

CRRAR

Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric

Presents:

THE RELEVANCE OF INFORMAL LOGIC TO EPISTEMOLOGY

Dr. Rongdong Jin

*CRRAR Visiting Research Fellow
East China Normal University
Shanghai, China*

Abstract

As a response to Johnson's call for a two-way interaction between informal logic and epistemology, this paper is aimed at exploring how informal logic could contribute to epistemology. It seems to me that it is only on the level of epistemic preferences presupposed by a theory that we can talk about how epistemology might stand to benefit from informal logic.

My first talk will focus on the basic differences between *episteme* and *phronesis* in Aristotle's classification of knowledge. Then I will analyze how deductivism in argument studies shares the same epistemic preferences with the theoretical tradition of knowledge which takes *episteme* as the paradigm case of knowledge. After that I will discuss some informal logicians' critique of deductivism and how they pursue a better theory of argument on the basis of those epistemic preferences favored by *phronesis*. Finally I will try to argue that informal logicians' critique of deductivism could reinforce the challenge to the mainstream conception of knowledge which has been dominated by *episteme* since Greek philosophy, and that their reconceptualization of argument not only requires but also could benefit the reconsideration of some key notions developed in traditional epistemology.

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009

4:00 – 6:00 p.m.

Parker House, 105 Sunset, Conference Room

All are welcome.