constructing a psychological framework for explaining the positives in adversity (Haidt, 2006; O'Leary, et al., 1998), the positives do seem to emerge. They are often striking. Dark clouds with light lining!

Given the positives, and on the converse side, is there a case that preventing suffering is a disservice? Siddhartha Guatama, the Buddha, found his parent's protectionism a disservice. He launched out into a world of suffering. There are stories of early Christian martyrs seeking suffering and death in the Roman Coliseum. The monastic lifestyle seems to value suffering. Where, and how, does one draw the line between foolish suffering, and wise suffering? Suicidal martyrdom is a phenomenon in history (e.g., Masada, Kamikaze pilots) and in contemporary times (e.g., suicidal bombing in the Middle East today). Some view such suffering as foolish, others see it as wise. It gets complicated.

In the biological realm one hears the story of the naturalist who stops in the forest to witness a group of butterflies struggling to emerge from their cocoons. He gets his own fingers

into the mesmerizing event and tries to help a few of them get successfully free. Shocked, he notices those he helped, actually flutter to the ground and hobble off. Those that emerged on their own fly away. It is suggested that there is something in the struggling process that contributes to fully functioning wings. Good intentions, bad consequences—iatragenic harm.

So again one asks: is there a case that preventing suffering is a disservice? "Surely not!" still seems to be a reasonable response. The rationalist points to the whole thrust of modern politics, life, religion, philosophy education, and so on. This thrust is premised on reducing suffering, and preventing suffering, and penalizing those who cause suffering. But is it that simple?

Some see the paternalism, and prevention-of-suffering-policies, in welfare systems, on native reservations, with no-child-fails in competitive sports, and so on, as a different type of harm—an iatragenic harm, the harm that follows good intentions. Sowell (1999) documents this type of do-goodery harm at an economic and political level in his book "The Quest for Cosmic Justice," and in his investigation of affirmative action (2004). Good intentions with bad consequences!

Ironically, malevolent harm, or natural harm, or authoritarian harm (e.g., from parents, teachers, colonial systems, etc.) can have good consequences with substantial posttraumatic growth. Benevolent acts (paternalism, laws, affirmative action, safe havens, and so on) can lead to iatragenic harm—bad things following from good intentions. It gets complicated.

The Philosophy Frame

Three philosophical positions come to mind immediately: existentialism, naturalism, and theism. These extend the issue of growth following harm beyond the psychological literature which reports on the post traumatic growth phenomena. These are worldview constructs. One

bridging worldview at the forefront is existentialism—existential philosophy, psychology and theology are quite amenable to valuing trauma. Tedeschi et al (1998) note names like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (in philosophy), Tillich (in theology), Fromm and May (in psychology), as representatives of various existential views, all of whom see value in suffering. Indeed, Haidt (2006) leads off his chapter on the "Uses of Adversity" with a quote from Nietzsche: "What doesn't kill me makes me stronger."

Then there is the naturalist worldview where oppression is actually a given, a basic assumption, a fundamental principle. Organisms encounter environmental constraints (trauma, harms, limits, etc.), some adapt and progress as a function of natural selection, that is, as a function of attributes they possess that facilitate adaptation. Without the oppressors natural selection would be mute. What follows is a trajectory consistent with "survival of the fittest," survival of the species, and enhancement of the species. Likely, many ethologists would find value in such culling opportunities.

Finally, there are religious worldviews, where representatives wrestle with the nature of suffering (e.g., Buddha and Job) and the merit in suffering, even unjust suffering. Considering Judaism and Christianity as examples, think about the following classic text from the Hebrew prophet Isaiah, and the suffering described there. This text points to dramatic suffering; and this suffering, where some Jewish scholars see Israel's suffering as the focus, and Christian scholars see Jesus' suffering as the focus, nevertheless, highlights a redemptive aspect to suffering.

Isaiah 53:1-12 (NASB)
1 WHO has believed our message?
And to whom has the arm of the LORD been revealed?

2 For He grew up before Him like a tender shoot,
And like a root out of parched ground;
He has no *stately* form or majesty
That we should look upon Him,
Nor appearance that we should be attracted to Him.
3 He was despised and forsaken of men,
A man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief;
And like one from whom men hide their face,

He was despised, and we did not esteem Him.

4 Surely our griefs He Himself bore,
And our sorrows He carried;
Yet we ourselves esteemed Him stricken,
Smitten of God, and afflicted.
5 But He was pierced through for our transgressions,
He was crushed for our iniquities;
The chastening for our well-being *fell* upon Him,
And by His scourging we are healed.
6 All of us like sheep have gone astray,
Each of us has turned to his own way;
But the LORD has caused the iniquity of us all
To fall on Him.

7 He was oppressed and He was afflicted,
Yet He did not open His mouth;
Like a lamb that is led to slaughter,
And like a sheep that is silent before its shearers,
So He did not open His mouth.
8 By oppression and judgment He was taken away;
And as for His generation, who considered
That He was cut off out of the land of the living,
For the transgression of my people to whom the stroke *was due?*
9 His grave was assigned with wicked men,
Yet He was with a rich man in His death,
Because He had done no violence,
Nor was there any deceit in His mouth.

10 But the LORD was pleased
To crush Him, putting *Him* to grief;
If He would render Himself *as* a guilt offering,
He will see *His* offspring,
He will prolong *His* days,
And the good pleasure of the LORD will prosper in His hand.
11 As a result of the anguish of His soul,
He will see *it* and be satisfied;
By His knowledge the Righteous One,
My Servant, will justify the many,
As He will bear their iniquities.
12 Therefore, I will allot Him a portion with the great,
And He will divide the booty with the strong;
Because He poured out Himself to death,
And was numbered with the transgressors;
Yet He Himself bore the sin of many,
And interceded for the transgressors.

Suffering is inescapable. But posttraumatic growth is consistent with many worldviews, psychological models, and literary frameworks prominent today. At the very least such worldviews present perspectives that can frame a concern about harm: the concern that one ought not to make a claim, or express an idea, that might hurt someone else, or harm someone else. There is a hierarchy of harm, and some major harms are more important than minor harms. And some minor harms might help one to better deal with major harms later. Truth claims,

arguments, facts, analogical reasoning, are more important than feelings. This seems to be a reasonable principle in the academy.

Is my fun more important than your feelings? No. I think there is a case to forgo fun to accommodate another's sensitivity. Is my sense of self-worth, my egotism more important than your feelings? Perhaps! I think there might be a case to forgo my egotism to accommodate another's sensitivity; yet, it becomes problematic if such an act negatively impacts my sense of self-worth. Is my ideology more important than your feelings? Yes, for the most part. However, there must be proper venues for ideology trumping feelings. Interestingly, these three motivational infrastructures represent three of the four sources of evil that Baumeister (1997) identifies as foundational. It gets complicated.

The Empirical "Particulars" Frame

Reflecting on particulars permits a consideration of both individuals and groups. Consider first some *individuals* who suffered, and yet their suffering and oppression actually seems to have contributed to their subsequent stellar persona. Dostoevsky, was oppressed and imprisoned; his execution was reprieved on the site, and, at the very time of his scheduled execution. He goes on to describe imprisonment, write about crime and punishment, wrestle with moral issues, and leave the world a profound body of literature. Solzhenitsyn, seeing the line between good and evil running right through the middle of each individual heart, finds himself on the oppressed side of the line. That oppression led to the world acquiring a profound body of history, literature, thought, and example. Vacláv Havel, who knew of the power of the powerless, illustrates the grand transformation in the furnace of oppression. As described by Bloom (1998) "Vacláv Havel and the Czech republic provide a convincing example of how an entire nation can transform trauma into freedom through the consistent exercise of strong,

personal, moral authority (p. 201)." Frankl, emerges from the German death camps, apparently transformed, and writes of transformation, for others, via Logotherapy. Weisel, emerges from the death camps and writes Night, which brings daylight to others. Bonhoeffer, from the safety of the West, goes back into the oppression; he goes back to Germany, though initially a pacifist, yet he is executed in the concentration camps for participation in the assassination plot against Hitler.

Was Ghandi transformed by political oppression? Was Luther transformed by religious oppression? Was Pascal transformed by oppressive physical health? From various biographical particulars one wonders if transformations of individuals generally are typically situated in a crucible.

Organizations emerged from the oppression of individuals—whether accidents, self-inflictions, social pressures, religious oppression, and so on. Consider MADD, Alcoholics Anonymous, Amber Alerts, the Protestant Reformation, Feminism, Abolition, GBLT, PETA, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and so on. Grief, tragedy, addictions, injustice, can lead to transformations.

Consider some *groups* who have been characterized by suffering. Perhaps the classic example of an oppressed group is the Jews. Their history from slavery in Egypt, oppression in Babylon, brutalized under Rome, scattered abroad in the diaspora, pogroms and holocaust is well known; yet the Jews rise to the surface in all fields through history. Dorothy Lee, a social anthropologist, writes of the Jewish shtetl in Eastern Europe before World War II (see Pronko, 1969). Lee notes the terrible educational and pedagogical conditions (no games, no diversions in the 10-hour day, crowded rooms, poor ventilation, noise, unfamiliar language for instruction, endless repetitions, few books, in fact some students learned to read only upside down while sitting across from the teacher who had the sole book, …). "Yet out of this miserable

schoolroom came people whose one desire was to be a scholar for life; who, when the path of secular studies was open to them, became great philosophers or teachers or men of letters or scientists (p. 206)." It is striking.

Consider the oppression of Christians in the Roman Empire. Yet Christianity thrives, produces a long tradition of scholarship, service, and knowledge building, even when tainted by centuries of political and religious corruption. Even a representative of critical theory and American pragmatism, an apparent atheist like Jurgen Habermas, would comment: "Christianity, and nothing else, is the ultimate foundation of liberty, conscience, human rights, and democracy, the benchmarks of Western civilization. To this day, we have no other options. We continue to nourish ourselves from this source. Everything else is postmodern chatter." (Downloaded from http://sciencestage.com/v/958). It is striking!

Consider the situational oppression of the disabled. We get people who paint with a brush in the mouth. We get people who play the piano with their toes. We get brilliant minds like Stephen Hawking communicating via technological innovations. We get reformers. We get laws. We get medicine. We get educational innovations. It is striking.

Consider the oppression of women. We get literature, theory, research, insight, and edification. We get cognitive challenges, emotional challenges, political challenges…. We get college enrollments where females outnumber males. We get compassion, nurture, perspectives, and art.

Consider the oppression of homosexuals. Now we are seeing success stories linked to economic success, artistic success, and literary success. We see progressive changes to laws, to rights, and to liberty. We see homosexuals represented in high-profile career paths. We see burgeoning research paths as knowledge builds in this area.

Consider black populations in the US. Has the black population progressed in spite of their oppression? Actually, this group provides some insight into the differences that might exist between the presence of oppression and the reduction of oppression. Sowell (2004) shows a contrast for blacks in the US for pre and post civil rights legislation in 1964. Prior to the civil rights revolution in the 1960s when we would assume greater oppression of blacks "the proportion of the black population going to college doubled in the two decades preceding the civil rights revolution… and this was reflected in the occupational rise of blacks (p. 20)." Further Sowell notes: "While it is an often-cited fact that the proportion of blacks in professional and other high-level occupations rose substantially in the years following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is almost totally ignored fact that the proportion of blacks in such occupations rose even more substantially in the years preceding passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (2004, p. 20)." He notes also that 87% of blacks were below the poverty line in 1940, but only 47% by 1960, a difference of 40%. A further drop of 17% between 1960 and 1970 seems comparably smaller, but weaker still was the drop of 1% after the establishment of affirmative action. Sowell writes "This striking difference between political myth and the economic reality has many implications. Among them is that what might otherwise be seen as a remarkable achievement by black Americans is instead seen as an example of government beneficence and largess—and a reason why affirmative action is an absolute necessity for black enhancement (2004, p. 21)." This is striking. You seem to get posttraumatic growth concurrent with oppression prior to Civil Rights, and iatragenic "illness" or "inversion" following beneficent intervention.

If comparisons are drawn with the white population as often happens within political venues, the inference of inequity surfaces. While there might be a trend to critique the situation by flagging the plight of the black student in the West, by comparison with white students,

surely another comparison to consider is with the black students in Africa, or China, or Russia, or Haiti, and so on. When such comparisons are made might there be a case for dramatic black progress? Furthermore, the evaluation regarding a white comparison group may be confounded with paternalistic interventions. Sowell (1999, 2004) for one seems to see a problem with good intentions producing bad consequences.

Milder forms of oppression exist as well. Consider the commonplace notion that nerds are picked on and poked at. They are objects of jokes and laughter. Do nerds go to the top? The stereotype is that they do go to the top—better careers, more money, attractive mates, and perhaps even the subsequent experience of the joys of justice.

What about the more serious and topical phenomenon of bullying? Is there posttraumatic growth following bullying? Do the bullied form organizations? Do they write poetry and plays? Do they work for laws? Do they support others? Do they choose career paths in the helping professions? Do they form life goals that would impress the onlookers?

It would be an interesting research area to study bullying in terms of posttraumatic growth. I don't know of any such research. Most current research addresses prevention and harmful consequences. But speculating brings to mind a number of potential growth outcomes. For example, consider the bullied person who develops comedic routines and skills to diffuse bullying. Then there are the bullied who develop martial arts skills, and the concomitant discipline and self-regulation strategies, to deal with the bully. Then there are those who socially withdraw into literature (reading and writing) later flowering as a way to deal with the bullying phenomena. Then there are those who develop verbal strategies to deal with bullies. Then there are those who write music to deal with bullies. Then there are those write plays to present to peers. In fact, dealing with bullies at a young age may help prepare one for dealing with complex interpersonal relations in the adult world and the career paths one follows.

Would it not be intriguing if having been bullied became a badge of honour? Ghandi was bullied. Solzhenitsyn was bullied. Dostoevsky was bullied. Jesus was bullied. True enough, but these bullying experiences were at a sophisticated political level. However, what about athletes, musicians and other pop culture celebrities? Were any of these contemporary heroes for our youth bullied? Are there role models there?

In fact, if the internet resources are reliable there are apparently many celebrities who were bullied. The following list was accessed from the three sites indicated below: … Tom Cruise, Mel Gibson, Harrison Ford, Michelle Pfeiffer, Michael Phelps, Christian Bale, Taylor Swift, Chester Bennington, Chad Michael Murray, Rihanna, Miley Cyrus, Jennifer Freeman, Rose McGowan, Tyra Banks, Gisele Bundchen, Pierce Brosnan, Kristin Kreuk, Brian McFadden, Clay Aikens, Jo O Mera, Jessica Alba, Fred Durst, Carlos Santa, Jimi Hendrix, Courtney Love, Janis Joplin, Ozzy Osbourne, John Lennon, Michael Jackson, Janet Jackson, Jim Morrison, Gary Coleman, Tina Turner, Whitney Houston, Pamela Anderson, Fiona Apple, Bill Gates....

http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20071017025211AAz6WGG

http://stampoutbullying.tripod.com/celebs.html

http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_young_celebrities_were_bullied

One could wonder: did the bullying have a possible, positive, formative influence on the above people? Given the literature on posttraumatic growth, it might be fair to consider this other side of the coin. It is possible that posttraumatic growth did indeed occur; it is possible that such negative experiences actually facilitated the creative process. Is it also possible that mild stresses help us deal with more serious stressors later in life?

Thus, the smoking/homosexuality analogy which might be considered "harmful" at some level can compete successfully with a policy premised on simple sensitivity. The analogy of a

smoking orientation with a homosexual orientation is fair, at this logical and philosophical level. The analogical thinking advanced ought not to be suppressed based on a "harm" criterion.

17. Problematized Love: What's All The Fuss?—The Banality of Sexual Orientation

There is probably some merit to referencing banality, at least as far as mitigating the analogy. Homosexuality in some worldviews is banal. Perhaps, at some level, lying, cheating on a test, and petty tax evasion via an underground economy, are banal as well. Perhaps homosexuality is also banal like marijuana use, gossip, or a host of more minor harms. Perhaps homosexuality is banal, like smoking. The focus on homosexuality is not to place the construct on a continuum from banal to monstrous. Rather, the argument is that homosexuality and smoking are analogous. Faults are faults. Homosexuality and smoking are analogous faults— perhaps even banal faults.

Homosexuality is not a ghettoizing fault, at least no more ghettoizing than a host of banal faults. Interestingly, smoking does have more of a ghettoizing effect, currently. We all have faults, banal moral faults. Haidt (2006) has an interesting chapter on "The Faults of Others" in his book, The Happiness Hypothesis. He looks at scandals, gossip and hypocrisy and then embeds the quote: "One of the most universal pieces of advice from across cultures and eras is that we are all hypocrites, and in our condemnation of others' hypocrisy we only compound our own. Social psychologists have recently isolated the mechanisms that make us blind to the logs in our own eyes. The moral implications of these findings are disturbing; indeed, they challenge our greatest moral certainties (2006, p.60)." He also looks at studies related to cheating, greed, compassion, selfishness, and so on. Then he embeds the quote: "What's not so obvious is that, in nearly all these studies, people don't think they are doing

anything wrong. It's the same in real life. From the person who cuts you off on the highway all the way to the Nazis who ran the concentration camps, most people think they are good people and that their actions are motivated by good reasons... protestations of one's virtue even when one chooses vice (2006, p. 63)." Rationalized goodness, and the banality of our faults, should not be a defense, or justification, for ignoring a phenomenon, even a banal phenomenon.

In Dostoevsky's diaries he mentions that during his imprisonment in Siberia he met many murderers, rapists, burglars, and so on; but, he never met a single person that would admit he had done wrong. In our eyes our faults can be banal. So yes, there could be some merit in pointing to the banality of certain phenomena. There could be some merit in assuming homosexuality is banal. But does it follow that anything we assume to be banal, or define as banal, does not warrant attention? Is banality a defeater for those who argue that homosexuality warrants substantial attention—psychological, sociological, theological, philosophical, and educational attention? No, banality can be a red herring—a distracter. Seeing banality can preclude seeking grace and accepting an offer of grace

Consider Eichmann and banality. Hannah Arendt wrote of her observations of the trial of Eichmann, in her 1963 book "Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report On The Banality of Evil." She set out to cover the trial expecting to see a monster. What did she really see? Here are a few quotes from her 1963 book: "Despite all the efforts of the prosecution, everybody could see that this man was not a 'monster,' but it was difficult indeed not to suspect that he was a clown (Penguin edition, 1977, p. 54)." "Dr. Dieter Wechtenbruch... seemed to be shocked less by Eichmann's crimes than by his lack of taste and education (p. 145)." "Servatius himself had declared, even prior to the trial, that his client's personality was that of a 'common mailman' (p. 145)." Eichmann seems banal!

Perhaps the most striking quote from Arendt is the following: "The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied—as has been said at Nuremberg over and over again by the defendants and their counsels—that this new type of criminal, who is in fact *hostis generis humani*, commits his crimes under such circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or feel that he is doing wrong (p. 276)." Here, obviously, banality and normalcy warrants attention.

What is the causal architecture of someone banal, like Eichmann? Are the causal influences tied to biology, environment, luck, chance, and choices? There is an interesting section in the epilogue of Arendt's book on accident and circumstance as the mechanism drawing Eichmann into such evil. Solzhenitsyn, is another one who studied evil, particularly in the Gulag; he also saw the role of chance, or accident, in evil. In tune with his own nature, and history, he phrased it something like: "The line between good and evil runs right through the middle of each individual heart." Even if the determining factors are "accident and circumstance" surely banal phenomena warrant attention.

Banality is not a justification for ignoring an issue. Nor is it an argument for giving a pass to that which is venial, or trite, or accidental, or simply "human." Creedalisms come into play here. Beliefs, philosophies, and worldviews are part of the mix. Obviously any number of "banal" things can warrant substantial attention. Smoking warrants attention. In many worldviews, creedal worldviews, homosexuality warrants attention. The right attention doesn't dam grace!

Chapter 3: Analogical Loves—Food, Suicidality, Smoking, Sexual Orientation, Etc.

This entire investigation began with empirical data collection that was conducive to considering the relationships between orientations and environment. One of my graduate students collected these data while working on his Master's degree. We had considered publishing some of the findings at the time as we had ethical approval to do so, but other commitments intervened. Like much graduate research the data sat shelved. The data were used for illustrations in in-class presentations (graduate classes) and tentatively for possible publications over the past few years. Constraints (time and other projects) interfered with further publication efforts. The data were revisited here as informative and elaborative with respect to several issues addressed in this essay.

Since both a sexual orientation and the smoking orientation show biological and environmental determinants, and analogical consistency, there is a conceptual rationale for considering further the environmental correlates of each. Are some correlates analogically alignable? Are some non-alignable? What might such parallels indicate about the viability of analogical reasoning? Similarly, where possible, it would be informative to explore empirically the environmental correlates of problem-eating, suicidality, ethnicity, handedness, and so on. This empirically-housed rationale serves to elaborate on the analogical parallels between a smoking orientation and a homosexual orientation; this focus adds a dimension in addition to the pragmatic reasons, the philosophical reasons and the ethical reasons for analogical thinking which were advanced earlier.

As working hypotheses it can be predicted that logical environmental profiles will emerge in empirical investigations which distinguish between (1) adolescents who are concerned about sexual orientation, and those who are not concerned, and (2) between adolescents who are habitual smokers and those who are non-smokers. Similar environmental

profiles should emerge for orientations related to ethnicity, eating problems, and for suicidality.

Emerging profiles, in a sense, provide an examination of the analogy that allows for mapping

whatever target analogy is in focus (e.g., homosexuality, eating problems, ethnicity, suicidality)

onto the base analogy (smoking) in a search for parallels that are alignable and non-alignable

with respect to elements, relations and goals. The absence of an environmental profile for

various constructs, or scenarios, might lead to suspicion regarding the validity of the analogical

reasoning process with respect to environmental determinants, environmental correlates, or

environmental consequences.

Three possible outcomes to consider here are: a *similar profile,* a *different profile,* and *no

profile*. The presence of a *similar profile* might suggest support for an acceptance of a common

pathway, perhaps an addiction model for sexual orientation and smoking; however, this would

be unjustified since a *different profile* could also be consistent with support for an addiction

model. One can reasonably expect addiction to alcohol and addiction to shopping to have both

commonalities and differences. Depending on the environmental correlates available for

consideration it is reasonable to expect profile differences, as well as similarities, for alcohol

addiction and nicotine addiction, for example. The mere presence of an environmental profile

for both scenarios, albeit a different environmental profile for each, would offer some support

for the merits of the analogy for mapping purposes but the nature of the correlates (causes

versus effects) would require further analyses, and more fine-grained research. Thus, parallels in

elements, structure, relations, goals, and so on, ideally can contribute to thinking, reasoning and

potentially to knowledge building, tentatively.

Method

Participants

Participants for this study were from a population of female[1] high school students in four Canadian high schools. Three hundred and twenty students were randomly selected (80 at each high school) and 149 responded (46.5% return rate) generating between 124 to 137 usable surveys. Coding errors (N = 12), and periodic missing data led to the sample size fluctuations. The data were drawn from archived data and serve to test various research predictions.

Instrumentation

A questionnaire was used to collect data on adolescent behaviours and attitudes on a variety of variables. The questionnaire was based on a survey by Small and Luster (1994) of adolescent practices and concerns related to development, drugs, parents, school, sex, community, and so on. The survey was modified by Haskell (2000) to include questions on participation in sports, physical activities, and other school-related activities. The basic information and raw data are used with permission from Haskell. The profiling questions relevant for the current study of sexual orientation related to (1) Demographics (age, menstruation onset), (2) Worry (Interpersonal Relationships, Peer Pressures, Physical Appearance, Thoughts of Depression and Suicide), (3) Sex (Sexual Harassment, Sexual Activity, Sexual Orientation Concerns), (4) Support (Paternal, Maternal, Community Adults, Community Resources), (5) Media (Time watching TV) and (6) Sports (Activity in Sports). One focus was related to sexual orientation and the dependent variable addressed whether or not participants had concerns about their sexual orientation. The second dependent variable was smoking as this was the principal analogy under consideration. Additional focal points (eating/dieting, suicidality, and ethnicity) emerged as questions arose.

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[1] While there are clear gender differences in homosexuality, especially a lesser incidence level for females, a gender-invariant approach is adopted here as the focus is the analogy, not the underlying causal mechanics, or substrate, of an orientation. Thus, while the presentation vacillates at times between male, female, and combined conceptual streams, sometimes blurring the distinctions, the gist remains. Admittedly, the approach is not ideal, but the analogous thinking and the value of an analogy are not lost in such details.

The profiling questions relevant for environmental correlates of the smoking orientation—in addition to the questions-cluster for concern related to sexual orientation—were: Age, Community Adult Monitors, Community Resources Available, Community Service Involvement, Community Fun Activities, Dad's Support, Mom's Support, Parental Involvement (Parents Know People I know, Parents Know Places I Frequent), Experienced Sexual Harassment, Sexually Active, Interfacing with Illegal Drugs, Drug Access, School Issues, School Quality, School Leaving (Drop-out), Thoughts of Depression/Suicide, Time In Sports, Time In School Activities, Time With Friends, and Time In Home Activities.

Procedure

A research randomizer was used (stratified across high school grade levels) to select a pool of female students to be invited to participate in the data collection. Of 320 permission forms distributed to the randomly selected participants, 149 were returned (46.5%). Twelve forms contained a coding error reducing the sample to 137. The planning and communications were conducted in conjunction with the guidance department personnel and the public health services attached to the schools. The public health nurse informed students of the details of the questionnaire implementation and parental permission was obtained for participation. The questionnaire was administered in cafeteria settings in the various high schools.

The data collected addressed a wide range of adolescent problems and issues (e.g., school, drugs, alcohol, appearance, suicide, sexual activity, birth control, and so on). For the current study, however, the focus is upon variables that have been empirically, logically, intuitively, or theoretically, linked to the issues of sexual identity, and smoking behaviour.

To facilitate data management, and data reduction, factor analyses were applied to the items from the questionnaire related to various sections addressing particular issues: Worries (5

factors), Drugs (3 factors), School (3 factors), Community (5 factors), and Parents (4 factors), Sex (2 factors). The factor analyses data are available upon request.

Results

The "Sexual Orientation Concerns" Investigation

In the original sample of adolescents 10.5% had indicated a concern about their sexual orientation. A Discriminant Function Analysis was planned to determine which psycho-social variables discriminated between those who were concerned about their sexual orientation and those who were not concerned. After removing outliers from the data the remaining sample (N-124) was subjected to a Discriminant Function Analysis. The means and standard deviations (z-scores, except for menstruation onset and TV viewing time) for the variables are reported in Table 11. The groups were reliably separated (Wilks' Lambda = 0.78, Chi-square = 25.80, df = 14, $p < .05$) with a successful classification rate of 84.5%. As may be seen from the univariate analyses in Table 11, there are five variables which discriminate.

Table 11. Means and SDs (z-scores, except for Mentruation Onset and TV Viewing Time) for Variables in the Discriminant Function Analysis Using an Environmental Model for Sexual Orientation Concerns with Subsequent Univariate Analyses [a]

	Sexual Orientation			
	No Concern (N=110)		Concern (N=9)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Menstruation Onset	2.34 [b]	1.27	2.78	.97
Age* (-.417, Rank 3)	.09	.99	-.71	.90
Worry About Harmonious Relations	-.07	.89	.03	1.08
Worry About Peer Pressures* (.389, Rank 4)	-.07	.87	.62	1.32
Worry About Appearance	.04	.92	-.38	1.04
Sexual Harrassment** (.541, Rank 1)	-.16	.82	.73	1.18
Sexually Active** (-.427, Rank 2)	.00	.96	-.78	.30
Dad's Support	.10	.96	.24	.57
Mom's Support	.10	.82	-.01	.91
Community-- Adult Monitors Active	.05	.94	-.40	.48
Community-- Resources Available	-.01	.91	.35	1.18
Time- Watching TV	2.59 [c]	1.19	2.56	1.13
Thoughts of Depression/Suicide	-.10	.87	-.52	.41
Time - In Sports* (.357, Rank 5)	-.12	.81	.46	.99

a. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$, in the univariate analyses, followed in parentheses by (1) pooled within-group correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical Discriminant functions and (2) rank from the Structure Matrix using .33 as the cutoff.

b. Rating based on a scale where 0 = < 11 years old, 1 = 11 years old, 2 = 12 years old 3 = 13 years old, etc.

c. Rating based on a weekly scale where 1 = < 1 hour, 2 = 1-4 hours, 3 = 5-9 hours, etc.

In effect, those showing sexual orientation concerns are: (1) younger, (2) sensitive to peer pressures, (3) experiencing, or have experienced, sexual harassment, (4) less likely to be sexually active, and (5) more likely to be investing more time in sports.

The "Smoking Orientation" Investigation

Using the same psycho-social cluster of variables we attempted to discriminate between those who were habitual smokers and those who were not smokers. Somewhat surprisingly, the model was successful in discriminating between these two groups as well (Wilks' Lambda = 0.791, Chi-square = 26.32, df = 14, $p < .025$), albeit with a reduced successful classification rate (68.6%). As may be seen from the univariate analyses in Table 12, there are five variables which discriminate.

Table 12. Means and SDs (z-scores except for Menstruation Onset and TV Viewing Time) for Variables in the Discriminant Function Analysis Using the Same Environmental Model for Habitual Smokers and Non-Smokers with Subsequent Univariate Analyses [a]

| | Smoking | | | |
| | No Habit (N=72) | | Habit (N=49) | |
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age* (.454, Rank 3)	-.18	.99	.28	.97
Menstruation Onset	2.42 [b]	1.11	2.27	1.44
Worry About Harmonious Relations	.06	.98	-.20	.89
Worry About Peer Pressures* (-.446, Rank 4)	.23	1.05	-.23	.90
Worry About Appearance	-.03	1.00	.03	.94
Sexual Harrassment	.02	1.03	.05	1.02
Sexually Active** (.615, Rank 1)	-.27	.95	.33	.95
Dad's Support	.17	.93	-.14	1.05
Mom's Support	.06	.87	-.15	1.21
Community-- Adult Monitors Active** (.559, Rank 2)	-.21	.87	.34	1.07
Community-- Resources Available	-.10	.88	.15	1.07
Time- Watching TV	2.54 [c]	1.26	2.63	1.20
Thoughts of Depression/Suicide	-.07	1.02	.00	.94
Time- In Sports* (-.390, Rank 5)	.14	1.05	-.25	.81

a. *p < .05; **p < .01, in the univariate analyses, followed in parentheses by (1) pooled within-group correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical Discriminant functions and (2) rank from the Structure Matrix using .33 as the cutoff.

b. Rating based on a scale where 0 = < 11 years old, 1 = 11 years old, 2 = 12 years old 3 = 13 years old, etc.

c. Rating based on a weekly scale where 1 = < 1 hour, 2 = 1-4 hours, 3 = 5-9 hours, etc.

In effect, those showing habitual smoking are: (1) older, (2) less concerned about peer pressures, (3) not perceiving adult community monitoring, (4) more likely to be sexually active, and (5) less likely to be investing time in sports. Clearly an environmental model can be used to discriminate between orientations, whether concern with a sexual orientation, or an orientation towards habitual smoking. The point being made here is not that concern regarding a sexual orientation parallels an addictive orientation, but rather that a psycho-social environmental model places an orientation towards habitual smoking in the same game as a concern about sexual orientation, and vice versa.

To further explore the environmental determinants of smoking a more reasonable environmental model was developed from the variable clusters available. Drawing upon

variables related to Age, Time-Based Activities, Depressive Thoughts, School, Drugs, Sexual

Issues, Parents, Community, and Worry—24 variables in all were used. With this model we

were successful in discriminating between the two group (Wilks' Lambda = 0.656, Chi-square =

41.78, df = 24, p = .01) with a successful classification rate of 79.6%. As may be seen from the

univariate analyses in Table 13, there are ten variables which discriminate.

Table 13. Means and SDs (z-scores) for Variables in the Discriminant Function Analysis For the Logical Environmental Influence Model for Habitual Smokers and Non-Smokers with Subsequent Univariate Analyses[a]

| | Smoking | | | |
| | No Habit (N=68) | | Habit (N=45) | |
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age*	-.18	1.00	.22	.98
Thoughts of Depression/Suicide	-.08	.99	-.09	.87
Time --Sports** (-.353, Rank4)	.21	1.05	-.29	.80
Time --School Activities	.12	.93	-.20	.86
Time --With Friends*	-.23	.90	.21	1.06
Time --Home Activities	-.18	.83	.15	1.08
Dad's Support	.14	.92	-.13	1.07
Mom's Support	.01	.88	-.12	1.21
Parents Know People I Know	.12	.89	-.19	1.14
Parents Know Places I Frequent	.16	.87	-.20	1.10
Sexual Harrassment	.03	1.05	.02	.93
Sexually Active** (.447, Rank 1)	-.30	.93	.30	.92
Drugs- Interfacing with Illegal Drugs*	-.18	.46	.27	1.50
Drugs Access	.01	1.01	-.17	.92
School- Social Issues Concern	.12	.99	-.09	.95
School Quality Concern** (.381, Rank 2)	-.15	.88	.37	1.02
School Drop-Out Concern	-.16	.79	.08	1.09
Community- Adult Monitors Active** (.359, Rank 3)	-.19	.85	.31	1.09
Community- Resources Available	-.04	.90	.22	1.06
Community- Service Ideals*	-.12	.95	.23	.93
Community- Fun Activities Experienced*	-.10	.88	.25	.72
Worry- Harmonious Relations	.08	1.03	-.18	.91
Worry- Peer Pressures*	.22	1.06	-.25	.93
Worry- Appearance	-.06	1.00	.00	.94

a. *p < .05; **p < .01, in the univariate analyses, followed in parentheses by (1) pooled within-group correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical Discriminant functions and (2) rank from the Structure Matrix using .33 as the cutoff.

In effect, those showing habitual smoking in this configuration are: (1) older, (2) less

likely to be investing time in sports, (3) more likely to be investing time with friends, (4) more

likely to be sexually active, (5) more likely to interface with illegal drugs (e.g., cocaine, marijuana), (6-9) more likely to have lower views of the school, of adult monitoring in the community, of community service, and of community "fun" activities, and (10) less worried about peer pressure. While this more comprehensive variable cluster does show numerous variables discriminating between smokers and non-smokers, it was diverse in drawing from relevant variables. Correlates were seen in sexual activity, the school, the community, and time allocation. In general, it would appear that the smoking orientation does align somewhat with the stereotype of the social, adolescent "rebel," someone generally on the margins of school, community, sports, and risky behaviour.

While the smoking orientation does align with the "rebel" type, the concern with a sexual orientation aligns more with the young, socially-challenged, athletic type. Given the difference between the two it is safe to say that we are not dealing with an equivalence of a personality type prone to addictive behaviour or addictions per se. Rather, there seems to be an environmental complexity underpinning patterns of entrenched behaviours. Thus, the findings do not so much as present a challenge to Satinover's (1996) suggestion that homosexuality is a type of addiction, but rather point to the environmental complexity underlying all behaviours that have the nature of learned, acquired or entrenched as descriptors.

The "Eating Orientation" Investigation

On the same data set comparable discriminant function analyses were run after the sample was grouped into two different categorizations. In the first categorization those who reported no dieting concern were distinguished from those who manifested concern by such behaviours that could be conceived of as *Positive* (such as normal dieting, exercise, and healthy eating). In a second categorization those who reported no dieting behaviours were distinguished

from those who reported more *Negative* type behaviours (such as induced vomiting and diet pills).

Considering first the Positive grouping, with 48 falling in the No-Dieting group and 73 in the Dieting Group, the discriminant function analysis, using the same cluster of variables as in the Sexual Orientation Test, was significant (Wilks' Lambda = .805, Chi-square = 24.3, $p <$ .05), but the only discriminating variables—with correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical discriminant functions ordered by absolute size—were Worry About Appearance (.53) and Time in Sports (.47). Positive dieters were more worried about appearance and did spend more time in sports. Using the second clustering of variables as in the Smoking Orientation test, again the model was significant ($p < .01$) and the two variables discriminating were Worry about Appearance (.362), and Time in Sports (.359).

Considering the Negative grouping, with 67 falling in the No-Dieting group and 55 in the Suspect-Dieting group, the discriminant function analysis, using the same cluster of variables as in the Sexual Orientation Test, was significant (Wilks' Lambda = .764, Chi-square = 30.37, $p < .01$) and the discriminating variables—with correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical discriminant functions ordered by absolute size—were Worry About Appearance (.525), Worry about Peer relations (.449), Age (-.414) , and Time in Sports (.331). In effect those typified as more prone to negative weight control were more worried about appearance and peer relations, younger, and spending more time in sports. Using the second clustering of variables as in the Smoking Orientation test, again the model was significant ($p < .01$) and the variables discriminating were Worry about Appearance (.374), Age (-.365), and School Issues (.338). While Time in Sports (.274) did not exceed the .33 cutoff in the Structure Matrix it was a variable showing a difference in the univariate analyses ($p < .05$).

In this second configuration it seems that School issues (truancy, suspension, and dropping out) as correlates are worth considering, as well.

Generally, it seems an eating orientation may serve as an analogy to a sexual orientation much like a smoking orientation. The rationale emerges from (1) the similar weighting for biological determinants, (2) the logical and evident environmental determinants, (3) the acknowledgment of choice in the action of eating and the development of eating patterns, and (4) the self-regulation issues associated with control.

The "Ethnic Orientation" Investigation

Since data were available to test the ethnicity analogy as well we ran two further Discriminant Function Analyses using the same two environmental cluster sets. The sample was divided into two groups (non-ethnic = 112; ethnic[1] = 14). Neither the sexual concerns cluster of 14 variables (Wilk's Lambda = .887, Chi-square = 13.41 (14), p > .1) nor the smoking orientation cluster of 24 variables (Wilk's Lambda = .841, Chi-square = 16.93 (24), p > .1) successfully discriminated between groups. In both analyses only "worry about appearance" showed up in the subsequent univariate analyses as a point of difference.

Given the different results related to the ethnicity analogy one wonders if the environmental correlates are less influential. More likely, the diversity of the ethnic group, and the small sample size, precluded detecting environmental patterns. So, what we seem to be dealing with here are some comparable phenomena in three orientations at this point—a smoking orientation, an eating orientation, and a sexual orientation—which have biological determinants, as well as environmental determinants, or correlates. Thus smoking, for example, is not being presented as a model for sexual orientation, or as a model for a problem-eating

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[1] The "ethnic" category was composed of two First Nations participants, four Asian, three Black, one Hispanic and six in an "Other" category, albeit only 14 were included in the analyses, due to missing data for some variables.

orientation. Rather, it is presented as an analogy and the comparable application with the current data set suggests it is a viable analogy. Possible benefits of the analogy remain to be seen.

The "Suicidality Orientation" Investigation

Data were available to test three aspects of suicidal behaviour: suicidal thoughts, suicidal plans, and suicidal attempts. The sample could be grouped into those who fell into the specific suicidality category and those who did not which then permitted discriminant function analyses using both sets of variable clusters (sexual orientation and smoking) used previously (with the exception of the removal of the thoughts of depression/suicide variable). The discriminant function analyses were all successful in discriminating groups. Using the Sexual Orientation Cluster the following emerged: (1) for Suicidal Thoughts (Yes, N= 34; No, N = 88) Wilks' Lambda was .708, Chi-square = 39.16 (13), $p < .001$, (2) for Suicidal Plans (Yes, N= 41; No, N = 81) Wilks' Lambda was .75, Chi-square = 33.27 (13), $p < .01$, (3) for Suicidal Attempts (Yes, N= 25; No, N = 97) Wilks' Lambda was .729, Chi-square = 35.92 (13), $p < .01$. The variables which served to discriminate and their rank in the Structure Matrix are seen in Table 14 for the small variable cluster (the Sexual Orientation Cluster).

Table 14. Correlations Between Discriminating Variables and Standardized Discriminant Function Ordered by Absolute Size Following Discriminant Function Analyses Using The Sexual Orientation Cluster of Variables.

	Suicidality		
	Thoughts	Plans	Attempts
First Variable	Dad's Support (-.54)	Sexually Active (-.59)	Dad's Support (.61)
Second Variable	Mom's Support (-.47)	Dad' Support (.52)	Mom's Support (.59)
Third Variable	Worry/Appearance (.34)	Mom's Support (.51)	Sexually Active (-.53)
Fourth Variable	Community Resources (.33)	Worry/Appearance (-.36)	

Perceived parental support was higher for students resistant to suicidality. This was striking in the data. Also, students who were reporting less sexual activity were more likely to be found in the non-suicidality category. Of interest, Community Resources were seen to provide something of a bulwark against suicidal thoughts.

Using the Smoking Orientation Cluster the following emerged: (1) for Suicidal Thoughts (Yes, N= 29; No, N = 84) Wilks' Lambda was .578, Chi-square = 54.57 (13), p < .001, (2) for Suicidal Plans (Yes, N= 35; No, N = 78) Wilks' Lambda was .567, Chi-square = 56.42 (13), p < .001, (3) for Suicidal Attempts (Yes, N= 22; No, N = 91) Wilks' Lambda was .604, Chi-square = 50.19 (23), p < .01. The variables which served to discriminate and their rank in the Structure Matrix are seen in Table 7 for the large variable cluster (the Smoking Orientation Cluster).

Table 15. Correlations Between Discriminating Variables and the Standardized Discriminant Function Ordered by Absolute Size Following Discriminant Function Analyses Using The Smoking Orientation Cluster of Variables.

	Suicidality		
	Thoughts	Plans	Attempts
First Variable	School Quality (-.52)	Sexually Active (.46)	Mom's Support (.47)
Second Variable	Dad's Support (-.41)	Mom' Support (-.37)	Sexually Active (-.46)
Third Variable	Mom's Support (-.39)	Drugs Illegal (.35)	Dad's Support (.43)
Fourth Variable	Community Resources (.349)	Dad' Support (-.34)	Drugs Illegal (-.37)

The rates noted for ideation, plans and attempts are puzzling at first glance. Lewinsohn et al (1995) have provided data on adolescent female suicidal ideation (prevalence, 23.7%) which is in line with the prevalence rates in this sample (ideation 27%), but the suicide plans

data in this sample are high (33.6%). Crosstabs analysis showed that 19 participants were indicating suicidal plans but no suicidal ideation. To explore the apparent disconnect between ideation and plans the data were examined with respect to these 19 subjects, and the results showed that of these 19 subjects the suicidal plans were recent for 17 of them suggesting a situationally-driven phenomenon which accounted for 12.4% of the total sample. Lewinsohn et al (1996) likewise report a 12% rate for suicide attempts without ideation. Perhaps what is most striking in this current data set is the high report for suicide attempts (21.9%) which is twice the lifetime prevalence rate for girls (10.1%) reported by Lewinsohn et al (1995). Ideation would seem to be a more persistent or long term type of phenomenon. That there are two ideational-types of suicide attempters—reflective (with ideation) and impulsive (without ideation history)—would have clinical significance with respect to prevention. Teachers, parents, counselors, social workers, should be alert to both types. It could be counterproductive to ignore the adolescent who does not present any history of suicidal ideation.

Again, parental support emerged as a dramatic correlate in the discriminant function analysis. In the suicidal ideation categories (whether Thoughts, Plans, or Attempts) participants were seen to perceive low levels of parental support (both Mother and Father support). Again sexual activity was seen to be a significant correlate as well. Of interest, as well, School Quality was seen to offer a potential bulwark against suicidal thoughts.

While there are biological correlates contributing to suicidality, it is reasonable to infer that there are important environmental correlates worth consideration. Specifically, parental support would seem to be a potentially important environmental influence. Also, there is a case to be made that perceived resources in the community and the school may ameliorate suicidal thoughts—a precursor to preventing suicidal plans and attempts.

Why sexual activity might correlate with suicidal plans and attempts is not immediately clear. It may tie to relationship problems generally, or the relationship issues that co-occur with sexual behaviour (denial, deception, failure, self concept, etc). Or it may link to guilt and shame if parental and religious boundaries are being crossed. It is an area that is worth closer conceptual consideration, especially given the current cultural commonplace concerns about child and adolescent sexual activity, STDs, pregnancy, HIV, and the encouragement of abstinence.

That smoking might serve as a base analogy to suicidality seems strange at first glance. Though the connection may not be immediately evident, in spite of the self-destructiveness inherent in both acts, the case exists with respect to comparable biological determinants, environmental determinants, learning, and thinking. That there are biological determinants is indicated in the twin studies revealing high concordance rates (35-55%) for suicidality (Brent & Mann, 2003), and the research reporting 5-HT abnormalities related to suicides (see Gould, Shaffer and Greenberg, 2003 for a discussion of biological risk factors related to serotonin). The environmental correlates are evident in contagion effects, media, demographics, and situational variables. It may be a little more troubling to make the case for suicidality as a learned behaviour though contagion effects are examples of learning. Moreover, suicidal ideation certainly parallels entrenched thinking, shallow thinking, or distorted thinking; so, it seems reasonable to advance the possibility that smoking can serve as an analogical base for suicidality.

Discussion

The Working Hypotheses

The first point to be made is that the working hypotheses were supported. The word "supported" is used loosely here since these explorations are more along the lines of an

examination, a quasi-test, or conceptual test, rather than statistical tests of hypotheses. It is

interesting that environmental variable clusters had discriminating potential. It seems smoking

does serve as an analogy here to orientations like a sexual orientation, or an eating orientation,

or suicidality. Moreover, this environmental analogy adds to the field of variables to consider—

variables in addition to the overall comparable levels of biological determinants (i.e.,

concordance rates for identical twin studies) which are evident in the literature. This

environmentally-based aspect of the analogy is seen with respect to an assortment of

environmental correlates, in that, similar environmental variable clusters generally serve to

discriminate although the specific relevant variables do differ. Situational profiles from the

environmental correlates are evident in the data analyses for various orientations—the smoking

orientation, a concern about sexual orientation, eating/dieting patterns, and suicidality. This is

not to claim that the environmental correlates are necessarily causal for an orientation, nor even

effects of an orientation; rather, they serve to build profiles where some correlates may be

instrumental, others effects, and still others merely tangential. The point being made is that

environmental profiles do emerge and should provide information for future consideration in

line with analogical thinking.

That an added examination regarding the ethnicity analogy was the one scenario not

discriminating may lend some support to the value of the smoking analogy. Why the ethnicity

analogy was not discriminating is not clear as one would logically expect cultural differences

between ethnic groups with respect to variables related to school, community, parents, sexual

mores, relations with peers, and so on. Possibly the variegated cultural mix washed out such

differences.[1] Had the ethnicity analogy shown similar discriminatory ability, it too would be

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[1] The one relevant environmental correlate related to the ethnic analogy or an ethnic orientation was "worry about appearance."
It is logical that an adolescent would be sensitive to differing and distinct physical features which would be associated with

interesting. A call for the comparable consideration of other analogies (left-handedness, petuality, Zomnia, Zoophilia, and so on) would be interesting also. If such data had been available in this current data set, then comparable discriminant function analyses could have been provided. As such, they now await future research.

Given that the profiles are different regarding the specific variables it is clear we are not dealing with a simple equivalence-addiction model here, although it would be premature to rule out addictive elements. Addiction is a complex phenomenon with many determinants and manifestations. Imagine the differences that likely exist between the shop-a-holic and the alcoholic. Surely it is reasonable to assume differing environmental profiles in spite of an addiction, or an addictive personality. The fact that there are environmental profiles does point to the relative importance of environmental correlates with respect to (1) the possible environmental influences on orientation formation, or (2) the consequences of an orientation, whether a sexual orientation, an eating orientation, a suicidality orientation, or a smoking orientation. Moreover, the correlational patterns would support an argument that the analogical process is not mitigated, or nullified, by non-alignable characteristics.

Environmental Correlates for Sexual Orientation Concerns

In the present study five correlates were seen to exist for adolescents concerned with their sexual orientation. One prominent correlate was age. In effect, younger students in this sample showed more concern with sexual orientation. Of the twelve students who indicated a concern, three were 14-years-old, six were 15-years-old, one was 16, one was 17, and one was 18. It appears that younger students (ages 14-15) are the more concerned group. This is consistent with Remafedi, Resnick, Blum, & Harris, (1992) who reported that concern or

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"race." But there is no substantive environmental profile in this analogy, whereby one might speculate on the environmental determinants of ethnicity, or consequences of ethnicity.

"uncertainty" diminished in older groups. While they view their data as an unfolding of sexual identity, it is also reasonable to note that the higher concern in younger adolescents parallels the immature cognitive resources they have to deal with such a concern. This would be especially important if sexual orientation was not an "unfolding" but rather a cognitive self-construction or a social construction. Who is building the identity: a master, a journeyman, or an apprentice? Or to put it another more graphic way—who is building the identity: an adult, an adolescent, or a child?

If it is younger students who are most concerned, and if younger students lack the more mature cognitive resources to assist with responsible decision making, then the younger students would appear, logically, to be particularly vulnerable to undue influence. Sources of influence that might pose a threat could be teacher biases, one-sided public health presentations, uninformed peers, media models, social acceptability, social agendas, propaganda, and so on. There is a burden upon parents, educators, media, politicians, indeed, the entire village—but it is a burden related to competing worldviews[1].

Such concerns are particularly important if sexual orientation is not biologically determined, and is not an "unfolding," but rather, is only nominally on the biological end of the biological-environmental influence continuum. One can acknowledge environmental models like the psychosocial models from Freudian-type influences based on the parents—for which there is evidence (see Zucker & Bradley, 1995) even though Freud would be considered passé—

[1] The major worldview clash here would be between (1) the typical religious worldview which tends to see homosexuality and smoking as major and minor negations of *proper function*, respectively, (i.e., a *dysfunction* related to an ideal or prescribed design plan), and (2) the naturalist worldview which tends to see both as merely "difference." Some naturalists might even argue for *hyperfunctionality* in both cases (in the case of both homosexuality and smoking) as diversity has survival value for the species. Which worldview prevails in the classroom? Or more pragmatically, how does a classroom function when competing worldviews are the norm, and tolerance is mandated? Multiple-perspective-taking is a good position! While multiple-perspective-taking in the context of critical thinking and analysis is the best answer, unfortunately, the introduction of the religious worldviews (honestly rather than as a caricature) would violate (1) the Americanized notion of the principle of the separation of church and state, or more likely, (2) the scientized notion of the separation of naturalism and non-naturalism. A more nuanced approach to this principle of separation would see the separation related to political advocacy or power (on the part of the state) not methodological advocacy. In fact, methodological and conceptual diversity is necessary where knowledge is paramount. The burden then, may involve refining that cherished shibboleth of "the separation of church and state" (or naturalism and supernaturalism; or conventional and unconventional) to ensure epistemological diversity at the table.

to Bem's model of "Exotic becomes Erotic" (Bem, 2001). In light of such possible, or prominent, environmental determinants or correlates, as in the present study, there are practical implications for educators with respect to policies and practices. The environment is important. Environmental variables would be important for profile-building, proactive planning, pedagogy, advocacy, prognosis, prevention, and so on.

The environmental correlates in this data set showed that those concerned about their sexual orientation were, in addition to being younger also sensitive to peer pressures, experiencing or had experienced sexual harassment, were less likely to be sexually active, and were more likely to be investing more time in sports. This is not a surprising profile. Educators could use such information in challenging stereotypes, in monitoring for sexual harassment and dealing with it, in teaching students strategies for dealing with peers and peer pressure, and for developing their own self-awareness about potential concerns.

Environmental Correlates for a Smoking Orientation

The habitual smokers in this configuration are characterized by the term "rebel" as a typical adolescent type. They are the individuals on the social and educational margins. They are seen to be older, involved socially with friends (likely popular), sexually active, and somewhat marginal with respect to sports, the school, and the community. As with sexual orientation concerns, so too with smoking—environmental variables would be important for profile-building, proactive planning, pedagogy, advocacy, prevention, and so on.

Educators could use such information. They could draw upon the information when providing information related to smoking. They could draw upon this information for planning anti-smoking campaigns; they could plan school practices that might draw in more marginal adolescents, and for encouraging community involvement and service. They can target parent involvement, and education. Education gets a high profile position.

Environmental Correlates for Other Orientations

With respect to eating/dieting there were two groupings: (1) *Positive* (healthier dieting) and (2) *Negative* (unhealthy dieting). *Positive* dieters were more worried about appearance and did spend more time in sports when compared with non-dieting students. Considering the *Negative* grouping, in effect, those typified as more prone to negative weight control practices were more worried about appearance and peer relations, they were younger, and they spent more time in sports. Using the second clustering of variables as in the Smoking Orientation exam, again the model was significant and the variables discriminating were Worry about Appearance, Age, and School Issues. In this second configuration it seems that School issues (truancy, suspension, and dropping out) as correlates are worth considering, as well. Basically, environmental correlates are evident, and as with smoking provide educators with information that could be beneficial in ameliorating the problems.

For the suicidality orientation, perceived parental support was higher for students resistant to suicidality. Also, students who were reporting less sexual activity were more likely to be found in the non-suicidality category, and Community Resources were seen to provide something of a bulwark against suicidal thoughts. Also, there was some evidence that School Quality might offer a potential bulwark against suicidal thoughts. Such correlates can provide educators and health care workers with some optimistic direction in structuring a healthy environment for adolescents experiencing an orientation labeled as suicidality.

The Genetic Component in Model Building

There is certainly a place for drawing upon biological influences when building a representation of the various phenomena considered here. There are biological influences that seem to influence sexual orientation, suicidality, eating problems, and smoking to some degree,

although perhaps smoking more so. Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that the "it's clearly genetic" explanation has fallen from a place of prominence in the research community with respect to sexual orientation, and grown in prominence with respect to other phenomena like smoking, suicidality, and eating disorders. Sexual orientation seems to be more like smoking, in terms of genetic influence, than more biologically-driven phenomena like eye-colour or skin colour—that is, phenomena that have only minimal environmental determinants operative. The hormonal hypothesis for sexual orientation is stronger, as in a possible hormonal influence on left-handedness (Geschwind & Behan, 1984), but still not deterministic. The hormonal influence on (1) certain architectural features of the brain and (2) certain sex-related, hard-wired behaviours is suggestive of a hormonal influence that can impact behaviour, but there are cautions as there is no direct demonstration that the hormone-behaviour relationships apply to the development of sexual orientation (Meyer-Bahlburg, et al., 1995). Biological influences are not considered deterministic. At best, there may be biologically-based influences towards certain predispositions, but there is no strong case for biological determinism at this point. One exception, or possible exception for hormonal differentiation, is the report of higher levels of testosterone as a correlate in a certain Lesbian subgroup (Gladue, 1988).

In fact, many researchers today would acknowledge that there are biological "influences" (genetics and prenatal hormones), environmental influences (family, peers, experiences, media, psychological), developmental influences (age, sex), interactive influences, and choices (personal and social constructivism) which are driving orientations (a sexual orientation, a smoking orientation, a suicidality orientation, an eating orientation, and so on), all of which are amenable to defusing the prominence of a paramount biological influence. The shift back to environmental influences is seen in Bailey's (1995) comment that, "the high rate of discordance among the MZ twins shows that environment must exert an influence on sexual

orientation" (p. 129). This becomes even more dramatic as Bailey had in mind concordance rates of 47 to 52% for males and 48% for females at the time he made this claim in 1995 (which, by the way, is a long way from Kallman's claim in 1952 of a 100% concordance rate). Bailey's more recent studies of twins, where several bias issues were addressed, show an even more dramatic shift to the environmental causes with concordance rates falling to 20% for male MZ twins and 24% for female MZ twins (Bailey, Dunne, & Martin, 2000). Moreover, examination of the counting technique used (i.e., counting each twin as a second subject) may be artificially inflating the concordance rates reported still more (Jones & Yarborough, 2000). Recent research on concordance rates are quite close to those reported by Bailey et al (2000); Långström, et al (2010) reported probandwise concordance rates for MZ twins at 18% for males and 22% for females for the variable "Any Lifetime Same-sex Partner." In reality, then, it is arguable that the genetic influence on smoking (and perhaps eating problems and suicidality) is stronger than the genetic influence on sexual orientation.

So clearly, biology is important, but environment is important—even more important. Since environment is important, learning is important. Pragmatically, learning is more important as learning is seminal. Learning is where phenomena originate and develop, and learning is where change originates and develops. Most important with respect to learning: learning enlightens re-learning. Learning underpins the formation of an identity, and the changes in an identity.

Chapter 4: Love and Epistemic Issues

Love is coloured by knowledge. Knowledge influences the caliber of love. The Hebrew word for know in an intimate sense (or a sexual sense) is *yada*. Knowing and loving are connected. They interface!

1. Problematized Love: Love and the Development of Knowledge

The concern underpinning this objection is that we now know more about human nature, human sexuality, human behaviour (i.e., biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, culture, etc.) than in recent decades, recent centuries, and recent millennia. As this contemporary knowledge base grows, behaviour, thoughts, conceptualizations, beliefs, and so on, are reconfigured in a manner permitting human sexual behaviour to be redefined in a manner that places love concepts and constructs in a position that transcends animal behaviour models (Bagemihl, 1999), historically prior cultural constraints, and the narrow sexual-love-construct introduced by Jesus (Ortberg, 2012). Homosexuality, for example, in this broadened, modern view, is to be tempered by our ever increasing knowledge, which is considered to be more favourable with respect to various sexual orientations.

These cognitive reconstructions are driven by higher-order sources that are beyond mere instinct or simple reproduction. In effect, political ideas like justice, equity, compassion, and harm, are of primary importance when judging loves. Next in the list, but also at a primary level, are the sociological concepts like social relationships, roles, norms, and dynamics. Then there are the psychological constructs tied to development, motivation, emotions, affections, personality, learning, cognitions, and perhaps even taxonomies of disorders. Finally, there are the conventional constructs tied to more traditional views of morality, religion, and teleology, but these latter concerns are considered clearly secondary.

The notion of progress is consistent with certain older prominent philosophical positions (e.g., Hegel and, for some, Marx), and newer philosophical positions (e.g., Popper, 1965, 1968 and Kuhn, 1970), albeit with some caveats (Van Fraassen, 2002, 2011). The sense is that we are wiser now as a result of the breadth of philosophical thought that has been invested in thinking. Similarly, given the history of science, particularly the physical sciences, it is argued that we are

more knowledgeable now about the basics of human nature. And the general growth in the body of knowledge (whether the social sciences, history, biography, or literature) does generate a sense of epistemic-elitism, or at least, an elevated epistemic end-point.

However, one ought to ask: is it possible that things can be progressing in some areas, like the corporate developmental progress of science, and regressing or worsening in other areas, like individual behaviour? Is it possible that knowledge can increase generally, at the same time that it worsens with respect to specific behaviours? If so, an argument for caution is warranted. Could things change in the not too distant future (Kuhn, 1970; van Fraassen, 2002, 2011)?

Concerns with flawed thinking are seen in proverbial quips, in historical events, in psychological thinking, in philosophical thinking, and in recurring emphases on the need for critical thinking dispositions and skills. Indeed, one position that might emerge from reflection on our knowledge could support the outright rejection of the idea of a clear trajectory in the progress of knowledge-driven behaviour; or at least support a call for the contextualization of knowledge within a framework that acknowledges such constructs as denial, rationalization, self deception, other deception, projection, logical fallacies, stupidity, foolishness, and so on.

The Commonplace Notions Argue for Critique

It is commonplace that people flag bad thinking, stupidity, and foolishness at all levels of society, and academia. Comedians thrive on such weaknesses. How much does literature depend on self-deception or deception? Is there any ring of truth in quips from people like G. K. Chesterton? Consider the following list of wisdom-bites from Chesterton:

- "In psychology, in sociology, above all in education, we are learning to do a great many clever things. Unless we are much mistaken the next great task will be to learn not to do them."

- "There is something to be said for every error, but, whatever may be said for it, the most important thing to be said about it is that it is erroneous."
- "Progress should mean that we are always changing the world to fit the vision, instead we are always changing the vision."
- "My attitude toward progress has passed from antagonism to boredom. I have long ceased to argue with people who prefer Thursday to Wednesday because it is Thursday."
- "Tradition means giving votes to the most obscure of all classes, our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead. Tradition refuses to submit to that arrogant oligarchy who merely happen to be walking around."

At the very least, such quips raise the possibility that some additional concerns ought to be considered, or some additional perspectives might be warranted, before defaulting to the notion that "modern times" is equivalent to progress. So, are there any grounds for arguing that maybe we ought not to jump to the claim, and comfort, of "progress in knowledge" as a rationale for less stringent thinking? There are various disciplines (e.g., media, literature, history, philosophy, psychology, and science itself) which are informative in advising caution.

Critique and History

Considering history, there is evidence in history that we might not be making the "progress in knowledge" we would like to believe we are making? It would seem so with just a minimal amount of reflection. Listen to Orwell writing in the 1940's: "As I write, highly civilized human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me." How could it be that modern civilized human beings were acting in such a fashion? How could it be that a civilized nation—a seedbed for profound thought (Einstein, Marx, Freud, Heidegger, and so on)—perhaps one of the most highly developed nations on the earth in the first half of the 20th Century, with knowledge frontiers envied by others, deep frontiers, could slouch to such depths?

How could it be that such philosophically astute thinkers as Heidegger, Feyerabend, and others could fall prey to National Socialism? How could it be that many in the modern intelligentsia were moved to support totalitarian icons like Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and others…?

How could it be that common people persecuted by Nazis could turn on other victims of that persecution when the Nazi persecution ended? The Kielce pogrom in 1946 in Poland is a reminder of failure, particularly the failure of thinking on the part of men and women, common people, politicians, police, the Catholic hierarchy, and so on (see Gross, 2006). Such weakness (whether stupidity, foolishness, evil, or shallow thinking) leads one to be suspicious about claims praising the "progress of knowledge."

Rather than offer answers to such questions, at this point, one could suggest that at the very least there are grounds for suspicion regarding the faith placed in the advance of knowledge, or "progress in knowledge" to explain cosmology, epistemology, anthropology, ontology, theology, axiology, and so on. The mysteries remain.

Critique and Psychology

Beyond history, psychology also offers grounds for caution in trusting popular knowledge claims and belief claims. This is accomplished in two ways. First, we see from psychology that there are monumental failures in the opinions, beliefs and knowledge claims of individuals. There are a plethora of explanatory models and variables advanced in psychology suggest caution is warranted in assuming one understands the mechanisms involved in such behaviours, and preferences, related to eating, smoking, sexual relationships, sexual orientations, racism, phobias and so on…

Dweck (2002) argued incorrect beliefs, or a failure to fully use one's beliefs, stunt intellect. Perkins (2002) pointed to blind folly and plain folly as forms of self-deception. Sternberg (2002) alerted us to foolishness as a function of systems imbalanced, while Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) pointed to mistakes in knowing, or illusions about what we think we know. Baumeister and associates (Baumeister, 1997; 2005; Baumeister & Vohs, 2004a, 2004b) argued for a focus on self-regulation failures in spite of what we know, as the mechanism for understanding stupidity, foolishness, misbehaviour, and even evil. Psychology and history push one towards caution not acceptance of the avant-garde knowledge claims. At the same time there are forces resisting change from the avant-garde position.

Why are some people intractable when it comes to change? Attitudes and beliefs can be firm and resistant to change in the face of compelling contrary evidence. One issue is the resistance to change. Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) points to phenomena like "overconfidence" and "anchoring" where beliefs are anchored to an original position, and change is resisted, almost as a natural process.

Another issue is the resistance to change in "espoused beliefs," but not necessarily the "beliefs-in use." We can espouse a particular belief but our behaviour betrays us with respect to an actual belief. It is as if one has a vested psychological interest in an espoused belief, and any attack on the belief is perceived as an attack on the person. The protection against such a fault is a scientific mindset. It would be ideal to hold a series of competing espoused beliefs. In this scenario, that is, a typical research scenario, evidence against one espoused belief advances one's competing espoused belief. Such a multiple-perspective-taking approach can serve the thinker well. Applying this approach to homosexuality would lead to multiple theories, or models, on the table with different levels of belief allocated to each. As may be seen in the following figure differing degrees of belief are allocated to explanatory determinants for the

source of homosexuality. Each configuration of determination carries a degree of weighted

belief based on experience, argument, research, evidence, coherence and so on. As the

influences change so the belief weight changes. Reading, reflection, research, revisiting, and so

on can lead to revision. The bars would change as a function of different forms of evidence and

argument being placed on the table.

Figure 9. Belief allocation to various models of causal determinants for homosexuality.

In this current configuration of the figure (Figure 9) the psychological highpoint is the

"Interactive" bar which would involve the influence of biology, environment, self, and willful

choices in the formation of a sexual orientation. Of course these weights could change as

additional evidence and arguments are place on the table.

In addition to the psychological highpoint in the table there are theological highpoints flagged in the last three bars. My own current thinking on the Biblical texts, particularly the Pauline texts, leads me to infer a corporate judgment, as much on individuals as upon a society turning from "the good, the true, and the beautiful." This represents a recent shift where in the recent past I would have placed all weight on individual judgment upon those turning from God. There is no bar for homosexuality as a "normal" (teleologically, morally, and theologically) variant in human behaviour; but openness to arguments for such a bar remains.

Critique and Philosophy

Another approach to resistance to change is seen in Lakatos (1970). To address the resistance to change a configuration proposed by Lakatos (1970) offers an epistemological approach, or methodological rules, for knowledge building. Lakatos argues with respect to research programs that we have three aspects to consider: a "hard core," negative heuristics and positive heuristics. It is probably fair to assume that the "hard core" is composed of the basic assumptions, beliefs, principles, knowledge, and so on that one accept as firm and foundational. The methodological technique he terms "negative heuristic" is the principle, and practice, of protecting the "hard core." "The negative heuristic of the program forbids us to direct the modus tollens[1] at this 'hard core'. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or even invent 'auxiliary hypotheses', which form a protective belt around this core, and we must redirect the modus tollens to these (Lakatos, 1970, p. 133)." The positive heuristic involves plodding along with knowledge building in spite of the problems. "The positive heuristic of the programme saves the scientist from becoming confused by the ocean of anomalies…. He ignores the actual

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[1] In logic the modus tollens is configured as If P then Q; not Q, therefore not P. But this is not necessarily true if P is bivalent. For example the claim "where there's smoke, there's fire" is not necessarily true; thus, the claim that there is no fire, does not support a denial of the claim "there is no smoke."

counterexamples, and available 'data' (Lakatos, 1970, p. 135)." While the focus of Lakatos is on the methodology of science, and science programs, it seems that the formula applies equally well to the psychology of personal knowledge building. Our basic "hard core" beliefs are immune from critique; instead we build auxiliary hypotheses as a protective belt. Then we plod along with knowledge building in spite of the problems. Of course this applies to both sides of an issue—the pro-smoking faction and the anti-smoking lobby, the pro-homosexual agenda and the traditionalists, the healthy eaters and the eaters of the healthy, and so on. Both sides have their "hard core" which is immune to the negative heuristics; both sides have their positive heuristics for knowledge building.

A Religious Example of Resistance To Critique

To illustrate where resistance mechanisms are operative in a clear way one might consider particular religious practices and beliefs that show almost intractable resistance. Consider the Mormon religion as an example. How can Mormonism continue to exist and grow in the face of so much contrary evidence and argument—linguistic evidence, historical evidence, biological evidence, and so on? When confronted with such evidence and argument many Mormons will typically default to an epistemological "warming in the bosom" that trumps all other sources of authoritative knowledge.

What is the Islamic default authority? What is the Christian default authority? What is the scientific default authority? More importantly, what is the proper reaction to a default authority? Is it not tentativeness, reason, analysis, critique, and a meticulous striving for coherence amongst all authorities, and an informed judgment about, and acceptance of, the better authorities?

When prophecy fails, as Schacter and Singer (1956) noted, or when argument fails, what is the appropriate epistemological response, or the typical epistemological response? Lakatos (1970) would likely put it as follows: affirm the "hard core," apply the negative heuristics, and pursue the positive heuristics. However, in such a response change is minimal, and probably tectonically slow. Of course, there can be the dramatic changes as well, the conversions, the loss of faith, and the paradigm shifts. On the one hand, it is these revolutions—these dramatic paradigm shifts—whether in science, in psychology, or in personal knowledge, that hold promise, but only if the revolution is better informed, better situated, closer to the truth, or actually true. On the other hand, these revolutions are more likely if one places everything on the table: the "hard core" elements, the negative heuristics and the positive heuristics. Of course, such changes and challenges are possible only if there is a general openness to the truth, a virtue epistemology.

When there is no openness, or very limited openness, to challenges to truth claims there may be serious problems in politics, in education, in religion, and in therapy. Propaganda, indoctrination, inquisitions, and brainwashing are the typical correlates of failures in the realm of reasoning. Redding (2001) notes the disjunction when liberals and conservatives relate. In politics competing ideologies can be formative. Both can be seen to have merit and coherence within a particular worldview. But do capitalist entrepreneurs send their young managers to Marxist workshops? No. One's fundamental worldview is important.

In a therapeutic interaction is worldview consistency important? Yes, the client is likely to shift towards the therapist's ideology. If the therapist's ideology is correct there is no problem; if incorrect, or lacking foundation there may be actual harm on the horizon. Such a potential conflict is seen by therapeutic communities which hold that homosexuality is natural

and unchangeable; they do not—in fact, cannot—support therapeutic endeavors aimed at change. They view such efforts as unethical.

Yes, we now know more about sexuality (biological, psychological, sociological, anthropological, cultural, etc.) than in recent decades, recent centuries, and recent millennia. Yes, as this contemporary knowledge base grows, sexual behaviour, thoughts, conceptualizations, beliefs, and so on, are reconfigured in a manner permitting human sexual behaviour to be redefined in a manner that places sexual concepts and constructs in a position that transcends both animal behaviour models and historically prior constraints. But the case is not closed. The honourable position is to wrestle with all ideas brought to the table. Tabling items for future consideration, or closeting items, should be the real taboos.

2. Problematized Love: Love and The Priority of Pragmatism

The gist of this argument lies in the pressing need of the therapeutic or interpersonal moment. In human relationships the pragmatic often overrides the thoughtful reflective response. The responses are often at a gut level, knee-jerk-but-supportive, rather than thoughtful, informative, and accurate. As an illustration, when a friend, partner, or spouse asks, "How do I look in these jeans I just bought?" there may be a pragmatic incentive to respond, "Great!" rather than offer the more nuanced response, "not too bad," or the most accurate response, "Bulky!" In a sense there is a kindness-cruelty continuum where the "kindness" end of the continuum seems to trump the truthful end of the kindness-truthfulness continuum. Should it?

Furthermore, this is not the only dimension of pragmatism which merits consideration. Consider the life/death dimension. Consider the opinion/knowledge dimension. Consider the propaganda/truth dimension. Consider the worse/better dimension. Are there scenarios in the

field of pragmatism where low level determinants and influences which drive behaviour would be better driven by higher level cognitive and metcognitive overrides? Moreover, should we invest effort to get closer to the higher ends of these axes—ends like Life, Knowledge, Truth, Best, Ethical, Virtuous, Right, Just, and so on? Opting simply for the pragmatic seems weak.

The Life/Death Dimension

During the time of the Nazi occupation of Poland there were some "Righteous Gentiles" who worked to ameliorate the plight of the Jews, often at great risk to themselves. Others, often "good" people by conventional standards, fell into the pragmatic quagmire and went with gut level reactions likely related to lifesaving, or face-saving, self-protection. Worse would be the pure low-level material acquisitions for some. Worse still, following the war, there were former victims of Nazis (i.e., Poles) who made their brothers-in-harms (i.e., their Jewish neighbours) further victims for apparently pragmatic reasons related to face-saving or low-level material acquisitions (see Gross, 2006). Pragmatism seemed to be egregiously detached from morality, and certainly less than noble. Moreover, in the case documented by Gross it seems fair to say pragmatism, at times, leads to deaths of the innocent[1].

The Opinion/Knowledge Dimension

For some time now there has been relatively common knowledge of misrepresentations in biology textbooks related to evolution. Haeckel's drawings of prenatal embryonic development, the story of the gypsy moths, and so on, are known to be false, inaccurate, or questionable; yet, they persist in the textbooks for what would appear to be pragmatic reasons (see Wells, 1999, 2000). Even Stephen J. Gould acknowledged the problem, according to Wells

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[1] Some might ask if pragmatism drives China's child limitation policy, abortion, infanticide, ESCR, war, ponzi schemes, suicide, and so on. In such life and death issues, death works.

(2000, p. 92), yet the information remains. It is surprising that Gould would not have been more proactive given his balance when considering Scopes and William Jennings Bryan, or the flat-earth history (Gould, 1999), and when considering the history of psychometrics (Gould, 1981). Apparently for pragmatic reasons—assuming it does something good rather than harm, or assuming it does no harm—opinion can trump knowledge. Pragmatism seems to be independent of morality, and certainly less than noble; moreover, it leads to dogmas.

Surely one would choose knowledge over opinion, at least, in principle. Surely knowledge trumps opinion: (1) even if pragmatism worked in accomplishing a particular legitimate end (e.g., showing natural selection as operative and consistent with the moths changing from light to dark as a result of the darker environment which arose in response to industrial pollutants) in spite of the flawed methodology (Wells, 1999), and (2) even if there was no harmful consequence. Knowledge is the ethical goal of creedalism, for sure, and the espoused goal of naturalism, though this has been challenged as a legitimate possibility for naturalism (see Haught, 2009). A rather long quotation from Haught follows as a reason for his claim:

> Although evolutionary and other scientific accounts must be part of any adequate understanding of morality, these cannot function coherently as ultimate explanation without subverting the whole naturalistic project. The project itself, as I noted earlier, is inseparable from the naturalist's own submission to the imperative to be responsible. Here responsibility means submission to an ethic of knowledge that takes scientific-objective-theoretic knowing as unconditionally normative. But any claim to be able to explain this exacting ethic in purely naturalistic terms would be to render it conditional rather than unconditional. Naturalism therefore cannot lead the intelligent and responsible subject to any secure foundations for either intelligence or responsibility (2009, p. 166.)."

The Propaganda/Truth Dimension

We have all likely heard the term "flat-earther" used as a pejorative term for someone locked into a weird idea, an antiquated idea, or holding an idea that the speaker just does not like. The flat-earth fiasco becomes the foundation for flat-earth finesses! Ironically, even the notion of a "flat-earther" is often just propaganda itself rather than an accurate presentation or use of science or history. As seen from Burton (1991) and Garwood (2007), dwelling on the "flat-earth," rather than just the earth, often served a purpose, a pragmatic purpose, for some "academics" with an ulterior motive.

When misrepresentations of knowledge, or people, or history are allowed to stand for pragmatic reasons (such as, it's not important, it's not harmful, or worse, it's useful for my purposes whether nefarious or "good"…) something seems amiss, does it not? Is it not clearly Machiavellian to hold that 'the end justifies the means?' That an objective sought somehow justifies propaganda is ominous.

Moreover, there seems to be a significant propensity for the marriage of propaganda and the educated classes. Hence, there is danger where academics are at play. As Chomsky notes: "Among those who participated actively and enthusiastically in Wilson's war were the progressive intellectuals, people of the John Dewey circle, who took pride, as you can see from their own writings at the time, in having shown that what they called the 'more intelligent members of the community,' namely themselves, were able to drive a reluctant population into a war… (2002, p.12)." The elitism is common as Chomsky (2002) notes in his chapter on spectator democracy when referring to journalism (i.e., Walter Lippmann), the Soviet System (i.e., Leninism), the business class, religion (i.e., Reinhold Neibuhr), or communications and political science (i.e., Harold Lasswell). Specifically focusing on the media Chomsky writes: "In

short, the major media—particularly, the elite media that set the agenda that others generally

follow—are corporations 'selling' privileged audiences to other businesses. It would hardly

come as a surprise if the picture of the world they present were to reflect the perspectives and

interests of the sellers, the buyers, and the product (p. 8)."

Propaganda is a multifaceted construct. Some hold that everything is propaganda. Some

hold that education is propaganda, not just 'can be' propaganda. Some hold that propaganda has

no effect. Others see it as having a profound effect. For a discussion of these variations see

Ellul's classic work on Propaganda published in 1965, and in English in 1973.

> "The only serious attitude—serious because the danger of man's destruction by
> propaganda is serious, serious because no other attitude is truly responsible and
> serious—is to show people the extreme effectiveness of the weapon used against
> them, to rouse them to defend themselves by making them aware of their frailty
> and vulnerability, instead of soothing them with the worst illusion, that of a
> security that neither man's nature nor the techniques of propaganda permit him to
> possess. It is merely convenient to realize that the side of freedom and truth for
> man has not yet lost, but that it may well lose—and that in this game, propaganda
> is undoubtedly the most formidable power, acting in only one direction (toward the
> destruction of truth and freedom), no matter what the good intentions or the good
> will may be of those who manipulate it (Ellul, 1973, p. 257)."

Assuming Ellul is correct one needs to monitor propaganda, analyze situations and

arguments for propaganda, and unmask propaganda even when in the service of good ends; that

is, even when the outcomes serve pragmatism, and advance a good. Propaganda, in the guise of

pragmatism, is no friend of truth.

Recognizing the limits to propaganda can serve to move one closer to the "truth" end of

the continuum, and away from pragmatism. Ellul (1973) notes at least four limits. First:

propaganda moves within the framework of pre-existing attitudes. These pre-existing attitudes

act as constraints, but if they align with the propaganda they facilitate the flow of the

propaganda. Second: "Propaganda cannot reverse fundamental trends in a society (p. 295)."

Ellul uses the example of democracy in the US being resistant to any propaganda for monarchy.

Third: "Propaganda can never be a propaganda of ideas, but must pronounce judgment on certain facts (whether these judgments are accurate or not). Propaganda cannot prevail against facts that are too massive and definite… (p. 295)." A need for coherence of the facts or consonance with the facts is a limit. But the facts must be massive it seems. And fourth: time. The dissemination of propaganda is a slow process, and the unfolding of truth based in facts is a slow process. Propaganda wears out over time even when it can be seen to be pragmatically working, though the time factor can be long (consider the duration of the Soviet Union); truth gets stronger.

Challenging pragmatism when mixed with propaganda is important. In addition to considering the limits of propaganda and the importance of facts, there is a case for examining the claims in propaganda in the context of competing claims, hypotheses, and theories (multiple-perspective-taking and multi-paradigmatic thinking). As well one must be alert to logical fallacies. Examining claims for various fallacies (e.g., ad hominem arguments, appeals to fear, appeals to authority, appeals to emotions and virtue-words like happiness, join the band wagon, bad analogizing, rationalizing, projection, denial, oversimplification, testimonies, poisoning the well, bifurcation, equivocation, labeling as in calling people bigots, intolerant, or phobic, unstated assumptions, and so on) can serve as an excellent challenge to propagandistic claims.

It's a Worldview Problem

So the real issue comes down to worldviews. As discussed at another point (see My Position in the Conclusion section) there is a case for Simultaneous, Overlapping, Discrete Authorities or SODA. One way of viewing the issues, *paradigmatic naturalism*, leads to types of interpretation consistent with description, valuing of diversity, science, theory building, and empirical research, as well as pragmatism. The simultaneous paradigm, *paradigmatic*

creedalism, leads to judgments situated in a belief system (e.g., Christianity, Islam), or a philosophy (e.g., existentialism, utilitarianism), and the understanding, doctrines, values, morality, meaning, and so on, that is properly situated within those worldviews. Both can operate simultaneously; both are discrete. Problems arise when the two systems merge; problems arise when one system is denied a place at the table.

Therapeutically, there are potentially serious conflicted responses between overlapping paradigmatic worldviews. Consider smoking, for example, the *paradigmatic naturalist* describes the behaviour, looks for causal theories, and considers the possible value in such diversity. Switching to their *paradigmatic creedalism* they might stress the importance of freedom (e.g., existentialism) and advise social watchdogs to back off. Or they might stress harm and seek the proportionally greater good for society and the individual (e.g., utilitarianism) if the individual stops smoking. Or they might stress the design, purpose, and teleology of the human being's bodily systems and argue smoking is an aberration that contravenes design and purpose (e.g., Christianity).

Consider homosexuality, as another example: the *paradigmatic naturalist* describes the behaviour, looks for causal theories, considers the possible value in such diversity, and proposes solutions to problems based on a basic pragmatism (are they better off?). They develop research programs, develop theories, test these theories, and so on. Then, switching to their *paradigmatic creedalism* they stress practices like helping, clinical practices, flourishing, justice, and principles, in the context of big-picture foci like ontology, cosmology, and axiology. They might stress the importance of freedom (e.g., existentialism) and advise social watchdogs, and the thought-police, to back off. Or they might stress harm/flourishing, and seek the proportionally greater good for society and/or the individual (e.g., utilitarianism) if the individual switches sexual orientation, or conversely if society simply accepts homosexuality. Or, as with smoking,

they might stress the design, purpose, and teleology of the human being and argue

homosexuality contravenes design and purpose (e.g., Christianity).

In essence then there is a worldview problem that exists here. The prescription suggested

here in SODA is to actually encourage simultaneous, overlapping, discrete, authorities. That

means creedal systems must acknowledge *paradigmatic naturalism*; it also means naturalists

must wrestle with *paradigmatic creedalism*. Users of both paradigms can be diligent in keeping

the two paradigmatic approaches discrete; part of the problem has been what could be called

"paradigm creep," where principles resident to one paradigm creep inadvertently into the other

paradigm. For example a word like "ought" is at home in a creedal paradigm, but out of place in

the naturalist paradigm. To say smoking is wrong is *paradigmatic creedalism*; to say smoking

damages healthy lungs is *paradigmatic naturalism*. When the naturalist says smoking is wrong

they have switched worldviews, they have switched to their creedalism.

The Anal/Analytic Dimension (The Five-Pill Problem)[1]

I use the Anal/Analytic label here to portray the difference between a focus that is

narrow, constrained, retentive, confined, habitual, and lacking a philosophical or scientific virtue

(Anal), and a focus that is exploratory, scientific, thoughtful, and reasonable (Analytic).

Consider the scenario of having five pills in front of you on the table, five similar pills. Each

one is white. Each is round. Each has the letter "A" on it. Should we focus on the similarities

thereby avoiding any kind of judgmental attitude? Such an approach, in a different venue, would

resonate with those concerned about an egalitarian, multicultural, relativistic, compassionate,

postmodern positioning. But does the analogy hold when we consider different applications?

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[1] The seminal idea for this pill-problem I owe to Greg Koukl of Stand to Reason. He used a two-pill problem
(aspirin and arsenic) to point out that differences are important when people are arguing for the fundamental
similarities in cultures and religions. It's the differences that are important.

In the first application of this metaphor we could advance the notion that the heterosexual, the bisexual, the self-identified homosexual, the distraught homosexual, the transsexual are quite similar. Similar, just like the five white pills are quite similar. Similarity is the principal focus. But is similarity where the important qualities lie?

Actually, the better inference one might draw from this metaphor is that what's important are the differences not the similarities. Moreover, identifying differences definitely requires judgment, categorization, and valuing.

In a second application consider the ailing eater (perhaps a bulimic with a stomach ulcer) and the treatment options with the five similar pills. The first pill is **A**rsenic, the second **A**spirin, the third an **A**ntibiotic, the fourth an **A**nti-viral, and the fifth an unknown labeled **A**gnosis. Surely there is a clear need for analysis and thoughtfulness in choosing the better pill, and the best pill. Thus, the second inference is that there can be degrees of benefit with some treatments clearly being more important and more beneficial than others. While one pragmatist might argue, "Hey, the aspirin helps, it got rid of some pain, and some inflammation." Another might argue, we need to consider (a) what not to try (e.g., arsenic), (b) what we ought to try (e.g., anti-virals), (c) what we need to use for co-existing and/or consequential problems (e.g., antibiotics), and (d) what we can consider experimentally, or diagnostically, if any kind of a conceptual case can be made (e.g., agnosis). Of course, it could be argued that each is a form of pragmatism, but the latter has certain cognitive aspects that are typified by reflection as opposed to impulsivity. The latter attends to valuing as opposed to mere pragmatism.

What's the difference between what works and what's right since the latter is clearly incorporating what works? Could it be the moral dimension associated with a particular creedal worldview? There are times when what works does not align with what's right.

A Pragmatism Taxonomy

So the issue is not necessarily best framed as the priority of pragmatism; rather, it may be better configured in terms of the type of pragmatism. Perhaps, Type 1 pragmatism is driven largely by avoiding harm or embarrassment to self. Second, Type 2 pragmatism could be conceived of as driven by avoiding harm or embarrassment to others. Third, Type 3 pragmatism is driven by what works (if the person reports the outcomes as favourable, desirable, appreciated, valuable, etc.). Fourth,Type 4 pragmatism could be driven by what works better. Fifth, Type 5 pragmatism is driven by what works best. Finally, Type 6 pragmatism is driven by what works right, or correctly. This Type 6 paradigm bridges obviously to one's *paradigmatic creedalism* since values are now in play. Disentangling opinion and propaganda from knowledge and truth becomes the mark of wisdom, and the application of simultaneous, overlapping, discrete, authorities.

This pragmatism hierarchy supports an analytical approach to problems, to concepts, to constructs, to positions, to knowledge, and to others. In essence, the analytic approach seems positioned to trump any low level argument from pragmatism. Or at least it would place pragmatic claims in a tentative position, at best.

One final consideration addresses the happiness/harm criterion that often serves to provide the rationale for pragmatism. It is assumed that what justifies a particular approach is that it works for an individual, it brings them an enhanced sense of self, or happiness, or well-being, and on the flip side it doesn't cause anyone harm. One sees such arguments, and compassionate concerns with respect to homosexuality and transsexual sex reassignment, in many of the current sexuality discussions (e.g., Bailey, 2003; Blanchard, 2005; Dreger, 2008). A couple of questions arise here, though. Can one argue for harm? Is there a case for harm? With sex reassignment there seems to be a case for harm as the body is being harmed. The fact that

some turn away from what they previously felt to be a source of happiness, whether lifestyle (Glatze, 2007) or gender reassignment (Heyer, 2011), argues for nuanced considerations. Are there lesser goods and greater goods? Esau seemed to think a "mess of pottage" was good; he traded for it something of greater value, his birthright (Gen. 25:27-34). "Old lamps for new ones!" The peace of life for a piece of cocaine! Can there be a hierarchy of goods and harms that call for more nuanced considerations? In such a light one should ask if there is a greater good in the process of being lost.

3. Problematized Love: Complexity or "Shades of Gray"

The thinking here is that the better approach to an issue like homosexuality is to acknowledge the complexity and nuance associated with the phenomenon. The issue of sexual orientation is not black or white. It is a nuanced issue and typified by "shades of gray." Fuzzy logic, fuzzy morality, and fuzzy epistemology, might be apt descriptors of this approach (see Shermer, 2004).

The problem with this "shades of gray" approach is that it is often cast as the very thing it is trying to avoid—either/or categories. That is, the issue is either black and white (absolutized) or "shades of gray" (relativized); and the very contrast is framed as two categories. The more appropriate approach, it could be argued, would be a "full spectrum" approach. That is, admittedly there is a black and white axis, and there are "shades of gray" axes. Furthermore, as there are some frequencies beyond human perception with normal functioning optical equipment, there could be some aspects of homosexuality beyond our initial perceptions of black, shades of gray, and white. This "full spectrum" approach allows for: (1) absolutes (and thus categorical thinking), (2) nuance (complexity, situational influences, beliefs, choices,

reason, judgment, etc.), and (3) the unknown (experimentation, instrumentation, theorizing, modeling, philosophy, theology, etc.).

The "shades of gray" position while appearing broad-based, panoramic, and liberal at first sight, could actually be construed as too limited, and too limiting. It is vulnerable to the follies and foibles of the limitations in postmodern relativistic thinking.

When considering a topic like homosexuality one can acknowledge that there are complexities and nuances that complicate understanding. In fact, it is part of the scholarly enterprise, and delight, to wrestle with such complexities. But one can also acknowledge that there is a clear categorical distinction as well (right or wrong) whether one is operating from the creedal paradigm, or the naturalist paradigm. To illustrate, on the biological reproductive axis, either the coital male is acting according to a design plan for procreation (right) or not (wrong). On a pleasure seeking axis, the coital male could be acting rightly if pleasure follows, but wrongly, if no pleasure follows. The axis considered influences the categorical judgment.

Further, exploration via theory and newly developed instrumentation of unknowns (e.g., genes, epigenetics, hormones, substance dualism, freedom, etc.), flesh out the understanding. Each of these can offer an axis for consideration. For example, on the genetic axis, there is a gene driving homosexual seeking behaviour, or not. Adding complexity through hormones, time, luck, interactions, development, choices, and so on, will complicate understanding, and challenge understanding.

The same full spectrum approach would be appropriate when considering many of the analogies considered (i.e., smoking, eating problems, racism, etc.) or analogies that could be considered (e.g., zoophilia, necrophilia, alcoholism, heroin addiction, etc.). The one thing "shades of gray" doesn't do is nullify the analogy; attempts to understand homosexuality continue, just like attempts to understand smoking continue.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

The objections offered from various sources arguably have been less than persuasive. There is not a sufficient, or clearly compelling, reason to abandon the analogy between smoking and a sexual orientation. In fact, each objection has served to reinforce the inference that the analogy can stand, and does stand. Each objection, as they are addressable, has actually strengthened the analogy. This turns the entire analogical-thinking process engaged in here into a deeper learning experience.

Homosexuality, like smoking, begins with a choice, albeit a choice contextualized. In both cases, the choice is contextualized by variables from one's environment, one's personality, one's biology, luck, developmental timelines, and the complexities of the various interactions of these variables. Homosexuality, like smoking, is maintained by choices, albeit, in both cases, with variations in the caliber of choice over time. Homosexuality, like smoking, even when entrenched, has windows of choice—windows of opportunity—where blinds can be lifted, and paths altered. That is a basic conclusion reached in this examination of the analogy between smoking and homosexuality. The objections raised and considered do not nullify the conclusion.

A homosexual orientation successfully maps onto a smoking orientation, thereby supporting the merit of the analogical reasoning advanced in Morton (unpublished manuscript). On the whole, given the successful mapping, one learns from the analogical reasoning that a sexual orientation, like a smoking orientation, is learned, has biological and environmental determinants, is driven by choices at various choice-points, is eventually entrenched, is subject to a narrative truth construction (incorporating confabulations, rationalization, denial, and other forms of self-deception) rather than a historical truth reconstruction, is resistant to change, and is

possible to change. Thus, both the smoking orientation and a homosexual orientation can be seen to be rooted in beliefs, in choices, in learning, and in thinking.

Furthermore, as one develops protocols for assisting those with a smoking orientation, a logical spillover to developing protocols for those target areas with analogical parallels (e.g., both positive behaviours like creative writing, and negative behaviours like eating disorders and suicidality) would exist. And what is critical is the place of beliefs, learning, education, and choices—factors too often minimized when the focus is on biology, environment, luck and time.

Consequently, when one looks for the primary discussion points that arguably emerge from this investigation, there are several important domains of concern that surface. Surely, if the important considerations relate to concepts like those mentioned above (e.g., beliefs, choice, learning, education, change, and …thinking) then it is clear that learning is a principal focus, if not the principal focus.

My Position

My attempt to situate myself in this broad topic required the wearing of multiple worldview hats simultaneously. In Morton (inpreparation) I adopted what I called the SODA approach, where SODA stands for *Simultaneous, Overlapping, Discrete, Authorities*. It is a takeoff on Stephen Jay Gould's (1999) notion of NOMA—"Non Overlapping Magisterial Authorities." While Gould presents a clear and interesting case[1] for considering two legitimate authorities (science and religion), his labeling of them as non-overlapping was seen to be too limiting. As noted earlier, Gould does actually make the claim that they do overlap in some ways. He writes: "…all human beings must pay at least rudimentary attention to both magisteria of religion and science, whatever we choose to name these domains of ethical and factual

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[1] Gould's book is admirable. His position is admirable. His treatment of the politicized outliers is admirable. For example, his examination of the flat earth stereotype is scholarly. Moreover, his treatment of the Scope's trial and Bryan is scholarly—that is, fair and balanced.

inquiry (1999, p. 58)." Further, he noted: "The magisteria will not fuse; so each of us must integrate these distinct components into a coherent view of life (1999, p. 58)." This was seen in Morton (unpublished manuscript) as actually supporting some form of overlapping. There, simultaneous worldviews were posited for both naturalism and creedalism (a system housed in a philosophical or theological framework that supersedes naturalism).

With respect to naturalism it was not simply the adoption of *philosophical naturalism* that positioned the scholar, as this must be framed by one's creedalism. Though *philosophical naturalism* is the dominant view in the sciences, and in the scientific approach to sex studies (e.g., Bailey, 2003), it is arguably fundamentally flawed (see Haught, 2006; and Plantinga, 1993b, particularly his chapter "Is naturalism irrational?"). A second approach which acknowledges positioning, *methodological naturalism*, is simply assuming naturalism for scientific research. The person adopting this stance may typically adopt alternate creedal worldviews in other areas of his or her life. A third approach could be called *paradigmatic naturalism*. In this approach the paradigm of naturalism is adopted but considered simultaneously with a non-naturalism paradigm, or what was termed in Morton (unpublished manuscript) *creedalism* (e.g., postmodernism, Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, existentialism, pragmatism, and so on). In essence, we have simultaneous, overlapping, discrete authorities—SODA. NOMA might fit conceptually, and for thinking analytically, but SODA fits practically, actually, and for thinking synthetically, and thinking abductively.

As discussed by Morton (unpublished manuscript), some smokers choose to smoke, are happy as smokers, value smoking, and would like to be left alone. Wearing the naturalism paradigm we describe their behaviour, we speculate on the motives, we project outcomes related to health. We might even wonder if smoking creates a diversity that can enhance the species. We test explanatory models of smoking behaviours. We are garbed in the *scientific* approaches.

Simultaneously, switching paradigms, say to Christianity, we make value judgments, for example: (1) one ought not to try and control smokers because freedom to choose a life course is a higher value, (2) one ought not to smoke because smoking has harmful health effects on an individual, (3) one ought not to smoke because smoking has harmful social effects, via modeling, on youth, (4) one ought not to smoke because smoking has harmful social effects on health care costs, (5) one ought to offer supports to smokers because smoking has addictive qualities that often overwhelm individuals, (6) one ought to support smokers because tolerance is a virtue, (7) one ought to support smokers because smoking makes people calm and happy, and (8) one ought to make the philosophical case, true to the moral paradigm, for and against smoking. Here we are garbed in the *creedal*.

To illustrate with homosexuality the reasoning is similar. Some homosexuals choose their orientation, are happy as homosexuals, value homosexuality, and would like to be left alone. When wearing the naturalism paradigm we describe their behaviour, we speculate on the motives, we project outcomes related to health, we wonder if homosexuality creates a diversity that can enhance the species, and we test explanatory models. Switching paradigms, say to Christianity, or some other creedal position, we make value judgments, liberal and conservative: (1) one ought not to try and control homosexuals because freedom to choose a life course is a higher value, (2) one ought not to adopt a homosexual orientation because homosexuality has harmful health effects on an individual, (3) one ought not to adopt a homosexual orientation as homosexuality has harmful social effects, via modeling, on youth, (4) one ought not to adopt a homosexual orientation because homosexuality has harmful social effects on health care costs, (5) one ought to support homosexuals because homosexuality has emerged from addiction qualities that often overwhelm individuals, (6) one ought to support homosexuals because tolerance is a virtue, (7) one ought to support homosexuals because homosexuality makes

people calm and happy, (8) one ought to make the philosophical case, true to the moral paradigm, for and against homosexuality, and (9) one ought to make the political and logical case that government has a vested interest in the propagation of the next generation and therefore should implement proscriptions and prescriptions regarding the generation, education, and protection of children (i.e., the gay marriage issue).

This SODA approach applies to zoosexuality, pedophilia, necrophilia, eating problems, and the entire panoply of acquired behaviours, beliefs, orientations, attitudes, theories, hypotheses, and so on. Also as indicated in Morton (unpublished manuscript), this SODA approach applies to positive proficiencies like musical skill, athletic prowess, and creative writing, as well. The solution to bad thinking is likely to be best understood in a multiple paradigmatic framing of the issues.

The approach presented in Morton (unpublished manuscript) as meritorious was drawn from Yarhouse (2001). This approach calls for integration of valuative frameworks when considering the development of a sexual identity. The "valuative framework" is at times a religious worldview. Regarding a sexual identity, Yarhouse proposes a five-stage model that allows for consideration of competing creeds. One benefit of the model according to Yarhouse (2001) is that it helps explain the common notion of "gays, and ex-gays, and ex-ex-gays (p. 340)." Fluidity can operate in each of the five stages: Stage 1: *Identity Confusion/Crisis*; Stage 2: *Identity Attribution*; Stage 3: *Identity Foreclosure versus Expansion*; Stage 4: *Identity Reappraisal*; and Stage 5: *Identity Synthesis*. There is room in this model for thinking, beliefs, agency, choices, change, learning, reflection, biological influences, social influences, cultural influences, compassion, tolerance, dignity, and freedom.

The model can be set up in a table as follows in Figure x.

Stage					
1	Identity Confusion or Crisis			-Experiencing an incompatibility with values, beliefs, religion, culture… -Confusion re sexual arousal psychology -Cognitive immaturity	
	▼ Yes ▼	▼ No►	Identity Foreclosure		
2	Identity Attribution			-attribution to emerging identity -attribution to proclivities, curiosity, inclinations, etc.	
	▼	▼			
3	Identity Foreclosure Adopt a gay, lesbian or bi identity	Identity Expansion Examine alternatives to a gay identity		-"same-sex experiences and relationships and social networks facilitate a gay identity" -"examine alternatives to a gay identity and lifestyle"	
4	Identity Reappraisal (success with identity)				
	Yes ▼ · No► · Yes ▼ · No►		Back to Stage 1	-response to difficulties with either trajectory. -based on "personal satisfaction, peer group support, family responsiveness and support, and one's own religious, cultural, or personal valuative framework"	
5	Identity Synthesis				
Figure x. Yarhouse's model of sexual identity development adapted from Yarhouse (2001).					

Figure x. Yarhouse's model of sexual identity development adapted from Yarhouse (2001).

This model seems amenable to the development of analogical orientations: a smoking orientation, a disordered eating pattern of behaviour, a suicidal proclivity, or just playing the guitar. The model, in effect, supports the analogy with smoking or guitar playing.

Revisiting Orientations—Sexual, Smoking, Etc.

Orientations like heterosexual and healthy-non-smoker have a social valence that is positive. Homosexuality, like smoking, is ephemeral if the analogical reasoning developed here is sound. All of the orientations, positive and negative, are learned; they are based on choices that morph at various choice-points; they are eventually entrenched. They are amenable to addictive thinking and self-deception. They are rooted in questionable beliefs. They are changeable albeit with great difficulty, smoking being the classic example. Where does the

analogy break down? The objections raised here in this essay are not supportive of a fault with the analogy.

When wearing the naturalist's paradigmatic hat there is no judgment, just description, just knowledge constructions, just theories and hypotheses. When wearing the creedal paradigmatic hat there are formulations of understanding, compassion, and calls to a changed mind, to better thinking, to the best thinking. There are calls to sound inference, to wisdom, and to grace. There may be arguments left unconsidered; one should welcome them. Welcome homosexuals and their arguments. Welcome smokers, and their arguments. Welcome zoophiliacs and their arguments. Welcome pedophiles and their arguments. Welcome those with curiosities light and dark, the persons and the arguments. The best arguments will win!

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